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ABSTRACT 




William I. Tchakirides 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2020 
Under the Supervision of Professor Amanda I. Seligman 
 
This dissertation uncovers the roots of discriminatory police power in Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
and traces Black-led efforts to make the city’s police bureaucracy more accountable to all citizens. It 
analyzes the politics of police reform in the century spanning the passage of two state laws that 
reconfigured Milwaukee’s law enforcement arrangements. The first (1885) removed City Hall’s 
managerial control over the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD). Corporate elites and social 
reformers fearful of rising working-class power and moral degeneration in the immigrant-industrial 
city lobbied for the statute’s enactment. The second (1984) reversed course, re-empowering non-
police officials after decades of Black-led campaigns for diverse input, representation, and oversight 
within Milwaukee’s white-controlled police bureaucracy. While the 1885 law created a civil service 
commission to regulate public safety hiring free of political machine influence, it also gave exclusive 
accountability to property-holders and shielded department heads from external supervision—
provisions later targeted by activists. A revision (1911) clarified the power of the city’s public safety 
chiefs, granting them indefinite tenure, policymaking authority, and institutional autonomy.  
In turn, the MPD fostered an outwardly exceptional status at the height of policing’s 
“reform era” (1920s-1950s). This apparent exceptionalism, marked by a value-neutral self-image, was 
established around administrative innovations and crime control efficiencies heralded by national 
policing experts. It was a dynamic that broadly served white middle-class and corporate interests, as 
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the MPD’s perceived legitimacy was contingent on biased discretionary practices and surveillance of 
labor militants, political-left radicals, the poor, and, increasingly after World War II, Black migrants 
seeking jobs and freedom. The department’s exalted status was tied to economic growth and 
acculturation programs that criminalized blackness and excused government actions that worsened 
segregation and inequality. Aggressive policing in Black Milwaukee compounded related injustices in 
public and private sectors, reinforcing racist narratives and uneven policy outcomes. With their 
number rising, African Americans confronted mounting instances of unchecked state violence using 
tactics like street-level resistance, civic negotiation, direct action protest, litigation, and federal 
intervention. Black and allied groups challenged a police power whose racist double-standards 
remained a threat irrespective of whether police chiefs employed liberal or reactionary law-and-order 
approaches. “‘Accountable to No One’” argues that the MPD sustained its authority by relying on 
an impervious blend of legal protections, social customs, and repressive policies that narrowed the 
scope of reform proposals intended to limit coercive police power. Racist discretionary practices in 
criminalized Black spaces exacerbated deteriorating economic conditions, unduly harming African 
Americans and justifying fresh cycles of police abuse. The MPD’s state-sanctioned legitimacy—
backed by the city’s white ethnic majority and a compliant criminal-legal system—maintained Black 
Milwaukee’s subordination based on common ideas about policing as a perfectible institution vital to 
democratic societies. This view blinded even the most progressive accountability advocates. Still, the 
movement garnered procedural reforms, despite struggling to improve the outlook of overpoliced 
and underprotected Black citizens, who faced declining public investments in housing, jobs, 
education, and healthcare. Meanwhile, police spending, institutional diversity, and police union 
protections grew, setting up new barriers to accountability. An overall disregard among liberal 
advocates for the economic dimensions of Milwaukee’s policing crisis meant that a recalibrated 
MPD continued to uphold a racial-capitalist system that marginalized Black working-class power. 
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advice, and careful edits, but Amanda made sure to check in on my mental health and wellness as we 
approached the finish line amid dueling 2020 emergencies: a racialized COVID-19 pandemic and 
intensifying protests against endemic police violence. Both crises made it difficult to focus on 
writing. Yet, they also served as urgent reminders of why communicating historical lessons is so 
essential to resolving contemporary problems. Throughout my graduate career, Amanda has 
modeled what a historian should be—public-facing in their scholarship, rigorous in their methods, 
dedicated to their craft, and, above all, human. I cannot thank her enough.  
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and served as brilliant minds to brainstorm ideas with and learn from over the years. I thank them 
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involving a range of political actors. I thank Joe for his insights and always leaving his door open to 
chat. Finally, I am incredibly grateful to Robert Smith, who helped shepherd this project in its early 
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better sense of an unjust world and imagined what it would take to overcome systemic barriers. We 
often did so in collaboration with undergraduate students and stakeholders in UWM’s Cultures and 
Communities program. More personally, Rob and I shared countless conversations about life, 
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politics, and culture as friends. I would not be the person, let alone historian, I am today without his 
mentorship. Thank you, Rob. 
Ultimately, I decided to become a historian of the carceral state after attending the 2012 
Organization of American Historians annual meeting, ironically located in Milwaukee. One 
presentation in particular, “From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime,” featured up-and-
coming scholars in what was then a burgeoning sub-field of the discipline. I attended the panel 
having recently finished Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow (2010) and was interested in mass 
incarceration as a civil rights issue. Khalil Gibran Muhammad, Elizabeth Hinton, Julilly Kohler-
Hausmann, Jessica Neptune, and Heather Ann Thompson wholly upended my impressionistic sense 
of U.S. politics, while also affirming the potency of grassroots activism as a force for collective 
liberation. Ever since, I have met, corresponded with, and, in some cases, presented alongside 
historians whose research has traced the roots of the carceral state, the contours of police power, 
and the often illusive politics of criminal justice reform. There are far too many individuals to name 
in this space, but all have inspired me to do better work as an academic considering the historical 
implications of surveillance, policing, and punishment. 
The focus of “‘Accountable to No One’” has evolved considerably since 2012, transitioning 
from a study on Milwaukee neighborhoods and civilian crime control, to an exploration of African 
American police officers and the legal system, to its current emphasis on the legislative and socio-
political foundations of police power and Black-led struggles for accountability. I started conceiving 
the project around the same time that I began working with an interdisciplinary team of carceral 
studies scholars. Together, we formed the Transforming Justice (TJ) research collective. Our group 
included UW-Milwaukee faculty members Robert Smith, Anne Bonds, Jenna Loyd, Lorraine 
Malcoe, and Jennifer Plevin, as well as fellow graduate assistant Yui Hashimoto. Each of these 
individuals helped me to more clearly envision the spatial, budgetary, and legal dimensions of mass 
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incarceration and racial criminalization, as well as what it meant to do political education and 
generate public-facing scholarship in partnership with people engaged in community-based work. 
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state. We met with Black women activist-intellectuals from organizations like Critical Resistance and 
Project NIA, including Rachel Herzing, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, and Miriame Kaba. They facilitated 
workshops and shared precious knowledge with organizers in our city and vice versa. TJ provided 
me with a lens for grasping the limits of reform, while setting me on an abolitionist path as a 
scholar-activist. It helped shape my doctoral work and gave me a fuller appreciation of what was 
happening on the ground as Milwaukee’s Black Lives Matter movement hastened in 2014 following 
the police shooting death of Dontre Hamilton and the Ferguson uprising. 
Transforming Justice strengthened connections I was making between racialized state 
violence and Black-led resistance in UWM history courses. In addition to Professors Seligman and 
Smith, I want to thank Greg Carter, Dan McClure, and the late Michael Gordon for their valued 
instruction. Professor Gordon offered enthusiastic support whenever our paths crossed outside of 
the classroom. He also introduced me to oral history as a research method. Subsequently, I was able 
to conduct an interview for Michael’s course with Milwaukee activist/educator Howard Fuller, who 
ended up being a significant figure in my dissertation. There are other UWM faculty members I wish 
to highlight: Merry Wiesner-Hanks helped fund several of my appearances at American Historical 
Association conferences. Jasmine Alinder brought me into her public history classroom to talk about 
the digital humanities with students. Aims McGuinness made me more aware of Milwaukee’s rich 
Socialist past. Chia Vang provided an unforgettable opportunity to work as a teaching assistant on 
the “Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam: History and Culture” study abroad course. And, Margo 
Anderson sharpened my public writing skills as an editor on the Encyclopedia of Milwaukee project. 
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“The police department has a reputation as a highly professional force that provides efficient service to the citizenry and 
gets excellent cooperation in return.” 
 - John J. McCarthy, Police Magazine, 1981 
 
“Milwaukee has had her share of a carnival of police brutality blood, as gory as can be found anywhere.”1 
- James Cameron, Founder of America’s Black Holocaust Museum, 1983 
 
 In 1983, America’s Black Holocaust Museum founder and community historian James 
Cameron indignantly challenged the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission (MFPC) in an open 
letter, “How can a people be brought to respect a government that constantly oppresses and exploits 
them?”2 The nation’s only known racial terror lynching survivor was addressing the civic inaction 
that historically greeted police killings of Black people in his adoptive home city. The “oldest police 
commission in the United States” was in the process of determining whether the three officers who 
ended the life of Ernest Lacy would face professional discipline.3 Before his asphyxiation by police, 
 
1 James Cameron, “An Open Letter to the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Regarding the Ernest Lacy 
Complaint,” March 31, 1983, 3, Dr. James Cameron Pamphlet Collection, Milwaukee Public Library, accessed October 
31, 2020, https://content.mpl.org/digital/collection/jcameron/id/520/rec/5. James Cameron was the only known 
survivor of a racial terror lynching in U.S. history. The incident occurred in Marion, Indiana in 1930 after county sheriff 
deputies arrested three young Black men on charges of murdering a white man and sexually assaulting his white 
girlfriend. The spectacle lynching was aided and abetted by local law enforcement. A white lynch mob tortured and 
hanged Cameron’s peers, Tommy Shipp and Abram Smith. Before nearly being lynched himself by the frenzied mob, 
Cameron reported hearing a voice say, “Take this boy back. He had nothing to do with any raping or killing.” The 
“sweet,” “feminine” utterance stood out above the cacophonous din of the lynch mob. Stunned and shaken, Cameron 
was transferred back into the sheriff’s custody. Authorities moved him to a jail thirty miles south of Marion, where he 
awaited a trial. For more on James Cameron’s story, see: James Cameron, A Time of Terror: A Survivor’s Story, rev. ed. 
(Milwaukee: LifeWrites Press, 2016); James H. Madsen, A Lynching in the Heartland: Race and Memory in America (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003); Syreeta McFadden, “What Do You Do after Surviving Your Own Lynching?” 
BuzzFeed News, June 23, 2016, accessed June 8, 2019, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/syreetamcfadden/how-to-
survive-a-lynching. 
2 Cameron, “An Open Letter to the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Regarding the Ernest Lacy Complaint,” 9. 
3 Richard Jerome, Promoting Police Accountability in Milwaukee: Strengthening the Fire and Police Commission (Los Angeles: Police 
Assessment Resource Center, 2006), 1. 
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the 22-year-old Black male was stopped, questioned, and arrested for a rape he did not commit.4 His 
assailants were white Tactical Enforcement Unit officers with pending police brutality complaints.5 
All three had the support of their police chief, the Milwaukee Police Association, and law 
enforcement’s historical “monopoly on legitimate storytelling” at their backs.6 All three had escaped 
prosecution on a confounding technicality after an inquest jury ruled in favor of criminal charges in 
a police brutality case for the first time in the city’s history.7 
Ernest Lacy’s death was the latest in a string of police killings of Black citizens dating back 
to the earliest phase of Milwaukee’s “late Great Migration.”8 Each case saw the exoneration of the 
officers involved and accountability denied to the families of Black victims, save for a handful of 
civil rights settlements that meted out compensatory justice. The city’s virtually all-white police 
bureaucracy had a long history of not only denying due process in response to Black grievances 
against law enforcement, but in denying the very reality of their claims. If Black complainants 
appeared to lack legitimacy, the authority of the police was never questioned. 
 Formal repudiations by Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy were bolstered by the fact that, 
during the first half of the 20th century, influential voices in criminal justice and government agencies 
 
4 The rape victim was a white woman. 
5 Patricia Worth, The Milwaukee Sentinel, “Brutality Complaint Dismissed,” October 26, 1981, Part 1, 1. The MPD’s 
Tactical Enforcement Unit was Milwaukee’s version of “SWAT.” The Los Angeles Police Department’s “Special 
Weapons and Tactics” unit was first established after the 1965 Watts rebellion as the nation’s first police unit dedicated 
to suppressing “potential urban warfare.” Max Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles: Race, Resistance, and the Rise of the LAPD 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 52-53. 
6 On the concept of police holding a “monopoly on legitimate storytelling,” see: Matthew Guariglia, “The Dirty Truth 
about Police Departments? They’re Lying to Us,” NBC News, June 7, 2020, accessed June 25, 2020, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/buffalo-police-pushed-old-man-said-he-tripped-because-police-
ncna1225881. One of the areas that monopoly was most visible was in the Milwaukee County Medical Examiner 
Office’s preliminary determination that Ernest Lacy died of “fright” and not police actions. Bruce Gill and Karen Rothe, 
“Fright May Have Caused Man's Death after His Arrest,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 11, 1981, Part 1, 1. 
7 Milwaukee County District Attorney E. Michael McCann essentially invoked a reverse racism argument when he 
convinced the Circuit Court to dismiss an inquest jury’s historic ruling in favor of criminal charges against the officers 
because a special medical examiner had intentionally balanced the inquest panel with an even number of Black and white 
jurors. That aim for racial fairness—a first on a Milwaukee inquest jury—was warranted given the Medical Examiner 
office’s history of conducting white-controlled hearings that inevitably exonerated the accused officers. See: Chapter Six. 
8 See: Appendix A. On Milwaukee’s “late Great Migration,” see: Paul Geib, “From Mississippi to Milwaukee: A Case 
Study of the Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee, 1940-1970,” The Journal of Negro History 83 (4) (Autumn, 1998): 
229-248. 
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counted the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) as one of America’s most exceptional police 
forces—an assessment based on its “professionalism,” administrative innovation, and crime control 
efficiency.9 Reports consistently treated Milwaukee “as the ideal in police administration.”10 In turn, 
local police bureaucrats typically sided with the presumed validity and legal standing of MPD 
accounts of police-Black citizen encounters, which doubled as official narratives of events in 
moments of racialized police abuse. That compulsory belief in the MPD’s underlying legitimacy 
remained intact even as the department’s strategic approach shifted amid the tumult of “civil rights 
insurgency” and white racial backlash in the 1960s.11 In this period, the agency transitioned from an 
outwardly progressive crime control ethos—what historians have called “liberal law-and-order”—to 
a more reactionary model.12 That the MPD operated objectively, on value-neutral terms, was an 
overriding presumption among white police bureaucrats, especially when Black citizens averred 
police mistreatment. Time and again, the MPD, MFPC, City Hall, and Milwaukee County District 
Attorney’s office met Black airings of police disrespect, neglect, harassment, brutality, detentions, 
and surveillance with incredulity. This frustrated complainants, exacerbated issues of mistrust, and 
undermined accountability for Black victims of police violence. The system’s contempt and reflexive 
backing of accused police officers exceptionalized African Americans as second-class citizens. They 
charged the MPD with violating their constitutional rights during police stops, interrogations, 
 
9 Historian Sidney Harring argues John Janssen was the nation’s first “professional” police chief in the U.S. He cites 
specific qualities, including “some notion of advanced, specialized training; a career protected by civil service, with 
standards set and enforced internally; some measure of autonomy in decision-making; and official adherence to a value-
neutral legal code for guidance in making policy.” The professionalization movement was driven by “nationwide 
attempts to strengthen police institutions in dealing with economic crises.” Sidney Harring, “The Police Institution as a 
Class Question: Milwaukee Socialists and the Police: 1900-1915,” Science & Society 46 (2) (Summer 1982): 197-221. On 
the MPD’s leadership in the “police-community relations movement” of the 1940s, see: Samuel E. Walker, “The Origins 
of the Police-Community Relations Movement: the 1940s,” Criminal Justice History (1) (1980): 225-246. 
10 Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform, 165. 
11 On Milwaukee’s late 1950s and 1960s civil rights movement, see: Patrick D. Jones, The Selma of the North: Civil Rights 
Insurgency in Milwaukee (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
12 Chapter Two explores “liberal law-and-order” approaches to police administration in detail. On this concept, see: 
Naomi Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); 
Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles. 
  4 
arrests, and beatings. However, police routinely received the benefit of the doubt, both within the 
criminal-legal system and across Milwaukee’s white body politic.13 In the aggregate, this dynamic 
strengthened a dual law enforcement system that regularly blunted accountability for the city’s 
growing Black population. It added to a harmful mix of discriminatory conditions in public and 
private sectors ranging from housing to employment, public accommodations to education. 
 Police accountability, for the purposes of this dissertation, refers to citizens holding law 
enforcement agencies responsible for police services rendered (or not rendered), as well as for the 
treatment of people by individual police officers.14 It may seem obvious that racism accounts for 
why police accountability has proven so fleeting for Black Milwaukeeans. Yet, how racist structures 
have actually formed, propagated, evolved, and sustained themselves at the local level presents a 
more complex story. In recent years, historians have detailed the central role that police agencies and 
crime control policies have played in contouring white supremacy and metropolitan politics, while 
also revealing the depths to which anti-Black racism permeates all aspects of organized law 
enforcement in America.15 However, few have looked at policing in Milwaukee, or other mid-tier 
large cities in the Midwest.16 As elsewhere, the system’s inequities, here, are socially and politically 
produced. White MPD officers and administrators, for example, have long relied on racist tropes to 
explain lethal police actions against Black persons, either in custody or in the midst of committing a 
 
13 Today, Milwaukee is a “majority minority” city. Margo Anderson, “Peoples,” Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed June 
29, 2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/peoples. 
14 Samuel E. Walker and Carol A. Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2020), 11. 
15 On the suburban implications of racialized criminal justice policies in post-World War II America, see: Matthew D. 
Lassiter, “Impossible Criminals: The Suburban Imperatives of America’s War on Drugs,” The Journal of American History 
102 (1) (June 2015): 126-140. 
16 Historians who have researched Milwaukee and local law enforcement’s relationship to the preservation of white 
supremacy are few. See: Simon Ezra Balto, “‘Occupied Territory’: Police Repression and Black Resistance in Postwar 
Milwaukee, 1950-1968,” The Journal of African American History 98 (2) (Spring 2013): 229-252; Ian Toller-Clark, “From 
Breweries to the Super-Max: The Making of Carceral Populism in Metropolitan Milwaukee, 1950-2000” in The 
Conservative Heartland: A Political History of the Postwar American Midwest, eds. Jon K. Lauk and Catherine McNicol Stock 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2020); Jones, The Selma of the North; Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The 
Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006). This dissertation defines 
mid-tier large cities as under 1,000,000 people. 
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perceived offense. Since at least the 1930s, the conventional press and police department itself has 
reported on the “crazed” behavior of Black police brutality victims. This has reinforced white 
perceptions of Black criminality and the “violent nature” of African Americans suspected by police 
of committing crimes, thus justifying their use of deadly force.17 In turn, the state’s historically white-
controlled criminal-legal system has backed up police self-defense claims, with county district 
attorneys, judges, and inquest juries excusing officers based on the MPD’s own biased chronologies 
of events. False or incomplete police testimonials have also fed medical examiner determinations, 
which too often omit the actions of officers in favor of obliquely citing health factors.18 These and 
other means of abdicating police liability have left the families of Black police brutality victims 
feeling powerless to secure justice in the wake of profound losses at the feet of the state.19 
 Given the lack of accountability afforded to Black Milwaukeeans—a deficit that applies well 
beyond the scope of tragic police killings—it is not surprising that the MFPC’s termination of the 
officer most directly responsible for Ernest Lacy’s death felt like a historic moment.20 That a 
 
17 This was the word choice of a Milwaukee police officer describing Ernest Lacy’s actions as he testified during the 
MFPC disciplinary hearing. “Officer Who Saw Lacy's Arrest Testifies,” The Milwaukee Journal, April 20 1983. MPD 
officers used similar justifications when relying on lethal force in incidents involving other groups of color and poor 
Milwaukee residents. This logic was not solely the preserve of police encounters with African Americans. 
18 This was initially the case in the police killing of Ernest Lacy, as one example. Gill and Rothe, “Fright May Have 
Caused Man's Death after His Arrest.” 
19 After Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, federal litigation emerged as one of the only recourses available to 
Black citizens harmed by police violence. This meant appealing to the U.S. Justice Department for a criminal 
investigation or filing a civil rights complaint for compensatory justice. However, the burden of proof has remained 
high. Civil rights lawsuits have never resulted in criminal charges being filed against MPD officers accused of brutalizing 
Black citizens. Some cases have ended in legal settlements paid out by the city—tax-payer funded sums that, in the last 
four decades, have reached in the millions of dollars. The families of numerous police brutality victims have pursued this 
option, including the family of Ernest Lacy. Walter Fee and Mark Ward, “Lacy Suit Settled for $600,000,” The Milwaukee 
Journal, September 30, 1985, Part 1, 1. Much of the conversation around garnering accountability in the face of police 
violence today centers on addressing “qualified immunity”—an esoteric legal doctrine that judges have used since the 
1980s to legally shield police officers accused of violating the constitutional rights of citizens. Amir H. Ali and Emily 
Clark, “Qualified Immunity Explained,” The Appeal, June 20, 2020, Accessed June 27, 2020, 
https://theappeal.org/qualified-immunity-explained/. 
20 One notable, if less acknowledged means that police have used historically deny accountability to Black citizens is 
“forum shopping.” Upon making arrests, police used their state-sanctioned authority to locate the “forum,” or site of 
prosecution (state, city, judge), most likely to lead to strict penalties and also not fall back on them in the guise of a civil 
rights lawsuit. The Wisconsin State Committee of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted that MPD officers abused 
this practice when arresting Black men and women on gambling and prostitution offenses on Milwaukee’s near north 
side. Wisconsin Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Police Isolation and Community Needs (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 51-53. 
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grassroots coalition of more than seventy-five organizations demonstrated for the better part of 
three years (1981-1983), demanding police suspensions, prosecutions, and firings, no doubt 
informed their decision.21 The Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy (CJEL) signified the apex of 
what had been a long, Black-led struggle for police accountability extending back to the 1920s. It 
was a local campaign unsurpassed in scale until 2020’s mass demonstrations against police racism.22 
The dismissal of an MPD officer accused of killing a Black resident was a long time coming in 1983. 
The MFPC had just begun acting as “the independent reviewing body” demanded by activists, many 
of who first learned about the commission’s public complaint review function in the mid-1960s.23  
 Remarkably, the MFPC had only heard its first police brutality complaint in 1968, less than a 
year after a Milwaukee police officer gunned down an 18-year-old Black college student accused of 
“firebombing” a paint store during the city’s 1967 uprising.24 Clifford McKissick’s murder occurred 
about a decade after Calvin Sherard and Rev. R. L. Lathan organized Milwaukee’s earliest Black-led 
street demonstration for racial justice following a police killing.25 The 1958 police murder of 22-year-
 
21 More than seventy-five community groups, many of whom had been engaged in police accountability struggles for 
decades, participated in this movement for justice. They demonstrated peacefully in the streets, boycotted shopping 
centers, and sat-in the Milwaukee County District Attorney’s office, all the while demanding some form of legal 
repercussion for the officers who killed Ernest Lacy. See: Laura R. Woliver, From Outrage to Action: The Politics of Grass-
roots Dissent (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1993). 
22 These demonstrations have echoed national and global protests for racial justice. While the police murders of George 
Floyd (Minneapolis, MN), Breonna Taylor (Louisville, KY), Tony McDade (Tallahassee, FL), and other Black men and 
women have broadly inspired this mass movement for racial justice, the killing of a Milwaukee Afro-Latino, Joel 
Acevedo, by an off-duty police officer in April 2020 has sparked local demands for that officer’s criminal prosecution 
and revived grassroots calls to “defund the police.” Genevieve Redsten, “Family of Joel Acevedo Says How Milwaukee 
Is Handling Prosecution of Police Officer Who Put Man in Fatal Chokehold is ‘a Disgrace,’” Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, 
June 24, 2020, Accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/crime/2020/06/24/joel-acevedo-family-
prosecution-of-milwaukee-police-officer-mattioli-weak-george-floyd-attorney/3249589001/; Mary Spicuzza and Alison 
Durr, “Protestors Paint “DEFUND THE POLICE,” on Street outside Milwaukee City Hall,” Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, 
July 1, 2020, accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/01/protesters-paint-
defund-police-outside-milwaukee-city-hall/5360939002/. 
23 “FPC Finally on Side of Citizens,” The Milwaukee Courier, November 4, 1978, 4; Barbara Dembski and Monroe Walker, 
“Filing Complaint Is a Course in Bureaucracy,” February 27, 1975, Part 1, 1, 12; Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission 
Meeting Minutes, May 19, 1966, Box 138, Folder 30, “Police Department, July-September 1966,” Records of Mayor 
Henry W. Maier Administration, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Milwaukee Series 44, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
Archives. 
24 Barbara Dembski and Monroe Walker, “Filing Complaint Is a Course in Bureaucracy,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 
27, 1975, Part 1, 1; “US Probe Asked by Groppi during McKissick Rites,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 7, 1967, Part 2, 
1. 
25 Black middle class leaders, at the behest of City Hall, attempted to call off Sherard and Lathan’s “prayer protest” 
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old Daniel Bell sparked the city’s Black freedom movement against the inequities of “Jim Crow 
North,” as African Americans, white and Latinx allies demanded equality in housing, employment, 
education, public accommodations, the criminal justice system, and other arenas through protest 
campaigns that lasted well into the 1980s.26 
To say that the MFPC moved slowly on adjudicating grievances registered against the MPD 
is an understatement. Between 1972 and 1981, the MFPC decided only 41 of 247 complaints filed 
against the MPD.27 Customarily, the department handled complaints against officers internally.28 
Investigations of alleged misconduct, particularly against Black residents, led to lost statements, 
mutual distrust, and the occasional threat or act of retaliation against accusers. The police complaint 
review system favored officers, propped up racial injustice, and induced fear among Black citizens. 
 None of this was unique to Milwaukee. The city reflected a national crisis of police 
legitimacy that directly affected African Americans. Historians point to several factors in explaining 
the lack of accountability Black men and women have experienced. First, the United States has a 
four hundred year record of treating Black lives as disposable, beginning with America’s brutal 
system of racial slavery.29 Second, U.S. policymakers have consistently isolated Black accounts of 
police mistreatment from “issues of individual rights and the state’s conception of the citizenry.”30 
 
march because, as historian Patrick Jones has written, they “felt uncomfortable with the group's strident rhetoric, 
confrontational style, appeal to the large working class, migrant population, and overall challenge to their status in the 
community.” They feared poor Black dissent in the streets and how it would reflect upon the entire Black community. 
See: Patrick D. Jones, “‘Get Up Off Your Knees!’: Competing Visions of Black Empowerment in Milwaukee during the 
Early Civil Rights Era,” in Neighborhood Rebels: Black Power at the Local Level, edited by Peniel E. Joseph, 45-65 (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) 52-53. 
26 Brian Purnell and Jeanne Theoharis, with Komozi Woodard, eds., The Strange Careers of the Jim Crow North: Segregation 
and Struggle outside of the South (New York: NYU Press, 2019). 
27 Gregory D. Stanford, Barbara Dembski, and James Romenesko, “If You Feel You’ve Been Mistreated…,” The 
Milwaukee Journal, July 26, 1981, Part 1, 10. 
28 Until the MFPC hired the city’s first “Community Relations Specialist” in 1967, the commission relied exclusively on 
the MPD’s own investigators to probe misconduct allegations. 
29 Christopher Lowen Agee, “Crisis and Redemption: The History of American Police Reform since World War II,” 
Journal of Urban History (2017), 2. On the violence and historical legacies of Black enslavement, see: “The 1619 Project,” 
The New York Times Magazine (August 2019), accessed June 9, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html. 
30 Agee, “Crisis and Redemption,” 2. 
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Third, white authorities have cast police racism and violent behavior as either an administrative 
problem or the actions of lone bad actors, not matters intrinsic to policing itself. Finally, police 
reforms, especially those materializing against the backdrop of the post-World War II civil rights 
movement and federal efforts to tamp down urban unrest, have served to expand police authority, 
budgets, militarization, and entanglements in virtually every aspect of public and private life.31 They 
have done so to the detriment of historically “overpoliced and underprotected” communities of 
color, which still face an inordinate share of invasive, costly, and destructive police attention.32 
 To that end, liberal Democrats have been as guilty as the most conservative Republicans in 
fomenting America’s policing crisis and fabricating the nation’s carceral state.33 Since the 1960s, 
bipartisan federal reforms have enlarged police authority, amplifying violence in minoritized urban 
spaces. Police reform has done little to address racist police discretion and its unchecked function in 
BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, People of Color) communities reliably starved of good-paying jobs, 
economic resources, adequate healthcare, equitable schooling, and protection from crime.34 Thus, 
many observers on the progressive-left hold that the state has never appropriately answered the 
racialized police violence that has long ravaged urban neighborhoods alongside the interpersonal 
crime resulting from under-addressed poverty, uneven resource allocation, and neoliberal budget 
 
31 Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Murakawa, The First Civil Right; Steve M. Gillon, Separate and Unequal: The Kerner 
Commission and the Unraveling of American Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 2018). 
32 Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118. 
33 The liberal Democratic administration of Lyndon Johnson, for example, created the Office of Law Enforcement 
Assistance in 1965 after the Watts Uprising. This initiated processes of federal investment in local criminal justice 
planning as part of the administration’s War on Poverty and America’s subsequent War on Crime. That platform 
advanced procedural reforms that further legitimized police power and strengthened police capacities to answer social 
ills, temper Black dissent, and crack down on “disorder” erupting in racially segregated, under-resourced, and 
disproportionately neglected urban spaces. See: Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime; Murakawa, The First 
Civil Right. 
34 Historically, police officers have held the non-binding latitude to decide among a range of actions, such as issuing a 
warning, writing a ticket, or making an arrest, when policing these low-level offenses. This police “discretion” was not 
widely recognized before the 1960s. Society merely viewed the police as serving a “ministerial” function, enforcing laws 
according to the ordinances written by legislative bodies. Larry E. Sullivan and Mari Simonetti Rosen, eds., “Police 
Discretion,” Encyclopedia of Law Enforcement, Volume 3 (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005), 337. 
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austerity. Rather, expanded police power has reinforced Black peoples’ supposed criminality and 
intractability. Such “narratives of racial difference” continue to undergird denials of police 
accountability today, if in a more racially “colorblind,” less overt fashion.35 
 Historical explanations for the dearth of police accountability experienced by Black citizens 
remain incomplete. For one, they have yet to account for temporal and regional variations in how 
powerful white citizens, police agencies, and state actors have collaborated to manufacture—
through law and custom—the fundamentally racist ideas that support structures of police legitimacy. 
These ideas have served to undercut official liability for those undergoing racialized police 
mistreatment. “‘Accountable to No One’” helps fill that void. It tracks how the Milwaukee Police 
Department has made and remade its durable authority and perceived legitimacy, substantively and 
symbolically, over the course of a century. This project does so in service of better understanding 
why police accountability has proven so elusive for Black victims of police violence and allied 
citizens championing freedom from police repression in one Midwestern city.  
As such, it also traces grassroots efforts to secure justice for Black men and women for 
whom law enforcement has violated their rights and to redefine the terms of police power so that it 
better serves democratic ends. As recent episodes of racialized police violence and organizational 
calls to defund the police in 2020 suggest, reform-minded approaches to transforming Milwaukee’s 
police bureaucracy have never curbed police racism, even as Black representation, input, and 
oversight on the police force has increased. A major reason why is the power that narratives of 
police legitimacy hold in the public imagination and the persistent belief that, even among many 
police brutality victims and accountability activists, law enforcement is perfectible as an institution. 
 
35 Jacqueline Jones, A Dreadful Deceit: The Myth of Race from the Colonial Era to Obama’s America (New York: Basic Books, 
2013), xi. Equal Justice Initiative founder Bryan Stevenson often refers to the “narrative of racial difference” that 
emerged from racial slavery in America. See: Equal Justice Initiative, “Segregation in America,” accessed June 20, 2020, 
https://segregationinamerica.eji.org/report/. On racial colorblindness, see: Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists: 
Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America, 5th ed. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017). 
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Through “procedural” reforms, most assume, policing can work effectively for all people.36 This 
project documents how liberal reforms around police discrimination and accountability have served 
to expand so-called “legitimate” police power as a means of remedying deep social and economic 
inequities. In truth, those inequities are reproduced by an increasingly unfettered capitalist system 
well-defended by law enforcement agencies like the Milwaukee Police Department. 
 
Project Overview  
 This dissertation holds that the lack of accountability afforded to Black citizens exposed to 
police violence in Milwaukee is rooted in Progressive Era developments that go back as far as the 
1880s. Then, African Americans in the city numbered just three to four hundred residents.37 State 
laws passed in the interest of landed professional and business elites to stabilize public safety and 
ensure the MPD’s outward neutrality lie at the heart of Milwaukee’s lax accountability structures and 
the department’s racially discriminatory function. These reform statutes, in addition to outlining the 
parameters of the MPD’s “professionalization,” affirmed law enforcement’s service at the behest of 
the industrial-capitalist order.38 Two state measures passed in 1885 and 1911, respectively, signified 
patrician responses to a series of social, economic, and political crises. These dilemmas threatened to 
disrupt Milwaukee’s traditional hierarchies of class, culture, and power.39 Economic recessions, 
 
36 As sociologist Alex Vitale has written, “procedural justice” is problematic because it falsely “assumes that the police 
are neutrally enforcing a set of laws that are automatically beneficial to everyone.” Alex S. Vitale, “The Answer to Police 
Violence is Not ‘Reform.’ It’s Defunding. Here’s Why,” The Guardian, May 31, 2020, July 6, 2020, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/31/the-answer-to-police-violence-is-not-reform-its-
defunding-heres-why. 
37 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by 
Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in The United States,” Population Division, 
Working Paper No. 76, U.S. Census Bureau, February 2005, 113. 
38 Police professionalization is generally credited to the reforms implemented by August Vollmer, who led the Berkeley 
Police Department between 1905 and 1932. Among Vollmer’s reforms were putting officers on bicycles, motorcycles, 
and cars; creating the first police school, advancing crime laboratories; using polygraph machines; seeking college-
educated recruits “specially trained for fighting crime”; and offering competitive salaries and pensions. Sarah A. Seo, 
Policing the Open Road: How Cars Transformed American Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 66-68. 
39 The Wisconsin policing statutes amended Milwaukee’s City Charter. Milwaukee was the only municipality in the state 
whose charter, rather than the Wisconsin legislature, determined police regulations. Matthew J. Flynn, “Police 
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strikes, political machine corruption, perceived moral decay, and police-involved clashes among 
immigrant laborers and capitalist defenders encouraged white Progressive Era reformers to fortify 
the MPD. Through the state legislature, the city’s middle-class and corporate establishment solidified 
the department’s legitimacy and social control function under the authority of an independent police 
chief.40 They did so in the face of ascendant populist and socialist workers parties. These parties 
aimed to gain leverage over a police regime that violently broke strikes, criminalized laborers, and 
mishandled immigrants, especially those who displayed progressive-left political views. Reform was 
tied to the re-assertion of a capitalistic, growth-oriented police power, which operated to the 
detriment of poor and toiling people.41 The MPD was never “a value-free institution,” or one that 
“evolved naturally from common social problems.”42 
 The first Progressive Era statute (1885) created a four-member public safety board vested to 
hire police and fire chiefs, as well as appoint, promote, and discipline personnel.43 The law removed 
the city’s police and fire departments from Milwaukee’s ward-based spoils system, installed new 
employment safeguards, and established lifetime tenure for public safety chiefs, whom the MFPC 
could only remove “for cause.”44 The commission was the first civil service board of its kind in the 
country. However, one of its legacies would be the illusion of impartiality, as the part-time mayor-
 
Accountability in Wisconsin,” Wisconsin Law Review 1131 (1974), 1133. 
40 Sidney Harring notes that police in the late 19th century supported, along with other municipal institutions, “the 
reproduction of capital” in cities. Police departments provided “important social control and welfare services and 
generally supervised the quality of urban social behavior.” Harring, “The Police Institution as a Class Question,” 199. 
41 Elite calls to professionalize the MPD were rooted in “respectable” citizens’ anti-Labor sentiment. Police reform in 
Milwaukee originated in “the class struggle and the bourgeoisie’s need to maintain social order.” Harring, “The Police 
Institution as a Class Question,” 220. 
42 Harring, “The Police Institution as a Class Question,” 219. 
43 Chapter 378, “Laws of Wisconsin,” April 14, 1885, 1251-1255. This dissertation’s framing of the “Progressive Era” 
relies on a longer historical scope. On the periodization of the “long Progressive Era,” see Robert D. Johnston, “The 
Possibilities of Politics: Democracy in America, 1877 to 1917,” in American History Now, Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, 
eds. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), 96-124. 
44 Previously, incoming mayoral administrations would fire the existing police chief and all personnel, with the intent of 
bringing in politically loyal members who would help raise money for the machine by collecting graft at the ward level. 
See: Sidney L. Harring, Policing a Class Society: The Experience of American Cities, 1865-1915, 2nd ed. (New York: Haymarket 
Books, 2017). 
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appointed body rubber-stamped the prerogatives of Milwaukee public safety chiefs, while holding 
few trials on citizen complaints. The 1885 law also expanded the size of the MPD by nearly fifty 
percent and outlined its organization and operating procedures. 
In 1911, a statutory revision further clarified the power of fire and police chiefs, authorizing 
them to “regulate” and “prescribe rules” for their departments, “control all books, records, 
machines” and other property.45 Milwaukee’s Common Council approved annual budgets. Yet 
elected officials rarely crossed police chiefs, who came to wield immense sway among white ethnic 
voters. The 1911 law provided that only “reputable freeholders,” or property owners, could register 
police complaints with the MFPC.46 The right to accountability was thus tied to property, i.e. a 
complainant’s class status. This undermined the ability of poor and low-income residents to seek 
redress in response to police misconduct—an arrangement that lasted until Black civil rights activists 
challenged the freeholder clause in the late 1960s. Finally, the 1911 statute expanded the MFPC 
from four to five members.47 In sum, the legislature entrusted lifetime-appointed public safety chiefs 
to devise strategies, regulations, and enforcement procedures. They did so at the general behest of 
social and economic elites, free of outside interference or any serious legal threat from the people 
receiving an inordinate share of police attention. Over the course of the 20th century, that 
increasingly meant poor and low-income Black and Latinx migrants and their descendants.48 
 With its legitimacy established, the MPD emerged as an early pioneer in the national police 
professionalization movement of the early-to-mid-20th century. Chapter One explores how it 
 
45 “Chapter 586,” Wisconsin Session Laws, 1911,” July 8, 1911, 758-760. This became a point of contention in later 
decades when federal courts and investigators attempted to review police files. 
46 The MFPC was also empowered to hear complaints from police and fire personnel. “Chapter 586,” 754. 
47 This expansion mattered for Milwaukee’s Socialist Party during its brief period of full control over city government in 
1910-1911. Mayor Emil Seidel was able to add two Socialist Party members to the MFPC, given it more control over 
police disciplinary actions. Harring, “Police as a Class Question,” 217. 
48 The bulk of Latinx residents in Milwaukee are of Mexican and Puerto Rican descent. Joseph A. Rodriguez and Walter 
Sava, Latinos in Milwaukee (Chicago: Arcadia Publishing, 2006); Sergio González, Mexicans in Wisconsin (Madison: 
Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2017). 
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cultivated and sustained an elite reputation. The department’s independent status so politically-
insulated its chiefs that only six served from 1888 to 1984. Their immunity enabled them to set an 
internal culture and administration that emphasized strict regimentation and institutional autonomy. 
These factors in turn engendered insularity and encouraged an “us-against-them” mentality during 
street-level enforcement.49 Police chiefs set the MPD’s strategic direction and reform agenda, which 
emphasized order maintenance and racial and class containment in ways that bolstered the interests 
of powerful white business, middle-class professional, and propertied elites. A narrative of policing 
exceptionalism coalesced around the MPD’s innovative reform practices and inferred crime control 
efficiency. Most notably, the federal Wickersham Commission singled out Milwaukee in 1931 as “a 
city free from crime…where the criminal is speedily detected, arrested, and promptly tried and sent 
on his way to serve time.”50 The father of police professionalism, Berkeley Police Chief August 
Vollmer, even cited the MPD’s “strong in-house training program” in the Wickersham Commission 
report. During World War II, the department became one of the first to instruct officers on 
addressing “minority problems” and produced a guide on “race and human relations.”51 
The MPD’s exceptionalism narrative evolved in policing’s “reform era.” In Milwaukee, this 
period was bookended by the legislature’s passage of the above statutes and the appointment of the 
MPD’s final “chief for life,” Harold Breier.52 The narrative elevated the stature of the city’s police 
 
49 Before African Americans emerged as a primary target for the MPD after World War II, it was working-class white 
European-American radicals and socialists who represented the MPD’s most discernible antagonists. See: Harring, 
Policing a Class Society. 
50 “Wickersham Report on Police,” The American Journal of Police Science 2 (4) (July-August, 1931), 339. 
51 Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform, 135; Joseph T. Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems,” 1, “Police 
Brutality General, 1954-1955,” Papers of the NAACP, Part 18, Special Subjects, 1940-1955, Series C: General Office 
Files: Justice Department-White Supremacy; The Milwaukee Police Department, “A Guide to Understanding Race and 
Human Relations,” 1952, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
52 Historian Robert Fogelson identified two major waves of police reform in America. The first lasted from about 1890 
to 1930 and the second from 1940 to 1970. See: Robert M. Fogelson, Big City Police (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1977). Chapters One and Two explore Milwaukee’s police reform era in depth. The city’s narrative of policing 
exceptionalism impacted other groups of color seeking accountability, including Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and 
Native Americans. However, this project focuses on African American experiences. They composed the largest racial 
minority population in Milwaukee and a disproportionate share of police brutality cases. Black citizens also took a lead 
role in challenging police power in the 20th century. Still, they hardly engaged in this struggle alone. As much as possible, 
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chiefs, conferring political influence and solidifying a common sense about the department’s 
assumed value-neutral authority. In turn, Milwaukee’s white ethnic majority placed a premium on 
the MPD’s celebrated reputation. Policing and the politics of crime control nourished local 
constructions of white racial identity, buttressing the MPD’s legally formulated professionalism.53 
 In the Depression-era 1930s, Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism crystallized in 
tandem with and fed off of hardening white racism. As the city’s Black industrial proletariat took 
shape, so too did the prejudices of white workers, homeowners, parents, and shopkeepers. White 
racial antagonism manifested in labor, schoolyard, and neighborhood disputes, and among white 
patrolmen called on to police status offenses in public spaces inhabited by both low-income and 
middle-class Black residents. However, it was during World War II that confrontations around social 
demographic change, the allocation of taxpayer resources, juvenile delinquency, and crime 
transitioned into racially demarcated, police-mediated struggles. In this period and after, the MPD’s 
exceptionalized leadership, service, and innovation converged with a politically contested, highly 
racialized politics of metropolitan “growth.”54  
Chapter Two focuses on this progression. Urban (re)development, population management, 
and police reform became entangled in the 1940s and 1950s, as Milwaukee experienced a “late Great 
Migration” of southern Black workers and families.55 In response to increasing Black movement, 
white civic leaders called on the MPD, as well as trusted Black middle-class elites, to enforce the 
city’s racial, class, and gender boundaries and temper opportunities for social disorder. Police 
 
“‘Accountable to No One’” attempts to cite where racial and class unity was present in the movement for police 
accountability. On Harold Breier and his life, career, and influence, see: Ronald H. Snyder, “Chief for Life: Harold Breier 
and His Era” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2002). 
53 On how policing shaped processes of white identity construction in the postwar city, see: Timothy J. Lombardo, Blue 
Collar Conservatism: Frank Rizzo’s Philadelphia and Populist Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018). 
54 Eric Fure-Slocum, Contesting the Postwar City: Working-Class and Growth Politics in 1940s Milwaukee (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). On the MPD’s “exemplary,” albeit mythologized, service reputation, see: George Kelling, Policing 
in Milwaukee: A Strategic History (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2015). 
55 Geib, “From Mississippi to Milwaukee.” 
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“boundary work” was self-reinforcing and integral to sustaining the MPD’s narrative of policing 
exceptionalism.56 It supplied the human assets required for police administrators to test out crime 
control initiatives, further justifying policing’s existence, as well as the racially imbued data needed to 
project effective order maintenance in and around Milwaukee’s segregated “Inner Core.”57 
Enforcing racial borders through aggressive discretionary policing not only enabled the MPD to 
manufacture consent, boost its image, and reinforce dominant narratives about Black criminality, but 
it also informed how law enforcement navigated issues of internal accountability. The more that 
police safeguarded the traditional order through formal policies and informal discretionary practices, 
the more socially isolated, institutionally inviolable, and inward-facing the department became. 
 African American population growth, hostile white resistance to Black urbanization, and 
political struggles over access and resources limned Milwaukee’s shifting postwar terrain. So too did 
the placations of white liberals and established Black professionals. The latter were concerned about 
what expanded Black poor and working-class migration meant for their tenuous position vis-a-vis 
the white power structure. Liberals responded to what W. E. B. Dubois called “the problem of the 
color line” by advocating acculturation to a white-prescribed milieu.58 And they did so in relation to 
a budding “conservative counterrevolution.”59 Like postwar liberalism, Cold War geo-political, 
social, and economic market-based imperatives shaped metropolitan conservatism. Racial 
conservatives and liberals alike blamed low-income Black residents for urban problems, largely 
 
56 As Stuart Schrader argues, police “boundary work” served as “a key part of how police approached themselves, 
orienting officers’ accountability mainly to professional standards rather than to broader social forces, actors, and 
institutions.” Stuart Schrader, “To Protect and Serve Themselves: Police in US Politics Since the 1960s,” Public Culture 31 
(3) (September 2019), 604. 
57 Milwaukee (Wis.). Mayor's Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City, Mayor’s Study 
Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City, Final Report to the Honorable Frank P. Zeidler, Mayor, City of 
Milwaukee (Milwaukee: The Committee, 1960). 
58 W.E.B. Dubois defined the “problem of the Twentieth Century” as the “problem of the color line.” W.E.B. Dubois, 
The Souls of Black Folk (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and Co., 1903), vii, 3. 
59 Tula A. Connell, Conservative Counterrevolution: Challenging Liberalism in 1950s Milwaukee (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2016). 
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abdicating responsibility for resolving inequality. The former tended to cite inherent traits in 
explaining perceived Black inferiority, while the latter condemned cultural behaviors that they 
thought resulted from segregation. Neither reckoned with the role that white supremacy played in 
maintaining racial hierarchy. 
 In this context, a triangular struggle for order arose among Black professionals, poorer Black 
newcomers, and white people whose politics pivoted around racist notions of Black disorder.60 Most 
established Black leaders focused on making incremental civil rights gains through communal self-
help and negotiations with Milwaukee’s white-controlled political system. This brand of activism 
entailed preserving order on the city’s criminalized near north side and projecting Black 
“respectability,” which meant convincing recent African American arrivals of the MPD’s legitimacy. 
Still, Black professionals knew the department to be an unfair agent of social control. A quick check 
on Milwaukee’s crime ledgers showed that police arrested African Americans for non-violent status 
offenses, like “vagrancy,” “drunkenness,” and “prostitution,” at an uneven rate. Still, Black 
professionals preached accommodation to southern migrants, who were unduly vulnerable to police 
violence based on their racial and class status and where they lived. Racial liberals believed poor and 
working-class Black people could transcend their subordinate position in the social order through 
hard work and lawfulness. As rampant inequality and urban liberalism’s shortcomings grew more 
pronounced in the late 1950s and 1960s, some Black professionals began shifting away from appeals 
to individual biases and white “hearts and minds.”61 Still, their hesitancy to challenge the racist 
designs at the core of the city’s postwar assimilation efforts helped advance the MPD’s narrative of 
policing exceptionalism, further calcifying police assertions of legitimacy. 
 
60 On the triangular struggle, see: Jack Dougherty, More than One Struggle: The Evolution of Black School Reform in Milwaukee 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 52-57. 
61 On liberals combatting discrimination by appealing to white hearts and minds in this period, see: Gunnar Myrdal, An 
American Dilemma, Volume 1: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper, 1944), 110. 
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 Indeed, the MPD played an important role in managing Milwaukee’s postwar “cultural 
adjustment” program through an emergent “liberal law-and-order” ethos.62 This approach 
simultaneously framed poor and working-class Black migrants as harbingers of disorder and the 
police as susceptible to racial bias. But it also positioned law enforcement as capable of redemption 
through “human relations” training and other procedural reforms. Police chiefs enacted policies 
masked by a colorblind language of value neutrality. Yet, their directives were predicated on 
tempering Black political dissent and quashing opportunities for social unrest. Meanwhile, the 
MPD’s autonomy and prodigiously white composition ensured that officers would continue to 
police as they saw fit. Internal accountability was the prerogative of the police chief and their 
subordinates. During this period, Black demands for fair employment and housing conjured violent 
white responses and police riots in cities. White Milwaukee parents, property owners, and 
powerbrokers all feared racial violence in their city and the potential for heightened Black demands 
for justice. Police leaders joined in the “race relations” discourse. Discussions focused on promoting 
tolerance and Black self-sufficiency (on white terms), not on ending institutional racism and better 
distributing economic resources and equal access to jobs, education, and housing. 
The MPD’s Youth Aid Bureau was a shining example of the liberal law-and-order approach, 
which updated the MPD’s exceptionalism narrative for the postwar period. The bureau’s goal was to 
increase contacts between the police and potentially “delinquent” juveniles—seemingly disruptive 
Black and Latinx teenagers, in particular. Marketed as part of a wider human relations agenda, the 
bureau helped broaden the MPD’s institutional reach and surveillance capacities.63 It established 
early connections between the police, schools, and social service agencies. Black youth saw closer 
 
62 See: Murakawa, The First Civil Right. 
63 Theretofore, the MPD’s surveillance capacities were best exemplified by the department’s labor-infiltrating and 
repressive “Red Squad.” S. Ani Mukherji, “Reds among the Sewer Socialists and McCarthyites: The Communist Party in 
Milwaukee,” American Communist History 16 (3-4) (2017), 113. 
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police scrutiny and experienced more arrests than their white peers, especially those who socialized 
in what middle-class social reformers saw as morally dubious, interracial settings with white women. 
 Upsurges in racialized police violence corresponded with rising inequality in housing, 
employment, and education. Postwar Black population growth coincided with violent forms of 
white resistance to social demographic change. When not committing acts of terror against African 
American families trying to buy homes beyond the near north side, exploiting Black homeowners 
and renters through nefarious real estate and lending practices, or engaging in workplace 
intimidation when Black laborers sought union memberships, white Milwaukeeans suburbanized as a 
means of social distancing from African Americans. Thousands of upwardly mobile white families 
relocated outside of the city in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, taking their tax dollars with them.64 This 
created new fiscal emergencies for Milwaukee officials, who had historically balanced the city’s 
budget. Corporations began to move too, although Milwaukee’s manufacturing base remained 
sizable well into the 1980s.65 White out-migrants claimed a desire for more space, better-funded 
schools, and lower taxes, but it was the physical separation from perceived urban ills and their 
proximity to criminalized Black residents that drove the exodus.  
The racial politics of postwar urban housing policies contributed to “white flight.”66 
Outwardly intended to improve the lives of poor and working-class people of all races struggling to 
rent and buy homes amid a postwar housing shortage, “urban renewal” and public housing 
construction programs exacerbated racial tensions, increased rates of Black poverty, and further 
 
64 On suburbanization in Milwaukee, see: John M. McCarthy, Making Milwaukee Mightier: Planning and the Politics of Growth, 
1910-1960 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009); Mark Edward Braun, “Suburbanization,” The Encyclopedia 
of Milwaukee, accessed June 30, 2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/suburbanization/. 
65 This also ensured that Milwaukee’s small Black industrial proletariat endured in an era of marked deindustrialization 
and urban decline. 
66 “White flight” from cities had an even greater impact than redistributing population and remaking municipal tax 
structures. It shaped conservative political ideologies, hostility towards the federal government, and people’s faith in free 
enterprise. See: Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007). 
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stigmatized low-income families of color. Racism structured the city’s growth-oriented 
redevelopment projects, which translated into uneven resource allocation and false promises of 
adequate housing for Black families. In turn, the threat of crime became a more pressing issue. 
Police and media reports affirmed Black migrant lives as disposable and dangerous in the public 
imagination, while simultaneously de-criminalizing illicit white behavior. Milwaukee’s “urban crisis” 
was never framed as one of white behavioral maladjustment.67 
 Black criminalization led to racialized police policies of “close surveillance” and stop, 
question, and search tactics that never fully abated.68 Sensationalized violent crimes involving Black 
suspects raised public anxieties around discriminatory sweeps. Acts of police brutality accompanied 
racial profiling, inspiring mistrust. Black migrants and professionals both felt “overpoliced and 
underprotected in their lives and property.”69 Public order enforcement on the near north side, 
especially of gamblers, drinkers, drug addicts, sex workers, party-goers, and idle persons pushed out 
onto street corners by overcrowding and under-employment, guaranteed a growing catalog of Black 
entry into the criminal justice system. Many Black persons who came into contact with the MPD 
were young. In 1970, as high as sixty-three percent of the city’s African American population was 
under 21 years old.70 Police authorized vice in the city’s Black Sixth Ward, while continuing to crack 
down on presumably amoral and illicit behavior that violated middle-class sensibilities. Police-Black 
 
67 Using historian Thomas Sugrue’s framing, the “urban crisis” refers to the local impact of several economic, racial, and 
political shifts that occurred in the mid-20th century U.S. The urban crisis was a consequence of “two of the most 
important, interrelated, and unresolved problems in American history: that capitalism generates economic inequality and 
that African Americans have disproportionately borne the brunt of that inequality.” Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the 
Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5. 
68 As Simon Balto observed in research on Milwaukee and Chicago, such racialized policing tactics predated the 1960s 
and subsequent decades. See: Balto, “Occupied Territory”; Simon Balto, Occupied Territory: Policing Black Chicago from Red 
Summer to Black Power (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2019). 
69 Race superseded class, as Milwaukee’s white-controlled law enforcement system often refused to observe intra-racial 
class distinctions, much to the chagrin of Black professionals lumped in with the city’s “criminal element.” Trotter, Black 
Milwaukee, 118. “Repression and negligence” were the “constitutive features” of the social contract between Milwaukee’s 
whitewashed police force and its Black population. Balto, “Occupied Territory,” 232. 
70 This figure is based on the 1970 census. Carl Hamm, “Milwaukee Police Department: Civil Service and Pension Case 
Study,” Police Foundation, August 15, 1971, 4, Box 1, Folder 16, “Greater Milwaukee Conference on Religion and 
Urban Affairs, Police Brutality, 1971, 1983-1984,” Joan McManus Papers, 1970-2003, UWM Manuscript Collection 267. 
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citizen altercations occasionally resulted in violence, even death. As such, the “contradictory 
character” of policing in “Bronzeville” revealed the narrative of policing exceptionalism’s mythic 
dimensions and racist double standards.71 Phrases like “police professionalism” and “community 
relations” signified pointless euphemisms for coercive police practices of racial control. 
 Resistance to the MPD’s presumed legitimacy took competing forms. Struggles for police 
accountability gained intensity as racialized police violence became more commonplace. Black youth 
confronted white patrolmen in crowd control situations, some harnessing their collective power to 
free peers apprehended by the police.72 On the other end of the spectrum, umbrella coalitions led by 
middle-class professionals prioritized police-Black community relations improvements and 
negotiated for procedural change with receptive white City Hall allies. For example, around 1957, 
the Milwaukee Urban League’s Lapham-Garfield Neighborhood Association began seeking ways to 
mitigate crime and police oppression by working with liberal city officials to more responsibly police 
the Sixth Ward’s mix of rental, public housing, and homeowner occupied properties.  
Inter-generational, regional, and class conflicts occasionally divided younger, more militant 
Black working-class leaders from the community’s old-guard. The 1958 police murder of Daniel Bell 
was a major turning point in the city’s Black-led struggle for police accountability.73 Younger 
working-class activists championed direct action protest and making visible demands for justice in 
response to the Louisiana migrant’s death; more conservative professionals advocated a go-slow 
approach. The latter continued to back the acculturation of southern migrants unfamiliar with Jim 
Crow North’s social expectations. Organizational leaders called for more Black police recruitment as 
a means of resolving police abuse and neglect, as the MPD employed few African American officers. 
 
71 Bronzeville was the self-determined, culturally resilient world African Americans carved out for themselves on the 
near north side within Milwaukee’s white supremacist confines. Robert S. Smith, “African Americans,” Encyclopedia of 
Milwaukee, accessed May 28, 2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/african-americans/. 
72 See: Balto, “‘Occupied Territory.’” 
73 See: Jones, The Selma of the North. 
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While racial accomodationists temporarily won the battle, their pacifying solutions proved untenable 
by the 1960s. As Milwaukee’s postwar civil rights insurgency took shape, the city’s Black population 
soared, and white racism, backed up by police violence, intensified. 
 Addressing police brutality took center stage in the mid-1960s, as a younger generation of 
activists refused to accept police mistreatment and the assumed cultural deficiencies used to justify 
Milwaukee’s racist acculturation program. Organizations like the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality 
Committee (CAPBC), the focal point of Chapter Three, challenged the inconsistencies of the MPD’s 
exceptionalism narrative. They advocated reform proposals in response to racialized police violence 
and called for direct action when demands went unmet by police bureaucrats. While the group fell 
into the common habit of framing abusive officers as individual “bad apples” in need of discipline, 
rather than indicators of a wider systemic problem, they brought police brutality to the forefront of 
the city’s burgeoning civil rights movement. The CAPBC took Black police misconduct complaints 
to white fire and police commissioners, who predictably upheld the status quo by pointing to the 
MPD’s exemplary reputation. In navigating Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy, the CAPBC initiated a 
process of discovery that divulged the legal underpinnings of police power and the extent to which 
the MFPC was capable of reviewing police brutality cases and meting out justice on acceptable 
terms. The group also learned about the 1911 “freeholder” clause that prevented most Black 
residents from filing police complaints and initiated efforts to revise the board’s review process.74 
When the CAPBC brought case descriptions from Black police brutality victims before the 
commission, they saw firsthand how the MFPC reflexively shored up police legitimacy and chilled 
dissent through bureaucratic inertia. As the commission denied the reality of Black police brutality 
grievances in 1964, two families filed the city’s first federal police brutality lawsuits. 
 
74 Milwaukee’s only Black alderperson, Vel Phillips, worked towards revising the City Charter to allow qualified 
“electors” to file grievances with the MFPC in 1968. 
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 That police violence became a civil rights issue in postwar Milwaukee was contingent on 
national developments—namely, the “rights revolution” occurring in the U.S. criminal-legal system, 
the legislative gains of the Black freedom struggle, and a series of uprisings against police violence 
and white supremacy in segregated Black enclaves like Harlem, North Philadelphia, and Watts.75 
Such events facilitated political openings for Black police accountability advocates in Milwaukee to 
articulate reform demands, lest the city devolve into its own episode of civil violence. With racial 
inequities enduring after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act, it 
became more apparent to young Black activists and movement veterans alike that non-violent civil 
disobedience alone would not mitigate the essential disposability of Black life. Greater access and 
opportunities to participate in a structurally unfair, if nominally colorblind society were not enough 
to address the harmful legacies of Black enslavement, labor conscription, terrorization, political 
disfranchisement, wealth extraction, and communal plundering.76 
 Even still, Milwaukee’s political system moved slowly to address racism. Some Black 
organizational leaders wondered if their city would be the next to burn. Most held out hope for civic 
negotiation and peaceful protests. Meanwhile, whiteness and policing grew more closely linked in 
the civil rights era. White neighborhood groups, citizen leagues, and even police wives organized 
counter-protests and letter writing campaigns that revealed deep-seated anger over Black calls for 
reform. They defended the MPD and its chief, Harold Breier, using racist language to describe what 
they saw as unruly invaders making false claims about their admirable police force. They also offered 
flimsy pronouncements of white crime victimization. White grassroots advocacy for the MPD 
 
75 Samuel E. Walker, The Rights Revolution: Rights and Community in Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998); Peter B. Levy, The Great Uprising: Race Riots in Urban America during the 1960s (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018). 
76 “Racial capitalism” refers to the global economic order built on racial slavery, violence, imperialism, and genocide. See: 
Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, rev. ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000), 1-3; Robin D.G. Kelley, “Introduction,” in Race, Capitalism, Justice, Walter Johnson and Robin 
D.G. Kelley, eds., Boston Review, Forum 1 (2017), 7-8. 
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reinforced long-standing ideas about police legitimacy and the department’s exceptionalism, while 
undermining the city’s Black-led struggle for police accountability. No white elected officials were 
willing to put their political careers on the line to champion a racially charged issue that most white 
constituents rejected. The MFPC acted as a firewall to protect police power. Its members were 
directly connected to a white south side political organization that backed the police chief and 
sympathetic political candidates, including Mayor Henry Maier and most of the Common Council.77 
 Police brutality—name-calling, harassment, physical abuse, and killings—added to a 
constellation of discriminatory policies and practices that delineated Black life on Milwaukee’s north 
side. Unheeded Black frustrations with abusive officers, combined with the area’s squalid living 
conditions, eventually led to civil unrest in Summer 1967. Chapter Four traces that unrest and its 
aftermath. Milwaukee police bureaucrats worked to fortify police power without actually attending 
to law enforcement’s role in stimulating the urban crisis and ignoring the pleas of Black 
accountability activists. The violence snowballed from a fairly routine incident of police harassment 
and intimidation against Black youth after a social event. Rather than force a productive moment of 
racial reckoning, the multi-day “civil disturbance” encouraged police and city officials to double-
down on harsh, invasive tactics against poor and working-class Black citizens on the near north side. 
The autocratic Chief Breier took a reactionary law-and-order stance, energetically suppressing any 
apparent Black dissent and various modes of political and civil rights activism on the left. Coupled 
with Mayor Maier’s decision to impose a spatially (racially) restrictive curfew and call in the state 
National Guard, police easily suppressed a comparatively minor “long hot summer” rebellion. 
 Maier and Breier emerged as folk heroes to fearful white residents across the metropolitan 
area. Firm in their belief that civil violence required a forceful response, they rejected the findings of 
 
77 The “south side” section of Milwaukee was the city’s primary seat of white supremacist power and reaction. Jones, The 
Selma of the North, 181-185. 
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the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in 1968. That federal committee, appointed 
by the liberal Johnson administration following the eruption of hundreds of urban uprisings, named 
white racism and systemic discrimination as root causes of civil violence, in addition to “subversive” 
and “anti-American” Black Power militancy.78 Yet, the administration felt the political pressure of 
looking tough on crime. It shelved most of the commission’s proposals and moved forward on 
passing a bipartisan Safe Streets Act in 1968 that introduced huge federal expenditures and 
investments in law enforcement, police militarization and “community relations” projects meant to 
improve the police image and preserve order.79 Mayor Maier concurrently blamed suburban 
municipalities and civil rights insurgents for racial inequities. “Agitators” were the instigators of 
unrest, not racist police tactics. He embraced federal funding to shore up police power, designating 
the MFPC as the city’s grant coordinating agency. Yet new friction emerged between Chief Breier 
and City Hall around the intervention of federal research teams looking to document what occurred 
in 1967. Breier tightly guarded his department’s independent political status, feeding its growing 
isolation from overpoliced communities, institutions concerned about crime, and elected officials. 
 More civil violence transpired, as the Milwaukee NAACP Youth Council (YC) led two 
hundred straight nights of protest for an open housing ordinance between September 1967 and 
April 1968. Thousands of angry white supremacists confronted a diverse cohort of peaceful 
protestors, who numbered in the hundreds. The mayor and Common Council did little to address 
decades of racist policies, other than offer a toothless “War on Prejudice.”80 Breier distinguished 
 
78 The commission did not frame rebellions against police violence and racial injustice as “a form of political speech,” 
which historians do today. Daniel Geary, “What the Kerner Report Got Wrong about Policing, the Perils of 
Romanticizing 1960s Liberalism,” Boston Review, May 19, 2016, accessed October 26, 2020, 
https://bostonreview.net/us/daniel-geary-kerner-report-got-policing-wrong. National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1968);  
79 The federal War on Crime added institutional heft and funding capacity to an existing Office of Law Enforcement 
Administration, established after the 1965 Watts uprising. See: Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime. 
80 The Common Council’s only Black member, Vel Phillips, had regularly proposed fair housing ordinances since 1956. 
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himself from his liberal law-and-order predecessors by rejecting “community relations” 
improvements as a solution for building trust with neglected Black citizens and upholding order in 
their segregated, resource-depleted communities. He shunned the civilian review board concept and 
offered tired excuses on why the MPD employed few Black officers. The department conducted 
internal inquiries for the MFPC when the public filed complaints, denying accountability. While a 
city-backed committee recommended an oversight body that went beyond the scope of the MFPC 
in 1968, the Maier administration dismissed the proposal. Police accountability advocates pressured 
the mayor and Common Council to hire a “Community Relations Specialist” to focus on “minority 
recruitment,” promote community relations, and assist in the complaint review process. However, 
Breier undermined the specialist’s effectiveness on reviewing complaints and recruiting Black 
personnel by offering little support. The MPD continued to flex its state-sanctioned authority, 
though it was more socially detached than ever at a time when federal authorities sought better 
coordination and cooperation from municipal police agencies. Washington D.C. looked to 
modernize the police function in the wake of 1960s urban upheavals—a process that included both 
weapons/technological enhancements and ensuring civil rights compliance. 
 While Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach contradicted aspects of the bipartisan 
War on Crime, he still applied for federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration block grants 
to fund computer equipment and hardware upgrades. These helped police respond to crime more 
efficiently and forcefully. The city and MFPC, meanwhile, applied for federal money to fund 
community relations programs and minority police recruitment, which Breier disdained. The chief 
scoffed at emerging preventive, or “proactive” crime control philosophies that were gaining traction 
in the 1970s. He eschewed procedural reforms that, he thought, appeased leftist political agitators. 
For Breier, there was no flawed police image to improve, no illegitimacy to correct. And he enjoyed 
ample white community and political support to back up his opinions. The “bad” people in his 
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city—a conflation of civil rights activists and street criminals—needed to learn harsh lessons as a 
result of their disruptive behavior. Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach reciprocally fed 
off of the gaining militancy of Black-led campaigns for racial justice. Primary targets of police abuses 
were Black Power groups like the NAACP Youth Council and Milwaukee’s Black Panther Party 
chapter.81 The MPD’s Tactical Enforcement Unit was purposely outfitted to suppress “subversive” 
political organizing activities and demonstrations. The “Tactical Squad” presented a dramatic foil for 
Black and allied accountability advocates seeking to improve police oversight. 
 Chief Breier’s bellicose leadership during what historians have called the “long 1970s” (1969-
1984) was a double-edged sword.82 His racial conservatism and reactionary law-and-order ethos 
obstructed Black freedom movement objectives. But the chief’s fervent dismissal of community 
relations programs and procedural reforms also obscured the fact that liberal law-and-order policing 
functioned as a tool for racial and class suppression. It reproduced inequality by criminalizing the 
Black poor and citing their potential for disruptive behavior.  
Nonetheless, the policing of decades past generated liberal nostalgia. Police reformers and 
accountability advocates, Black and white, believed in the possibility of a more socially enlightened 
version of law enforcement—one that resembled the height of the MPD’s exceptionalism era in the 
1940s. This was predictable, given Chief Breier’s autocratic leadership and his overtly racialized law 
enforcement strategies. The violence that the MPD inflicted against minoritized people and the poor 
 
81 Milwaukee’s initial BPP chapter was short-lived because of police repression and in-fighting. One unjustified arrest on 
a misdemeanor “resisting arrest” charge in 1969, in particular, led to a lengthy trial that “exhausted the chapter’s 
resources and energy.” Lisa Cacho and Jodi Melamed, “How Police Abuse the Charge of Resisting Arrest,” Boston Review, 
June 29, 2020, http://bostonreview.net/race-law-justice/lisa-cacho-jodi-melamed-how-police-abuse-charge-resisting-
arrest. On the Milwaukee BPP, see: Andrew Witt, The Black Panthers in the Midwest: The Community Programs and Services of 
the Black Panther Party in Milwaukee, 1966-1977 (New York: Routledge, 2007); Yohuru Williams, “‘Give Them a Cause to 
Die For,’ The Black Panther Party in Milwaukee, 1969-1977” in Liberated Territory: Untold Local Perspectives on the Black 
Panther Party, ed. Yohuru Williams and Jama Lazerow (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 
82 Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2001), 4; Aaron Brenner, Robert Brenner, and Cal Winslow, eds., Rebel Rank and File: Labor Militancy and Revolt from Below 
During the Long 1970s (New York: Verso, 2010). 
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in the 1960s and 1970s strengthened reformist convictions. The sitting chief cut an obvious target. 
His twenty-year tenure overlapped with a complex and conflicting period that saw both the 
expansion of civil rights protections and the growth of an ever more punitive criminal justice system, 
which disproportionately targeted poor and working-class BIPOC citizens. 
 As Chapter Five details, police accountability groups and sympathetic elected officials 
mobilized against Breier’s unchecked power in the years following the 1967 civil disturbance. They 
did so via street protests, federal court filings, and political lobbying. These efforts chipped away at 
his unbridled authority. Black Power organizations—fed up with the false promises of urban 
liberalism and its failure to address economic problems—urged “community control” of the police 
and other municipal services. Their demands grew louder in the wake of a series of racialized police 
killings that occurred between 1972 and 1975. A rising neighborhood stabilization movement, 
frustrated by institutional and social fragmentation, also organized at the community level in this 
period. Community associations became a powerful interest group, especially on matters of crime 
control and police accountability. Discontented rank-and-file police were active as well. The 
Milwaukee Police Patrolmen’s Protective Association (MPPPA) decried their chief’s strict internal 
regulations and unwillingness to budge on “community relations” improvements. The MPPPA 
aimed to safeguard officers who worked in “high crime” areas. As such, they pushed to expand the 
rights of police by striking, collectively bargaining, and lobbying in Madison. The MPPPA 
challenged Breier’s stringency, despite his routine defense of officers accused of brutality.  
 Black, Latinx, and women officers confronted the MPD’s strictures and the failure of 
Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy to adequately comply with federal civil rights decrees. They utilized 
the anti-discrimination provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to advance workplace rights, then 
sued in response to recruitment, assignment, and promotions violations. Integration persisted as a 
reform demand among progressive-left and liberal activists. Meanwhile, national study committees, 
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the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, and the U.S. Department of Justice clarified the statutory matter 
at the heart of Milwaukee’s police accountability struggle. Through legal actions and investigations, 
the federal government and community-based organizations further exposed the anti-democratic 
rule of Milwaukee police chiefs and pushed to limit their authority by empowering City Hall. 
Consequently, in 1977, the Wisconsin legislature revised the 1911 statute that outlined police power 
in Milwaukee and gave the MFPC approval to annually review new rules set by public safety chiefs. 
They also imposed term limits on future department leaders, excusing the still politically influential 
Breier.83 Nonetheless, a more diverse body of state representatives was now answering the reform 
calls of accountability advocates, police union leaders, and neighborhood groups.  
 Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order ethos was under threat in the 1970s, but the fight 
was far from over. As Chapter Six recounts, the police chief’s capacity to oversee the MPD’s racist 
law enforcement practices and virtually all of the department’s internal operations endured into the 
1980s. However, around the same time that the Wisconsin legislature passed its first reform bill, 
revising police rule-making authority, an important development emerged. In 1978, a former 
patrolman who was party to the 1958 police killing of Daniel Bell came clean to a far-reaching police 
coverup. The revelations sparked fresh accountability protests and a civil rights lawsuit. A campaign 
to “oust Breier,” who was Inspector of Detectives in 1958, collected thousands of signatures and 
activists demanded further legislative changes. 
 Then, in 1981, Milwaukee Tactical Squad officers brutalized and asphyxiated Ernest Lacy—a 
23-year-old Black man wrongfully stopped, interrogated, and arrested for a rape he did not commit. 
A major campaign for justice coalesced that drew in more than seventy-five local organizations. Led 
by Black Power activists Howard Fuller and Michael McGee, the Coalition for Justice for Ernest 
 
83 In March 1977, Milwaukee’s Common Council set the terms of the next police chief’s tenure at seven years with the 
option of renewal. “Police Commission Beginning to Make Its Voice Heard,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 6, 1978, 
Part 2, 2. 
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Lacy spent two years struggling to get the Milwaukee County DA to file criminal charges and, when 
that failed, for the MFPC to discipline the officers responsible for the young man’s death. Chief 
Breier intimidated demonstrators and had a visible presence at rallies—then the largest in the history 
of Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability. Calls renewed for the MFPC to remove 
Breier. The political will for administrative action reached new heights, as Milwaukee’s racial 
demographics markedly shifted. The city was on course to become a “majority minority” city in the 
next millennium. In 1984, state lawmakers passed what became known as the “Breier Bill.” Senate 
Bill 56 finally transitioned police rule-making authority to the MFPC. Along with Breier’s sudden 
retirement that Spring, the firing of the officer who suffocated Lacy, and the passage of a state law 
requiring police to administer first aid to arrestees in need, Milwaukee’s Black-led movement for 
police accountability gained significant victories. 
 Still, a fundamental question persisted after 1984: could policing itself be made “legitimate” 
for everyone, especially now that police power was more evenly distributed? A sign pointing to “no” 
was that government had invested millions of dollars in expanding law enforcement and penal 
control as a solution to economic and social problems, ignoring white supremacy and class 
exploitation in the process. Disproportionately funding the state’s punitive arm to suppress rising 
fears of street crime drew taxpayer dollars away from funding social welfare, healthcare, jobs, and 
education. Conservative Republicans and “tough on crime” Democrats identified social welfare 
provisioning as wasteful public spending after the 1960s and vilified BIPOC citizens who relied on it 
to survive. Increasingly, the state turned to private, market-based solutions to help solve problems 
that, for much of the 20th century, were at least partially addressed by the federal government.  
Civil rights advancements ironically intersected with political and economic restructurings in 
the late 20th century to negatively impact poor and working-class families of color. Deteriorating 
economic conditions in hyper-segregated cities like Milwaukee, civic neglect, and revanchist 
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neoliberal policies aggravated metropolitan inequality further. Punitive responses seemed like the 
only viable solution to intensifying drug and gang-related crime. Despite substantive reform gains, 
police accountability victories coincided with the erosion of Black Milwaukee’s tenuous industrial 
foothold. Police power was restructured, yet deindustrialization, domestic budget austerity, and the 
onset of a national mass incarceration crisis have helped facilitate Wisconsin’s status as the most 
racially punitive state in the U.S.84 Racism, under the aegis of colorblindness, persists in Milwaukee. 
A revised liberal law-and-order policing narrative upholds the virtues of the “thin blue line,” while 
positioning the city’s Black poor as no less condemnable and criminogenic than in past decades. 
 
Historiography 
 “‘Accountable to No One’” is a history of the entwined forces that sustain cycles of police 
reform, resistance, and repression. It focuses on one municipality: Milwaukee, Wisconsin.85 As such, 
it joins a torrent of recently published scholarship that aspires to trace the lineage of America’s 
immense and discriminatory criminal justice system; the social, economic, cultural, political, and legal 
implications of policing and punishment for people living in the U.S.; and law enforcement’s vital 
place within frameworks of “carcerality.”86 Concurrently, this project engages with histories of Black 
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Pawasarat and Lois M. Quinn, “Wisconsin’s Mass Incarceration of African American Males: Workforce Challenges for 
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colonialism. It was built atop First Nation lands occupied by Potawatomi, Fox, Ho-Chunk, Menominee, Sauk, Ojibwe, 
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migration, urbanization, activism, and confrontations with white supremacy.87 Some of the works 
categorized as “long civil rights movement” history have integrated law enforcement—its inflictions 
of racialized state terror and denials of accountability to African Americans and other groups of 
color—as a prime obstructer of Black freedom.88 While these studies have addressed policing’s 
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impact on Black strivings for racial equality and self-determination, policing has rarely served as the 
main locus of analysis.89 With the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement’s ascendance in the 2010s, 
following a succession of high-profile, in many cases video-recorded police and vigilante murders of 
Black men and women, this emphasis shifted. A growing number of social and political historians 
began considering the pivotal role of law enforcement in perpetuating systems of inequality and 
injustice in cities. They connected it to the broader history of punitive American state building.90 
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Lastly, “‘Accountable to No One’” locates Black Milwaukee’s struggle for police liability within a 
growing corpus of scholarship that examines how issues of race, class, gender, and sexuality have 
intersected with 20th century struggles over housing, education, employment, public 
accommodations, urban development, and people’s right to access public services and resources in 
Milwaukee.91 In doing so, it charts the role law enforcement has played in shaping popular 
understandings of race, crime, and (in)security. Indeed, matters of race and policing have contoured 
this history in largely unaccounted for ways. Policing has always been central to the making and 
remaking of urban policy in Milwaukee and remains as urgent today. 
 Much of the new policing history that informs this dissertation starts from the discipline’s 
gaining recognition that Black mass incarceration is the civil rights dilemma of our age—what legal 
scholar Michelle Alexander famously referred to as the “New Jim Crow.”92 As such, “‘Accountable 
to No One’” is one of many “carceral studies” that have answered Heather Ann Thompson’s call 
for historians to “think critically about mass incarceration and begin to consider the reverberations 
of this never-before-seen phenomenon.”93 As of this writing, more than 2.2 million people live 
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under some form of penal confinement in the U.S.94 In 2015, another 7.2 million lived “on 
probation, on parole, or under a deportation order,” adding to the grim statistics.95 In fact, what is 
known today as the U.S. has long stood as a global exemplar in “human caging,” dating back to the 
earliest days of European settler colonialism in North America.96 Scholars have found that 
Wisconsin itself proportionally incarcerates more Black people than any other state in the union, 
with most imprisoned, jailed, and detained African Americans hailing from Milwaukee and Southeast 
Wisconsin.97 The state’s high rate of Black incarceration has resulted in a series of collateral, 
compounded outcomes for African Americans, including both the formal and perceived “mark” of 
criminality and cyclical exposure to an inordinate level of police monitoring, arrests, harassment, and 
brutality.98 Wisconsin’s racialized criminal justice disparities reflect Milwaukee’s stark inequities, 
hyper-segregation, and conservative racial politics.99 This dissertation helps move local stakeholders 
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towards a fuller understanding of why Milwaukee is such a unique carceral site. 
 “‘Accountable to No One’” joins a profusion of contemporary studies on metropolitan 
policing, all of which frame the emergence of America’s carceral crisis as one that transcends 
conventional political binaries. Historians have detailed how bipartisan policy decisions throughout 
the New Deal-Great Society era—not post-1960s crime rates, as previously thought—accounted for 
mass incarceration’s historic rise and its sharp racial imbalances.100 Law enforcement has always 
played a decisive role in advancing the country’s racialized carceral regime, since the police function 
as “the enforcement arm of the racial capitalist state.”101 Much of the new policing history has 
countered a once emergent backlash thesis, which stressed white conservative political responses to 
street crime and 1960s civil unrest over mutual liberal desires to neutralize Black dissent and 
safeguard capitalist structures.102 That Democratic and Republican actors alike initiated the “major 
punitive turn in American policy and culture” in the wake of the nation’s postwar civil rights 
revolution and “Great Uprising” undercuts simplistic liberal narratives of racial progress.103 Still, 
scholars have disagreed about when precisely the infrastructure for the modern carceral state was 
first laid. Some underscore federal choices in the 1960s; others highlight local dynamics from earlier 
decades.104 This study joins those emphasizing the discretionary policing of northern Black urban 
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spaces and residents in the early 20th century as a fundamental driver of Black criminalization, white 
ethnic de-criminalization, and, in turn, Black mass incarceration.105 Nowhere have these dynamics 
played out more clearly than in Milwaukee: the “worst city for black people to live” in America.106 
 The urgency of today’s carceral crisis and the onset of BLM has encouraged a growing 
number of historians to investigate American law enforcement’s roots as a white supremacist, 
capitalist-serving enterprise.107 This study is no different. Organized policing’s very existence in the 
U.S., beginning in the 1830s, has long been predicated on elite white needs to fill jails and prisons 
with mostly Indigenous, Black, and Brown people for a range of social, economic, and political 
purposes. All have served to uphold the nation’s dominant system of racial capitalism—from the 
need to harness cheap, disposable labor, to silencing political dissent, to removing a supposedly 
dangerous “criminal element” from redeveloping cities. White editorialists, social scientists, and 
politicians used 19th century systems of policing and punishment to legitimate Black criminality as 
the 20th century approached. They relied on allegedly colorblind crime data to argue that granting 
African Americans citizenship was a mistake, as they supposedly signified a criminal race. Statistics 
attributed the criminality of white ethnics, on the other hand, to socialization factors. As Khalil 
Muhammad has argued, the statistical language that emerged in the context of rising Black migration 
to northern cities is “the glue that binds race to crime today as in the past.”108 This played out in 
Milwaukee as well, where racialized police repression converged with class and political dynamics 
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shaped by the city’s large, foreign-born, non-English speaking European population. White Anglo-
capitalist interests converged with those of the white working-class to establish an urban terrain 
characterized by racial resentment for the growing number of African Americans moving to the city.  
 The new policing history far exceeds the scope of earlier interrogations of U.S. law 
enforcement written in the wake of 1960s and 1970s social upheavals. These works largely addressed 
municipal policing with an eye towards explaining its class control imperatives, the origins of law 
enforcement’s service function, processes of police professionalization, and how departments 
underwent “reform” by separating from ward-based political machines.109 Much of the recent work 
on policing differs in its attention to, most notably, Black and Latinx agency and calls to center the 
voices of those who have decried police violence and challenged racist narratives supported by law 
enforcement. Indeed, as these studies and “‘Accountable to No One’” reveal, organized resistance to 
police brutality was a major element of the Black freedom struggle. Newer histories also diverge in 
their framing of municipal police power as a force that actively shapes and expresses urban policy.110  
This dissertation is in part an institutional history of how police power in Milwaukee was 
made manifest and communicated locally by both law-and-order police administrators and rank-and-
file officers. It is also an exploration of how excessively policed and neglected African Americans 
have defied police authority through political negotiation, peaceful protest, and physical resistance. 
Liberal and conservative law-and-order frameworks reinforced a political consensus around policing 
that positioned it as a necessary service for reducing conflict and making society safer for capital 
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accumulation and market-based consumption. While many Black residents were deeply concerned 
about issues of crime and safety in their own racially segregated neighborhoods, poor services 
rendered by overwhelmingly white, discriminatory, and brutal police regimes only amplified their 
anxieties. Regardless, Black professionals called on political leaders, including a growing number of 
Black elected officials, to both hold the police accountable and get tougher on crime.111 
 As such, Black residents consistently demanded police reform over time. Policing historians 
have illustrated how law enforcement methodically used its political and discretionary authority to 
undermine civil rights movement gains and demands for police reform in the mid-20th century—
namely the establishment of civilian review boards, the hiring of minoritized police officers, and the 
implementation of “community relations” units.112 Rather than heed federal calls to enhance police 
responsiveness and improve safeguarding, law-and-order police chiefs promoted racial instability 
and generated insecurity within segregated Black and Latinx communities by aggressively policing 
poverty and competing modes of dissent. All of this fed a retributive law enforcement system that, 
beginning in the 1960s, federal and state actors promised would become more democratic and 
community-oriented. Instead, expansions of police power reproduced harms and discriminatory 
outcomes for millions of poor, middle- and working-class Americans of color. Many of these works 
also shed light on the ideological diversity found within local campaigns for police reform. 
 Intersections of gender, sexuality, and other identities have further complicated this history. 
Recent scholarship on urban morals enforcement and vice policing in cities—often in service of 
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protecting the interests of economic growth, white middle class elites, and capital accumulation—
has emerged as a growing sub-genre. Historians have analyzed in vivid detail how the policing of 
Black and Latinx youth, Native American populations, sex workers, LGBTQ+ residents, petty 
gamblers, houseless people, disabled folk, and other individuals pushed out onto the margins of 
conventional society by a range of discriminatory forces have contributed to racist, classist, sexist, 
and ableist criminalizing narratives.113 Examinations of gender, in particular, and its relationship to 
policing and the carceral state has added much needed depth to a field that often centers the 
experiences of male actors. As Kali Gross argues, Black womanhood brought its own unique set of 
political exclusions and criminalization. African American women were, since the colonial period, 
“not entitled to the law’s protection,” while also unable to “escape its punishment.”114 
 Finally, “‘Accountable to No One’” is informed by recent scholarship on the imperial origins 
of the police professionalization movement and the interwar and wartime transmissions, or border 
crossings, that occurred among military police abroad and “civilian” police forces at home.115 Several 
influential Progressive Era police chiefs and administrators served in the Spanish American War, for 
example, fighting imperial missions in colonial states like the Philippines and Cuba. They brought 
back to the U.S. new policing techniques developed overseas to track down guerrilla insurgents and 
impose social control among ostensibly rebellious indigenous populations. Communications tactics, 
training, and patrol methodologies imbued the professionalization movement that MPD chiefs 
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NYU Press, 2019); Anne Gray Fischer, “Land of the White Hunter’: Legal Liberalism and the Racial Politics of Morals 
Enforcement in Midcentury Los Angeles,” The Journal of American History 105 (4) (March 2019): 868–884; Fischer, “‘The 
Place is Gone!’: Policing Black Women to Redevelop Downtown Boston,” The Journal of Social History 53 (1) (Fall 2019): 
7-26. 
114 Kali Nicole Gross, “African American Women, Mass Incarceration, and the Politics of Protection,” The Journal of 
American History 102 (1) (June 2015), 25-26. 
115 On border crossings, see: Seigel, Violence Work. Seigel identifies three myths about police and the borders presumed 
to circumscribe their actions: One, that they are actually civilian and not military. Two, that they are public and not 
private “market agents.” Three, that they are local actors who only work for municipal bodies and no higher. Seigel, 
Violence Work, 13. 
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embraced from the 1910s through the 1930s.116 This process continued in the post-World War II 
era, when military police in the Office of Public Safety worked to prevent “subversives” from 
provoking insurgent campaigns in “Third World” countries susceptible to Communist influence.117 
The federal state helped advance counter-insurgent policing capacities in at least fifty-two countries. 
Such efforts set the stage for greater police militarization efforts after the 1960s. The federal 
government delivered military-grade weaponry and gear to police around the globe as it waged the 
Cold War. This weaponry was deployed in cities, as police agencies engaged in the War on Crime 
and War on Drugs. Veterans brought strategies, know-how, and arms home to municipal police 
departments working to suppress political dissent and social upheaval. The federal government 
established channels for local police forces to apply for military-grade hardware. Contrary to what 
criminologists and policing experts have argued, law enforcement never had a “golden age” free of 
coercive, militarized, racist policing models. The U.S. state always directed law enforcement against 
perceived outside agitators, incendiary elements, and criminalized groups of color. 
 
Challenging the Kelling Thesis 
 From a historical perspective, Milwaukee provides an ideal case study for how elite white 
constructions of police legitimacy have worked to undermine and narrow Black demands for 
accountability in response to endemic police violence. The narrative of policing exceptionalism 
analyzed throughout this dissertation undergirded and legitimized the city’s white-controlled police 
bureaucracy in, what scholars have identified as, the “reform era” in U.S. policing.118 In turn, the 
 
116 See: Julian Go, “The Imperial Origins of American Policing: Militarization and Imperial Feedback in the Early 20th 
Century,” American Journal of Sociology 125 (5) (March 2020): 1193-1254; Matthew A. Guariglia, “The American Problem: 
Race, Empire, and Policing in New York City, 1840-1930,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 2019). 
117 See: Stuart Schrader, Badges without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2019); Seigel, Violence Work. 
118 While Milwaukee’s reform era in policing extends from the enactment of civil service hiring in 1885 through the term 
of Police Chief Harold Breier (1964-1984), scholars tend to frame policing’s “reform era” as between 1890 and 1970. 
See: Robert M. Fogelson, Big City Police (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
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MPD’s self-reinforcing mythologies have defined a white hegemonic racial politics, common 
understandings of public safety, and highly raced and classed ideas about urban criminality and 
disorder.119 While this study does not evaluate crime as a specific unit of analysis, per se, it does take 
the phenomenon seriously as one that shapes individual choices, “quality of life” perceptions, and 
public fears about health and the well-being of families, property, and communities.  
Still, this project does not see crime as detached from the larger processes of racial capitalism 
that have begotten uneven social and economic terrains or police behaviors that are proven to 
inflame inequitable urban conditions. Reform era policing in Milwaukee, and its relationship to 
assorted processes of crime control and order maintenance, has had a veiled national reach that this 
study only begins to unearth. That reach into the U.S. crime and policing discourse is reflected in the 
work of a criminologist well-regarded in national policing circles, yet also heavily criticized by 
policing’s sharpest opponents. For better or worse, he has had an outsized influence on the telling of 
Milwaukee’s law enforcement history, in addition to formulating best practices for cities wanting to 
address matters of public safety.120 
 George Kelling implicated his hometown’s story of race and policing in the larger conceptual 
framework he and criminologist James Q. Wilson introduced in their consequential, if statistically 
misleading 1982 article: “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.”121 Wilson and 
 
119 “White fixations on the specter of Black crime,” as Simon Balto argues, encouraged and reinforced the overpolicing 
and underprotection of comparatively poorer African American citizens and urban spaces. Balto, Occupied Territory, 128. 
120 Kelling’s account of Milwaukee’s policing history has become a dominant narrative. It is an incomplete one at best, as 
it diminishes the role police themselves have played in structuring ideas about public safety, shaping urban policies, 
applying racialized enforcement double-standards, and framing patterns of crime and criminality according to factors of 
race, class, and gender. George Kelling, “Milwaukee Police Department,” Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed June 15, 
2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/milwaukee-police-department/; Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee. 
121 James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” Atlantic Monthly 
(March 1982), 29–38. In 2001, Bernard Harcourt debunked Broken Windows theory, finding that “disorder,” as Kelling 
and Wilson subjectively conceived it, had little bearing on crime. See: Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False 
Promise of Broken Windows Policing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 243. Broken Windows theory, as 
Bench Ansfield argues, was particularly specious because Kelling and Wilson “manipulated and distorted the findings of 
prior studies to call forth a racialized image of urban decline, one that marshaled broken windows to stoke fears about 
the future of the US urban landscape.” Bench Ansfield, “The Broken Windows of the Bronx: Putting the Theory in Its 
Place,” American Quarterly 72 (1) (March 2020): 104. 
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Kelling’s provocative theory called for the hyper-enforcement of low-level behavioral 
misdemeanors, like graffiti writing, littering, panhandling, public urination, and selling untaxed 
cigarettes—crimes on the level of the public order offenses white police officers unduly arrested 
countless Black citizens for during the MPD’s era of assumed exceptionalism.122 Broken Windows 
theory holds that minor violations, if left unchecked, raise neighborhood fears of disorder and breed 
more serious violent crime. Therefore, the concept calls on police to crack down on nuisance 
offenses, so as to alleviate community anxieties and mitigate injurious harms.123 Under Broken 
Windows, home and business owners—the “good,” “orderly” residents—signified “the natural 
representatives of the ‘community.’”124 While the theory’s authors framed Broken Windows as a 
race-neutral project, its application in cities has buttressed historically racist policing practices and 
logics that aggressively target, control, and detain BIPOC people, the working poor, and groups 
living on society’s margins.125 The implications are serious. Broken Windows policing has helped fuel 
 
122 Wilson and Kelling viewed Broken Windows as an updated version of the “community watchmen” approach of the 
19th century. Wilson and Kelling, “Broken Windows,” 9. 
123 The goal is to “concentrate less on catching criminals and more on enforcing informal neighborhood norms of 
behavior.” Samuel Walker, “‘Broken Windows’ and Fractured History: The Use and Misuse of History in Recent Police 
Patrol Analysis,” Justice Quarterly 1 (1) (1984), 78. 
124 Stuart Schrader, “Defining Key Policing Terms,” Stuart Schrader professional website, June 15, 2016, accessed June 
24, 2020, https://stuartschrader.com/blog/defining-key-policing-terms. 
125 Sarah Childress, “The Problem with ‘Broken Windows’ Policing,” PBS Frontline, June 28, 2016, accessed June 21 
2020, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-problem-with-broken-windows-policing/. In practice, Broken 
Windows policing has enhanced “the collective punishments of communities already under siege,” burdening the 
working poor with fines and fracturing already strained relationships with law enforcement. The logic of Broken 
Windows, historians Jordan Camp and Christina Heatherton argue, has served to “locate disorder within individuals, off-
loading liability onto the bodies of the blamed.” Jordan T. Camp and Christina Heatherton, “Introduction: Policing the 
Planet,” Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter, Jordan T. Camp and Christina Heatherton, eds. 
(New York: Verso Books, 2016), 3. Broken Windows has contributed “tremendous intellectual energy to the wars on 
crime and drugs in the early 1980s” and subsequent decades. Anne Gray Fischer, ““Land of the White Hunter”: Legal 
Liberalism and the Racial Politics of Morals Enforcement in Midcentury Los Angeles,” The Journal of American History 105 
(4) (March 2019), 884. The theory relies on a false premise of universally accepted police authority and neutral public 
understandings of crime and disorder, criminals and disorderly people. It is at once an “ideological” and “political” 
project. While Broken Windows presents as racially colorblind, it has resulted in a grossly disproportionate level of stops, 
searches, fines, and arrests of people of color. That racialized groups, particularly African Americans, are seen by Broken 
Windows advocates as having a greater propensity to commit illicit offenses, while also being the primary victims of 
street crime is passed-off by the theory’s supporters as “mere statistical inevitability.” Camp and Heatherton, 
“Introduction: Policing the Planet,” 6. Broken Windows conflates racial criminalization with spatial representations of 
disorder, ensuring that it remains largely confined to minoritized urban communities and commercial thoroughfares 
frequented by people of color. As Camp and Heatherton have argued, Broken Windows is an “expression of 
neoliberalism at the urban scale”—one rooted in conservative notions of personal responsibility and the belief that 
  43 
America’s mass incarceration crisis, exacerbating racial disparities throughout the criminal justice 
system.126 It has devastated Black lives in Wisconsin, which, as recently as 2014, incarcerated the 
highest percentage of African American men in the U.S.127 Despite operating under a different 
organizing ethos—proactivity instead of reactivity—Broken Windows policing has essentially 
supplanted one discriminatory law enforcement approach for another. 
 Milwaukee’s story of policing exceptionalism rests at the heart of the “imagined community” 
of preventive order maintenance policing envisioned by Kelling and Wilson’s Broken Windows 
theory.128 This dissertation contends that its purported outcomes, “a sense of order and civility,” 
promised a return to the idealized city of the late criminologist’s youth.129 This was an era of 
Milwaukee’s history when “social controls” and white ethnic conceptions of neighborhood safety 
intermingled with a virtually all-white police function. That function was invested in mitigating crime 
in mostly white communities, shutting people of color out of such spaces, and sanctioning illicit 
behavior in the overpoliced and underprotected Black neighborhoods where the MPD funneled vice 
and illicit activities. Through the policing of blackness, as well as assorted racial, gender, and sexual 
boundaries, reform era patrolmen regenerated disproportionate Black arrest and incarceration rates. 
This reinforced white presumptions of Black criminality and disorder in ways that harmed African 
Americans’ overall prospects for accountability.130 Kelling came of age as Milwaukee’s narrative of 
 
“good” people are obligated to protect their neighborhoods from the “bad.” Broken a Windows “has normalized a shift 
in state capacities away from the production of social goods and towards “security” concerns produced in their 
absence.” Camp and Heatherton, “Introduction: Policing the Planet,” 2-4. 
126 Rather than preventing serious crime through the policing of minor behavioral offenses, thereby limiting 
incarceration, the order maintenance approach has acted as “a supplement that feeds into and itself produces a dramatic 
increase in detentions, arrests, and criminal records.” Harcourt, Illusion of Order, 6. 
127 See: Toller-Clark, “From Breweries to the Super-Max”; Pawasarat and Quinn, “Wisconsin’s Mass Incarceration of 
African American Males.” 
128 On the concept of an “imagined community,” which initially referred to concepts of nationalism, see: Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 2006). 
129 Wilson and Kelling, “Broken Windows,” 9. 
130 Kelling’s thesis undervalues the agency of police departments themselves, whose function as street-level arbiters of 
harm and conventional white middle class norms help maintain racial capitalism and systems of oppression at the local 
scale. Save for the top police administrators who have devised reactive crime-fighting strategies that eschewed his 
idealized version of crime prevention (like Police Chief Harold Breier), Kelling’s social control thesis frames the police as 
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policing exceptionalism crested in the 1940s and 1950s—a moment when “the neighborhood was 
great” and his family “moved around freely and still felt safe.”131 As he has written, “this relatively 
benign world ended in the 1960s when crime, the fear of crime, and urban disorder exploded in 
Milwaukee and so many other cities across the country.”132 Kelling’s wistful framing of public safety 
prior to a noted uptick in the city’s Black population in the 1950s and 1960s served a symbolic 
function in his research and consulting projects, which advanced Broken Windows policing in 
partnership with significant law enfacement agencies in major U.S. cities.133 Ergo, Milwaukee and its 
era of policing exceptionalism looms larger in the story of race, policing, and public safety than is 
commonly understood, partly because of how convergences of white supremacy and law 
enforcement have informed one prominent scholar’s “colorblind,” value-neutral ideas about order, 
social control, and community. 
 
neutral historical agents. The police are acted upon by social, economic, and political forces, but never the influencers of 
disparate urban conditions, which have reinforced processes of racial criminalization and disorder in Black communities. 
Consequently, Kelling’s argument advances a misleading logic of police legitimacy that continues to hold devastating 
consequences for Black citizens and other minoritized groups. Rationales that elevate policing as a primary solution to 
community health and safety issues are only now being reckoned with by cities in a serious way, due to the organizing 
work of grassroots police accountability activists. 
131 George Kelling was born in 1935. His family lived on N. 27th St., on Milwaukee’s west side until he was six years old. 
For most of the 1940s, the Kellings resided on N. 47th St., across from the Parklawn public housing project on the city’s 
northwest side. The local housing authority located that complex on the suburban fringes because of white fears about 
racial integration. Kelling concedes that his “entry into criminal justice” work was directly tied to Milwaukee, as were his 
perceptions of law enforcement. As a young college graduate in the late 1950s, he worked at a juvenile detention center 
and as a probation officer in Minneapolis. Kelling completed a Master’s in Social Work at UW-Milwaukee. In 1960, he 
was hired as Assistant Superintendent of Juvenile Detention for Milwaukee County. He briefly left for Minnesota again 
between 1963 and 1965 to “oversee childcare and social work at a children’s psychiatric facility.” Kelling, by his own 
account, then returned to Milwaukee to teach corrections courses at UW-Milwaukee’s School of Social Work. He 
became more interested in policing during this “era of civil rights and anti-war protests,” when the “police were highly 
visible and controversial.” Kelling claims to have worked with the Commandos, whom he describes “a militant civil 
rights group,” while also consulting for Milwaukee’s police union—something he would continue to do sporadically over 
the years. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 10. 
132 Kelling attributes the order maintenance of his youth more to community-based and institutional “social controls” 
than to reform era policing strategies. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 8-9. One might infer that Kelling meant Black 
“crime,” a largely white “fear of crime,” and Black “urban disorder,” given the city’s racialized discourses and the 
segregated geographies of 1960s civil violence. Moreover, white pundits, city officials, and news reporters routinely 
linked blackness and illicit behavior in public forums. See: Simon Ezra Balto, “‘Occupied Territory:’ Police Repression 
and Black Resistance in Postwar Milwaukee, 1950-1968,” The Journal of African American History 98 (2) (Spring 2013): 229-
252. 
133 Former New York City and Los Angeles police head Bill Bratton called Kelling, “the most profound influence on 
American policing in the last 40 or 50 years.” Sam Roberts, “George L. Kelling, a Father of ‘Broken Windows’ Policing, 
Is Dead at 83,” The New York Times, May 15, 2019, accessed June 23, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/obituaries/george-kelling-dead.html. 
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 Kelling’s conceptualization of policing in Milwaukee reifies a problematic account of law 
enforcement that indirectly enshrines anti-blackness and reinforces a white supremacist-capitalist 
framework of metropolitan history. It also legitimizes policing as the primary solution to urban ills. 
This dissertation challenges the thesis of Kelling’s final book, Policing in Milwaukee. In it, he argues 
that an “erosion in social control” exposed the inadequacies of reform era policing, causing a crisis 
of police legitimacy in the 1960s that demanded resolution through enhanced order maintenance 
and “community policing” strategies.134 Despite the police department’s vaunted status as a national 
reform leader in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, Kelling contended that the MPD was ill-equipped to 
preserve order in the 1960s and 1970s without previously established social controls in place.135 He 
noted that such constraints—cultural institutions, familial networks, built environments—had 
balanced the police department’s response-oriented crime control program. Urban disorder 
 
134 “Police legitimacy” refers to the “acceptance of police authority by the public.” Walker, “‘Broken Windows’ and 
Fractured History,” 84. “Community policing” is a post-1960s law enforcement strategy embraced by Kelling that calls 
on law enforcement agencies to form “police-driven partnerships that put additional resources at their disposal and win 
the cooperation of community leaders.” Through routine, “friendly” contacts with neighborhood residents, the police 
are supplied with “low-level” information and “security assistance” that operates in service of disorder “pacification.” 
Scholar Kristian Williams argues that “community policing” is an important aspect of the police’s “domestic 
counterinsurgency program.” Kristian Williams, “The Other Side of the COIN: Counterinsurgency and Community 
Policing,” Interface 3 (1) (May 2011), 91-92. 
135 According to Kelling, the main flaw of reform era policing, in Milwaukee and elsewhere, was its emphasis on 
responding to crime via rapid response, random automobile patrols, and detective work rather than preventing crime 
through neighborhood foot patrols and implanting trusted police in communities to help residents solve problems. 
Reform era policing isolated law enforcement, he argued, from the very people they were called on to “protect and 
serve.” Kelling advocated a return to “Anglo-Saxon policing,” whereby “conspicuous officers…embedded in small 
geographic areas,” or beats, prevented crime “through police presence” and discretionary, proactive order maintenance. 
Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 16-17. Although the MPD was considered a national exemplar of reform era policing 
throughout the first half of the 20th century, Kelling argues that the department’s exemplary approach was only effective 
so long as “police operated within and as part of communities and neighborhoods where informal social control 
provided a foundation for their efforts.” Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 56. Those informal social controls—families, 
schools, businesses, community institutions—in his view, started to break down in the mid-1950s. This process 
accelerated during the reign of Milwaukee’s most autocratic and overtly racist police chief, Harold Breier, in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The erosion of community-driven social controls, Kelling argues, converged with a police administrator who 
rejected his predecessors’ openness to improving “community relations” and the department’s public image, creating a 
worst case scenario that mandated strategic revision. Milwaukee Police Chief Joseph Kluchesky (1936-1945) led in the 
national “community relations movement,” which introduced human relations training, increased contact between police 
and Black leaders, and the recruitment of Black officers in the 1940s. Police-Black community relations also deteriorated 
under Breier, who rejected external government interference and scrutiny. A detective culture predominated at the 
expense of beat patrol. Breier’s reactionary approach and strict regulation encouraged line officers to unionize and 
demand greater workplace rights. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee: A Strategic History, 54. 
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proliferated when these constraints dissolved and the MPD was left randomly patrolling and seeking 
out crime rather than proactively working with upstanding community partners to prevent daily 
public order violations. Therefore, a new strategy was needed that integrated the police into 
Milwaukee’s shifting social fabric to better maintain order and reduce public fears.136  
 From a tactical perspective, Kelling disagreed with the near-term goals and strategic practices 
of reform era policing.137 However, its end result of racialized poor and working-class suppression, 
on terms favorable to white middle and business class interests, was consistent with Broken 
Windows policing outcomes.138 Kelling’s rationale is deceptive, in part because he argues that 
Milwaukee’s postwar crisis of police legitimacy was centered not on the racist and violent behavior 
of the police but on administrative inefficiencies and the city’s ostensibly deteriorating social fabric. 
While he rightly observed that existing law enforcement models increasingly struggled to control 
crime after World War II, raising public fears about “disorder,” he also laid most of the blame on a 
 
136 This logic influenced Kelling’s consultancy on the hiring of Milwaukee Police Chief Edward Flynn in 2007. In 
Kelling’s view, hiring Flynn, a disciple of Broken Windows style “problem-oriented” policing, restored the MPD to its 
rightful crime prevention focus. See: Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee. 
137 Some scholars argue that Kelling misevaluated reform era policing regardless. Samuel Walker, for example, argues 
that Kelling and his co-authors exaggerated the “depersonalization” the police and their “crime control orientation” 
from the 1930s-1960s. Walker, “‘Broken Windows’ and Fractured History,” 88. 
138 Reform era and Broken Windows policing strategies have shared commonalities, despite the former focusing largely 
on crime control and the latter on reducing “perceptions of disorder.” Both approaches relied on public investment in 
police services, an expanded law enforcement presence on the streets, and common assumptions about police legitimacy 
to succeed. Each has functioned to maintain the existing racial and class order, re-inscribing police authority as a means 
of guaranteeing the dominant hierarchy. The primary goal of reform era policing was responding to crime efficiently, 
resolving it after the fact. That meant random patrols, answering service requests, effecting arrests, and closing cases. 
Perceptions of order mattered because they allegedly generated communal stability and residential investment in helping 
police monitor illicit behavior. When it came to reform era policing, some departments were better than others at 
clearing cases. Kelling points to reform era policing’s overall inefficiency at resolving crime, but also points out that the 
MPD was better at doing so than most departments because of the city’s neighborhood-level “social controls” and its 
“law abiding population.” Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 52-53. Reported crime statistics drove this process, faulty and 
police-manufactured as they were, which also justified law enforcement’s existence. For Kelling, attenuating public fears 
about crime was as critical as responding to crime because, as he argued in his research on foot patrols in Newark, NJ, 
neighborhood perceptions of disorder correlated with actual crime rates. See: Police Foundation, The Newark Foot Patrol 
Experiment (1981), 5. As a policy program, Broken Windows is profoundly racialized and has further criminalized 
blackness and poverty. It did so more implicitly through a racially coded language and geography of “disorder” that, as 
one scholar argues, “positioned itself as racially neutral, even progressive.” The broken windows themselves were a stand 
in for a range of material and embodied “disorders.” Ansfield, “The Broken Windows of the Bronx,” 119. By relying on 
a 1969 social scientific study conducted in the predominantly Black and Puerto Rican South Bronx, it was clear who 
Wilson and Kelling inferred to be “disorderly.” Wilson and Kelling, “Broken Windows,” 3. 
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breakdown in “norms and social controls.”139 This “unwittingly” emanated from “new social 
policies” enacted by liberal policymakers after World War II, disrupting established networks of 
crime control and order maintenance in Milwaukee neighborhoods. Kelling even suggested that 
postwar “cultural and legal changes,” including the juridical fruits of the Black freedom movement, 
served to uphold the rights of individuals at the expense of communities, thereby producing an 
environment susceptible to the spread of crime and disorder.140 
 As “‘Accountable to No One’” makes clear, the “golden age” of public safety that Kelling 
alludes to was not the lived experience of many poor and working-class Black Milwaukeeans.141 
What may have felt like an extended period of social tranquility backed up by benevolent policing for 
white citizens in the 1940s and 1950s was also one of racialized police control, violence, and neglect 
for many “others.”142 The perceived social controls of Kelling’s youth were fashioned by white 
supremacist ideas, policies, and structures.143 Kelling’s memories of an idealized public safety 
landscape overlooked racist, often violent encounters among white police, resistant white residents, 
 
139 Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 47-48. 
140 Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 56. George Kelling directly advised police chiefs on the implementation of Broken 
Windows-style “community policing” in these cities. See: George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken 
Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in our Cities (New York: Free Press, 1998). 
141 Bryan Wagner, Disturbing the Peace: Black Culture and the Police Power After Slavery (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 202. See: Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118. 
142 The MPD fulfilled long-standing obligations to white middle and business class concerns, administering social control 
among those living on society’s margins, particularly Black migrant workers viewed by whites as prone to disorder and 
criminality. On the roots of protecting elite middle class and corporate interests in Milwaukee, see: Sidney L. Harring, 
“The Police Institution as a Class Question: Milwaukee Socialists and the Police, 1900-1915,” Science & Society 46 (2) 
(Summer 1982): 197-221. Despite being identified by the federal government, policing experts, and national media as a 
leader in police professionalization from the 1930s to the 1960s, the MPD disproportionately stopped, arrested, and 
initiated violent clashes with African American residents. According to Kelling, police professionalization meant 
“bureaucratization, civil service, centralized command-and-control, pre- and in-service training, and tenure for police 
chiefs.” This began with the passage of the 1885 state law establishing the MFPC and then the hiring of Milwaukee’s 
first reform chief, John Janssen, in 1888. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 51-54, 56, 67. The “community relations” 
movement of the 1940s focused more on quelling dissent, Black and Brown youth crime, and interracial mixing than 
instilling procedural justice and better safeguarding all residents through policing. The improvement of the police image 
was the ultimate goal. See: Chapter Two. 
143 Moreover, the 19th century “Anglo-Saxon tradition” of policing that Kelling elevates as a strategy worth returning to 
serves no “conscious purpose of fighting crime or serving neighborhood needs.” That police derived legitimacy from 
meeting the desires of neighborhood residents was, as Samuel Walker argues, “highly romanticized.” Walker adds: 
“Urban neighborhoods were not stable and homogeneous little villages nestled in the city. They were heterogeneous, 
and the rate of geographic mobility was even higher than contemporary rates.” Walker, “‘Broken Windows’ and 
Fractured History,” 87. 
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and Black migrants struggling for survival, rights, and access.144 African Americans’ undue 
vulnerability to police discrimination and brutality in the Great Migration period and the MPD’s 
unchecked discretionary power revealed the shortcomings of reform era approaches well before 
Kelling’s alleged breakdown of social controls in the 1960s.145 Black Milwaukeeans did not need to 
experience the displacement and disfranchisement caused by urban renewal and freeway 
construction, for example, to know that reform era policing was deficient in providing them 
communal security. Well before the 1960s, Black youth challenged police policies of “close 
surveillance” and aggressive order maintenance tactics.146 Black professionals confronted white 
perceptions of the police as colorblind and efficient crime control agents, pointing out enforcement 
double-standards and decrying pervasive police brutality. Activism and street-level resistance 
exposed how the MPD engendered disarray in Black and interracial spaces through biased policies 
and unchecked violence. Hardly neutral arbiters of morality and justice, police fueled and acted on 
ingrained ideas about race and class as they patrolled Milwaukee’s near north side. Because, in 
Kelling’s view, reform era policing focused on responding to crime rather than crime prevention, the 
MPD was ill-equipped to handle the perceived breakdown of social controls brought on by postwar 
liberalism and the cultural/civil rights revolution. If anything, however, racist police discretion 
worsened in the context of the 1960s civil-rights revolution because activists specifically targeted 
racialized and coercive law enforcement. The police actively made civil rights demonstrations, as 
well as the neighborhoods that activists lived in and organized in, less safe.147 
 
144 See: Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118. 
145 Conversely, Kelling argues police work was “routine and non-discretionary” in the reform era. Kelling, Policing in 
Milwaukee, 55. This is inaccurate. See: Walker, “‘Broken Windows’ and Fractured History.” Anti-Black police racism 
manifested in a number of forms, from verbal insults and harassment, to fines and arrests, to physical beatings and 
death. 
146 See: Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118; and Chapter One. 
147 While Kelling is correct that postwar growth policies like urban renewal and highway construction displaced 
thousands of Black residents, worsening patterns of inequality and disrupting living conditions for African Americans 
relegated to Milwaukee’s segregating north side, he overstates and distorts the impact of the civil rights revolution in 
explaining the origins of its public safety crisis. Most notably, Kelling discounts the saliency of race in law enforcement 
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 Overall, Kelling’s narrative discounts the role of the police in furthering disorder in poor and 
working-class urban spaces of color.148 In fact, the state’s expansion of police power as a response to 
Black political dissent and rebellion in the 1960s—as opposed to doubling-down on federal anti-
poverty measures—exacerbated existing racial inequities, amplified a sense of confusion in Black 
enclaves, and further aggravated aspects of the postwar urban crisis. It was not an “across-the-board 
decline in social control in neighborhoods, schools, and even families” or “increasing public disorder 
created by the presence of the mentally ill and petty offenders” that revealed the deficiencies of 
reform era policing.149 Rather, policing itself—empowered by federal cash infusions, new computer 
technologies, enhanced statistical record keeping, military-grade equipment, and broadened 
surveillance capacities—served to inflate crime rates.150 Policing created new means of effecting 
arrests, and reinforced long-standing perceptions of Black criminality. Although Kelling rightfully 
observed that “American criminal justice was riddled with racism,” he never provided a full analysis 
 
already, and the roles of police actions and white ethnic resistance to, for example, the building of racially mixed public 
housing and efforts to integrate all-white neighborhoods. Kevin D. Smith, “From Socialism to Racism: The Politics of 
Class and Identity in Postwar Milwaukee” Michigan Historical Review 29 (1) (Spring, 2003), 3. While Kelling notes that 
racial discrimination impacted Black lives in the 1950s and 1960s, and touches on some key moments in Milwaukee’s 
civil rights history, he largely fails to probe how policing itself undermined Black citizenship claims and reproduced racial 
inequality. In Policing in Milwaukee, Black citizens rarely encountered racist policing before the 1950s. As a result, Kelling 
elides earlier modes of resistance, such as the activism of the Sixth Ward Law and Order League in the 1930s. While he 
contends that “racism’s influence on the growth and development of the Milwaukee Police Department…was profound 
and undeniable,” he never fully explains how racism structured MPD policies. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 57. Mistrust 
between police officers and Black residents intensified after World War II, largely because of discriminatory policing 
practices that targeted north side African Americans. See: Balto, “Occupied Territory.” 
148 The police, in Kelling’s summation, behaved as neutral state actors above the fray of local politics. Instead, politicians 
answered Milwaukee’s assorted postwar crises—a housing shortage, unmanageable automobile traffic, declining mental 
health facilities, “injustices to juveniles,” school segregation, and more (as identified by Kelling)—through liberal 
policies, like slum clearance and urban renewal, public housing and highway construction, court-ordered busing and 
juvenile justice reform, the decriminalization of minor offenses and the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, and the 
centralization of local government agencies. These combined efforts, Kelling argues, weakened social controls and 
community-based institutions, leading to rising crime rates in Milwaukee and other cities. Kelling suggests that 
Milwaukee suffered a crisis of liberalism, not unchecked police violence, arguing in favor of the conservative trope that 
family and community structures broke down as a result of liberal policies. Such policies and their outcomes had the 
hardest impact on poor Black youth, whom Kelling and other conservative criminologists have positioned as susceptible 
to immoral behavior and criminal activity. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 57. 
149 Kelling argued these forces proved “too stimulating for youthful predators,” causing an explosion in reported street 
crimes that police agencies were ill-equipped to resolve. Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee, 67. 
150 Police crime reporting is loaded with “problems, biases, and imperfections.” Balto, Occupied Territory, 67-68. In turn, 
conventional media outlets elevate and normalize “police rhetoric and logic by often reporting in terms constructed by 
the police.” Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles, 6. 
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of how law enforcement materialized Black criminality and spawned inequality.151 Policing was, 
instead, perfectible through proactive, problem-oriented, “community policing” reforms and the re-
establishment of the social controls of his youth.152 This dissertation rejects this framework. 
 
151 Internal racism, Kelling writes, “substantially interfered with the ability of police to deal with neighborhood and 
community problems,” but his evidence remains disconnected from a police mission that was fundamentally predicated 
on upholding the interests of white middle class and corporate elites. 
152 Kelling’s main argument in Policing in Milwaukee it that the “community policing” movement he helped advance in the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s effectively restored law enforcement’s proactive, community-supported crime prevention 
mission. When he consulted on Milwaukee’s hiring of Police Chief Edward Flynn in 2007, Kelling was, in his view, 




Manufacturing the Narrative of Policing Exceptionalism 
  “In Milwaukee, you’re safer on the streets than in any other big city of its size. Violence is 
rare, police efficient, criminals uncoddled. How does Milwaukee do it?”1 So began the lede in a 
September 1964 article in U.S. News & World Report on the virtues of the Cream City’s prized 
criminal justice system. “Efficient” policing, “tough” prosecution, “swift and sure” court judgments, 
among other factors, combined to make Wisconsin’s largest city “one of the most law-abiding” in 
the country.2 The other main ingredient, according to Mayor Henry Maier, was the cooperation of a 
“settled and stable population.”3 Consequently, the whole citizenry, “men, women, and 
children…have come to be accepted as an arm of law enforcement.” Each Milwaukee Police 
Department (MPD) officer “has a thousand pairs of eyes,” he added. Residential cooperation and 
surveillance augmented a community-wide project of crime control and order maintenance.4 “We 
like to have an omnipresent force of policemen on the streets,” noted Inspector Raymond Dahl 
approvingly. 
  About three hundred words into the piece, the author broached the subject of race. While 
the article barely conveys it, race had become a more contentious issue in Milwaukee ever since 
 
1 “How One City Keeps Its Streets Safe,” U.S. News & World Report, September 28, 1964, 68. 
2 The other factors mentioned in the article were “alert newspapers,” “good schools,” an “absence of tenement-type 
slums,” and its “comprehensive” network of parks. “How One City Keeps its Streets Safe,” 68. 
3 In truth, census data shows that Milwaukee’s population was anything but “settled and stable” in the mid-1960s. 
Milwaukee’s African American population alone was in the process of growing from 62,458 in 1960 to 105,088 in 1970. 
Meanwhile, the city lost 70,200 white residents in that same span. The city’s total population loss nearly quadrupled from 
1970 to 1980, at 80,887 residents. A loss of 138,752 white residents in that span was offset by a gain of 41,852 Black 
residents and nearly 25,000 Latinx residents, or “Hispanic Origin.”  Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census 
Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other 
Urban Places in The United States,” U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Working Paper no. 76 (February 2005), 
Table 50. “How One City Keeps Its Streets Safe,” 68. 
4 As Inspector Raymond Dahl claimed, “people in this town are willing to give information to the police, willing to be 
witnesses.” “How One City Keeps Its Streets Safe,” 68. “Order maintenance law enforcement” is an approach to 
policing municipal offenses that civic elites and morally upstanding citizens viewed as threatening to the conventional 
public order of a given locale. The approach was racialized and often targeted poor and working-class members of non-
white groups for petty offenses like vagrancy, public drinking, and disorderly conduct. Christopher Lower Agee, “Crisis 
and Redemption: The History of American Police Reform since World War II,” Journal of Urban History (2017), 2, 4. 
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World War II and the expanded availability of industrial jobs ushered in an extended period of Black 
migration to the city. “It is safe to walk the streets at night in Milwaukee,” the writer assured readers. 
“Although the Negro population is sizable, there have been no serious racial disturbances.”5 The 
racist implication was clear in this statement. Even with all of these Black people coming to live 
among the city’s white citizens, crime rates were stable, order was preserved. In addition to 
normalizing whiteness, the author made a distinction between Milwaukee and other U.S. cities 
grappling with civil unrest in the summer of 1964. African Americans across the urban North, 
frustrated by chronic police abuse and discriminatory housing, employment, and educational 
structures, were challenging their imposed second-class citizenship through a series of uprisings that 
saw Black citizens confront the “occupying” police forces who were, as James Baldwin wrote about 
Harlem two years later, “the hired enemies of this population.”6 In turn, conventional media outlets 
seemed on the hunt for effective policing models that projected an alternate image to “race riots” 
and racialized urban disorders. One might argue they aimed to reaffirm the legitimacy of the police, 
balancing “law-and-order” and the “procedural justice” then encoded in New Deal liberalism.7 In 
 
5 “How One City Keeps Its Streets Safe,” 68-71. Milwaukee had not fully avoided “racial disturbances” during the post-
World War II period. While they did not occur on the scale of Harlem or North Philadelphia’s uprisings in 1964, 
multiple “near riots” occurred among white police patrolmen and Black youth in the dozen years leading up to Harold 
Breier’s 1964 appointment as police chief. That Black youth were being routinely watched, stopped, questioned, 
harassed, and, in many cases, forcefully commandeered and arrested reflected broader feelings of racialized insecurity 
and anxiety during the Cold War 1940s and 1950s. On the “near riots” that took place between white patrolmen and 
Black youth in 1950s Milwaukee, see: Bernard Toliver and Joseph Himden, “Research in Police-Community Relations in 
Inner-Core Area, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1959–1960” (Master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 1961); 
Simon Ezra Balto, “‘Occupied Territory:’ Police Repression and Black Resistance in Postwar Milwaukee, 1950-1968,” 
The Journal of African American History 98 (2) (Spring 2013), 245. On Cold War racial fears in Milwaukee, see: Kevin D. 
Smith, “From Socialism to Racism: The Politics of Class and Identity in Postwar Milwaukee” Michigan Historical Review 29 
(1) (Spring, 2003): 71-95. For a national study on this topic, see: Elaine Tyler May, Fortress America: How We Embraced Fear 
and Abandoned Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 1-6. 
6 James Baldwin, “A Report from Occupied Territory,” The Nation, July 11, 1966, accessed July 5, 2020, 
http://www.thenation.com/article/report-occupied-territory/. 
7 On Congress’ efforts to shore up the ability of police departments to administer law-and-order, see: “Law 
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary United States 
Senate,” U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1965. Historian Michael Flamm has described “law and order” 
as “a new issue” that “emerged at the forefront of political discourse” in the 1960s as local and national conservative 
forces addressed what they saw as New Deal-Great Society liberalism run amok. However, in Wisconsin at least, the 
phrase had a longer history. “Law and order leagues” concerned about the influence and dangers of immigrant vice and 
crime emerged as early as 1913, suggesting a much longer history of fear-driven tough on crime approaches in U.S. cities 
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truth, fearful white citizens and politicians, in Milwaukee and elsewhere, employed law-and-order as 
a euphemism to describe their desires for racial and class containment. 
 In framing the relationship between race and public safety, Milwaukee police bureaucrats 
quoted in the above article failed to account for how law enforcement itself engendered feelings of 
insecurity, animosity, and mistrust among Black citizens through the MPD’s “omnipresence” and 
neglect of service in African American spaces.8 Poor, jobless, and under-employed Black adults, as 
well as young people, articulated their own anxieties around navigating the city’s Sixth Ward streets.9 
An “attitude study” conducted in 1965 with both Black and white residents living in and around 
Milwaukee’s “Inner Core” highlighted this racial discrepancy.10 Black respondents felt that their 
neighborhoods got policed less effectively than exclusively white neighborhoods. A preponderance 
cited the police as “disinterested,” “prejudiced,” “brutal,” and focused on “petty things.” How 
African Americans saw an officer’s race mattered too, with a larger percentage citing white 
patrolmen as “mean,” biased, and disrespectful.11 Conversely, white respondents were more likely to 
describe white officers as “afraid” of working in Black neighborhoods and “not strict enough with 
Negroes.” They observed “increasing crime” and “tension” in racially mixed communities and 
expressed “fear” about disorder at a higher rate.12  
  Taken together, the 1964 U.S. News & World Report piece and 1965 attitude study implied a 
 
undergoing social demographic change. “Fail to Censure Janssen on Vice,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, May 2, 1913, Part 1, 1. 
Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 1. 
8 “Black Milwaukee” borrows from historian Trotter’s parlance in describing the socio-economically diverse world of 
African-Americans in the city. Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945, 
2nd ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 118, 285. 
9 The Sixth Ward was a municipal voting district encompassing the vast majority of the city’s African American 
population. Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118. 
10 The attitude study was conducted in October 1965. It was commissioned by The Milwaukee Journal Co. It divided the 
north side into three sections: “Upper Core,” “Middle Core,” and “Lower Core.” “Attitude Study among Negro and 
White Residents in the Milwaukee Negro Residential Areas,” Bisbing Business Research, Green Bay, Wisconsin, 1965, 
Wisconsin Historical Society, accessed August 19, 2019, 
http://content.wisconsinhistory.org/cdm/ref/collection/tp/id/71332. 
11 “Attitude Study among Negro and White Residents in the Milwaukee Negro Residential Areas,” 94. 
12 “Attitude Study among Negro and White Residents in the Milwaukee Negro Residential Areas,” 89. 
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racial disjuncture around policing in 1960s Milwaukee. Each suggested that understandings of the 
MPD’s efficacy in preserving order, controlling crime, and safeguarding the city were incomplete 
and disconnected from harsh truths faced by countless Black Milwaukee residents—namely that 
policing in the city too often manifested as a racist enterprise. In this view, Milwaukee’s all-white 
police bureaucracy was blind to the role that its virtually all-white police force played in instigating 
racial discontent, in a place that historically privileged and prioritized whiteness. Furthermore, police 
bureaucrats refused to see how the MPD’s own policies and discretionary practices fomented social 
discord, indirectly proliferated crime, and hardened perceptions of Black criminality.13 
  This chapter begins the process of interrogating Milwaukee’s racial disjuncture around public 
safety in the 20th century, exploring how it has characterized diverse experiences with local law 
enforcement over time. It argues that the separation between how white and Black citizens 
perceived the MPD in the 1960s is actually rooted in a narrative of policing exceptionalism that first 
gained traction in the 1910s and 1920s, before flowering in full bloom in the 1930s and 1940s. This 
narrative holds that the Milwaukee Police Department was unparalleled among U.S. law 
enforcement agencies in its assumed professionalism, willingness to innovate, and effectiveness at 
controlling crime. As a result, influential white observers in both government and policing circles 
conferred a self-reinforcing, meritorious legitimacy upon the department—the legacy of which 
remains a significant obstacle to both liberal reformers and abolitionists today. 
 The MPD’s leadership in the “reform era” of U.S. policing evolved in relation to convulsive 
social, economic, and political events that carried profound racial implications.14 These included 
 
13 Legal scholar Matthew Flynn defines police discretion as “the power of a police officer to decide in a variety of 
situations to take action, not to take action, and how to take action. Policies may be made by the command level of a 
police department to control that discretion.” Matthew J. Flynn, “Police Accountability in Wisconsin,” Wisconsin Law 
Review 9 (4) (1974), 1148. 
14 On the “reform era” in U.S. policing, see Eric H. Monkkonen, Police in Urban America, 1860-1920 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981); Hahn and Jeffries, Urban America and Its Police; Robert M. Fogelson, Big City Police 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform. 
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World War I, the Great Migration, the Great Depression, and the rise of New Deal liberalism.15 The 
MPD’s exceptionalism narrative emerged at a time when Milwaukee’s Black population numbered 
less than 10,000, well before the city experienced its “late Great Migration” upon U.S. entry into 
World War II. The Progressive Era was not one of racial enlightenment.16 In the early 20th century, 
“white rage,” joined with nativist fervor.17 It was powered by new theories of race science that 
diminished Black citizenship claims. Escalating forces of white supremacy inflicted mass terror 
against Black men and women, and not exclusively in the Jim Crow South, but also in Midwestern 
cities, like Milwaukee. One reason that the city’s Black population remained comparatively small in 
these tumultuous years was that the MPD strictly enforced “vagrancy” laws against African 
American transients and under-employed workers. These laws essentially “made it a crime to be a 
certain type of person.” According to historian Risa Goluboff, one did not need to commit an 
offense to be arrested; one merely had to look “suspicious,” “dissolute,” or “lacking a lawful 
purpose.”18 As white officials affirmed, the MPD aggressively enforced vagrancy offenses against 
Black people so as to prevent the violent unrest occurring in nearby cities with much larger Black 
populations, such as occurred in Chicago in 1919. However, they were also acting in accordance 
with racist white manufacturing and trade union prerogatives meant to undermine Black industrial 
employment gains and labor competition. In 1931, this system of vagrancy enforcement contributed 
 
15 Milwaukee County employment dropped by 44 percent from 1929 to 1932. Kenneth Germanson, “Workers’ 
Movements,” Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, July 10, 2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/workers-movements/. 
16 Milwaukee’s Black population mushroomed in the post-World War II period, from a population of around 10,000 
residents in 1945 to more than 105,000 by 1970. While the number of white, or European ethnic Milwaukeeans 
increased from 578,177 in 1940 to 675,572 in 1960. That number contracted to 605,372 in 1970 and has continued to 
shrink ever since. Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 
1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States,” Population 
Division, Working Paper No. 76, U.S. Census Bureau, February 2005, 113. Paul Geib refers to Black movement to 
Milwaukee from the 1940s to the 1960s as a “late great migration,” given that the total number of Black migrants to the 
city during this span far exceeded that of previous decades. Paul Geib, “From Mississippi to Milwaukee: A Case Study of 
the Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee, 1940-1970,” The Journal of Negro History 83 (4) (Autumn, 1998), 231. 
17 Carol Anderson, White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016). 
18 Risa Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional Change, and the Making of the 1960s (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 2. 
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to a policing regime that drew plaudits from the U.S. Justice Department, which lauded the MPD 
for having “speedily detected, arrested, and promptly tried” all criminal suspects.19 The federal 
government even recommended the department’s first-of-its-kind Police Training School to other 
countries, bolstering its elite public status.20 
 Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism originated in statutes passed during the 
“long Progressive Era.”21 In the late 19th century, white Protestant social reformers were eager to 
“clean up” the ill effects of rapid industrialization, expanded immigration, and machine politics in 
the city.22 Concurrently, elite business interests demanded greater control over the political power of 
organized labor.23 The MPD provided the most readily available and powerful means for reformers 
and manufacturers to impose order over what they viewed as the worst outcomes of immigrant 
working-class ascendancy. To ensure that police served their class-based interests, these groups 
lobbied state officials in Madison, Wisconsin to override Milwaukee’s “home rule” of the police.24 
Ready to oblige, the state’s Republican-controlled legislature passed laws that, among other 
outcomes, guaranteed police power would remain in the hands of capitalist and middle-class elites 
and not the workers parties seeking greater municipal influence. Some, like the Social Democrats, 
 
19 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Police (Washington D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1931), 3. 
20 Police Chief Joseph Kluchesky to Mayor Daniel Hoan, December 12, 1939, Folder 668, “Police Department, 1934-
1940,” Hoan, Daniel Webster Papers, Mss-0546, Milwaukee County Historical Society. 
21 On the periodization of the “long Progressive Era,” see Robert D. Johnston, “The Possibilities of Politics: Democracy 
in America, 1877 to 1917,” in American History Now, Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, eds. (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 2011), 96-124. 
22 This modernizing, reformist impulse among white Protestant middle-class reformers lingered in Milwaukee for 
decades. See: Eric Fure-Slocum, Contesting the Postwar City: Working-Class and Growth Politics in Postwar Milwaukee (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
23 Sidney Harring’s work on the policing of class in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era U.S. is essential to 
understanding these political dynamics around law enforcement in Milwaukee. Sidney L. Harring, Policing a Class Society: 
The Experience of American Cities, 1865-1915 2nd ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2017). For studies that 
address policing and its relationship to urban class politics in the U.S., see: Marilynn Johnson, Street Justice: A History of 
Police Violence in New York City (Boston: Beacon Books, 2003); Matthew A. Guariglia, “The American Problem: Race, 
Empire, and Policing in New York City, 1840-1930,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 2019); Sam Mitrani, The 
Rise of the Chicago Police Department: Class and Conflict, 1850-1894 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013). 
24 Bethany Harding, “Home Rule,” The Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed September 11, 2019, 
https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/home-rule/. 
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had successfully vied for control of City Hall from 1910 to 1912.  
Wisconsin Chapter 586, signed into law in 1911, bestowed lifetime tenure on Milwaukee fire 
and police chiefs. It also granted them power to regulate their departments through a centralized 
command structure. That law expanded on an 1885 statute, Chapter 387, which established the 
Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission (MFPC) as the city’s public safety recruitment, testing, and 
disciplinary review board. The MFPC was among the first civil service agencies in America and the 
nation’s first independent public safety board.25 It was empowered to hear complaints against police 
from registered property owners and to remove public safety chiefs “for cause.” These statutes 
effectively insulated the MPD from municipal control and, at least on paper, instituted a quasi-
judicial oversight structure to ensure proper function of the fire and police departments.  
 The 1920s and 1930s were pivotal decades in the formalization of the MPD’s exceptionalism 
narrative and in the attendant criminalization of blackness taking place across the white ethnic city. 
It was in this fluctuating period of both economic excess and downturn that the department became 
a national leader in the movement for police professionalism. However, in the eyes of the city’s 
small but growing Black population, the MPD was also becoming a more pronounced, increasingly 
racialized symbol of oppression. The 1930s, in particular, showed how the narrative of policing 
exceptionalism intersected with and built off of evolving white conceptions of racial and class 
hierarchy and their assumed relationship to public order, crime control, and safety. Even many white 
liberals supported the cultural racism that buttressed the social, economic, and political denigration 
of African Americans. The policing of public order and morals offenses reinforced that prejudice.  
Milwaukee was not a racially democratic city, even under the leadership of its renowned 
 
25 Other historians have argued that Philadelphia liberals established the nation’s “first independent civilian review 
board” in 1958. That board, too, consisted of mayoral appointees who heard public complaints, could order 
investigations, and served in a quasi-judicial capacity. They also claim it was the “longest lived,” despite Milwaukee’s 
having been founded seventy-three years earlier. Eric C. Schneider, Christopher Agee, and Themis Chronopoulos, 
“Dirty Work: Police and Community Relations and the Limits of Liberalism in Postwar Philadelphia,” Journal of Urban 
History (2017), 3, 5. 
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Socialist mayors.26 In this period, elite social reformers crusading against “immoral” vice activities 
joined in the nationwide process of  rendering Black criminality distinct from illicit white poor and 
working-class behavior. And yet, it is also in this moment that Milwaukee’s small, but growing Black 
middle-class first challenged what many in the city’s Bronzeville community saw as the racialized 
policing of  urban vice.27 A Black professional-led organization, the Sixth Ward Law and Order 
League (SWLOL), presented an alternative to the all-white Citizen’s Law and Order League and its 
morals enforcement of  vice activities. The latter primarily concerned itself  with illicit gambling and 
sex work, particularly in the city’s increasingly Black near north side area. The former targeted 
racially discriminatory policing of  Black citizens and spaces. 
 
The Statutory Roots of  the MPD’s Exceptionalism Narrative 
 Understanding Milwaukee’s racial disjuncture around policing in the 1960s means first 
excavating the city’s unsettled class politics near the turn of the 20th century. Milwaukee’s class 
politics gave shape to the legal formation of the city’s police bureaucracy—the MFPC, MPD, City 
Hall (Mayor’s office and Common Council), and Milwaukee County District Attorney’s office. 
Knowing this provides a deeper sense of how the state structured police reform and mechanisms of 
redress in the event of police misconduct, as well as why these tools have historically proven so 
difficult to access for poor and working-class Black citizens experiencing police violence. In a period 
of heavy industrialization and uneven wealth accumulation, immigration and working-class 
suppression, fiscal surplus and economic depression, Milwaukeeans immersed themselves in, to 
borrow historian Robert Wiebe’s verbiage, “the search for order.”28 Establishing control of the 
 
26 Trotter, Black Milwaukee; Jane L. Collins and Victoria Mayer, Both Hands Tied: Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom of-
the Low Wage Labor Market (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 2010). 
27 On Bronzeville, see: Robert S. Smith, “African Americans,” Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed May 28, 2020, 
https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/african-americans/. 
28 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966). 
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police was crucial to setting social and class boundaries and, thus, delimiting power. 
 White corporate and professional elites suppressed competing working-class interests by 
strengthening their grip on law enforcement. While race may not appear to be a discernible factor in 
the efforts, it is important to note that racial categories were still being sorted out. Policing played a 
role in this process.29 Social and economic elites organized industrial cities like Milwaukee around 
what scholar Cedric Robinson termed “racial capitalism.”30 Race has remained inextricably linked to 
urban development in the U.S. The statutes analyzed in this chapter not only concentrated police 
power in Milwaukee, but, over time, helped to confirm racial power in the city. With their passage, 
the MFPC gained the authority to determine who got hired onto the MPD. Meanwhile, the police 
chief not only wrote and enforced police department regulations, but also decided who was to be 
promoted or chosen for specialized squads. In other words, they determined who would monitor 
“subversive” activities among poor and working-class people, union leaders, and progressive-left 
politicians. This was real power, and it was thoroughly racialized. Policing, as historian Matthew 
 
29 Nora Krinitsky, “The Politics of Crime Control, Race, Policing, and Reform in Twentieth-Century Chicago” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Michigan, 2017), 17. See: Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and 
the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and 
the Making of the American Working Class (New York: Verso, 1991); Nell Irvin Painter, The History of White People (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2010). 
30 Scholar Cedric Robinson argued that Marx’s idea of capitalism as a revolutionary departure from feudalism was an 
incomplete interpretation. It missed, in particular, how racism and capitalism evolved together, in symbiosis, as 
feudalism transitioned to capitalism across Western Civilization. Racial capitalism, Robinson’s shorthand, depended, as 
historian Robin Kelley has written, “on slavery, violence, imperialism, and genocide” to materialize. These forces were 
deeply racialized and already had been prior to the emergence of capitalism. Imperial European processes of 
“racialization” relied on the dispossession, colonizing, and enslavement of racial subjects globally. Invasion, settlement, 
and the expropriation of lands supported social, political, and economic justifications based on racial hierarchy. This 
historical background is crucial to understanding how white natives, European immigrants, and their descendants in 
industrial U.S. cities like Milwaukee understood race and its relationship to the capitalist system that organized their daily 
lives. It informed public conversations around race and the collective worldview of all civic actors, including those 
commonly associated with politically “progressive” understandings of inequality within capitalist systems, such as the 
city’s Socialist Party. Needless to say, the longer history of racial capitalist development produced noticeable blind spots 
around race and its intersection with class. It helps us to understand the anti-Black racist structures that law enforcement 
served to monitor and perpetuate, as well as distinct modes of Black radicalism that emerged in opposition. Cedric 
Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, rev. ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2000), 1-3; Robin D.G. Kelley, “Introduction,” in Race, Capitalism, Justice, Walter Johnson and Robin D.G. Kelley, 
eds., Boston Review, Forum 1 (2017), 7. 
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Guariglia argues, helped European ethnics “lead their communities into whiteness.”31 Accessing law 
enforcement was essential to the larger “project of racial state building.” By the mid-20th century, the 
MPD was predominantly staffed by men of Irish, German, and Polish ancestry.32 The department’s 
apparent whiteness afforded social and economic mobility to European immigrants and their 
descendants through civil service employment. Save for a handful of token appointments, that same 
mobility was denied to Black and, later, Latinx citizens—really until the civil rights insurgencies of 
the 1960s and 1970s.33 Anti-Black racism facilitated “the formation of a more consolidated 
whiteness.”34 The MPD led this charge when police officers used their discretion to determine who 
constituted a criminal and who did not. The Progressive Era police laws and their practical effects, 
i.e. police professionalization through a civil service system, aided in normalizing public conceptions 
of racial difference. Police choices, informed by individual biases about who was “good” and “bad,” 
carried value across the civic landscape. The MPD’s racialized discretion was the bedrock of the 
narrative of policing exceptionalism. 
 Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy was rooted in turn of the century campaigns to reform local 
police authority so that it better served the interests of wealthy white manufacturers and professional 
elites. These powerful entities struggled to impose “order” in the midst of the city’s rapid industrial 
expansion in the late 19th century. Manufacturing growth transformed Milwaukee’s social and 
economic life, in addition to its “ethno-cultural” geography.35 Ethnic, cultural, and religious identities 
guided political affiliations across Wisconsin and the Northwest Territory.36 A corporate-backed 
 
31 Guariglia, “The American Problem,” 6. 
32 Irish Americans dominated the ranks of the MPD in the early-20th century. Harlan D. Hahn and Judson L. Jeffries, 
Urban America and Its Police: From the Postcolonial Era through the Turbulent 1960s (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 
2003), 6. 
33 Wisconsin Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Police Isolation and Community Needs, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1972). 
34 Guariglia, “The American Problem,” 6. 
35 John D. Buenker, The History of Wisconsin, Volume IV: The Progressive Era, 1893 – 1914 (Madison: State Historical Society 
of Wisconsin, 1998), 126. 
36 John Buenker, “Cream City Electoral Politics: A Play in Four Acts,” in Perspectives on Milwaukee’s Past, edited by Margo 
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Republican Party machine ascended in Milwaukee during the 1870s, achieving near parity with its 
Democratic rival. Social and religious traditions continued to inform party affiliation, but this 
relationship became tenuous amid industrialization, new and expanded immigration, and sundry 
economic crises. Democrats and Republicans alike failed to meliorate economic depressions, like the 
Panic of  1893. Thereupon, the two-party dynamic shifted. Third parties emerged, organized around 
a more “class-conscious, issue-oriented brand of  politics.”37 Milwaukee’s gaining industrial foothold 
and foreign-born population shaped the city’s germinating working-class consciousness.38 Populist, 
Progressive, and Socialist parties entered the electoral system after the 1870s; municipal politics 
became more competitive, with voters growing fervent in their partisan loyalties. The Democratic 
and Republican parties formed coalitions to challenge the rise of  socialist and workers parties. In the 
process, class became the crucial fault line that divided the city’s politics.39  
 Explosive industrial development, economic panics, and population changes meant new 
demands for existing municipal services, including law enforcement. How the city delivered policing 
services became a visible source of  tension. In the 1880s, leaders of  industry and commerce joined 
middle-class, mainly Protestant social reformers concerned about the role of  law enforcement in 
managing class and socioeconomic status across a rapidly transforming urban terrain. These groups 
 
J. Anderson and Victor R. Greene (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 18-22. 
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lobbied the Wisconsin legislature, then controlled by Republicans, to insulate the MPD from both 
the threat of  working-class political control and the corrupting influence of  ward-based political 
party machines. Manufacturers and social reformers wanted greater flexibility to, respectively, call 
upon the police to crush labor rebellions and enforce vice ordinances. Corporate leaders were 
anxious about rising workers parties and labor militants disrupting the flow of  manufacturing and 
commerce. Strikes grew more common and violent in the late-19th century. Workers parties appealed 
to newly arrived Southern and Eastern European immigrant groups, as well as existing German 
residents. Meanwhile, elite social reformers believed that only by decoupling the police from City 
Hall would Milwaukee’s volatile social landscape be stabilized, immorality and corruption eliminated.  
With a population of  over 150,000 by the mid-1880s, Milwaukee was the only city in 
Wisconsin designated as a “city of  the first class” by the state legislature. However, Madison exerted 
significant control over Milwaukee, determining its property and corporate tax structures, its welfare 
services, and the functionality of  its fire and police departments. While city officials advocated for 
home rule, power in Milwaukee remained divided among Wisconsin legislators, City Hall, the 
Milwaukee County Board of  Supervisors, and a handful of  local commissions.40   
Ever since the state formally elevated the MPD in 1855 from preceding “marshal,” 
“constable,” and “night watchmen” systems, frequent mayoral turnover and patronage appointments 
had bred corruption. This led to ineffective public order enforcement.41 Police chiefs, who 
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were “men who worked the streets” and “responded to citizens’ cries for help, arrested suspects, and brought suspects 
to watch houses for processing.” They worked at the behest of city representatives. Adam Malka, The Men of Mobtown: 
Policing Baltimore in the Age of Slavery and Emancipation (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 30. 
Prior to being formally chartered in 1846, Milwaukee relied on a township constable and village marshal to enforce the 
law. Thomas Kukowski, “Crime,” The Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed July 6, 2020, 
https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/crime/. Middle-class social reformers actually began campaigning for a citizen review 
board to monitor Milwaukee’s police and fire departments as early as 1864. John Gurda, Cream City Chronicles: Stories of  
Milwaukee’s Past (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2007), 210. 
  63 
historically served at the behest of  City Hall, were beholden to party directives.42 Machine politicians 
called on the MPD to collect graft. Incoming mayors replaced police chiefs at will and handpicked 
subordinates. Whoever generated the highest vote totals earned the job. After the appointment of  
new chiefs, “the whole police force would quit…knowing that otherwise they would be fired.”43 
Once in office, police chiefs faced the “constant fire of  the party out of  power.”44 The city 
appointed eight different police chiefs from 1855 to 1885.45 High turnover led to poor service and 
stifled internal development. This challenged the public’s ability to secure police accountability, or 
“fair and effective police services.”46  
 Corporate and social elites advocated for a more stable, independent MPD that would no 
longer be subject to the whims of  the political party in power. But they also wanted a police force 
capable of  suppressing disorderly behavior, particularly in vice districts, and of  turning back 
working-class power, especially strikes. Workers parties were cultivating political strength through 
Milwaukee’s Federated Trades Council (FTC). In 1882, they briefly won control of  City Hall from 
Republicans, forging a coalition with Democrats after a violent cigar-maker’s strike.47 “Responsible 
citizens” answered this in 1884 by pushing for a civil service law in the state legislature that would 
 
42 Fifteen of Milwaukee’s first sixteen mayors represented the Democratic Party. The city’s first Republican mayor was 
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eliminate the city’s “spoils system,” which determined who received public safety positions. Attorney 
Jerome R. Brigham led this reform charge, essentially drafting the bill that later passed a Republican-
controlled legislature in 1885. “Chapter 378 of  the Laws of  1885” was, according to former MFPC 
chairman William Gore, the first statute in the U.S. to “institutionalize the concept of  civilian 
oversight of  the police.”48 The law, which amended the City Charter, authorized Milwaukee mayors 
to appoint fire and police commissioners to overlapping four-year terms.  
While the terms of  police power in the city would be clarified further by state legislators in 
1911, the 1885 law fundamentally changed the structure of  police leadership in Milwaukee. The 
four-person MFPC was never to feature more than two members from the same political party. The 
measure directed the commission to set rules and regulations for selecting, appointing, classifying, 
and promoting all public safety personnel. However, it had no supervisory authority over the MPD’s 
operations.49 The MFPC was authorized to hire and discharge public safety employees by a 
unanimous vote, including chiefs. The statute only gave mayors power to suspend a fire or police 
chief  “for cause,” at which point the commission would hold a review hearing to recommend for or 
against termination.50 Consequentially, the law granted fire and police chiefs indefinite lengths of  
tenure, meaning they could potentially serve for life. The legislature approved Chapter 378 two years 
after the U.S. Congress passed the Pendleton Act, which “transformed the nature of  public service” 
in American by instituting civil service.51 The law included a safeguard for rank-and-file officers, 
protecting them from the re-shuffling of  personnel based on economic strains.52 Jerome Brigham 
 
48 Gore was the first African American fire and police commissioner. Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police 
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served as one of  the first four MFPC members appointed by Mayor Emil Wallber, a fusion ticket 
Republican who won by consolidating the working-class German vote.53 
 Milwaukee’s first “chief  for life,” John Janssen, set the terms for the city’s narrative of  
policing exceptionalism during his record thirty-three years at the helm of  the MPD (1888-1921). He 
did so by expanding police power and, thus, raising the department’s legitimacy in the eyes of  
everyday people. In the process, the German-American chief  helped usher in U.S. policing’s “reform 
era,” also known as the “professionalization movement.” Janssen took full advantage of  the 
authority granted to him by the state.54 He established a centralized, tightly-controlled police agency. 
Janssen was detail-oriented, known to work long hours. He was also a strict disciplinarian, who 
expected obedience from all officers. To ensure that police personnel guarded Milwaukee’s streets 
effectively, Janssen ordered beat patrolmen to report to supervisors at least once an hour using “call 
boxes” that he had installed throughout the city.55 
Chief  Janssen grew Milwaukee’s police force dramatically during his lengthy tenure, from 
181 to 649 officers. He also secured a number of  pay increases for police personnel, with 
competitive wage scales. Other reform innovations introduced by Janssen included a fingerprint 
system (1907), motorized ambulances (1910), motorcycle patrols (1910), traffic enforcement (1914), 
the nation’s first police band, and a police parade intended to boost the MPD’s image and showcase 
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its state-sanctioned authority.56 The “Czar,” as Janssen became known, established the MPD’s first 
district system, when he opened a south side police station in 1891. Janssen also founded one of  the 
first regular police training programs in the U.S. An ostensibly forward-thinking police academy 
would, over time, become a hallmark of  the department’s narrative of  policing exceptionalism. 
 While Chief  Janssen was formally non-partisan, he understood that his authority derived 
from, as historian Sidney Harring writes, “the bourgeois political system.”57 That was who the MPD 
ultimately served. The proudly anti-union, strike-quashing chief  embodied the elite vision for 
independent police power outlined in the 1885 statute. Janssen disdained the socialist politics of  
Milwaukee’s working-class and scorned Social Democratic leaders publicly. 58 In 1911, Janssen told 
the city’s first Socialist Party mayor, Emil Seidel, to “go to hell.” Seidel had called for the chief  to 
resign after authorizing brutality against women garment workers while they were on strike.59 Janssen 
refused to step down.  
The chief  allegedly maintained a “black box” filled with “incriminating data” on city officials. 
He was prepared to make this data public if  they interfered with the MPD’s affairs. In key ways, 
Janssen was a forerunner to police chief  Harold Breier’s autocratic reign from 1964 to 1984. Both 
men kept close tabs on local politicians, as well as poor and working-class people they saw as 
disruptive to the status quo. Each was insular, secretive, and loathed anyone who challenged their 
authority, especially progressive-left “agitators” and “radicals.” Janssen and Breier both employed 
strict discipline against rank-and-file personnel who violated department regulations. Still, the former 
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used his discretion to protect high-ranking officers who collected graft and served his direct needs. 
One city official referred to Janssen as the “Prussian bulldozer” for how he closed in on crime.60 But 
the chief  was also selective about which laws his men enforced. He tolerated a good measure of  
corruption and vice. During most of  Janssen’s tenure, Milwaukee stayed a “wide open town.” Vice 
was largely siloed by the MPD into a single downtown district. With the support of  the five-term 
Democratic Mayor David Rose, Janssen restricted saloons, gambling halls, and prostitution to the 
Third Ward.61 Affluent residents and out-of-towners regularly visited the “high-class red light 
district” on River St.62 Business men participated in vice activities, and profited from them as well. 
Eventually, social reformers looked to indict Chief  Janssen and Mayor Rose on gambling and 
corruption charges. The chief  of  police protected the city’s vice district at the same time that he 
“directed a crusade” against ancillary working-class “stall saloons,” brothels, and dives.63 
When Milwaukee’s Socialist Party briefly won full control over city government in 1910, it 
looked to clamp down on vice and corruption as part of  a broader public health initiative. The 
Socialist Party’s victory encouraged a more strained relationship between the MPD and City Hall. 
The party saw the police department as a generally repressive force that was against working-class 
interests. Nevertheless, police rank-and-file officers were municipal workers; they, too, deserved 
reasonable wages, working conditions, hours, and time off. Milwaukee Socialists hoped to emphasize 
the service-oriented aspects of  policing, using patrolmen to check in on residents and businesses.64 
Mayor Seidel advised Chief  Janssen to inspect sanitation conditions, stop truancy, and regulate 
factory smoke. Much to his chagrin, the MPD’s function remained order maintenance, protecting 
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property, interfering with trade union activities, and aggressively breaking strikes. Janssen rebuffed 
Socialist Party demands and made end-runs around the mayor via state representatives.65  
 It was in this period that Wisconsin’s legislature, controlled by Progressive Republicans, 
revised the 1885 policing statute.66 Again, corporate and middle-class elites responded to rising labor 
militancy and the Socialist Party’s ascendance in City Hall. Chapter 586, passed in 1911, made it 
easier for the MPD to “break” work stoppages, which were becoming more frequent. The law 
consequently deepened animosities between the department and Socialist leaders. The latter 
considered vice, which Janssen openly tolerated, as worthy of  close policing.67  
 Milwaukee’s Socialist Party was reformist. Its interests resembled liberal Democrats and 
Progressive Republicans more than radical workers parties.68 The Socialist Party advocated for 
policies that restricted corruption, regulated utilities, granted workers economic relief, and paid 
down municipal debt. But they also embraced Milwaukee’s conservative trade union politics, which 
tended to look down on unskilled laborers. Socialist Party co-founder Victor Berger, the first 
Socialist elected to the U.S. House of  Representatives (1910), set the party’s tone and direction. This 
included racist proclivities.69 For example, local Socialists refused to advocate for Black workers and 
welcomed racially restrictive covenants that relegated African Americans to inferior housing stock.70 
Berger believed that the city’s working-class politics should emphasize an evolution within 
capitalism, not its destruction. The party rejected the Marxist view that a revolutionary “cataclysm” 
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would birth socialism “in a pure and finished form.”71 Milwaukee Socialists also legislated on labor 
demands through traditional government channels rather than seeking workplace confrontations 
with hostile manufacturers. This further distinguished them from radical progressive-left parties.  
Still, Chief  Janssen’s MPD was hostile towards Socialist Party demonstrators and campaign 
workers, who struggled to make the department operate on their behalf. The 1911 statute prevented 
a Socialist-controlled City Hall from halting the MPD’s repressive anti-worker practices. In turn, 
policing remained “a powerful weapon in the class struggle.” The MPD’s state-sanctioned autonomy 
and ostensibly “value-neutral ideology” shielded it from political interference.72 
 Chapter 586 did not merely serve as a mechanism to quell working-class power. It also 
strengthened the MFPC. In an apparent compromise with Social Democrats in Milwaukee, the state 
legislature expanded the MFPC from four to five members, doing so against the wishes of  Chief  
Janssen. Mayor Seidel could now appoint a Socialist Party commissioner as a tie-breaking vote.  
The law also authorized the commission to hear both disciplinary appeals and civilian complaints 
made against officers or public safety departments. If  a chief  discharged, suspended, or reduced the 
rank of  an employee, the MFPC served as a quasi-judicial board of  appeals.73 Previously, the 
commission only appeared at citizen complaint hearings held by the MPD “in an oversight 
capacity.”74 The MFPC’s revised statutory function now read: 
In cases where duly verified charges shall be filed by any reputable freeholder… 
setting forth sufficient cause for the removal of  any member of  either of  said 
departments, including the chiefs or their assistants, it shall be the duty of  such 
board to immediately suspend such member or officer and cause notice of  the filing 
of  such charges…and to set a date as herein provided for the trial and investigation 
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of  such charges…The board shall decide by a majority vote whether the charges are 
sustained. If  sustained the board shall immediately determine whether the good of  
the service requires that the accused shall be removed, suspended from office 
without pay for a period not exceeding sixty days or reduced in rank. If  not sustained 
the accused shall be immediately reinstated without prejudice…75 
 
 The 1911 statute was not a democratic measure. The state only authorized “reputable 
freeholders,” or property owners, to file complaints against the police. This ensured that the MFPC 
rarely heard Black grievances, particularly as the city’s African American population grew in postwar 
decades. As historian Simon Balto has observed, “the extreme poverty of  many African American 
victims of  police repression compounded the frustration they felt with the police department.”76 
Entrenched poverty and discriminatory lending made it difficult for Black families to purchase the 
homes needed to file police grievances. Most complainants of  color did not own property. The law 
systematically barred thousands of  Black renters, youth, and transients, all of  who were overly 
vulnerable to police misconduct, from obtaining justice.  
Few Black migrants knew about the MFPC’s oversight function, or that property 
qualifications precluded lawful complaints. The city did not publicize the commission’s oversight 
role. When Black complainants did own property or had a complaint filed on their behalf  by a 
registered freeholder, the MFPC’s standard practice was to refer grievances to MPD district stations 
for investigation, which rarely resulted in discipline. Despite Chapter 586’s democratic allusions, 
most poor and working-class residents had no legal basis to disrupt a law-and-order regime that 
principally safeguarded manufacturing, professional, and propertied interests. The law’s requirements 
implied that a hierarchy of  rights and privileges existed that benefited white landed citizens above all. 
Democratizing Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy, therefore, was not simply a matter of  changing 
public perceptions of  what equal citizenship entailed, but about further revising the statute that 
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authorized police officials to so readily deny accountability. 
More significantly, however, Chapter 586 clarified the powers enjoyed by Milwaukee public 
safety chiefs. Notably, the statute eliminated the mayor’s ability to suspend fire or police chiefs “for 
cause,” locating that power with the Fire and Police Commission.77 This language was important, as 
it conferred even greater authority onto public safety chiefs who now enjoyed “full independence 
and life-time tenure.” By and large, public safety chiefs enjoyed the support of  the MFPC, whose 
members served in a part-time capacity. For most commissioners, the appointment was a prestige 
position that required little involvement. They tended to rubber stamp the police chief ’s 
prerogatives.78 The law granted public safety chiefs power to “regulate” and “prescribe rules” for 
their departments, including full “custody and control of  all books, records, machines, tools, 
implements, of  every kind.”79 They were directed to “preserve” the “public peace” and enforce “all 
laws and ordinances.” The police chief  was solely responsible for the “efficiency and general good 
conduct of  the department.” Responsibilities became more contested as public complaints of  police 
brutality, neglect and abuse of  power accelerated in the postwar and civil rights eras. Because 
Milwaukee’s city charter had no language forcing police chiefs to obey City Hall’s orders, the 
potential for a contentious relationship stayed ever-present.80 
 
Politics, Class, and Race 
  With Chapters 387 (1885) and 586 (1911) on the books, Milwaukee moved ahead of the 
curve on a sweeping national project of police professionalization. From the Progressive Era 
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through the mid-1930s, the MPD cultivated an international reputation for technical innovation, 
strategic foresight, and effective crime control. Freed from outside interference and term limits, the 
department institutionally blossomed from 1888 to 1936 under the guidance of just two police 
chiefs: John Janssen and Jacob Laubenheimer.81 The city’s first and only Socialist police chief, 
Joseph Kluchesky, followed from 1936 to 1945.82 He introducing reforms characterized by the 
“liberal law-and-order” politics of the World War II era. Alongside infrastructural upgrades 
advocated for by Socialist Party mayors in waste disposal, water management, street lighting, and 
parks beautification, the MPD’s crime fighting capacities contributed to Milwaukee’s vaunted status 
as “the healthiest large city in the nation.”83 Accurate or not, this was the story that police 
bureaucrats came to tell themselves about the department and what many residents, mainstream 
press outlets, and public commentators increasingly understood to be true.  
  Well into the 1950s, academic researchers characterized the MPD as a pioneering law 
enforcement agency.84 The department, in this view, helped modernize policing during what criminal 
justice scholars have referred to as policing’s “reform era.”85 From the 1920s through the 1950s, the 
MPD garnered national accolades, including being singled out by the National Commission on Law 
Observance and Enforcement, a federal committee that researched crime and policing in the U.S. 
towards the end of Prohibition (1931). In 1939, Chile’s Popular Front government verified that the 
MPD’s reputation carried across continents; it inquired about sending three federal officers to 
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Milwaukee’s Police Training School to learn about traffic management and law enforcement 
education.86 As the U.S. News & World Report story shared at the outset of this chapter demonstrates, 
positive national reporting on the MPD lasted well into the 1960s.87 
  And yet, Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism was forged during the same early 
20th century decades that saw troubling narratives of racial difference and white supremacist 
coercion intensify. White powerbrokers in the city gradually linked the movement, behavior, and 
attitudes of Black men and women more closely to urban disorder, illicit vice activities, and juvenile 
delinquency.88 They did so despite many white people’s co-participation in vice and crime. Processes 
of Black criminalization were by no means unique to Milwaukee. Throughout the Progressive Era, 
white middle class citizens in positions of institutional and academic authority condemned blackness 
as distinct from poor and working-class white immigrant behavior. Many did so on the same 
biological basis used to justify racial enslavement and post-Emancipation systems of Black penal 
control, like the “convict lease” system.89 By the New Deal 1930s, Progressive Era reformers were 
doing so on cultural grounds. Ostensibly well-meaning social scientists, intellectuals, and liberal 
reformers, as historian Khalil Muhammad has argued, led in justifying Black racial inferiority and 
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legitimizing the specialized treatment African Americans received from municipal institutions, like 
the police.90 Women’s clubs, the Catholic Church, medical experts, and social scientists all had a hand 
in working to address conditions “known to foster crime and criminals.”91  
  Overwhelmingly white police regimes based order maintenance practices on racialized crime 
discourses that exonerated white behavior, while criminalizing Black comportment. The statistics 
police collected in comparatively poor, racially segregated Black urban spaces and vice districts 
helped generate criminalizing narratives.92 Consequently, the selective discretion of  white officers on 
patrol in these areas fueled racially biased outcomes: higher rates of  Black arrests, brutality, and 
death at the hands of  the police. Law enforcement did so, one historian writes, “by distorting the 
reality and perception of  crime”—misrepresentations that blended into the perceived truth of  
Milwaukee’s narrative of  policing exceptionalism.93 While there was some accuracy to the MPD’s 
exalted professional reputation, at least from the perspective of  technical innovation, it clearly came 
at the expense of  African American oppression.  
  Milwaukee police chiefs symbolized the MPD’s vaunted national standing. Longtime Socialist 
Mayor Daniel Hoan (1916-1940) placed veteran detective Jacob Laubenheimer’s name before the 
MFPC in 1921 to lead the department just before Chief  John Janssen died that year.94 The MPD’s 
new administrator was not only commended for maintaining a low crime rate throughout his fifteen 
year tenure, but also for implementing a proto-version of  what criminologists came to refer to as 
“community policing.”95 Laubenheimer’s approach to crime control relied on citizens assuming “to 
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an unusual degree, a responsibility for the maintenance of  public order.”96 However, the department 
never fully turned away from Janssen’s more reactionary and anti-labor model. The consolidation of  
police authority under a unitary chief  aided Laubenheimer in further expanding the MPD’s budget, 
garnering resources, and increasing the number of  sworn personnel.97 He began a pension system 
for retired officers and, like his predecessor, fought to increase rank-and-file salaries.   
  Structurally, Laubenheimer re-organized the MPD’s Detective Bureau; modernized the 
department’s record-keeping and crime tracking systems; and established early medical, traffic, and 
identification bureaus. In 1922, he opened one of  the nation’s first dedicated police training 
academies.98 There, new recruits and veteran officers learned about the laws they enforced; “effective 
wrestling and jiu-jitsu holds;” “marksmanship;” and how to “hunt down criminals,” administer first 
aid, and “handle their jobs with courtesy and tact.”99 Laubenheimer founded the Milwaukee Police 
Training School because, as he said, “uniformed policemen, especially the traffic officers” had been 
“condemned in a bombardment of  complaining letters, delegations, and newspaper editorials, for 
their abusiveness and insolence.”100 An aspect of  the training was “acquainting” police with the 
district attorney’s office, the local court system, and the county morgue.101 
  In December 1930, Laubenheimer instituted an early radio communications division within 
the MPD, a hallmark of  reform era policing.102 Radios helped facilitate rapid police responses to 
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crime. Dispatch operators could now communicate directly with squad cars, allowing them to 
quickly address reported offenses and make arrests. In turn, the department emphasized a rapid 
response approach, while de-emphasizing preventive beat patrol strategies.103 Nevertheless, MPD 
officers remained “ubiquitous” on the city’s streets, especially during Prohibition and the Great 
Depression Era of  the 1920s and 1930s. Police militarization was part of  the department’s response 
orientation. It’s important to recognize that the MPD’s militarization was not ushered in during the 
1960s as a response to Black political dissent, but rather in the 1930s as a reaction to white labor 
militancy. Under Laubenheimer, the MPD added high-powered rifles, machine guns, and armored 
squad cars to its advanced weapons arsenal.104 Captain Floyd McGuire’s trainings incorporated 
lessons in shooting and handling “sub-machine guns,” “tear gas bombs,” and “personal combat.”105 
This expansion of  police strength added to the MPD’s training procedures and revised bureaucratic 
and communications structures. All of  these largely internally generated reforms, funded by city and 
state government, fortified public perceptions of  police legitimacy. 
 As Chief  Laubenheimer led the MPD deeper into law enforcement’s reform era, the 
department’s exceptionalism narrative hardened. But it did so alongside both interpersonal and 
institutional racism. Anti-Black discrimination was, in part, fed by rising economic anxieties and 
fears among white working-class ethnics over interracial job competition. Since the late 19th century, 
Black migrants had been leaving the Jim Crow South in ever higher numbers. Civic leaders and white 
residents in Milwaukee expressed apprehension about Black in-migration during the 1910s, 1920s, 
and 1930s. Some presumed that Black movement spelled not only economic peril for white 
industrial workers, but a latent criminal threat. Despite the depths of  racist white terror being 
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inflicted upon Black men and women, not only across the U.S. South, but nationally, many white 
residents subscribed to racist stereotypes of  African American migrants as deviant and disorderly.  
Racial bigotry and fears about Black migration were woven into local politics. Coming on the 
heels of  “Red Summer” in 1920, Mayor Daniel Hoan ran for a second term on a “law and order” 
platform.106 Nearby Chicago had just experienced one of  the nation’s deadliest race riots in history.107 
Hoan was determined to uphold Milwaukee’s self-proclaimed status as “the most peaceful city in the 
entire world.”108 While Milwaukee did not experience a riot itself, white residents feared racial 
violence could reach their city’s limits. That anxiety lingered for years. Milwaukee NAACP President 
Edward Thomas, for instance, was arrested and charged with attempting to “stimulate a race riot” in 
April 1921. He had placed two photographs of  racial terror lynchings inside a street facing window 
of  the civil rights organization’s headquarters, visible to passersby, so as to raise awareness and spark 
public conversation. A crowd of  Black spectators gathered around the images and discussed their 
contents. Police dispersed the crowd, confiscated the pictures, and sent them to the City Attorney’s 
office.109 Tempering opportunities for dissent mattered far more than reckoning with the problem of  
the color line for white officials. 
  Although Milwaukee’s Black population would see its most extensive growth after World 
War II, a comparatively small Black community had formed in the city by the 1920s. The western 
Great Lakes region proved to be an attractive destination for thousands of  African American 
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refugees, most fleeing white racial exploitation or searching for better-paying jobs outside of  the Jim 
Crow South. While most Black folk moving to the region settled in Chicago, some continued north 
to Milwaukee. Here, they hoped to secure a social and economic foothold. Discriminatory rental and 
real estate markets forced early Black newcomers to inhabit an established “red light district” on the 
northern edge of  downtown known colloquially as “Little Africa.” Progressive reformers called this 
section “the badlands,” based on its scattered taverns, brothels, and gambling dens.110 Segregation 
ensured Black peoples’ spatial isolation from more affluent white ethnic groups. Black migration was 
connected to immigration and labor dynamics. Restrictive federal immigration laws slowed Southern 
and Eastern-European settlement in Milwaukee during World War I and the 1920s. The unexpected 
shortage of  unskilled labor encouraged the recruitment of  Black workers on cheap contracts. 
Immigration quotas helped to more than double the city’s Black population, from 980 residents in 
1910 to 2,229 in 1920.111 By 1930, more than 7,500 African Americans called Milwaukee home. 
Black migrants worked for meager wages in meatpacking plants, leather tanneries, metal foundries, 
and construction sites. While only nineteen percent of  Black men in Milwaukee held industrial jobs 
as of  1910, that number rose to almost eighty percent by 1930.112 Though under-skilled and 
vulnerable to firings in times of  economic uncertainty, a distinct Black industrial “proletariat” 
formed in the late 1910s and 1920s.113 
  Amid this expanded Black migration, white Protestant nativism threatened Milwaukee’s 
ethnic diversity.114 White power brokers, mostly of  German and “Anglo-Saxon” descent, determined 
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that Italians, Greeks, Slavs and other Central and Eastern European groups were failing to 
acculturate, or “melt,” into the city’s social fabric. Their anxieties were rooted in xenophobic fears 
that Eastern Europeans harbored anti-American beliefs and values, or were Bolshevik sympathizers 
eager to undermine their patriotic way of  life. Civic leaders instituted assimilation programs in 
schools and corporate workplaces. English lessons and civics courses brought thousands of  Central 
and Eastern European immigrants into Milwaukee’s conventional social order, as well as its thriving 
industrial economy. The assimilation programs foreshadowed how white officials and social service 
providers, as well as some Black professionals, would respond to African American migration after 
1940. Long-standing narratives of  racial difference that tied blackness to criminality formalized in 
academic journals and social scientific literature during the first few decades of  the 20 th century. 
White scholars inhibited African Americans from treading the same path to “whiteness” as Eastern 
and Southern European immigrants, establishing racist justifications for excluding Black men and 
women from the benefits of  full citizenship.115 White fears around cultural “others” grew 
increasingly racialized in the pre-World War II period. 
  Few exhibited anti-blackness more overtly than the resurgent Ku Klux Klan of  the 1920s.116 
Chapters surfaced in this decade far beyond the South, including in Wisconsin, a former Union state 
and key Underground Railroad terminus.117 The white nationalist organization, initially established in 
1865 during the early days of  Reconstruction, included many white sheriffs and lawmen in its ranks. 
Despite Mayor Hoan’s claim that the Klan would “find Milwaukee a hotter place to exist than in 
Hades itself,” a Klavern formed on W. Kilbourn Ave. in 1921.118 Black residents cheered the Socialist 
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mayor for stating that “police would make short work of  anyone advocating violence.”119 
Nonetheless, Milwaukee’s Klavern featured 4,400 members in 1924. Dedicated to the “faithful 
maintenance of  white supremacy, they ranged from Freemasons to Socialists and exhibited a 
“contempt for Catholicism.”120 Milwaukee’s Klavern fit into a larger white supremacist project. 
Numerous “sundown towns,” for example, dotted Wisconsin’s landscape in the 1920s and 
subsequent decades. These all-white communities, save for a few token Black families, restricted 
African Americans and other racial minorities by “force, law, or custom.”121 The Klan’s Nativist 
actions served as a precursor to the formation of  more buttoned-up, if  barely less racist 
conservative organizations in the post-World War II period, like the John Birch Society.122  
  While it appears that most Black Milwaukeeans evaded the overt anti-blackness embodied by 
the Klan, white racism nevertheless influenced many aspects of  Black life. African American 
workers were “last hired and first fired” amid economic downturns and experienced rampant 
discrimination in the housing market and in public accommodations.123 Black male and female 
domestics, industrial laborers, and middle-class professionals lived in close proximity, often in 
unsanitary conditions.124 Most lacked affordable or accessible housing options. Residential 
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segregation resulted from white collusion in real estate, finance, and homeowner’s associations. The 
passage of  discriminatory zoning ordinances, the use of  racially restrictive housing covenants, and 
the enactment of  biased federal housing policies all contributed to the city’s worsening racial 
apartheid. As Milwaukee’s growing Black community moved slightly north from downtown, 
segregation and ethnic succession proceeded on a block by block basis. Many white homeowners 
were simply unwilling to share residential space with Black families. They framed their hesitancy in 
economic and culturally racist terms. To their benefit, white folk were more financially, legally, and 
socially equipped to move out of  Milwaukee’s aging core and, in the 1930s and 1940s, took 
advantage of  federal housing and Veterans programs to do so.125 Still, a good many white residents 
retained homes and apartment buildings within the city’s African American community, some 
renting to Black tenants and families at exorbitant rates. 
  In the context of  hardening residential segregation on Milwaukee’s near north side, Black 
families cultivated an array of  institutions that served community needs, from churches and 
newspapers, to fraternal associations, banks, and improvement organizations. The Milwaukee 
NAACP (f. 1915) and Urban League (f. 1919) branches played a role in working to build racial parity 
and Black resiliency through tactics of  civic negotiation, liberal accommodation, and legal 
intervention. Black churches served as community pillars and meeting hubs.126 These institutions, 
among others, disseminated racial uplift, facilitated dialogues with white city officials and business 
leaders, and addressed civil rights concerns.  
  In time, Milwaukee’s Black middle class also advocated for better police-community relations 
and the hiring of  Black officers to patrol in the Sixth Ward. The need for Black police representation 
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grew more urgent in the 1920 and 1930s. Adequate police protection on the north side was at a 
premium, especially given the area’s poorer living conditions and the MPD’s selective tolerance of  
vice. The Wisconsin Enterprise Blade, a Black-run newspaper, responded to the alleged molestation of  
a Black women in the area by editorializing on the need for “A Colored for Detective” in 1925.127 
Biased policing undermined Black safety, both from white patrolmen who allowed crimes to occur 
and from police officers who occasionally inflicted violence on residents. Chandler Owen, a visiting 
Black socialist writer, reflected on law enforcement’s sharpening double-standards and 
underprotection in Milwaukee’s Bronzeville neighborhood: “In the Negro section, dives are allowed 
to run wide open, gambling houses are not suppressed and places of  ill repute are prevalent.”128 
Meanwhile, vice is “suppressed in other parts” of  the city. Chief  Laubenheimer responded, accusing 
Owen of  “exaggerating” and playing up his outsider status.  
  Nevertheless, the MFPC authorized the employment of  the city’s first Black police officer in 
1924.129 Judson Walter Minor, Jr. moved to Milwaukee from Brunswick, Georgia in 1918, part of  the 
first wave of  Black migrants venturing from the largely rural-agricultural South to the urban-
industrial North.130 He entered Milwaukee’s labor market as a skilled worker, trained in masonry at 
Tuskegee Institute.131 Minor harbored expectations of  making a decent living, raising a family, and 
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giving back to his community. In 1924, the MPD was almost all German and Irish American. Black 
residents numbered just a few thousand and had zero police representation. Upon his appointment, 
Minor wasted no time testing out his authority. He arrested a disgruntled white bridge operator, 
allegedly drunk at the switch. The white man was shocked at being arrested by a Black officer, a 
verboten act in the South.132 He berated Minor, earning a disorderly conduct charge.  
  The encounter was not the patrolman’s last with an antagonistic white citizen. Minor faced 
the Klan’s wrath directly while on patrol in a confrontation that suggested some white Milwaukeeans 
expected white citizens to keep order in their communities; the only “legitimate” policing was white 
policing. In 1925, Minor arrested a 45-year-old “Klansman,” Henry Henning, for disorderly conduct 
in Bronzeville. The self-avowed “charter member of  the Lone Star Klavern” approached the Black 
officer while drunk, reportedly exclaiming, “I don’t like Koons [sic], Kikes [sic] or Katholics [sic], 
especially in uniform.” A judge gave the “disorderly” man a minor fine and he was freed the next 
day—a show of  judicial restraint less readily available to Black arrestees apprehended on 
misdemeanor offenses.133 Minor’s encounter illustrated the depths of  interpersonal racism that some 
white residents subjected Black citizens to in public, as well as what Black officers could expect to 
face in the white supremacist city. Moments of  evaded justice like this one surely informed Minor’s 
decision to leave the police force after only a few years of  service.134 This indicated that on-the-job 
racism had the power to shape Black police attrition rates, a pattern that became more discernible as 
Black officers got hired in larger numbers after World War II.135  
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Policing, Industrial Labor, and Racism 
  Black police hiring, token as it was, played into the MPD’s developing narrative of policing 
exceptionalism. However, the department’s status as an independent, innovative and effective crime-
fighting agency would be brought to its height by the U.S. Justice Department. The federal 
government engaged in its first large-scale study of crime and law enforcement in America from 
1929 to 1931. That study positioned the MPD as the nation’s model law enforcement agency, 
arguing that “no other city has such a record.”136 Consequently, the city’s narrative of  policing 
exceptionalism was more firmly established in the eyes of  a broad public and the city’s police 
bureaucracy. 
  President Herbert Hoover formed the eleven-person National Commission on Law 
Observance and Enforcement in 1929, tasking it with investigating policing conditions and the 
causes of  crime across Prohibition America.137 Former Attorney General George Wickersham 
chaired the group, which set out to research, analyze, and make recommendations.138 The 
“Wickersham Commission” aimed to modernize criminal procedure across the U.S.. It followed in 
the tradition of  civilian-led investigatory bodies from the Progressive Era, which gathered 
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information on urban problems, including police abuse, and made recommendations, such as the 
expansion of  civilian oversight.139 For eighteen months, the Wickersham commission studied 
policing and lawlessness in the U.S. In 1931, it issued a series of  reports, headed by its “Proposals to 
Improve Enforcement of  Criminal Law in the United States.”140 Many local police administrators 
rejected the commission’s recommendations based on “longstanding traditions of  local jurisdiction” 
and opposition to the establishment of  a nationalized police system.141 
  The federal government’s findings exposed the ingrained nature of  police violence, 
especially around practices of  the “third degree.” The third degree, according to the commission, 
meant “the employment of  methods which inflict suffering, physical or mental, upon a person, in 
order to obtain from that person information about a crime.”142 Despite legal restrictions against its 
use, federal investigators found that aggressive behavior among patrolmen, detectives, and 
prosecutors was common nationwide. Law enforcement organizations responded by denying this 
finding and the International Association of  Chiefs of  Police demanded a counter-investigation.143 
Racist police actions were not, apparently, a primary research concern for Wickersham and his 
colleagues, as they failed to systematically account for distinctions in how police achieved forced 
confessions among white and Black suspects. But they did note that “third degree practices were 
particularly harsh in the case of  Negroes.”144 The commission’s analysis of  the third degree was 
narrow in that it relied only on legal evidence. It excluded, as historian Nora Krinitsky writes, the 
“violence that may have occurred in other police-civilian interactions.”145 This suggests that 
 
139 Krinitsky, “The Politics of Crime Control,” 301-302. 
140 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, “Proposals to Improve Enforcement of Criminal Laws 
of the United States,” (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1931). 
141 Vesla Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American Political 
Development 21 (Fall 2007), 240, 263. 
142 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, 1931, 19-20. 
143 “Wickersham Report Rouses Ire of Chiefs, The Milwaukee Journal, June 16, 1932, 8. 
144 Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, 188; See: Marilynn S. Johnson, Street Justice: A History of Police Violence in New York City 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 225; Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness, 268; Balto, Occupied Territory, 47. 
145 Krinitsky, “The Politics of Crime Control,” 304. 
  86 
discretionary abuses of  police power were even more widespread. 
  The Wickersham Commission cited “the short term of  service” of  police administrators as 
“the chief  evil” underlying any public “loss of  confidence” in law enforcement. Milwaukee was the 
exception. Because Wisconsin law afforded public safety chiefs lifetime tenure and independent rule-
making authority, the MPD was presented as a brilliant example of  police professionalism.146 Since 
chiefs in other cities were subjected to “arbitrary dismissal,” and felt compelled to protect their “own 
patrons,” the “interest of  the public” got neglected. Other departments had, the commission 
reported, failed “in the prevention, detention, and prosecution of  criminals.”147 Milwaukee, 
conversely, was “cited as a city free from crime…where the criminal is speedily detected, arrested, 
and promptly tried and sent on his way to serve his time.”148 Because “no control over the chief  is 
even attempted by the politicians,” they are able to “act independently, freed from the dictation of  
politics.” August Vollmer, regarded as the father of  the police professionalization, extolled the 
“refreshing” organization of  law enforcement in Milwaukee. He claimed the city’s police chiefs were 
“amply protected by legal enactments.”149 Such recognition confirmed for city officials, the MFPC, 
and everyday citizens that Milwaukee’s police force was indeed exceptional. A legacy of  this federal 
recognition was that public calls for police reform became a political “third rail.” City officials dared 
not challenge the MPD or, more specifically, the police chief ’s insulated authority, lest they risk being 
voted out of  office in an upcoming election. 
  Closer scrutiny, however, shows that all was not ideal for the department according to the 
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commission’s report. It stated that Milwaukee was not immune to the bootlegging, gambling, and 
the vice typical of  the Prohibition era. The MPD denied this claim. Nonetheless, shortly after the 
commission gathered its data on policing in the city, Chief  Laubenheimer said his department was 
opening “a concerted drive against gambling dens.”150 Much of  the MPD’s renewed attention on 
vice would be focused on the increasingly Black near north side, where police now funneled and 
selectively enforced vice. More rigorous morals enforcement joined existing police crackdowns on 
radical labor actions, especially those planned by groups outside of  the trade union movement. For 
example, Chief  Laubenheimer instructed roughly two hundred officers, ten armed with machine 
guns, to put-down a street protest organized by the local Communist Party in March 1930. 
“International Unemployment Day” demonstrators, “communists and ‘red’ agitators,” had instigated 
a riot, according to The Milwaukee Sentinel, battering police, onlookers, and motorists.151 Alternatively, 
Communist Party newsletters blamed the police and mainstream dailies for fomenting a counter-
insurgent disturbance. The MPD’s “Red Squad” arrested fifty-one protest participants. Officers 
identified Communist leaders as co-conspirators and charged them with “incitement to riot.” Other 
arrested people received “vagrancy” charges. Police identified foreign-born “aliens” and subjected 
them to deportation. Laubenheimer unilaterally banned Communists from holding “future meetings, 
demonstrations, and parades.”152 Despite the city’s best efforts “to jail, deport, and discredit the 
Communists,” historian S. Ani Mukherji writes, “jobless workers flocked to Milwaukee’s 
Unemployed Councils in the early 1930s” amid dire economic conditions.153 
  Police hostilities towards Black citizens throughout the 1920s and 1930s intersected with 
anti-Black labor dynamics perpetrated by white employers and unions. White workplace aggression 
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ebbed and flowed according to national economic, social, and political factors, such as the Great 
Depression, the federal government’s New Deal response, and conservative anti-Communist 
anxieties. Largely relegated to unskilled positions, Black laborers earned meager wages based on 
discriminatory pay scales. They had access only to the least desirable jobs at the lowest-paying firms. 
Racist white employers and trade union attitudes prevented Black upward mobility. Negative 
stereotypes about Black workplace habits pervaded on shop floors. Unions discriminated through 
“exclusionary clauses, rituals, or by [establishing] separate all-black locals.” Despite proclaiming his 
distaste for segregation, Mayor Hoan supported racially separate unions.154 Conversely, Black 
professionals called for integrated labor confederations and workplaces. As Black migration 
increased, police aggravated the city’s economic racism. MPD actions matched the social attitudes of  
the broader white society. In 1923, for example, during a period of  relative prosperity, the 
department clamped down on poor Black migrants seeking industrial and service jobs.155 Detectives 
arrested thirty-nine Black men on vagrancy charges in a single raid. Twelve had employment and 
money on hand; they successfully beat the charge. However, a white judge informed twenty-seven 
others that Milwaukee had no use for “their kind.”156 The judge sentenced the men to ninety days of  
labor, echoing the Jim Crow South’s inhumane exploitation of  the 13th Amendment’s involuntary 
servitude loophole. Their forced labor was to be followed by expulsion from the city. 
 Entwined issues of  race and class that conceivably threatened to crack the MPD’s narrative 
of  policing exceptionalism in the 1930s only fortified it. Racial attitudes and class affinities 
progressively superseded the department’s occupational loyalties to manufacturing and social elites. 
Despite class-based grievances among white industrial employees and the police—who were 
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historically charged by business leaders with defending capitalist interests—both parties found 
themselves accessing a shared racial identity founded on white supremacy and the dignity of  blue-
collar work. Black labor competition repelled white industrial workers, who engaged in wildcat “hate 
strikes” meant to restrict them from joining an instable local economy amid the Great Depression.157  
The 1934 Wehr Steel Strike provided an early, conspicuous example of  the informal 
partnership between white blue-collar workers and police in undermining Black labor competition. 
It was, according to historian Joe Trotter, the “first clear-cut case of  racial violence in the city’s 
industrial labor market.”158 The conflict started when white Wehr Steel Machine Shop employees 
struck to gain recognition of  their newly formed American Federation of  Labor (AFL) union.159 
White workers did not inform their Black counterparts at the plant of  recent union organizing. 
When the company responded to the labor action by bringing in Black strikebreakers, white workers 
and police attacked them for crossing the picket line. In one instance, white officers and workers 
overturned a carload of  Black men approaching the plant. The foundry’s owners called on the MPD 
to defend the Black workers they hired to keep the business running, as well as to protect their 
property and maintain order. Instead, the police crossed their own occupational allegiances and 
engaged in a brutal act of  racial oppression.160 Mayor Hoan responded to the strike by pushing for 
the Boncel ordinance (1935). The act authorized either the mayor or police chief  to shut down 
manufacturing plants when they refused to negotiate during labor conflicts, of  which 107 occurred 
in 1934.161 The city may have had little specifically to say about the brutality police inflicted upon 
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Black strikebreakers, but the ordinance nonetheless targeted the violence on display.162 
 To be sure, the Wehr company was as racist as white workers who joined with police to 
attack Black strikebreakers. Like most other Milwaukee manufacturers, Wehr hired non-union Black 
workers to save money.163 Depressed wage structures equated to higher profits for the business. 
When labor disputes ended, corporations like Wehr fired their temporary Black workers. They 
considered them cheap labor, only capable of  finishing marginal jobs.164 Black industrial workers 
performed the hot, dirty, dangerous work that white employers believed them naturally “suited 
for.”165 At the same time, Wehr sought to undermine the power of  white labor organizations. Plant 
managers warned Black personnel not to join the AFL union. Black workers saw this as an effort to 
remove them from the city’s industrial plants. Black laborers themselves were not against organizing. 
During the 1934 strike, Milwaukee NAACP President Joseph Dorsey joined with the Milwaukee 
Urban League (MUL) to unionize Black workers. This stood against company protocol, as Wehr had 
made a rule to avoid the formation of  non-company unions. Aside from a handful of  Congress of  
Industrial Organizations locals, the city’s trade unions refused Black membership. While the 
attractiveness of  Chicago as a destination was likely the prevailing factor, employer and union 
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discrimination against Black workers contributed to Milwaukee’s low Black migration totals before 
World War II. After 1934, established Black professionals and working-class migrants collaborated 
more deliberately to organize Black workers and address economic discrimination.166  
 
Vice Policing and the Sixth Ward Law and Order League 
 As racial segregation on Milwaukee’s north side hardened during the Great Depression, 
discriminatory policing grew more conspicuous. The MPD’s renewed focus on vice crime amid the 
recession initiated a gradual turn away from monitoring white poor and working-class behavior and 
towards more concerted surveillance of poor and working-class Black behavior. This was especially 
the case after the department began directing vice away from the River St. area and more towards 
non-white spaces, like Black sections of the Sixth Ward. The River St. district once brimmed with 
bars, gambling, and sex work in the early 20th century, attracting an inter-state clientele. However, 
white middle-class reformers lobbied state officials to pass regulatory morals laws and pressed law 
enforcement to funnel vice away from downtown. In turn, the MPD increasingly pushed vice into 
Bronzeville. There, police regulated prostitution and gambling, specifically the neighborhood’s 
“policy racket.”167 Police vice regulation was selective and lasted well into the post-World War II 
period, when social reformers demanded ever stricter morals enforcement amid a national “juvenile 
delinquency” crisis. Outwardly, reformers presented this shift as one that benefitted Black migrants. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, the MPD increasingly staked its reputation on how well it preserved order 
on the near north side. The department frequently “collided with the growing open-air socializing 
and drinking of the sixth ward.”168 Black migrants suffered from a dearth of adequate housing, jobs, 
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and recreational opportunities, forcing them to congregate on city streets. Accordingly, police 
patrolmen and Morals Squad officers looked to challenge Black residents for control of the streets. 
The result was more tumultuous police-Black community relations. 
 The MPD was known to use a heavy hand when regulating vice, especially in Black spaces. 
Milwaukee’s small but well organized Black middle class decried the department’s aggressive 
treatment of “juvenile offenders apprehended on Walnut St.,” Bronzeville’s main artery.169 They 
rejected associations of criminality with blackness, while protesting against entwined issues of 
economic racism, employer and union discrimination. As Milwaukee NAACP leader James Dorsey 
responded to the Milwaukee Woman’s Club’s 1940 vice crusade, “Give our people work and there 
won’t be any ‘policy.’”170 Black professionals like Dorsey did not approve of gaming per se but saw a 
lack of opportunity for the city’s nearly 10,000 Black inhabitants to earn a living. Speaking at a 
community symposium, undertaker Emmet Reed, Jr. noted that the Sixth Ward policy racket 
supplied jobs to some two hundred Black citizens “as [number] writers and in other capacities.”171 
Discriminatory employment double-standards converged with racist ideas about the policing of 
Black space. These shaped policy choices; City Hall encouraged order maintenance policing at the 
behest of white social reformers. Economic racism compelled Black residents into taking vice work 
and engaging in activities that corrupt police officers were willing to overlook for a cut of the action.  
 Economic improvements and structure of access and opportunity, as opposed to police 
empowerment, would have made a difference for Black families. Sometimes they did. For instance, 
Milwaukee brothels, some of which relied on the labor of Black sex workers, closed after the federal 
government provided Black women with Works Progress Administration jobs.172 Mayor Dan Hoan 
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understood these economic dynamics. In 1925, he advocated for reducing an investment in one 
hundred fifty new patrolmen to fifty officers as a cost-saving measure. City Hall then reinvested the 
savings ($2,000 per patrolman) “towards the maintenance of playgrounds and social centers.” 
Consequently, he argued, Milwaukee was able to maintain its reputation as “the crimeless city.”173 
With a brief end in Socialist mayoral leadership during the 1940s, the wartime economic boom, and 
the racial hysterics that joined increasing Black migration, order maintenance policing received even 
more vigorous support in the 1940s. Police answered the demands of white social reformers 
concerned about Black crime, while allowing gambling activities, bingo, horse racing, church raffles, 
and policy, to survive in adjacent white communities.174 
 Policing vice was, of course, not new in Milwaukee. Civic boosters, social reformers, and 
other elite white professionals challenged working-class leisure pursuits and games of chance as early 
as the late 19th century. Vice enforcement was ethnically selective. It helped lead to reforms like the 
Progressive Era policing statutes and the MPD’s turn towards professionalization. After passage of 
Chapter 586 in 1911, the MPD responded to another potent social reform drive to eliminate 
“disorderly” behavior and to impose law-and-order in the city’s vice districts. Milwaukee was a 
“pioneer” in community-based law-and-order policing well before the term connoted a backlash 
against Black-led social protests and racial militancy.175 A “Law and Order League” formed in 1912 
that sought to rid the city of “vice,” “immorality,” and “white slavery,” particularly near the 
Milwaukee Auditorium.176 Law and order leagues spread nationally during the Progressive and 
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Prohibition Eras.177 Milwaukee’s first “morality” league “favored the closing of all disorderly 
houses.”178 Defending (white) women’s virtue was a key organizational directive. The group’s 
chairman called for “prohibiting women from entering saloons” and making it “unlawful” for them 
to “accept employment as cabaret singers.”179 The League criticized Chief Janssen’s vice 
enforcement. In an early example of a police chief invoking the MPD’s exceptionalism narrative to 
ward off critics, Janssen argued that he policed “the cleanest city morally on the globe, and the 
government reports show that.”180 This initial law and order league, if short-lived, challenged police 
to do better at controlling purportedly licentious behavior in Milwaukee. Vice reform took on new 
resonance in the 1930s, as white civic boosters and morals crusaders endeavored to modernize the 
mostly working-class industrial city and organize it more faithfully around managerial growth 
imperatives.181 A renewed, more reactionary Citizens’ Law and Order League took on vice and 
traffic violators, as well as political radicals, Communists, and other presumed agitators.182 
 As the criminalization of vice in Milwaukee progressed in the mid-1930s, characterizations 
of morals crime grew more racialized and, thus, associated with black migration and the threat it 
seemed to pose to the city’s traditional white order. Portrayals of vice crime in newspapers, among 
white civic leaders and anti-gambling reformers gave shape to racist ideas about Black vice 
participants and, by extension, poor and working people living in Milwaukee’s developing 
Bronzeville neighborhood. While most Black professionals also saw vice as immoral, denigrating, 
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and potentially dangerous to community health, that did not mean they accepted overpolicing of the 
Sixth Ward as a remedy.183 The violence of the 1934 Wehr Steel Strike demonstrated to many Black 
residents where local police stood on interwoven matters of race and class and revealed who was 
considered worthy of police protection in the eyes of white power brokers. Organizing against police 
violence marked an opportunity for intra-racial class solidarity among established Black 
professionals and poorer migrants filtering into the area. There was economic incentive, as the 
former relied on the latter to make a living, selling goods and services in a racially segregated urban 
market. Despite increasing class frictions, professional and working-class Black residents had a 
mutual interest in community survival. 
 The 1934 Wehr Steel Strike preceded one of the first documented instances of organized 
Black resistance to police brutality in Milwaukee. Not long after white police officers joined white 
workers in pummeling Black strikebreakers in 1934, MPD Vice Squad officers began cracking down 
on the Sixth Ward’s illegal “policy racket” at the behest of white social reformers.184 Law 
enforcement allowed low-stakes gambling games to proceed as long as they were contained to 
specified districts. Indeed, it was a lucrative pursuit for some officers as well, as Black “numbers 
runners” were known to pay off beat patrolmen to avoid arrests or harassment.185 However, such 
practices became muddled when social reformers demanded crackdowns on illicit gaming in 
Milwaukee’s Bronzeville community. After city officials obliged, police sprang into action. Class 
status did not matter for Black participants and others congregating in the vicinity of policy wheels.  
One consequential incident, in particular, made this clear. In August 1935, white undercover 
officers engaged in racially discriminate stop and frisks in the city’s Black district, “promiscuously 
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padding and searching orderly Race citizens.”186 One apprehended person, Robert Johnson, was 
“accosted by two plainclothesmen” while walking at N. 6th St. and W. Galena. After he protested a 
white man’s rummaging through his hand bag, he was told, “Shut up, you all should be dead…if I 
had my way you wouldn’t walk the streets.” The officer “struck him a heavy blow on the jaw, almost 
knocking him to the ground.” While on the floor, another officer kicked Johnson so hard that he 
required medical attention. White Vice Squad members reportedly committed other brutal acts 
throughout the Sixth Ward’s racially contained confines.187 
 Robert Johnson’s experience of police terror encouraged the short-lived formation of 
Milwaukee’s first Black-led police accountability organization in September 1935. Whereas the city’s 
white Citizens’ Law and Order League focused on public order offenses and demanded a more 
assertive police presence to control misdemeanor infractions and “morals” violations, the Sixth 
Ward Law and Order League specifically addressed the growing issue of racialized police brutality 
and its relationship to diminished neighborhood security in Bronzeville. James Dorsey, an African 
American attorney and Milwaukee NAACP president, helped spearhead the interracial group’s 
formation. The league was middle class, professional in makeup. H. B. Kinner, the Black owner and 
operator of the Alberta Villa hotel, served as its president.188 By their very existence, the SWLOL 
confronted the idea of a value-neutral police power, and they did so right as the MPD was 
burnishing its exceptional reputation among national policing experts and federal officials. Still, the 
developing narrative of policing exceptionalism had a powerful influence on how this specific group 
of “respectable” Black male leaders went about challenging the racialized police violence in their 
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community. Because of their precarious status within Milwaukee’s racial and class order, they had to 
act according to the social and political terms set by white officials. In part, that meant embracing a 
“bad apple” logic that castigated individual officers with ostensibly malicious intent, and letting the 
city’s larger, “exemplary” policing system off the hook. Nevertheless, the SWLOL ushered in a 
history of Black Milwaukee residents struggling for police accountability that lasts to the present day. 
 The Sixth War Law and Order League’s first community meeting revealed the significance of 
police brutality as an issue during a period that some scholars have referred to as a “golden age” of 
socially enlightened law enforcement professionalism.189 A crowd of residents “from all walks of 
life” filled the pews of St. Mark A.M.E. Church on the city’s north side for the SWLOL’s initial 
gathering. “Almost the entire colored population of Milwaukee turned out,” the New York Age 
reported, along with “prominent” white residents, to discuss “intolerable” acts of police brutality by 
the MPD’s Vice Squad.190 Among the attendees were white city and county representatives known 
for championing the needs of Black constituents. The Johnson case was the centerpiece of the 
meeting.191 A resolution was unanimously adopted calling for the dismissal of “one particular officer 
because of his brutal actions.” As Johnson recounted his attack before the crowd, he noticed one of 
the officers who brutalized him was standing in the back of the church in a show of intimidation; 
the man’s presence nearly “provoked a disturbance,” but “order was immediately restored.”192 
Among the meeting’s outcomes, a committee was appointed “to file petitions of protest and prepare 
complaints against instances of police brutality.”193 However, it was “definitely made clear” that “the 
protest” only targeted “certain members of the force”—“the roughneck element which has recently 
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succeeded in gaining admission to the department.”194 The MPD, “which has long been reputed to 
be one of the most efficient in the country,” participants attested, was not framed as the cause of the 
public’s anger. Police legitimacy was affirmed; what Black residents demanded was more culturally 
responsive and anti-racist policing. 
 The Sixth Ward Law and Order League attempted to secure justice for Robert Johnson and 
others brutalized by the MPD’s Vice Squad in recent raids. Members knew about the legal recourse 
offered by the MFPC, which was prescribed by the 1911 statute. Importantly, they were 
“freeholders” and could file lawful complaints. Under the auspices of the SWLOL, Johnson 
submitted a complaint against his attackers on September 12, 1935.195 The grievance formally 
charged two MPD officers with “assaulting and reviling” Johnson.196 Dr. P. Jay Gilmer, an SWLOL 
member, also filed a police brutality complaint for himself. 
 What happened next with Robert Johnson’s case demonstrates the farce of Milwaukee’s 
police accountability system and the extent of the MPD’s power when citizens filed grievances 
against officers. With seemingly no recourse, Johnson dropped his complaint against Vice Squad 
officers Vaughan Bennett and Lewis Wagner. Police had arrested “a woman friend” of Johnson’s 
“on charges that she stabbed another negro woman,” according to Attorney James Dorsey. At the 
Milwaukee Safety Building, accompanied by Dorsey, Johnson told a deputy police inspector that he 
was “willing to do anything to keep this woman out of trouble.”197 He agreed in a statement, 
according to the Deputy Inspector, to drop his brutality complaint if the woman was freed.198 The 
MPD saving face was apparently more important than garnering justice for an alleged stabbing 
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victim.199 Regardless, the department had manipulated the system to its own benefit, a dropped 
police brutality charge.  
 However, the SWLOL, backed by two liberal white politicians—Sixth Ward Alderman 
Samuel Soref and County Supervisor George Herrmann—continued to press their complaint that 
police had engaged in a campaign of “intimidation and coercion”200 on the near north side. The 
league filed a formal grievance against Bennett and Wagner. In it, they argued that law enforcement 
“induced” Johnson to relent from his claim by making a “deal” to dismiss unrelated charges against 
Ms. Haywood, an associate he wanted to help. The commission called for witnesses to the alleged 
act of brutality, stalling the case for two more weeks. At a hearing on October 17, Johnson himself 
failed to appear. According to one newspaper account, he was afraid he would be “run out of town” 
by the police.201 “Over the head of Police Chief Laubenheimer,” the MFPC eventually suspended 
Officers Louis Wagner and Vaughan Bennett for sixty and thirty days, respectively.202 The process 
worked, for the time being, likely because two white politicians had backed up the SWLOL’s claims. 
Alderman Soref told the commission that after Robert Johnson registered his complaint, there were 
other instances of police “abuse” committed against Black citizens in his district.203 MPD 
administrators deflected this criticism, charging the alderman with playing politics.204 The 
department rejected all allegations that police brutality occurred while conducting gambling sweeps. 
  As Soref and Herrmann’s support of the SWLOL implies, struggling for police 
accountability for African Americans in Milwaukee has always been an interracial struggle, at all class 
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levels. Not all white social reformers readily accepted the racist ideas about Black life and culture 
that increasingly fueled policing strategies and outcomes. White allyship around racialized police 
violence and the MPD’s institutional bias exposed cracks in the department’s budding 
exceptionalism narrative. As Mrs. Angelo Cerminara, of the Milwaukee Women’s Club asserted in 
1930, “The common belief that the Negro is more criminal than the white person has no foundation 
in fact.”205 She acknowledged that racist perceptions of Black criminality informed police behavior 
and the disproportionate rates of arrest that helped build outward perceptions of crime control 
efficiency. “Because police officers share this belief, Negroes are more liable to arrest than whites.” 
Moreover, as Cerminara continued, “The higher rate of discharges of Negroes as compared with 
other race groups…proves that many of the arrests are unwarranted.” Police faced little social or 
professional risk in surveilling and stopping Black citizens. In fact, they were encouraged to arrest 
“vagrants,” a legal term applied to seemingly idle poor and working-class peoples. If a suspected 
vagrant was Black, the likelihood of arrest appeared to increase. As Cerminara notes, criminality in 
Wisconsin was “painted in darker colors” than deserved.206 Because their number was still relatively 
small, Black citizens constituted “less than one third of one percent” of state prisoners in “corrective 
institutions.” That was soon to change, as racialized police violence and discrimination became more 
commonplace in the 1930s and 1940s. This followed national trends. While white vigilante terror 
against African Americans declined after World War II—a result of anti-lynching campaigns and 
Black migration out of the Jim Crow South—police brutality increased.207  
  Against this backdrop of intensifying conflict among industrial employers, Black residents, 
white blue-collar workers, and police in the 1930s, elite white civic interests continued to build on 
 
205 “Milwaukee Woman’s Club Hears Report on Race,” The Chicago Defender, March 1, 1930, 10. 
206 “Milwaukee Woman’s Club Hears Report on Race.” 
207 Balto, “The Laws of the Land,” 84-85; Robin D.G. Kelley, “‘Slangin’ Rocks...Palestinian Style:’ Dispatches from the 
Occupied Zones of North America,” in Police Brutality: An Anthology, Jill Nelson, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
2000), 32. 
  101 
the MPD’s popular narrative of policing exceptionalism. The Citizens’ Bureau of Milwaukee, a 
group comprised of powerful corporate and institutional leaders, cited five reasons why their city 
was regarded among the safest in the nation in 1937. For starters, it featured “a law abiding 
population.”208 The group mentioned Milwaukee’s low number of itinerant workers, arguing it led to 
fewer major crimes than in large rail hubs like Chicago or Detroit. During the Great Depression, 
“transient vagrants” in Milwaukee were subject to “speedy justice.”209 As mentioned above, in the 
case of the twenty-seven Black laborers convicted on vagrancy charges, such enforcement was often 
racialized, particularly in times of economic strain. The second reason cited for Milwaukee’s 
exceptional status was the MPD’s foot and motor patrols, which covered a minimal forty-four 
square mile of city lands.210 Third, police chiefs served long terms, freed by state law from political 
interference. As outlined above, this meant police administrators were, save for committing an 
egregious offense, accountable only to themselves. Fourth, the courts supported and cooperated 
with law enforcement, meaning quick and warranted detection of crimes, along with prompt trials 
and sentencing. The courts reinforced the authority that the MPD derived from state law, and 
backed up the department in all cases. Finally, aside from “voluntary salary contributions,” police 
expenditures remained funded by city government during the Great Depression, even as other 
budgeted areas suffered reductions and city workers got paid in scrip.211 The Citizens’ Bureau basked 
in the glow of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement’s findings six year 
earlier, which affirmed for white social and economic elites the virtues of police reform. The 
Progressive Era policing statutes produced lengthy, consistent terms of service by MPD chiefs, 
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rendering Milwaukee “a city free from crime.”212 Meanwhile, Black citizens were beginning to 
experience something very different in their encounters with police.213 
 
Conclusion 
  The administrative independence that the Wisconsin legislature afforded Milwaukee police 
chiefs in the long Progressive Era enabled them to set the terms of police power without political 
interference. These laws mattered for Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability, as 
they authorized the institutional freedom that police chiefs relied on to pursue racially differential 
policing tactics unchecked. The MPD took on the personality, outlook, and priorities of chiefs, only 
six of which served between 1888 and 1984. The statutes’ civilian review components, if under-
utilized by the MFPC and restricted to property-holders, instilled the promise of oversight. Yet, the 
commission’s quasi-judicial review function was not broadcasted to the residents most vulnerable to 
overpolicing and underprotection. Commissioners, more often than not, co-signed decisions made 
by police chiefs and mayors. This process undermined accountability and neutralized the potential 
for meaningful civilian oversight.  
  The legislature manufactured the MPD’s national position as innovative, reform-oriented, 
and efficient at controlling crime. That exceptional status was reinforced by public assumptions 
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about law enforcement as an intrinsically noble and legitimate pursuit, in addition to federal actors, 
like the Wickersham Commission. No one in Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy, save for the Socialist 
Seidel administration in the early 1910s, attempted to amend the terms of police power in the early 
20th century. In turn, the MPD occupied an elevated space in the civic imagination. It also became a 
firmer part of Milwaukee’s white cultural identity. Despite its insulation, law enforcement was an 
inherently political project, much as it was elsewhere in the U.S. The MPD served the dominant 
social, cultural, and economic hierarchies established by white middle- and business-class elites. It 
was institutionally separated from City Hall, but not Milwaukee’s increasingly racialized class politics.  
  Moreover, individual police officers themselves undermined the idea of an objective, value-
neutral police function. Patrolmen were socially conditioned to act on biased views. They harbored 
common assumptions about race, class, and gender that reflected the ethnically segmented 
communities they hailed from. Most were descendants of German, Irish, and Polish immigrants, 
who trod a well-worn path to whiteness and social acceptance—first through patronage 
appointments, then civil service.214 When a Black officer, Judson Minor, was hired onto the MPD in 
1924, discretionary policing diverged based on his vantage point. It was a short-lived experiment, 
with another Black officer not hired until 1932.215 The ample discretion that white officers harnessed 
to maintain order and control crime permitted them to conduct the racialized boundary and violence 
work that white powerbrokers saw as necessary to preserve the status quo and moral order. 
  In the first several decades of the 20th century, Milwaukee underwent a process of 
recalibration on matters of class and race. It was a period marked by European immigration and 
working-class suppression, Black in-migration and racial suppression. The city’s evolving working-
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class consciousness informed questions of racial identity, especially as a distinct Black proletariat 
formed in the city alongside a Black middle class. Black community formation and development 
converged with white professional class moralizing and nativism. Both forces translated into anti-
Black racism. The Great Depression and New Deal economy of the 1930s only strengthened the 
city’s racial and class boundaries. Social taboos emerged around the presumably immoral behaviors 
of Black residents living on Milwaukee’s segregated near north side. However, Black middle class 
residents and workers cultivated a world of their own in Bronzeville, regardless of the MPD 
funneling most of the city’s vice into the community. African Americans were the most likely 
citizens to experience police aggression based on their low position in the city’s racialized cultural 
order. They also lived in segregated spaces where police disparately enforced public order laws, like 
vagrancy, prostitution, gambling, and drunkenness. White middle-class reformers advocated for the 
MPD to crack down on such offenses, despite some also professing an affinity for the plight of 
Black workers and families. White-led institutions, employers, unions, and residents strove to limit 
African American population growth out of fears of economic competition, but also anxieties about 
racial mixing, “race riots,” and the perceived immorality of Black migrants. 
 The MPD’s internal growth and development became entwined with the racial resentments 
that many white blue-collar and professional workers exhibited towards the city’s comparatively 
poorer Black migrant population. White patrolmen policed boundaries of race, class, gender, and 
sexuality on discretionary terms, which often devolved into race-based harassment and brutality. 
Order maintenance policing in Bronzeville reinforced commonly held white assumptions about 
blackness and criminality, racial inferiority and disorder. Cyclical patterns of poverty, crime, 
surveillance, and arrest implicating Black migrants, transients, laborers, and youth established a 
popular logic about who was deserving of police attention and who was not. Racial containment, not 
safety and service, demarcated the policing of blackness. Public order enforcement on Milwaukee’s 
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near north side limited African Americans’ quality of life and sometimes threatened them directly. 
Such policing informed a growing sense of isolation from the state and reinforced social, economic, 
and political disadvantages. This dynamic only worsened after the 1930s. Because of the perceived 
threat that expanded Black migration and population growth posed to white understandings of 
labor, class identity, and citizenship in the 1940s and 1950s, African Americans garnered more 
intensive police attention and abuse. The larger the city’s Black population became, the more that 
white observers depicted Black people confined to inner city communities as sources of immorality 
and danger. Targeting the aggressive enforcement of public order laws and revising how Black 
spaces got policed became a driving impetus for accountability advocates going forward. 
 Bolstering the administrative hand of Milwaukee police chiefs made garnering effective 
oversight more difficult for citizens. State lawmakers showed faith in the MPD to self-regulate and 
adhere to a self-prescribed set of rules and ethics. Yet it did not consider how racism historically 
structured policing. The state surmised that the MFPC would arbitrate disputes related to discipline 
and misconduct. Intradepartmental regulations mattered. Police chiefs vigorously enforced rules 
among officers. But when it came to the word of poor and working-class Black citizens charging 
white personnel with brutality, the latter received the benefit of the doubt from supervising officers, 
the MFPC and criminal-legal system. Investigations into misconduct fell to the MPD itself. Police 
grievances often disappeared into the law enforcement bureaucracy. Rarely did they result in justice. 
Within this set of power relations, Milwaukee police cultivated meanings, policies, and practices that 
benefitted their interests at the expense of anyone demanding accountability. In a racially partitioned 
city that increasingly criminalized poverty and blackness, police empowerment ran counter to 




Liberal Law-and-Order in Milwaukee 
 Applications of “liberal law-and-order” by the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) in the 
1940s and 1950s reinforced the city’s burgeoning narrative of policing exceptionalism, while 
concurrently shielding the department’s biased function in poor and working-class Black spaces.1 
The combined effect was the narrowing of institutional accountability for African Americans 
increasingly aggrieved by police violence, as well as the shoring up of middle class perceptions of the 
MPD’s state-sanctioned legitimacy. This served to render Black complaints of police racism and 
mistreatment all the more dubious to white police bureaucrats in City Hall and the Milwaukee Fire 
and Police Commission. Correlated developments that germinated locally in the Depression-era 
1930s, but hastened amid the wartime emergency undergirded the MPD’s turn to liberal law-and-
order: accelerated northern Black migration, largely to work in urban defense industries; eruptions of 
civil violence in cities around issues of race, class, and policing; an uptick in crimes related to youth 
misbehavior; and intensifying anti-communist fears over domestic political subversion. 
 Despite being cloaked in a high-minded language of procedural justice, liberal law-and-order 
was a culturally racist project. Its adherents framed issues of morality, crime, and public safety in 
paternalistic terms that singled out Black people, especially migrants, as susceptible to disorder and 
criminality. In this way, it diverged from the overtly racist explanations of racial conservatives. 
Instead, liberal law-and-order treated racism as “erratic,” “irrational,” and “baseless.” As scholar 
Naomi Murakawa argues, “correcting” racism within this framework entailed “criminalizing ‘private’ 
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acts” and “modernizing carceral machinery to increase procedural protections, decrease 
discretionary decisions, and insulate the system from arbitrary bias.”2 A long-term outcome was the 
creation of “colorblind” institutions, which failed to account for racism as “a systemic problem 
rooted in specific social practices and pervading relations of political economy and culture.”3  
 Liberal law-and-order surfaced in Milwaukee, as it did nationally, out of  white political fears 
about Black and Latinx dissent during World War II. Federal demands for urban pacification amid a 
series of  “race riots” in manufacturing cities joined growing calls to address white vigilante terror, 
which belied America’s democratic self-image at a time when the country was looking to define itself  
against fascist and communist governments abroad. As such, liberal law-and-order was centered on 
making police agencies more value-neutral, procedurally fair, and proactive as peacekeepers, in 
addition to being more accessible to a wider range of  middle class community stakeholders.  
 Between the 1910s and 1930s, the MPD achieved a global reputation for crime control 
efficiency, innovation, and professionalism. It earned that reputation despite ongoing clashes with 
striking workers and radical political parties, as well as mounting charges of  discriminatory policing 
by African Americans. Two police chiefs—Joseph Kluchesky (1936-1945) and John Polcyn (1945-
1957)—revised and extended the MPD’s elite status among powerful national observers, policing 
experts, and local constituents. By employing new administrative reforms, such as introducing a 
“race and human relations” training course (1945), founding the Youth Aid Bureau (1946), and 
establishing a Police Aide program (1952) that directed high school students towards law 
enforcement careers (and away from delinquency), the MPD emerged as a national leader in the 
“police-community relations movement.”  
 However, the MPD’s exceptional, or differential treatment of  Black residents was part and 
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parcel of  maintaining its rank atop the U.S. policing ladder. Expanded Black migration to Milwaukee, 
and the assumed potential for African American youth, workers, and the poor to foment social 
disorder, violent crime, and political agitation in the traditional white ethnic metropolis gradually 
became the MPD’s main focus in the late 1940s and 1950s.  
 Liberal law-and-order was an imperfect political project—one that struggled to shift the 
behavior of  law enforcement officers and measurably reduce tensions in the postwar city. It was a 
shallow institutional response to much deeper historical issues of  white capitalist hegemony and 
policing’s essential objective of  racial and class control. While it expanded police power, most 
administrators and rank-and-file officers rejected liberal law-and-order approaches in the moment, 
arguing that their agencies should play, at best, a minimal role in addressing “the underlying 
economic and social causes for racial tension.”4 Liberal law-and-order advocates, conversely, saw a 
vigorous role for police in advancing social and economic stability in service of  crime prevention. 
The MPD’s espousals of  liberal law-and-order tried to answer the stark racial demographic changes 
brought on by the war. In large part, its police chiefs responded to growing ethnic white anxieties 
around the threat of  Black mobility, job competition, and the prospects of  interracial encounters.5 
Many white residents feared how the city’s growing African American population would impact their 
privileged status within the civic hierarchy based on historically ingrained racist assumptions. 
 As such, the MPD’s embrace of  liberal law-and-order converged with the postwar city’s 
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white supremacist racial and class politics, encouraging a volatile social climate and eventual turn 
towards a more reactionary version of  law-and-order as Milwaukee’s Black population grew in the 
1960s.6 A citywide emphasis on racial acculturation, at the expense of  racial justice, informed this 
trajectory. In the 1940s and 1950s, the MPD selectively embraced colorblind rhetoric and policies 
geared towards bringing acculturated Black citizens more firmly into the department’s ambit of  
order maintenance policing; racial pacification was the intended effect.7 It did so without 
relinquishing its state-sanctioned authority or the MPD’s primary task of  defending Milwaukee’s 
white-prescribed social, economic, and political hierarchies. Consequently, the MPD embraced 
liberal law-and-order principles at the same time that many of  the department’s line officers 
denigrated Black life and culture as fundamentally backward and criminogenic. Their discretionary 
actions took the form of  harassment, intimidation, and brutality. The rising, disproportionate 
number of  police stops, arrests, and detentions of  African Americans in this period reinforced Black 
Milwaukee’s racial derogation in the eyes of  white city officials and residents, and was amplified in 
the conventional press, creating a cycle of  Black criminalization that ostensibly mandated further 
police attention. Liberal law-and-order policing, therefore, helped to exacerbate racial disparities 
more than it instilled equal enforcement.  
 The approach simultaneously supported and relied on Milwaukee’s wider project of  Black 
“cultural adjustment” to succeed. The MPD was responsible for ensuring that cultural adjustment 
played out in an orderly fashion at street level. To prevail, it required Black middle class buy-in. 
Black-led organizations and welfare agencies, such as the Milwaukee branches of  the National 
Association for the Advancement of  Colored People (MNAACP), Urban League (MUL), and Young 
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Women’s Christian Association (MYWCA), lent the enterprise legitimacy.8 Black professional leaders 
worked with white police administrators, city officials, and other municipal power brokers to mollify 
seemingly unruly Black migrants and temper their presumed criminality. Public assumptions of  
Black migrant criminality grew in relation to urban crime reporting and in reaction to a series of  
racially charged police-Black citizen encounters that garnered press attention. Black middle class 
leaders also looked to educate Black migrants on appropriate, or “respectable” behavior in the white 
ethnic city. For some, cultural adjustment was an appropriate means of  racial uplift—one that also 
elevated their own civic and political standing with white officials. Yet, Black middle class 
professionals also found themselves in the precarious, often frustrating position of  having to 
embrace white cultural norms, while also being asked by City Hall and liberal organizations to keep 
watch over poor and working-class Black conduct. This expectation resulted primarily from white 
assimilationist racism and, in part, civic responses to mounting street crime and episodes of  police-
Black community violence on Milwaukee’s near north side. 
 Efforts to build equity for poor and working-class Black migrants through cultural 
adjustment, such as they were, failed. The adjustment program refrained from promoting white self-
reflection and, thus, allowed systemic racism to proceed uninterrupted. White liberals in power and 
select members of  Milwaukee’s Black middle class viewed racism as rooted in individual behaviors. 
They, and other liberal voices throughout the country, believed that racial assimilation best resolved 
issues like neighborhood overcrowding, employment discrimination, housing segregation, and police 
violence. Following the widely accepted logic of  Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal’s book An 
American Dilemma (1944), they saw racism as a social formulation, not a power construct. White 
 
8 Other social welfare agencies in Milwaukee included the Mayor’s Commission on Human Relations, the Young Men’s 
Christian Association, the Department of Municipal Recreation, the County Park Commission, the Housing Authority, 
the Department of Public Welfare, and Ministerial Associations. “Findings and Recommendations on the Welfare of 
Negroes and the Urban League,” 1-2, Box 155, Folder 1, “Human Relations (July-December, 1949),” Carl F. and Frank 
Zeidler Papers, 1918-1981, Manuscript Collection 352, Milwaukee Public Library. 
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bigotry resulted from the physical isolation, or “ghettoization,” of  people of  color. Black 
residents—in truth, forcibly confined to under-resourced, overcrowded, and environmentally 
hazardous enclaves—theoretically developed pathological behaviors as a result of  their separation 
from white people. For liberal scholars like Myrdal, racism existed within individual hearts and 
minds. It could be eliminated through integration, cultural conformity, and “acquiring the traits held 
in esteem by the dominant white Americans.”9 White Milwaukee officials, including Chiefs 
Kluchesky and Polcyn, emphasized fixing Black behavior ahead of  addressing the economic 
underpinnings of  racial inequality. Policing, therefore, helped engender disparate outcomes, while 
reinforcing narratives of  racial difference. Racist ideas about Black life and culture bolstered the 
notion that Black people and spaces required exceptional police treatment. 
 Another impact of  Black movement to Milwaukee was heightened white middle class 
anxieties around Black leisure-time pursuits and their supposedly nefarious influence. Activities like 
gambling, club-going, and house partying in the Sixth Ward carried the threat of  interracial intimacy 
and an increase in public disorder.10 Despite numerous white citizens engaging in the same activities, 
business and political leaders viewed Black leisure as a threat to modernization. Illicit Black behavior, 
they surmised, posed a hazard for the city’s “growth” agenda and a social threat to its white middle 
class sensibilities. Black migrants had limited political power to respond to racist accusations. 
 
9 Myrdal argued that a “creed” united American citizens in an enduring quest for liberty, justice, and fair treatment. That 
“creed” upheld racial pluralism and encouraged coexistence. It required white Americans to recognize their shared 
responsibility in devising solutions to “the Negro problem.” Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and 
Modern Democracy (New York: Harper, 1944), 928. However, Myrdal downplayed how systemic racial barriers reproduced 
and compounded poverty, joblessness, and crime in predominantly Black urban neighborhoods. In his review of An 
American Dilemma, Ralph Ellison observed that white scholars too often function as racial surrogates, as if black people 
“do not exist in the real world at all” and get caught up in “moral conflict” over control rather than in building “a 
democracy in which the Negro will be free to define himself for what he is and…for what he desires to be.” Ralph 
Ellison, “An American Dilemma: A Review,” 1944, Teaching American History, accessed January 11, 2015, 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/an-american-dilemma-a-review/. 
10 The Sixth Ward refers to a political district of the Milwaukee Common Council. In 1940, 82.9 percent of African 
Americans lived in the Sixth Ward. 10.4 percent lived in the adjacent Tenth Ward, on the Sixth Ward’s southern border. 
Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2006), 176. 
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Milwaukee’s white ethnic majority held sway over elected officials, who continued to act on the 
behalf  of  white constituents when making decisions on matters like housing construction, urban 
renewal, and commercial redevelopment. Meanwhile, the MPD continued to safeguard the white 
middle and business class interests that established its exceptional status in the 1910s, 1920s, and 
1930s, while bringing the white working-class more firmly into the fold as citizens worthy of  
protection. Police order maintenance was increasingly tied to monitoring poor and working-class 
Black comportment. In turn, perceptions of  who deserved police protection grew more racialized. 
Thousands of  white workers and families supported racist housing policies that funneled poor and 
working-class Black migrants into Milwaukee’s aging, overcrowded, under-resourced inner city. Many 
of  the same people took advantage of  federal programs that subsidized suburban access, home 
ownership, and middle class security after the passage of  New Deal housing reforms. In doing so, 
they barred African Americans from treading the same well-worn path to economic stability and 
freedom to pursue the “American dream.” 
 Black middle class residents, too, expressed uncertainty about what the movement of  
seemingly low-skilled, comparatively poorer Black migrants meant for their tenuous social relations 
with white residents and the connections they had forged over decades with white Milwaukee 
officials. Black in-migration challenged the racial identity of  a city that historically privileged white 
labor, business interests, property owners, and families, as well as the class-based identities of  
segmented Black professionals, who relied partially on the patronage of  segregated Black workers. 
As Milwaukee’s Black population mushroomed after the Second World War, an ever more fraught 
“triangular struggle for order” emerged among established Black leaders, recent migrants, and white 
residents of  diverse class backgrounds. This triangular struggle—aggravated by the city’s deepening 
racial apartheid—challenged the MPD’s capacity for carrying out liberal law-and-order strategies and 
threatened the department’s ability to project police power as racially-neutral or rooted in liberal 
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criminal justice imperatives. Rising social tensions, poverty, and reported crime on Milwaukee’s near 
north side meant that police resources were directed towards this rapidly segregating area. Police 
power became ever more predicated on the efficiency with which law enforcement imposed social 
control and effected arrests in the city’s Black neighborhoods. Because white MPD administrators 
afforded their overwhelmingly white officer corps ample discretion in police-citizen encounters, 
both racialized police violence and Black resistance to aggressive order maintenance policing became 
more pronounced. Many poor and working-class Black folk resisted their second-class treatment at 
the hands of  the police. Youth crowd disruptions of  MPD apprehensions, for example, served as a 
vital mode of  defiance. Black youth challenged the central tenet of  liberal law-and-order that 
African American juveniles possessed latent criminality.11 
 Nevertheless, African American professionals’ opinions on Black migrant criminality stayed 
mixed. Old-guard leaders debated how best to assuage rising police-Black civilian tensions without 
sacrificing precarious relations with white politicians in City Hall. They could only restrain the 
intensifying anger and frustration of  a growing number of  working poor residents for so long. Intra-
racial class dynamics began to shift after a white patrolman shot and killed an unarmed Black 
migrant, Daniel Bell, in 1958.12 The killing raised the stakes of  whether the community would take 
direct action to challenge white police abuse. Competing strands of  Black political activism surfaced, 
setting up dual crises of  police legitimacy and Black community leadership. Meanwhile, white civic 
officials were more concerned about defusing racial tensions than ensuring justice for a grieving 
family and irate citizens. While a lasting movement for police accountability had yet to coalesce, the 
basis for its organization over the course of  the next two decades materialized. African American 
leaders in Milwaukee’s civil and human rights community hoped to re-assert the terms of  police 
 
11 Carl Suddler, Presumed Criminal: Black Youth and the Justice System in Postwar New York (New York: NYU Press, 2019). 
12 The depths of this case of police malfeasance would not come fully into light for decades. 
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power under a liberal law-and-order framework in the throes of  mounting Black dissent. 
Milwaukee’s narrative of  policing exceptionalism was showing weakness, as more Black citizens 
decried police violence. They posed a legal and institutional danger to a police bureaucracy whose 
order maintenance prerogatives depended on the MPD’s image as a beacon of  law enforcement. At 
the dawn of  the 1960s, liberal law-and-order had lost much of  its legitimacy among African 
Americans. 
 
Law Enforcement Liberalism 
  In the aftermath of World War II, liberals in Democratic president Harry Truman’s 
administration avowed that America’s existing criminal justice machinery required modernization, 
rationalization, and strengthening “in the name of racial progress.”13 Domestic and international 
imperatives contributed to liberal desires for police reform. Racialized police violence and “race 
rioting” gripped U.S. cities in the midst of wartime mobilizations and the attendant population shifts 
of the 1940s.14 In this period, Americans paradoxically challenged fascism, genocide, and 
communism abroad while tolerating racial terror lynchings, police brutality, and prison exploitation 
at home, particularly in the Jim Crow South. Black civil rights activists and Popular Front allies on 
the Left exposed these incongruities.15 In turn, the Truman administration ordered the formation of 
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) in 1946 to investigate and report on the 
“disturbingly high” incidence of violence committed by white criminal justice workers and citizens 
 
13 Murakawa, The First Civil Right, 67. 
14 Milwaukee was spared. However, the charged labor conflicts outlined in the previous chapter reflected a tumultuous 
dynamic between police, workers, and middle class residents of racially diverse backgrounds that heightened local fears 
of disorder. 
15 On the Popular Front and civil rights activism in the 1930s and early 1940s, see: Robin D.G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: 
Alabama Communists during the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). Martha Biondi, To 
Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); 
Glenda W. Gilmore, Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 1910-1950 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2008). 
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against groups of color. “Evils,” such as “violent physical attacks” on “members of minority 
groups,” the use of “third degree methods to extort confessions,” “brutality against prisoners,” 
“unwarranted arrests,” “unduly prolonged detentions,” and “search and seizure power” had finally 
caught the eye of federal officials as a national problem.16 
 Before World War II, “race rioting” was largely characterized by white mobs attacking Black 
and Latinx residents with limited police intervention.17 In the 1940s, self-defense against police 
violence in segregated racial “ghettos” became the “race riot’s” defining feature.18 As historian Stuart 
Schrader contends, such conflicts “were not only a problem at home, they had the potential to bring 
about intergroup clashes of a different order” abroad.19 Racial violence could undermine U.S. 
influence with non-white foreign allies, lending international enemies “effective propaganda.”20 
Municipal police regimes, therefore, needed better training and tactics to prevent and combat 
domestic racial unrest, lest it threaten “Cold War civil rights” imperatives.21 A handful of police 
reformers active in the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) surmised that law 
enforcement had to rein in policies that explicitly endorsed racial hierarchy. Police social control 
tactics had long emphasized “race management,” in tandem with class control. But at a moment of 
Axis defeat and European imperial decline, preserving domestic racial hierarchies threatened the 
 
16 The U.S. courts, according to the committee, were also behaving antagonistically towards Black citizens and 
undermining their civil rights. As the Truman Committee phrased it, “different standards of justice” produced “unjust 
convictions” against “unpopular minorities,” who were “sometimes convinced” they could not “expect fair treatment 
from the legal machinery.” President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President’s 
Committee on Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 1947), 25-29. 
17 On U.S. rioting, see: Paul A. Gilje, Rioting in America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). 
18 Early 20th century urban “race riots” were characterized by police racism. Police contributed to these disorders 
“through discriminatory law enforcement practices” that, as Samuel Walker argues, “kindled black resentment.” In the 
face of racial violence among citizens, police “were often passive in the face of white lawlessness.” Walker, “The Origins 
of the Police-Community Relations Movement,” 227. 
19 Stuart Schrader, Badges without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2019), 27. 
20 J. E. Weckler and Theo E. Hall, The Police and Minority Groups: A Program to Prevent Disorder and to Improve Relations between 
Different Racial, Religious, and National Groups (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1944), 1 
21 Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000). 
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potential of U.S. Leadership abroad. The federal state prepared to lead a global system of sovereign 
nations after the war, organized around principles of economic and political development. 
Eliminating racism at home became “a geopolitical necessity.”22 
  To combat the racialized “lawlessness within police departments,” the PCCR called for their 
liberalization. They argued that U.S. police forces should proactively recognize and adhere to 
existing civil rights laws and colorblind ideas of equality. Embedded in the panel’s ambitious set of 
recommendations was federal support for state and local governments in administering civil 
sanctions against police brutality and mob violence. The committee advocated for the improvement 
of state and local police coordination with the U.S. Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. 
Members called on police forces to defend civil rights laws and create “new police training 
programs” that “indoctrinate[d] officers with an awareness of civil rights problems.” The PCCR 
looked to ensure “proper,” race-neutral police treatment of citizens “arrested and incarcerated in 
local jails.” It also suggested raising police salaries, so departments could “attract and hold 
competent personnel.” Finally, the committee recommended passage of a federal law “specifically 
directed against police brutality and related crimes.”23 This liberal push for procedural police justice 
and fairness at the federal level meant raised expectations for accountability among vulnerable local 
populations threatened by discriminatory policing, abuse and neglect. 
 While the PCCR’s final report, To Secure These Rights (1947), influenced liberal efforts to 
 
22 Liberal understandings of inter-group relations became axiomatic in the police-community relations movement of the 
1940s. Federal agencies, like the CIA, also worked with state and local police departments to export the movement’s 
liberal ideals abroad, going so far as to train international defense forces on how to “serve and protect” Americanism 
and the new global capitalist order. Schrader, Badges without Borders, 28. Anti-communist liberalism, as outlined in texts 
like Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, provided a framework for police-community relations proponents seeking to 
rid police departments of bias. Myrdal’s influential tome held that racism could be overcome by appealing to individual 
hearts and minds and relied on colorblindness to solve the problem of prejudice. 
23 The federal statute, the Committee stated, “should enumerate such rights as the right not to be deprived of property 
by a public officer except by due process of law; the right to be free from personal injury inflicted by a public officer; the 
right to engage in a lawful activity without interference by a public officer; and the right to be free from discriminatory 
law enforcement resulting from either active or passive conduct by a public officer.” To Secure These Rights, 156-158. 
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reform policing and the nation’s wider criminal justice system in response to the urban uprisings of 
the 1960s, it landed with a thud in Congress. Long-standing political divisions within the Democratic 
Party over race and civil rights blocked the committee’s recommendations from seeing federal 
enactment. Reactionary Cold War fears over the global containment and domestic infiltration of 
Soviet Communism amplified those divisions. However, the report also disappointed most racial 
progressives, who believed the PCCR had not gone far enough to prevent “the larger system of 
racial violence” described by groups like the National Negro Congress and Civil Rights Congress in 
the 1930s.24 In failing to address racism from a systemic vantage point that accounted for racist 
economics and policy, the committee merely “framed ‘the crime problem’ as a subset of ‘the Negro 
problem.’” This helped advance the conservative logic that “racial liberalization” of the law and 
federal support for civil rights had a “criminological effect” on Black citizens.25 Coming from 
different directions, northern liberals and reactionary southern Democrats aligned on the belief that 
“state-recognized civil rights” and Black criminal behavior were connected.26 
  The criminal justice reforms outlined by the PCCR embraced the New Deal’s most 
democratic impulses. It placed a discernible focus on expanding human rights through procedural 
fairness. The committee reflected the gaining civil rights demands of African Americans, as well as 
the political imperatives of the nation’s emergent position as a global superpower. However, as 
Black Studies scholar Naomi Murakawa persuasively argues, the Truman Committee functioned 
 
24 As progressives on the left argued, To Secure These Rights “depoliticized” private white lawlessness and police complicity 
as it related to extralegal violence. The committee disconnected white vigilante violence and police collusion from a 
racist criminal justice system that continued to link blackness to criminality. It separated the worst, most visible aspects 
of racist violence perpetrated by white citizens, such as racial terror lynchings, from the nation’s larger carceral 
machinery. 
25 In other words, civil rights activism required equal criminal punishment. This included Black resistance to overly-
aggressive order maintenance policing in racially changing cities like Milwaukee. In that city, the conservative view of 
postwar civil rights enforcement came into sharper focus during the civil rights insurgencies and counter-insurgencies of 
the 1960s, as Police Chief Harold Breier blamed Black-led demonstrations for the city’s rising crime rate, while also 
rejecting liberal law-and-order’s more egalitarian pretenses. 
26 Northern liberals saw improved civil rights enforcement, or liberal law-and-order, as a solution to urban disorder, 
while southern Democrats saw the expansion of civil rights as a cause for sustained discord. 
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within “a specific grammar of racism.” That syntax began from the position that racism itself was an 
inherent “misconception,” or “an emotional misfire.” Liberal Democrats held that bigotry was 
“seemingly lodged in individual police officers,” who were “afflicted by stereotypes and 
irrationalities.”27 Police chiefs who subscribed to liberal law-and-order, therefore, aimed to diminish 
the capacity for “bad apples” to “contaminate” an otherwise virtuous policing mission. That mission 
was focused on preserving social order and protecting the “first civil right of citizens,” or “the right 
to safety and security of the person,” in a procedurally just and colorblind fashion.28 They never saw 
their “progressive” departments as drivers of racial inequality or injustice. Liberal law-and-order was, 
chiefly, a project of police order maintenance and social control. As this chapter contends, 
understanding the “grammar of racism” that liberal law-and-order trafficked in is essential to 
understanding why police accountability has proven so elusive for African Americans in Milwaukee. 
 The PCCR drew on the existing efforts of reform-minded police chiefs and liberal advocates 
to control racial unrest and improve police-community relations in postwar cities undergoing 
dramatic social and economic changes. Milwaukee played a role in this process, helping to spearhead 
the national police-community relations movement of the mid-1940s. The city’s police chief, Joseph 
Kluchesky, emerged as a leading advocate for police-community relations.29 Under his guidance, the 
MPD experimented with and applied liberal law-and-order principles. Kluchesky expounded on 
 
27 Jordan T. Camp and Christina Heatherton, “How Liberals Legitimate Broken Windows: An Interview with Naomi 
Murakawa,” in Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter, Jordan T. Camp and Christina Heatherton, 
eds. (New York: Verso Books, 2016), 228. In the above interview, as well as in her own text, The First Civil Right (2014), 
Murakawa makes the point that post-World War II crime policy was not simply about racial conservatives pushing for 
more aggressive policing, prison expansion, and longer sentences for criminal offenders. Racial liberals, too, “aimed to 
build the bias out of the criminal justice system with more procedural rights, more guidelines, more formal protocols in 
everything from arrest to sentencing calculations.” Policing the Planet, 229-230. 
28 To Secure These Rights, 20; Murakawa, The First Civil Right, 2-3. There is, of course, nothing wrong with police attempting 
to meet expectations of democracy and to eliminate prejudice within the workplace and criminal-legal system on its face. 
However, that the U.S. was founded on and governed around a system of racial capitalism—from the earliest 
enslavement of West Africans in the 17th century to the coercion of Freedmen into debt peonage after Emancipation to 
punishing Black bodies and exploiting them through convict lease systems and the mass incarceration crisis of today—
has remained a lingering problem. 
29 Walker, “The Origins of the Police-Community Relations Movement,” 234. 
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existing theories about police-minority relations and the importance of exercising colorblind 
strategies and internal regulations that respected civil rights law. American Council on Race 
Relations (ACRR) staff member J. E. Weckler and Wilmette, Illinois Police Chief Theo Hall first 
warned in 1944 that “new job opportunities for members of minority groups…competition among 
workers for war-scale consumer goods, housing, transportation, recreation” might lead to “increased 
antagonism between racial, religious, or national groups.” Police departments had the “heavy and 
complex burden” of both “maintaining civil rights and public order.” While they could not “control 
or solve the basic causes,” it was, Weckler and Hall argued, incumbent upon them to work with 
other city agencies to address “the broad problems related to housing, recreation, transportation, 
and so on.” Not doing so meant “deaths and injuries, extensive property destruction, and severe 
damage to public morale.”30 
 Chief Kluchesky incorporated these liberal suppositions about social control, interagency 
cooperation, and “protecting every citizen’s civil rights” through “strict neutrality” into Milwaukee 
police academy trainings. His overarching goals were to proactively defuse inter-group tensions, 
prevent opportunities for civil disorder, and maintain a positive police image. While Weckler and 
Hall called for the establishment of “race relations” units, Kluchesky chose not to pursue this step.31 
In addition to monitoring racial unrest, he paid even closer attention to “juvenile delinquency,” or 
the behavior of legal minors who committed crimes, as well as the police department’s vice 
containment activities, particularly on the increasingly Black near north side. Kluchesky’s successor, 
John Polcyn formalized several of his predecessors liberal law-and-order ideas and initiatives when 
he was named to lead the MPD in 1945.32 For instance, Polcyn founded the MPD’s Youth Aid 
 
30 Weckler and Hall, The Police and Minority Groups, iii. 
31 Weckler and Hall, The Police and Minority Groups, 16. 
32 Chief Polcyn began his career with the MPD as a patrolman in 1916. For four years, he served in the U.S. Marine 
Corps. That experience shaped, what admirers considered, his “military efficiency, obedience, sobriety, and good 
conduct. Prior to serving in the U.S. Marine Corps, Polcyn labored as a railroad worker and as a street car motorman. He 
ascended the ranks to sergeant, lieutenant, and captain, before being appointed by the MFPC as chief in 1945. Polcyn’s 
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Bureau in 1946, published a “race and human relations” training manual in 1951, and established a 
Police Aide program in 1952 that aided young people “of good moral character” in beginning law 
enforcement careers.33 Police agencies around the country used the MPD’s liberal human relations 
training guide to instill lessons about race, order, and community relations.34 Through their strategic 
embrace of liberal law-and-order, Kluchesky and Polcyn revised and updated Milwaukee’s narrative 
of policing exceptionalism, organizing it more deliberately around a race-neutral framework for 
social control. This was central to the wider development of police reform movements and 
America’s nascent turn towards police-community relations strategies. The MPD, again, provided a 
reform blueprint, as well as a reason for outside observers to consider it among the most exemplary 
police forces in the U.S.  
  Kluchesky’s emergence as a liberal law-and-order chief reflected the Milwaukee Social 
Democratic Party’s view in the 1930s that it was “more important to prevent crime than to punish 
criminals.”35 He began his policing career as a District One patrolman in 1912, worked his way 
through the Traffic Bureau, and was eventually promoted to Superintendent of the Bureau of 
Identification in 1928. Kluchesky was the only Socialist ever named chief of police in Milwaukee. He 
served as a bodyguard for Mayor Daniel Hoan from 1922 to 1925. Kluchesky’s support for trade 
unions did not negate his allegiance to preserving law-and-order. When the MFPC appointed him 
chief of police in 1935, he was no less dedicated to order maintenance than Janssen and 
Laubenheimer before him. For instance, he ordered the aggressive suppression of street 
 
“vigilant, alert, and efficient” administration of the MPD, his state-sanctioned “independence” and “non-political 
policies,” and his “preventive crime measures and constructive social attitudes” earned him the respect of U.S. Senators, 
like Estes Kefauver of the Senate Crime Committee, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. “Conferring of Diploma of 
Distinctive Public Service,” June 5, 1951, Box 94, Folder 5, “Police Department (1950-1951),” Carl F. and Frank Zeidler 
Papers. 
33 Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada, Personnel News, March 1952, Box 94, Folder 7, “Police 
Department (1953-1954),” Carl F. and Frank Zeidler Papers. 
34 Milwaukee Police Department, Annual Report, 1955, Appendix, vi. 
35 Mayor Daniel Hoan to Minnesota Attorney General Harry H. Peterson, May 28, 1935, Folder 668, “Police 
Department, 1934-1940,” Hoan, Daniel Webster Papers, Mss-0546, Milwaukee County Historical Society. 
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demonstrations, including a 1938 rally aimed at “a group of Nazi agents, spies, and dupes” around 
the Milwaukee Auditorium. Police expressing “Nazi and anti-Semitic sympathies,” reportedly 
engaged in “mass arrests, bullying and abuse,” including “several cases of extreme brutality.”36 
Kluchesky also lent the MPD’s services to county sheriffs working to put down a strike at the Allis-
Chalmers manufacturing plant led by the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1939.37 His racial 
politics mirrored the mixed views on race held by members of Milwaukee’s Social Democratic Party; 
Kluchesky was no less a product of the white supremacist cultural milieu that shaped his political 
counterparts. For years he was a member of the “blackface comedy team” Johnson and Jackson, 
which performed at “Socialist Party vaudeville shows.”38  
  Despite harboring and presenting the culturally racist views of the day, Kluchesky outwardly 
championed the improvement of race relations within the police department, and among white 
residents and African Americans out of a perceived need for order maintenance. He went so far as 
to draft essays on the subject, which were read widely and embraced by other police chiefs seeking 
to temper racial conflicts or the potential for unrest in their cities. Following his 1945 retirement, 
Kluchesky served as an in-demand public speaker. He delivered lectures on race relations and 
juvenile delinquency before organizations like the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP), where he was also a one-time president. Kluchesky also served on the National Advisory 
Committee on Social Protection of the Federal Security Agency and worked as a special consultant 
for the ACRR.39 For nearly a decade after retiring from the MPD, Kluchesky taught courses at the 
 
36 The Milwaukee Union Industrial Council, who filed a complaint with the MFPC, demanded, among other calls, for an 
immediate investigation of the department and its relationship to Nazi sympathizers and for action to be taken against 
those who engaged in brutality. Milwaukee Union Industrial Council to Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, 
November 7, 1938, Box 3, Folder 15, Fire and Police Commission, 1936-1939, Daniel Webster Hoan Mayoral Records, 
1909-1987, City of Milwaukee Archival Collection 8, Milwaukee Public Library. 
37 Milwaukee City Attorney to Chief Kluchesky, June 13, 1939, Box 6, Folder 4, Police, 1932-1940, Daniel Webster 
Hoan Mayoral Records. 
38 Joseph Kluchesky biographical narrative, Box 22, Folder 10, “Police Department, 1942-1948,” John L. Bohn Mayoral 
Records, 1937-1951, City of Milwaukee Archival Collection 16, Milwaukee Public Library. 
39 “Understanding Attitude toward Minority Groups,” International Association of Chiefs of Police Annual Conference, 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Police Academy.40 His lectures on police-
community relations further bolstered the MPD’s national standing as an innovative, reform-
oriented police force. In effect, Kluchesky became one of the most sought after instructors on 
liberal law-and-order. National audiences, including the NAACP, applauded his willingness to speak 
on “group tensions” stemming from “prejudices against racial and religious minorities.”41  
  To ensure that peace was maintained according to a liberal law-and-order ethos, Chief 
Kluchesky called on MPD personnel to follow a series of actionable steps. Law enforcement was to 
provide citizens with equal protection of civil and property rights and receive complaints with “no 
thought of difference.” They were to follow “special procedures” when reporting incidents with 
“racial or religious implications.” To “dispel tensions before they result in violence,” he argued 
police should reach out to existing community organizations concerned about “racial and religious 
matters.” Police personnel had to maintain working relationships with government agencies and 
commissions concerned about “inter-group relations.” There was also a need to conduct human 
relations trainings with officers, involve specialists in the field, and instruct them on how to 
“observe and recognize signs of approaching trouble,” as well as how to handle “mobs, riots, and 
other emergency situations.” Rank-and-file officers should report published promotions of 
“prejudice against racial, religious and nationality groups” to police administrators for FBI 
investigation, and any information concerning hostile groups so that “meetings can be watched 
closely” and “proper action can be taken.” Significantly, law enforcement had to work with school 
principals to recognize inter-group tensions and call the police as needed. Finally, police 
administrators must provide personnel with a complete list of applicable human relations laws and 
 
December 11, 1945; “Police Attitude toward Juvenile Delinquency,” 1940, Folder 669, “Police Department, Chief 
Joseph Kluchesky, 1938-1940,” Hoan, Daniel Webster Papers. 
40 Alexander B. Elkins, “Battle of the Corner: Urban Policing and Rioting in the United States, 1943-1971” (Ph.D. diss., 
Temple University, 2017), 124. 
41 Joseph T. Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems,” 1, “Police Brutality General, 1954-1955,” Papers of the 
NAACP, Part 18, Special Subjects, 1940-1955, Series C: General Office Files: Justice Department-White Supremacy. 
 123 
ordinances.42 The civil rights and liberties of individual citizens were to be respected and protected. 
  Kluchesky essentially formulated a prototypical version of “community policing” that 
positioned law enforcement as not only the front-line guardians of life and property, but of 
“democracy itself.”43 In doing so, he connected police-community relations, social welfare, and order 
maintenance. Building bridges to Black-led community groups, like the MUL and MNAACP, 
required buy-in from African American leaders. The chief suggested that police administrators 
assign “qualified members of the department to participate in group discussions dealing with 
housing facilities, recreational centers, parent-teacher relations, and other projects designed to 
improve conditions for the under-privileged.”44 In this way, the MPD was among the first police 
agencies to advocate for a broader social function in service of peacekeeping and crime prevention. 
As Kluchesky articulated, the police must conduct their duties with “an attitude of genuine sincerity 
and understanding, without bias or discrimination.”45 The preservation of law-and-order hinged on 
the degree to which police personnel not only tolerated, but looked past ethnic, racial and religious 
differences. Only by “maintaining complete impartiality and protecting the civil rights of every 
citizen,” could law enforcement build “general trust” in police fairness. That trust was, “in times of 
critical tension,” the “only basis” on which police could “expect the cooperation of all groups in the 
prevention of disorder.” Fair-minded, face-to-face police interactions with diverse groups was, in 
Kluchesky’s view, a preventative cure for the “race riots” occurring across the U.S. in the 1940s.46   
  Chief Kluchesky lectured police on their responsibility to uphold the rights of all citizens, 
regardless of race. Achieving this colorblind vision meant acculturating non-white citizens to white 
 
42 Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems,” 3-4. 
43 Christopher Lowen Agee, “Crisis and Redemption: The History of American Police Reform since World War II,” 
Journal of Urban History (2017), 5. 
44 Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems.” 
45 Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems,” 5. 
46 In 1943 alone, 47 cities reported 242 “racial battles.” Murakawa, The First Civil Right, 27. Thirty-four people died in 
Detroit’s “race riot” that year. 
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Milwaukee’s established middle class order. City officials expected Black and Latinx migrants—
mostly Mexican and Puerto Rican—to shed their “disorderly” cultural and behavioral traits, which 
elite white reformers, business interests, and blue-collar residents saw as at odds with the city’s 
dominant order. Kluchesky himself admitted that police were “possessed of prejudices,” just like 
other members of the public. At the same time, he argued that police attitudes had to be vested with 
“impartiality” to meet policing objectives.47 That the “effectiveness of a police force” was “largely 
determined by the attitude of individual officers,” indicated that race relations training should be 
thorough, recurrent, and lasting. The MPD enhanced its instructional schedule in the mid-1940s to 
include “race and human relations” courses as a response to civil unrest occurring in other U.S. 
cities.48 In places like New York, Detroit and Los Angeles, police themselves instigated urban rioting 
by inflicting brutality against Black and Brown citizens. Civil violence elsewhere encouraged 
Milwaukee elected officials to seek proactive means of easing latent tensions around race, crime, and 
law enforcement. To do so, they relied on the MPD’s exceptionalized reform orientation. 
 In truth, the MPD laid the groundwork for a revised liberal law-and-order approach before 
the PCCR began investigating the nation’s criminal justice system. The department’s embrace of law 
enforcement liberalism stemmed from its existing “juvenile delinquency” and vice control agenda. 
Racial pacification was merely an extension of the department’s established social control program. 
The goal, it appears, was to cloak social control initiatives in a cover of racial neutrality so as to head 
off civil unrest, align with civil rights law, and preserve the police image in the face of both domestic 
and international criticism. For middle class reformers and civic boosters eager to expand economic 
growth in Milwaukee, the combination of vice, or morals offenses, and youth crime threatened the 
 
47 Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems,” 1-2. 
48 White, Black, and Latinx servicemen vied over urban access and structures of opportunity in cities like Detroit, New 
York, and Los Angeles in the mid-1940s. Competition for jobs, housing, and resources occasionally turned violent and 
police attempted to forcefully restore order. More than anything, police-community relations served as a euphemism for 
racial pacification in the context of mounting urban unrest. Regaining control, not obtaining justice for minoritized 
victims of police violence or white vigilantism, fueled liberal law-and-order approaches. 
 125 
city’s modernization efforts. Youth crime control became a more critical function in the MPD’s 
broader crackdown on immorality and vice; the two were linked. Public order maintenance around 
illicit vice and youth crime grew increasingly racialized as the 20th century progressed, especially as 
police and white civic actors tied race more closely to poor and working-class life. White 
Milwaukee’s deep-seated fears about Black bodies, specifically the presumed sexual lusting of Black 
men for white women, lurked beneath the surface of the MPD’s morals enforcement. Consequently, 
white anxieties around the taboo of interracial sex undermined the agency’s capacity to instill racial 
fairness as prescribed by liberal law-and-order. The MPD, and the city more broadly, was more 
concerned about young white women falling prey to or simply congregating with Black men. 
 Monitoring youth crime had long been on the minds of police officials when the MPD 
revised its training procedures to mitigate opportunities for civil unrest in 1944. Chief Kluchesky 
established parameters for controlling “juvenile delinquency” as early as 1937, outlining the need for 
“a separate division of trained men and women for the handling of children in their contacts with 
the police department.” The MPD featured a “juvenile activities, delinquency and crime prevention” 
course at Milwaukee’s Police Training School as early as 1938.49 The curriculum’s language was race-
neutral. However, it was not difficult to discern when the department referenced Black youth, given 
common depictions of Black migrants and the congested inner city streets that systemic white 
racism compelled them to occupy.50 As Kluchesky wrote for the FBI’s Crime Prevention newsletter:  
 
Newcomers in a neighborhood are frequently found on the streets at night with 
nothing in particular to occupy their minds or bodies…Obviously it is to the 
advantage not only of the child itself, but to the police and the community as a 
whole, to have these children participate in supervised pursuits rather than to have 
 
49 The Police Training School was established in the early 1920s under Chief Laubenheimer. “Juvenile Activities, 
Delinquency & Crime Prevention,” 1938, Box 6, Folder 4, Police, 1932-1940, Daniel Webster Hoan Mayoral Records. 
50 As one historian argues, “the collateral effects of the inner core’s dramatic overcrowding, deteriorating housing stock, 
and limited job opportunities was the increased presence of black residents in the city’s public spaces.” Simon Ezra 
Balto, “‘Occupied Territory’: Police Repression and Black Resistance in Postwar Milwaukee, 1950-1968,” The Journal of 
African American History 98 (2) (Spring 2013), 234; Jack Dougherty, More than One Struggle: The Evolution of Black School 
Reform in Milwaukee (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 56. 
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them roaming the streets in search of mischief.51 
 
Though not racially explicit, the chief presumed that youthful “newcomers” were 
predisposed to crime, or “mischief,” in his description. If left to their own devices, migrant children 
would seek out disorderly behavior. The language in police training materials on juvenile 
delinquency, while race-neutral, utilized descriptors and contextual markers that revealed when 
police meant Black youth. Young people on the near north side had the potential to become “police 
problems” if they were not guided towards police-sponsored centers, where they would be kept 
under law enforcement’s watchful eye. Otherwise, they might become “delinquent adults.” As 
Kluchesky noted, “juvenile behavior in any community” was a “fair barometer of adult behavior.” It 
was no surprise to police administrators that “conditions which bring about default in obligations of 
adults…reflected in undesirable behavior on the part of their children.”52 
To ward off “race riots” similar to those experienced by Detroit in 1942 and 1943, 
Kluchesky worked to prevent interracial mixing. Inhibiting social disorder meant ensuring Black 
containment in the Sixth Ward and doing all the department could to prevent white residents from 
entering the vicinity. Police kept close watch of Black youth. Law enforcement viewed African 
American young people as the prime fomenters of unrest. As the FBI’s Milwaukee Field Division 
observed in 1943, “youthful Negroes” would “frequently band together in a crowd of from three 
hundred to four hundred, especially on weekends, and cause considerable commotion by yelling and 
shouting and forcing people off the sidewalks.”53 Through coercion and other means, federal agents 
relied on African Americans to surveil their own people. As a Black informant reported to 
 
51 Joseph Kluchesky, “Youth: A Homefront Challenge---Through Law Enforcement,” Crime Prevention, FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin (September-October, 1944). 
52 Kluchesky, “Youth.” 
53 Robert A. Hill, ed., The FBI’s RACON: Racial Conditions in the United States during World War II (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1995), 165. 
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Milwaukee FBI agents, “if these individuals decided to roam the streets in the white residential areas, 
trouble might ensue.”54 Black attorney George Brawley said police threatened white visitors to the 
Sixth Ward with vagrancy arrests if they did not exit the district. Black business-owners reported 
“many complaints” of white customers being called away from businesses by patrolmen, who 
ordered them to leave the area.55 Chief Kluchesky denied these charges before Milwaukee Mayor 
John Bohn’s Committee on Interracial Relations, testifying to the department’s adherence to racial 
colorblindness. Youth control was interwoven with the liberal law-and-order imperative of racial 
pacification. In 1944, Kluchesky called for eradicating bias “from the minds of children.” Young 
people, he argued, offered “the most fertile field in which to plant the seeds of understanding and to 
uproot and destroy the weeds of religious prejudice and racial hatred.”56 The chief encouraged 
Milwaukee youth to participate in Saturday morning classes at the Police Training School, which he 
saw it as a crucial preventative measure. The department not only taught young people that their 
diversity was “the foundation of American security, growth and progress,” but that they could trust 
the police as their “friend.” Improving the police image and instilling trust was at the heart of law 
enforcement liberalism. At the academy, young people learned about the police function and 
“necessity of maintaining law and order.” “The appeal of patriotism,” Kluchesky noted, was “strong 
with children” and must “be effectively utilized.” 
 Milwaukee police leaders viewed the threat of juvenile crime through a similar racial prism as 
illicit vice offenses—gambling, public drunkenness, and prostitution. Milwaukee’s vice markets 
flourished in the 1940s and 1950s, as historian Khalil Muhammad once framed it, “under a cover of 
blackness.”57 Therefore, vice-related crime threatened the fundamental building block of moral 
 
54 Hill, The FBI's RACON, 165. 
55 “Ban on Whites Charge Denied,” The Milwaukee Journal, January 11, 1945, Part 2, 8. 
56 Kluchesky, “Police Action in Minority Problems,” 4-5. 
57 Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America 
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order: white middle class families. Police aggressively monitored opportunities for convergences of 
youth and vice. The MPD understood unsupervised minors and young adults to be susceptible to 
indecency, vice, and related public order offenses. In 1943, the Common Council passed the city’s 
first youth curfew ordinance.58 Milwaukee’s police academy featured a course, “Juvenile Activities, 
Delinquency and Crime Prevention,” in 1945. For trainees, “police interest in juvenile activities” was 
positioned as central to “the larger problem of ‘crime prevention.’”59 Actual arrests of minors in the 
1940s matched the department’s emphasis on youth control, particularly during World War II: 7,106 
arrests in 1943, 6,501 in 1944, and 6,302 in 1945.60 Most of these were on non-violent traffic or 
pedestrian offenses. However, disorderly conduct arrests remained high at 1,582; 1,581; and 1,212 in 
that same span. Rising youth crime and attendant middle class fears about moral breakdown 
encouraged the MPD to enhance its institutional composition and strategic objectives. 
Consequently, it brought thousands of local youth under its purview. 
 Chief John Polcyn, like Kluchesky, embraced the blend of liberal law-and-order guidance 
and long established institutional independence that characterized Milwaukee’s narrative of policing 
exceptionalism in the post-World War II era. Speaking before the United Spanish War Veterans at a 
1946 conference, during his first year as chief, Polcyn referred to Milwaukee as “the home of law 
enforcement,” a city “free of politics,” where police “enforce the law impartially,” and it is 
immaterial to law enforcement “what color, creed, or political belief you are.” The MPD, he said, 
 
58 In July 1943, the Milwaukee Common Council passed a “curfew ordinance” prohibiting all youth under the age of 
sixteen from “loitering upon public streets, highways, roads, alleys, parks, public buildings, places of amusement and 
entertainment, vacant lots, or any pubs places” from 12:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. Any minor under the age of eighteen years 
of age was prohibited from visiting, loitering, idling, wandering, or strolling in a hotel, lodging for rooming house 
between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. without a parent or guardian. Between July 1943 and January 1945, 234 juveniles were 
arrested for violating the curfew ordinance; 158 were sent to the juvenile detention center; 69 were turned over to their 
parents; 17 were released. 155 parents were arrested for violating the ordinance, as well, with warrants issued in 38 of 
these cases. Police were called on to connect apprehended juveniles with social centers with the cooperation of parents. 
“Juvenile Delinquency Control Program as Operative in the Police Department of the City of Milwaukee, Wis.,” Box 94, 
Folder 4, “Police Department (1948-1949),” Carl F. and Frank Zeidler Papers. 
59 “Juvenile Delinquency Control Program as Operative in the Police Department of the City of Milwaukee, Wis.” 
60 Milwaukee Police Department, Annual Report, 1943-1945. 
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was “only concerned with individual behavior.”61 Polcyn actualized much of Kluchesky’s vision for 
youth control when he established Milwaukee’s Youth Aid Bureau (YAB) in 1946. The YAB 
collaborated with other municipal agencies to monitor, rehabilitate, and discipline “juvenile 
delinquents.”62 The public education system and MPD partnered to control youth behavior. Law 
enforcement was brought into schools by administrators to observe and, if necessary, arrest 
disorderly young people. The MPD, Milwaukee County Juvenile Court, and Department of 
Municipal Recreation and Adult Education oversaw the “Juvenile Delinquency Control Program.”63 
It should be considered part of the city’s wider cultural adjustment efforts. Juvenile justice agencies 
served a specific function within the criminal justice system, with the prevention and rehabilitation 
of allegedly criminogenic youth, particularly African Americans, serving as a mutual objective. The 
 
61 Expecting Spanish American War veterans to partake in the city’s drinking culture, Chief Polcyn assured the them, 
“Wherever you meet a police officer, when you get tired of making the rounds of the breweries, he will take care of 
you.” Poor and working-class Black residents were offered no such assurances when encountering police while 
intoxicated. United Spanish War Veterans, “Proceedings of the Stated Convention of the 48th National Encampment, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin,” August 4-8, 1946, 84. 
62 A “delinquent child” was defined by the “Children’s Code of Wisconsin” as “any child under the age of eighteen years 
who has violated any law of the state or any county, city, town or village ordinance; or who by reason of being wayward 
or habitually disobedient is uncontrolled by his parent, guardian or custodian; or who is habitually truant from school or 
home; or who habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals of health of himself or others.” “Juvenile 
Delinquency Control Program as Operative in the Police Department of the City of Milwaukee, Wis.”; The State Board 
of Control of Wisconsin, “Crime Prevention Bureau,” The Rebuilder 1 (1) (February, 1937), 124-125. 
63 Juvenile justice programs dated back to the turn of the 20th century. They were principally organized around 
rehabilitation. This shifted in the 1940s, as youth crime rose during World War II. As historian David Wolcott argues, 
“the general public increasingly regarded the treatment-oriented goals of juvenile courts as inconsistent with the practical 
demands of maintaining public order.” Fears, largely political and racial, gripped the nation. They manifested in press 
accounts of youth behavior and rising gang activity. Young working-class males formed street gangs against the 
backdrop of the era’s mass migrations. Reduced employment opportunities for teenagers and young men with limited 
schooling, combined with housing pressures associated with urban redevelopment, fostered youth gang formation. With 
fathers and male role models at war, boys, according to commentators, lacked paternal guidance. Girls, meanwhile, were 
seen as prone to sexual delinquency, evidently based on their desires for men in uniform. Chief Kluchesky once wrote 
that “in young girls, the craving for life and adventure is frequently satisfied by the man in uniform.” With mothers 
working outside of the home to support families and the war effort, writers of the time identified a breakdown in family 
and moral structures. In this context, cities called on the police to manage and get tougher on juvenile behavior. Chicago 
opened the world’s first juvenile court in 1899. Milwaukee followed soon thereafter, in 1902. Tera Eva Agyepong, The 
Criminalization of Black Children, Race, Gender, and Delinquency in Chicago’s Juvenile Justice System, 1899-1945 (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2018); David B. Wolcott, Cops and Kids: Policing Juvenile Delinquency in Urban American, 
1890-1940 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2005), 55, 193-194. Some older male youths returned from war and 
applied their military training and arms expertise to gang warfare on city streets. This contributed to a rise in violent 
gang-related crime. On youth gang formation in the World War II and postwar era, see: Eric C. Schneider, Vampires, 
Dragons, and Egyptian Kings: Youth Gangs in Postwar New York (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Joseph 
Kluchesky, “Youth: A Homefront Challenge-Through Law Enforcement,” 5. 
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MPD enforced the state juvenile code at street level, apprehending offenders and referring cases to 
the city’s juvenile court. Because police were “active throughout the city and familiar with conditions 
prevailing in all neighborhoods,” public officials saw them as well positioned “to cooperate with 
other agencies.”64  
 Youth control programs resulted in the unprecedented expansion of discretionary police 
surveillance, contacts, and arrests of Milwaukee young people. While overall juvenile arrests had 
decreased from wartime highs following the Youth Aid Bureau’s formation, they saw a steady 
increase over the course of the 1950s.65 Youth criminal supervision in Milwaukee during the 1950s 
corresponded with national patterns, as youth criminal justice supervision grew nationally by roughly 
2.5 times from 1949 to 1957.66 While the MPD did not report individuals’ race in tabulations of 
youth crime between 1943 and 1956, it did thereafter. Racial disparities in arrests of minors widened 
as the postwar era progressed, alongside arrests of Black adults. Despite comprising between 4 and 
8.5 percent of Milwaukee’s population from 1950 to 1960, Black men and women comprised 
anywhere from 63 to 75 percent of all prostitution and commercialized vice arrests; 58 to 72 percent 
of all narcotics arrests; 51 to 82 percent of all gambling arrests; and 31 to 33 percent of all disorderly 
conduct arrests in the 1957 to 1960 period. Considering that at the outset of World War II Black 
youth represented slightly more than 1.4 percent of Milwaukee’s youth population, they comprised 
5.4 percent of all juvenile arrests from 1942 to 1944.67 Detention rates reflected disparities in 
enforcement and arrests. Milwaukee House of Corrections records show that Black jailing went up 
from 14 to almost 33 percent between 1948 and 1960.68 These numbers signified the high level of 
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65 1959 was the only down year. Arrests of minors reached 3,526 in 1947, 3,789 in 1948, and 3,999 in 1949. These 
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police attention paid to Milwaukee’s near north side, and the increasingly anxious public discourse 
around race, crime, and safety. It is in these years that Milwaukee began trying to police its way out 
of a deepening “urban crisis,” well before the 1960s. 
 Controlling youth crime aligned with the MPD’s contributions to Milwaukee’s “cultural 
adjustment” program. Black behavior, criminal or otherwise, was positioned by white civic leaders 
and police officials as a function of Black familial and cultural leanings. While City Hall liberals 
recognized that inequality made life difficult for Black citizens, they nonetheless pathologized Black 
behavior, rarely considering how government policies created differential outcomes and hardened 
segregation patterns. In 1952, for instance, a report drafted by the University of Wisconsin School of 
Social Work observed that Black migrants were “largely young adults,” often men, who reproduced 
at comparatively high rates.69 They moved into a congested “Inner Core” area of the city—its 
population characterized by low income, irregular employment, “sub-standard economic status,” 
“poor health,” “poor housing,” “dependency,” “low educational attainment,” and “high delinquency 
rates.”70 Because these were similar problems, previously confronted by “other new arrivals,” i.e. 
European immigrants, liberal committees like the Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights 
(MCHR) expected Black newcomers from the South to assimilate. Family and morality was at the 
heart of Black cultural adjustment. Black parents, researchers wrote, had “an obligation to provide 
for the young people of this community the opportunity to fulfill their desires and needs for social 
and cultural growth.” The “influence of the family” was “very important” in explaining “delinquent 
behavior.” “Insecure economic and social status coupled with inadequate living conditions” created 
a “family climate” that hindered the ability of Black youth to “meet and accept the responsibilities as 
 
69 John W. Teter, “Report on a Survey of Social Characteristics of the Lower Northside Community,” in Milwaukee 
Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, 1956, 16. 
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well as the opportunities…put before them.”71 Academic researchers suggested that anywhere 
“families of marginal income and social status” resided, “together with inadequate living 
conditions,” high delinquency rates resulted, including in white spaces.72 
 Yet, the MPD concentrated its enforcement strategies on the increasingly Black near north 
side. This did not automatically equate to police protection. Black families living there were already 
dealing with the social and economic vulnerability that came with systemic discrimination, 
experiencing a dangerous combination of overzealous policing and law enforcement neglect.73 
Moreover, youth crime was more complicated than it seemed for many Black citizens. For example, 
in 1952 Hillside Terrace public housing residents demanded better police protection in response to 
outside youths, non-tenants, “constituting a menace to the welfare and safety” of housing project 
residents. Youths inflicted “considerable loss” to property, broke off tree branches, smashed 
windows, and engaged in “acts of gross indecency,” tenants reported.74 Black public housing 
residents pointed to a “lack of police protection” and “slow response” times as contributing factors. 
Their public safety concerns suggested all residents desired to live decent lives, secure in their 
“property” and “welfare.” However, the MPD did not administer its services fairly, despite its 
colorblind pronouncements. When protection was needed most, too many African Americans found 
it lacking. When police encountered “unruly” Black youth, they too often inflicted a “brutal and 
heavy hand.”75 The behavioral racism that gave shape to disparate policing in Black spaces undercut 
the MPD’s efforts to address juvenile delinquency’s root causes.  
  White perceptions of Black cultural inferiority, economic deficiency, and inherent criminality 
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fueled competing forms of resistance to Milwaukee’s “Negro influx.”76 These ranged from cross 
burnings on the lawns of prospective Black home buyers in all-white neighborhoods, to rampant 
employment discrimination, to City Hall write-in campaigns from white business-owners and 
residents fearful of Black crime waves. Narratives of racial difference lent white perceptions of Black 
migration legitimacy, as did racist ideas about interracial intimacy. White homeowners living in the 
unincorporated town of Granville, for example, exhibited “strong active resistance” to Black home-
buying.77 Business owners voiced fears about losing customers “because of the Negro trade,” as well 
as “the safety and welfare of their wives and daughters while…working nights.” Black men posed an 
apparent threat to their virile conception of white manhood. Police “overheard discussions 
concerning the fraternization of Negro men and white women.” MPD officers warned “physical 
violence might erupt from such incidents.” White families living in the Westlawn neighborhood also 
expressed fears about the “problem” of “non-white population movement into traditional all white 
communities.”78 Rumors swirled that the working-class housing project would be “either 100 
percent black or predominantly of Negro occupancy.” A white minister informed the Milwaukee 
Human Relations Commission that he would find a private school to send his daughter to, then 
argued [white] business owners might have been amenable to hiring “non-white employees who ‘live 
in’” the city; that was “quite different from a non-white person living next door as a neighbor.”79 
Integration for some white residents was not just a matter of decreasing home values or lost social 
prestige, but of perceived safety risks centered on Black criminality. 
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  White middle class reformers framed racial inequality in Milwaukee as a consequence of  
individual conduct and Black ghetto formation. Some middle class elites chalked up racial 
disadvantage in employment, housing, and education to interpersonal white bigotry, which gave 
shape to poor living conditions and, in turn, Black cultural pathologies and criminal behaviors. The 
psychological impact of  assimilationist racism within individuals superseded the institutional racism 
that produced uneven racial structures and outcomes. As historian Simon Balto has observed, 
“rather than indictments of  infrastructural non-investment or systematic inequality, rhetorics of  
moral failure, personal accountability, and racial responsibility” characterized public debates around 
Sixth Ward conditions after World War II.80 As issues of  overcrowding, poverty, and crime worsened 
during Milwaukee’s postwar housing crisis, an “emergent language of  black moral failure” shaped 
police approaches to social control and order maintenance. The MPD arrested Black adults and 
youth at higher rates than white offenders who engaged in similar activities. Arrests on charges like 
“drunkenness,” “vagrancy,” “gambling,” “disorderly conduct,” and “suspicion” rose. Blackness was 
condemned and criminalized through the aggressive policing of  leisure-time spaces, especially 
underground dance parties, jazz performances, and gambling halls.81 
  Vice control remained a significant concern for white middle class reformers in the 1940s. It 
merged with issues around youth crime and Black migration. More vigorous enforcement of  vice-
related crime in the Sixth Ward ensured that poor and working-class Blacks experienced 
disproportionate police stops, arrests, and detentions. Gambling arrests, for instance, surged during 
the wartime years, nearly tripling in 1942 and 1943.82 White middle class reformers linked Black 
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gambling arrests to lax parental supervision and the city’s rising juvenile delinquency problem.83 
Organizations like the Milwaukee Women’s Club demanded vigilance from the MPD’s Vice Squad in 
the Sixth Ward, especially around its Black-run “policy racket.”84 The MPD fleetingly allowed some 
vice activities to flourish on the near north side through the 1940s. Milwaukee’s Black-run policy 
circuit was lucrative, and benefitted from police support. While low-level “numbers runners” and 
players faced occasional busts, some white patrolmen used their discretion to turn the other way for 
pay-offs.85 The sympathies of  liberal white reformers for the economic plight of  poor and working-
class Black migrants began shifting; the perceived immorality of  Black newcomers tested their social 
tolerance. Progressive reformers expressed concerns about disorderly Black conduct. Innez Barr, of  
the Milwaukee Woman’s Club, worked with the MUL to regulate vice in the Sixth Ward.86 Her efforts 
to monitor Black leisure time activities reflected a gaining assimilationist racism that eventually 
formed the basis of  Milwaukee’s cultural adjustment program. The Youth Aid Bureau supported 
white middle class drives to reform Black behavior. Widespread anxieties also emerged around youth 
crimes of  an interracial nature. Barr and other liberal reformers made connections between Black 
gambling, vice, and juvenile delinquency. This joined with FBI surveillance of  young Black migrants. 
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Federal police in Milwaukee kept a watchful eye on the potential for “wartime urban and racial 
unrest.”87 
 Police underprotection of  African Americans, conversely, was the problem for some Black 
leaders. Undue vice and public order law enforcement confounded some Black clergy, whom City 
Hall liberals expected to help acculturate southern Black migrants. While Black middle class leaders 
disdained vice as much as white officials, they believed achieving public safety meant securing more 
equitable and discerning law enforcement. In 1948, Rev. W. J. G. McLin requested that Chief  Polcyn 
provide a reasonable police presence in the Sixth War to curb gambling, loitering, and drunkenness.88 
Businesses that served liquor were concentrated on the near north side, feeding its image as an 
immoral space. McLin told Polcyn that Black Milwaukeeans did not participate in vice activities 
alone. The white press, he editorialized, unfairly targeted African Americans. “Does the mere 
question of  color warrant so much extra space?”89 Police tended to ignore Black requests for police 
assistance, unless the department faced accusations of  wrongdoing or white citizens were involved.90  
White middle class fears about rising moral disorder, juvenile delinquency, interracial 
intimacy, and Communism all blended together in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This convergence 
tested the MPD’s liberal law-and-order ethos, which called for officers to adhere to racial-neutrality 
and fairness in enforcing the law. White anxieties around Black in-migration, the susceptibility of  
youth to drugs and seemingly nefarious entertainment, and racialized press accounts supported 
notions of  criminality among Black juveniles and young adult men. Racially-specific reporting 
worked in tandem with location-specific policing of  youth on the city’s near north side. According 
to the MPD, “police interest in juvenile activities” was “justified” and “vital to the community” 
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because of  “its relation to the larger problem of  ‘Crime Prevention.’”91 The injection of  race into 
vice control made Milwaukee’s perceived morals crisis more acute for city officials who were already 
concerned about the city’s transitioning racial boundaries and related pernicious influences.  
In 1948, lurid press depictions of  “Bare Teenage Vice Orgies” among Black teens and young 
men and white teenage girls intensified the department’s juvenile control program. Newspapers 
made connections to the ascendant popularity of  jazz music—a distinctly Black cultural art form 
that challenged minstrelsy and racist white interpretations of  Black men as smiling, docile 
entertainers. One raid, in particular, resulted in the arrest of  seven “jazz-mad” white teenage girls 
and nine “Negro men and boys,” said to be abusing “marijuana and liquor.”92 In addition to policing 
interracial sex, the MPD’s Vice Squad aggressively enforced narcotics laws. Black young adults were 
perceived as harbingers of  drug abuse in Milwaukee.93 According to police, the girls, all from “good 
homes,” admitted “improper sexual relations with the Negro youths.” Four of  the Black minors 
faced “sex delinquency” charges. The alleged leader of  the “thrill ring,” Walter Beach, “deserved a 
severe sentence,” according to the Milwaukee County Assistant District Attorney, as he had “no 
regard for womanhood.” A judge sentenced the 18-year-old, who had no previous criminal record, 
to a two-to-three-year prison sentence at Green Bay reformatory “on charges of  carnal knowledge 
and abuse of  two white girls.”94 
A second case stands out for the racialized nature of  the public discourse it provoked and 
disproportionate number of  Black arrests it produced. In April 1950, two concerned white women 
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wrote to Mayor Zeidler about a “rooming house” allegedly rented for “immoral purposes” on the 
near north side.95 “White girls” exited the premises “in the early morning hours.” The “nuisance” 
property was “running wide open, despite repeated complaints.”96 The women were frustrated that 
police made numerous arrests at the property, mostly of  Black men and women, but not of  the 
property owner(s). The racialized nature of  the “immoral” behavior allegedly taking place 
heightened the criminal justice response. This was not merely an issue of  commercialized vice 
among youths, but of  the taboo practice of  interracial sex. As Chief  Polcyn wrote in a letter to the 
Milwaukee County District Attorney, “teenage white girls have been observed frequenting the 
premises,” with an “unusual amount of  activity and traffic of  both white and colored person going 
in and out.”97 Subsequent police charges ranged from “disorderly conduct” to “soliciting for 
prostitution” to “lewd and lascivious behavior.”98 The rooming house operator was eventually 
charged under the “Linley Law,” but not before police racked up a number of  arrests.99 
Judging by newspaper headlines in 1950, white civic elites saw Communism as every bit as 
threatening morally as interracial juvenile sex and prostitution. As the postwar “Red Scare” and 
McCarthyism neared its zenith, Wisconsin Communist Party (WCP) leaders challenged the MPD’s 
discriminatory policing on the near north side. On April 12, 1950, they registered a complaint with 
the MFPC that police were “terrorizing, intimidating, and penalizing” the “legitimate social and 
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personal relations” of  white and Black citizens.100 The complaint, filed months before the federal 
government passed the McCarron Act authorizing police to arrest and detain subversives, was 
prompted by the actions of  a squad of  officers.101 The squad was presumably conducting political 
surveillance when it approached a white woman sitting in a parked car after “they observed two 
colored men dash” from the vehicle. The woman, WCP secretary Esther Eisenscher, informed 
police all was well. Fred Blair, WCP vice-chair, then approached the officers and asked for badge 
numbers, which Chief  Polcyn says were provided.102 As the squad left, the officers pulled over a 
truck for an alleged broken tail light. They then searched the vehicle of  Mortimer Altman, “a known 
communist,” finding only “posters advertising the appearance in Milwaukee of  Mrs. Eslanda G. 
Robeson at the Masonic Hall.”103 The MFPC refused to accept the WCP’s discrimination complaint, 
arguing they “had to file formal, legal charges before any action could be taken by the 
Commission.”104 The officers who supplied badge numbers denied “being in the vicinity” of  the 
encounter between the squad and WCP members, stating, according to Polcyn, that they “cannot 
understand how their badge numbers could have been secured since they had absolutely no contact 
whatsoever” with the complainants.105 The WCP’s demand for police accountability went nowhere. 
Regardless, their leadership soon went underground.106 
Thereafter, Polcyn tightened the MPD’s vice control efforts. In 1950, he issued a directive to 
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all personnel: It was “their duty and obligation…regardless of  rank or specific assignment, to take 
proper action whenever…lewd, obscene or indecent performances” and “strip tease acts” came to 
their attention.107 All were fair game for arrest. Those who failed to vigorously police vice and public 
order offenses would be “severely disciplined.” As the chief  continued. “Milwaukee has always been 
known as a clean city with clean entertainment. This Department will leave nothing within its power 
undone to keep it so.” For many residents, including one who wrote to Milwaukee Mayor Frank 
Zeidler in 1951, it was “common knowledge” that the city had “one of  the finest police 
department’s in the country.”108 The force’s durable narrative of  policing exceptionalism, as well as 
the city’s moral order, was on the line. 
 
Policing the Late Great Migration 
 The MPD’s embrace of liberal law-and-order was shaped by increasing Black migration 
during and after World War II. Black Milwaukee expanded from 8,821 residents in 1940 to 62,458 in 
1960.109 Black migration, and the mixed responses it generated, encouraged the city’s police 
department to enact new trainings on race and human relations that were meant to mitigate 
opportunities for civil unrest. However, liberal reforms from on high rarely translated into equitable 
police service and protection across Milwaukee’s color line. Poor and working-class Black migrants 
grappled with intensifying episodes of police mistreatment as their number grew. Chronic 
joblessness, under-employment, and poverty reinforced a perceived need for vigilant policing among 
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white city officials and residents, making it difficult for the MPD to live up to its liberal 
proclamations of racial neutrality. Opportunities for discretionary police misconduct on the near 
north side abounded as the city directed police resources towards Black spaces. Aggressive order 
maintenance policing became more noticeable as Black Milwaukee’s population grew and its physical 
proximity became more constrained. This produced differential outcomes in the form of undue 
fines, arrests, detentions, and “juvenile justice” referrals. Responding to pressures applied by white 
social reformers and civic leaders, the MPD cracked down on public order offenses: drunkenness, 
vagrancy, and gambling. More serious violent crimes, such as murder, homicide, rape, and assault, 
also drew significant police attention. Several violent crimes involving Black criminal suspects in the 
mid-1950s were sensationalized in the press, creating a more frenzied atmosphere. Black 
criminalization disrupted interracial and intra-racial class dynamics among Black middle class 
residents, comparatively poorer migrants, and white liberals. Cultural adjustment was City Hall’s 
response to resolving growing tensions around race, crime, and order maintenance. 
 Historian Paul Geib refers to Black Milwaukee’s expansive population growth as the city’s 
“late Great Migration,” given that the bulk of African American migrants arrived later than in other 
cities.110 Most Black newcomers to Milwaukee in the 1940s and 1950s hailed from Lower South 
states like Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia.111 Others travelled from Upper South or border states 
like Arkansas, Tennessee, and Kentucky.112 Still, some made their way from the Lower Midwest, or 
previous migration destinations, like Chicago or Cleveland. Milwaukee’s Black migrant population 
was young and largely male.113 African American arrivals encountered a racist world, not all too 
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different in attitude and structure from the regions they left behind. Many poor white southern 
laborers also joined northward migrations. They added an overtly racist understanding of Black life 
and culture to an ethnically diverse white European city whose residents already subscribed to 
narratives of racial difference. Like earlier Black migrants, those participating in the city’s late Great 
Migration sought economic opportunities and to escape the dehumanization and “white rage” that 
coursed through the Jim Crow South.114 Economic opportunities pulled, while white racial violence 
and discrimination pushed tens of thousands of refugees north. The pressure of finding better jobs 
and freedom joined correlated factors, like improved educational access and secure voting rights.115 
Still, Milwaukee, like other northern migration destinations, betrayed a mix of hope and discontent. 
The city’s racially divided terrain was at once wholly unfamiliar and eerily recognizable. While not all 
Black migrants experienced racial violence first-hand in the South, the threat of physical harm, either 
at the hands of white police or white neighbors, shaped Black yearnings for survival in Milwaukee. 
Still, with the relative availability of industrial, domestic, and hospitality work, many Black men and 
women made the best of their new circumstances. 
 Patterns of Black settlement in Milwaukee reflected those of other Midwestern cities 
attracting Black workers and families.116 Legal and extra-legal acts of discrimination forced migrants 
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to live in a spatially-confined area of mixed residential, commercial and industrial lands situated just 
north of downtown.117 The federal government condemned Milwaukee’s near north side through 
“redlining.” A 1938 Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) map, for example, characterized it 
as grade “D,” meaning it showed “detrimental influences in a pronounced degree,” a “low 
percentage of home ownership,” “very poor maintenance,” “vandalism,” and “an undesirable 
population” or “infiltration of it.” The redlined perimeter of the area on federal housing maps 
signaled to mortgage lenders that they should refuse loans to area occupants, or otherwise proceed 
on “a conservative basis.”118 Black Milwaukee’s territorial limits stretched slightly further north and 
west in subsequent decades, as more economically mobile white families, mainly of German and 
Jewish descent, departed the near north side for outlying neighborhoods and incorporated and 
unincorporated municipalities on the city’s suburban fringes.119 Only ninety Black Milwaukee 
families lived in majority white communities as of 1960.120 As the MNAACP reported in 1958, “the 
ability to rent outside the accepted Negro community is practically impossible.”121 By 1945, the 135-
block near north side area was about two-thirds Black. Although sixty-eight percent of the housing 
 
University of Chicago, 1996). 
117 In 1940, Black Milwaukee’s boundaries extended from 3rd St. on the East to 12th St. on the West, State St. on the 
South to Wright St. on the North. “Inner Core,” is the verbiage public officials came to use to identify Milwaukee’s near 
north side—a racially segregated Black inner city space that both federal and local government agencies helped create 
through discriminatory housing and zoning policies in collaboration with white real estate interests and private citizens. 
The Sixth Ward refers to a political district of the Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 176; “Final Report to the Honorable Frank P. 
Zeidler, Mayor, City of Milwaukee,” Mayor's Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 15, 1960. 
118 “Milwaukee County, Wisconsin 1938,” American Geographical Society Library Digital Map Collection, accessed 
September 17, 2019, https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agdm/id/3028/; “Explanation,” 2, “Text to 
accompany “Map of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin: residential security map” 1938,” American Geographical Society 
Library, accessed September 17, 2019, https://uwm.edu/libraries/wp-content/uploads/sites/59/2015/03/Pages-1-59-
Text-to-accompany-Map-of-Milwaukee-County-Wisconsin-residential-security-map-19381.pdf. 
119 On how these processes of neighborhood demographic change and ethnic displacement played out at the local level 
in nearby Chicago, see: Amanda I. Seligman, Block by Block: Neighborhoods and Public Policy on Chicago’s West Side (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
120 Milwaukee’s Black population was 62,485 in 1960. Sylvia Bell White and Jody LePage, Sister: An African American Life 
in Search of Justice (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 2013), 164-165. 
121 Milwaukee Branch, NAACP, “Problems facing the Negro in Milwaukee,” April 17, 1958, 2, Folder, 009055-012-0271, 
Papers of the NAACP, Part 25--Branch Department Files, Series C--Branch Newsletters and Printed Materials, 1956-
1965. 
 144 
stock Black families occupied in 1946 was considered to be sub-standard by the state, proud Black 
homeowners and renters meticulously cared for the properties they inhabited. Nevertheless, housing 
deterioration grew more severe in the late 1940s and 1950s as segregation hardened. This 
encouraged civic disinvestment. 
 The opening of defense jobs to Black workers in the 1940s sparked Milwaukee’s late Great 
Migration. Wartime enlistments produced high labor shortages, generating economic opportunities 
for Black workers previously shut out of manufacturing positions.122 With white labor shortages and 
equipment demands increasing, a greater share of Black workers accessed skilled and semi-skilled 
positions. Industrial labor opportunities sometimes served as stepping-stones into civil service 
careers, like policing.123 Although racist hiring practices and union discrimination denied Black 
laborers industrial employment at the start of the 1940s, wartime necessity and civil rights activism 
shifted economic prospects. U.S. entry into World War II invigorated a national Black freedom 
struggle. In 1941, the national March on Washington Movement for an end to hiring discrimination 
in defense plants augmented the local interracial organizing of the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (1936-1941) and the lobbying efforts of civil rights organizations, like the MNAACP 
and MUL, to help establish a Black manufacturing base in the city.124 Although interracial working-
class alliances fractured upon the return of white servicemen, thousands of Black manufacturing 
employees maintained their industrial foothold.125 Even with the onset of deindustrialization, 
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manufacturing remained the bedrock of Black Milwaukee’s labor economy. 
 African Americans and their liberal allies also waged a national “Double V campaign” for 
“victory at home and victory abroad” over anti-democratic forces.126 This struggle impacted liberal 
law-and-order’s conceptualization, as it revealed the need to project law enforcement’s institutional 
colorblindness to the world. As a rhetorical and ideological struggle that pitted democracy and 
freedom against fascism and communism, the Second World War raised questions for Black citizens 
about whether defending American values of freedom and liberty overseas would lead to democratic 
advances at home.127 The global conflict shined an international light on domestic racism and local 
state violence perpetrated against Black citizens, including racial terror lynchings, police brutality, 
and prisoner mistreatment. While most white Americans professed an allegiance to the “inalienable 
right” to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” and defended a Constitution that demanded 
“equal protection of the laws,” they often condoned the second-class treatment of Black, Brown, 
Asian and Native peoples.128 Not just in the Jim Crow South, but in northern cities too, where de 
facto housing, employment, and education discrimination only worsened in the context of rising 
Black migration. Civil rights advocates in Milwaukee aimed to leverage the war’s geopolitical 
implications in struggles to end discrimination in public and private life. In part, that meant calling 
attention to the economic plight of Black residents unfairly closed off from the city’s industrial 
workforce. They had to “walk a fine line” in doing so, balancing their democratic agenda with the 
strict ideological constraints and anti-Communism of the early Cold War period.129 Appearing “un-
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American” threatened to derail Black Milwaukee’s nascent civil rights struggle, just as appearing 
racist threatened to hinder liberal law-and-order. 
 In the midst of global economic and political crises, the federal government worked to bring 
organized labor more firmly into the liberal-capitalist order as middle class producers and 
consumers. Beginning with the New Deal reforms of the 1930s, the state conferred civic and 
fiduciary benefits to citizens that effectively neutralized many of the class-based antagonisms of the 
late-19th and early-20th centuries. Concurrently, powerful southern white Congressmen in President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s political coalition negotiated to exclude the vast majority of Black families, 
agricultural and domestic workers, and returning soldiers from the economic protections and 
assistance programs of the New Deal and World War II eras. Most Black Milwaukeeans were 
excluded from the opportunity to access postwar largesse. Federal interventions and legislation from 
this period, consequently, strengthened the city’s white ethnic working-class majorities, allowing 
them to thrive in a strong postwar economy and access middle class benefits. Federal mortgage 
programs empowered white workers to move out of the city and into single-family suburban homes. 
Freed from the financial burdens of administering public welfare to poor and working-class non-
white citizens, they readily paid lower property taxes. The growing white middle class relied on 
racially restrictive housing covenants, strict zoning laws, and acts of physical and symbolic resistance 
to prevent Black families from moving into white communities. The Federal Housing Authority 
(FHA) refused to make loans to nonwhite families, viewing them as risky financial investments 
based on the physical and economic characteristics of their decidedly poorer neighborhoods. 
 Back in the city, the common perception among white employers and labor leaders, as well 
as members of Milwaukee’s Black middle class, was that southern migrants were exclusively low-
skilled workers who could only perform low-wage jobs. In truth, Black migrants had “rich and 
varied” employment experiences, working as farmers, retail clerks, grocers, industrial laborers, and 
 147 
other occupations.130 In framing migrants as “low-skilled and ‘culturally’ set apart” from the 
conventional order, white officials availed themselves the cover needed to treat them as exceptional. 
They used narratives of racial difference to justify discrimination. White lawmakers deflected on 
issues of racism, positioning southern Black migrants as existing beyond “the normative middle 
class.”131  
 Entrenched segregation ensured pronounced intra-racial class variation in Black Milwaukee. 
Poor and working-class Black residents occupied the same residential and commercial spaces as an 
existing cadre of Black professionals—many of who moved to the city between World War I and 
the Depression-era 1930s. These “respectable” attorneys, clergy, teachers, bankers, doctors, barbers, 
retail shop owners, and tavern keepers gave shape to the self-determined, robust entrepreneurial 
spirit of “Bronzeville.” By 1952, 167 manufacturing firms employed 4,786 Black workers.132 Black 
professionals, on the whole, made their livelihoods within the near north side by catering to 
working-class Black patrons in a racially segmented labor and leisure market. Population growth and 
congestion in this area, according to some, led to lower neighborhood standards and property 
deterioration, while also encouraging white flight. That Black professionals established businesses, 
churches, civil rights organizations, newspapers, social clubs, literary societies, and self-help 
organizations was a testament to the community’s resiliency and perseverance in the face of systemic 
racial exclusion.133 Members of the city’s white majority also patronized Bronzeville’s taverns, juke 
joints, and night clubs. As a result, the MPD’s Vice Squad paid attention to interracial encounters 
taking place between Black and white patrons, especially those suspected to be of a “sexual” or 
“deviant” nature. While such interactions may not have spurred racial terror lynchings, as was 
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common in the South, it nonetheless created cause for alarm among white citizens, thereby 
necessitating police action.134 African American migration challenged Milwaukee’s reputation as “a 
bastion of Midwestern white middle class morality.”135  
 Black migration in the 1940s and 1950s engendered a triangular struggle for order on the 
city’s racially transitioning north side that held important ramifications for Milwaukee’s narrative of 
policing exceptionalism.136 Black in-migration, and the varied responses it generated, challenged 
white residents, the established Black middle class, and the growing number of poor and working-
class Black migrants trying to navigate their new urban surroundings. Each viewed their 
circumstances from divergent perspectives, anchored in aspirations for survival and respect, 
recognition and power in the civic ecology. For the thousands of white Milwaukeeans living in and 
around the near north side during this period, that meant preserving existing structures of racial 
privilege that benefitted white European ethnics, regardless of class position. Conversely, Black 
professionals and working-class migrants operated from marked power deficits. The urban 
landscape was rife with barriers to opportunity, sustained by the broader white populace through 
varying levels of social, economic, and political complicity. Black people’s limited control over how 
they could use and access urban space lent itself to “a constant state of reappraisal, adjustment, and 
ultimately improvisational living.”137 As such, conceptions of law-and-order took on diverse 
meanings for all three groups, given shape by the level of municipal influence each held in relation 
to one another and the substantive weight that an evolving set of anti-Black ideas assumed in the 
 
134 See: Balto, “Of Harlots and Hoodlums.” 
135 Joe Austin, unpublished conference paper, The Organization of American Historians Annual Meeting, Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, 2012. 
136 While he does not frame it as “a struggle for order,” historian Jack Dougherty references “the triangle formed by 
Whites, established Blacks, and Southern newcomers during the postwar migration” as a useful starting point in 
understanding the relationship between Black Milwaukeeans and the MPD. Jack Dougherty, “African Americans, Rights, 
and Race-Making,” in Perspectives on Milwaukee’s Past, Margo Anderson and Victor Greene, eds. (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2009), 143. 
137 Benjamin Barbera, “An Improvised World: Jazz and Community in Milwaukee, 1950-1970,” (Master’s thesis, 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2012), 4. 
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public consciousness.  
 City powerbrokers positioned Milwaukee’s virtually all-white police force at the vanguard of 
this triangular struggle. White civic and political leaders tasked the MPD with maintaining order and 
preserving established hierarchies on the street. The collective experiences of Black professionals 
and working-class migrants reveal the extent to which law enforcement operated at the behest of 
white governing and corporate interests concerned with economic growth. White corporate leaders 
and politicians were, in turn, granted authority by the professional and working-class constituencies 
that comprised the city’s white majority.138 Press depictions of Black criminality and illicit behavior, 
particularly crimes of an interracial and sexual nature, elicited white fears, which justified disparate 
levels of police attention directed towards Black spaces.139 Surplus policing in Black spaces meant 
African American youth were disproportionately targeted for stops, searches, and arrests. The MPD 
used its overpolicing of the near north side to justify continued overpolicing. This dynamic cyclically 
primed the latent biases of many white patrolling officers. 
 Clashes over the policing of urban space mounted as Black in-migration accelerated. White 
residential concerns around crime and safety melded with ancillary worries about interracial job 
competition, mixed-race social interactions, and the postwar housing crisis.140 Meanwhile, numerous 
 
138 The latter exhibited deep racial anxieties in response to Black in-migration and the perceived threats that Black 
movement posed to Milwaukee’s prevailing social, political, and economic arrangements. For instance, dramatic 
newspaper accounts of Black migrant transgressions in The Milwaukee Journal and The Milwaukee Sentinel newspapers 
fanned white fears of a “Negro invasion.” Kevin D. Smith, “From Socialism to Racism: The Politics of Class and 
Identity in Postwar Milwaukee” Michigan Historical Review 29 (1) (Spring, 2003), 86. 
139 The MCHR decried “race labeling” of Black criminal suspects in newspapers as outside “the public interest.” 
However, it did so because it aroused “emotional reactions” among white readers, not because noting a suspect’s race 
advanced narratives of Black criminality. Such reactions drew attention away from “the behavioral problem” of migrant 
youth that municipal liberals were attempting to resolve. As the MCHR saw it, “the major issue in any human relations 
problem is behavior, not race.” Yet, Black “behavior” evidently required a unique approach. “Minutes, Executive 
Committee, Mayor’s Commission on Human Relations, October 26, 1948,” November 1, 1948, Box 89, Folder 2, 
“Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights (1948-1952),” Carl F. and Frank Zeidler Papers. 
140 Many white residents decried urban renewal and redevelopment projects that benefitted poor and working-class 
families of color, seemingly at the expense of white tax-paying citizens. Real estate agents, who had a financial stake in 
upholding Milwaukee’s stark patterns of residential segregation, consequently framed urban redevelopment proposals 
like integrated public housing for returning World War II veterans and working-class families as “un-American.” This 
reasoning fused anti-communist hysteria with Cold War racial paranoia, limiting what appeared politically possible for 
City Hall liberals in addressing a host of deepening urban ills that hit poor and working-class Black families the hardest. 
 150 
Black residents expressed parallel misgivings about community safety and interpersonal violence 
occurring on the city’s near north side.141 Escalating police-community tensions gave the impression 
of looming civil disorder, compelling white elected officials to focus more on the behavioral 
misconduct of Black youth and the expansion of recreational opportunities as part of the city’s 
acculturation agenda. The MUL worked with the Milwaukee vocational school, MPS, and MPD to 
support Black cultural adjustment. One of the League’s goals was to create a favorable hiring climate 
for recently arrived Black laborers.142 In truth, dismal living conditions, bolstered by intensive real 
estate exploitation and the use of racially restrictive housing covenants, narrowed Black 
employment, educational, and political prospects. A number of established Black professionals—
who were putatively “adjusted” to the city’s existing racial order—joined the liberal Zeidler 
administration in preaching acculturation to Black migrants. Several old-guard African American 
leaders retained hope that white Milwaukeeans would accept the city’s growing blackness and 
overcome their racist fears to see Black citizens as functional, contributing members of society. 
 Convergences of race and class undermined Black organizational resistance to white 
supremacy after World War II.  The “external effects of racism,” Tula Connell argues, intersected 
with “the internal dynamics of social and cultural forces that originated within the black community 
itself.”143 Currying favor from white politicians and civic leaders was a grudging necessity for Black 
professionals. But many also stayed focused on eliminating racial barriers in employment, education, 
and housing. The expansion of economic opportunity was a collective objective for Black-led 
organizations. Many hoped that acculturation to the status quo would translate into social, 
economic, and political power. At the same time, Milwaukee’s Black middle class refused to 
 
141 Some Black middle class residents positioned Milwaukee’s deepening racial divides as the root causes of disorder, and 
were less inclined than white civic leaders and residents to blame the behavioral shortcomings of Black migrants as the 
primary impetus for Milwaukee’s postwar urban crisis. Others took a more conservative view that blamed Black 
migrants directly. 
142 Connell, “1950s Milwaukee,” 34. 
143 Connell, “1950s Milwaukee,” 29. 
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compromise its self-worth or Bronzeville’s safety for the sake of new Black migrants. Their 
conceivably objectionable behavior might render the community vulnerable to civic neglect, crime, 
and aggressive police treatment. The vibrant commercial district along N. 3rd St. and W. Walnut St. 
validated the extent to which African Americans had cultivated “a place of their own.”144 In truth, 
the area’s gradual economic decline after World War II had more to do with unrealized political 
promises around slum clearance, public housing construction, and urban renewal than rising crime. 
Yet, these latter forces supported powerful public narratives of an undeserving Black poor. As the 
1950s wore on, the accumulating effect of police violence, civil rights violations, and white racial 
antagonism exposed cultural adjustment and racial accommodation to be losing propositions in the 
struggle for Black freedom in Milwaukee. 
  African Americans pushed for police recruitment as part of the city’s “police-community 
relations movement” in the 1940s and 1950s. In the Jim Crow South, Black citizens fought to 
overcome rigid white supremacist efforts to deny them positions of authority.145 In some northern 
cities, like Chicago, token Black police hiring dated back to the 1870s, though officers faced similar 
arrest, patrol, and promotional restrictions.146 Black police hiring in Milwaukee was rare, and 
remained so throughout the liberal law-and-order era. Before World War II, the department had 
 
144 This line draws on Andrew Wiese’s phrasing to describe processes of Black suburbanization. Andrew Wiese, Place of 
their Own: African American Suburbanization in the 20th Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
145 Reverend Martin Luther King, Sr., for example, led Atlanta’s charge for Black police hiring. In 1947, King Sr. framed 
his community’s protests in political terms of taxation without representation. The segregated city of roughly 100,000 
African Americans did not have a single Black officer assigned to defend the community’s interests. James Forman, 
Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017), 83-84. In the 
post-Reconstruction period, few African Americans secured police jobs in the South. None held positions, for example, 
in the Deep South states of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, or Louisiana until the 1940s. Where African 
Americans could secure police work, they often did not wear uniforms, were not authorized to arrest white citizens, and 
could only police in Black neighborhoods. W. Marvin Dulaney, Black Police in America (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1996), 30. 
146 Between 1872 and 1930, the CPD appointed 260 African Americans. Dulaney, Black Police in America, 19. There, white 
political machine operatives sought to exploit Black vice districts and relied on token African American officers to 
regulate informal economic markets and control crime. Progressive civil service reforms threatened, but did not 
eliminate this corrupt system. It was not until the 1960s that reform Superintendent O. W. Wilson professionalized and 
democratized Chicago policing. Still, he employed Black officers largely to criminalize Black protest and defuse racial 
tensions among Black citizens and the police. Peter Constantine Pihos, “Policing, Race, and Politics in Chicago” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2015), 62. 
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only ever employed three Black officers.147 When the MFPC hired Felmers Chaney as a patrolman in 
1946, he was just the fourth African American serving on the force. Like most of his neighbors 
occupying the lowest, most vulnerable rungs of the city’s industrial ladder, Chaney desired more 
secure and higher paying work. He grudgingly followed the prodding of his barber and took the 
MPD’s entrance examination.148  
  Bringing liberal law-and-order to life in Milwaukee, for the Black middle class, meant 
bringing Black people into the criminal justice system as workers. This served the MPD as well by 
reinforcing its legitimacy among African Americans and advancing the liberal notion that policing 
was a democratic enterprise. Extant calls for hiring Black officers grew louder within middle class 
circles as the civil rights movement gained traction. Desire for Black police protection was rooted in 
strivings for equal access, civic opportunity, and community safety. It was more than a job—African 
Americans long viewed the safeguarding of Black lives by Black people as a civil rights issue.149 
Establishing communities secured by African American officers would, the logic went, help Black 
citizens advance economic opportunities, support housing initiatives, and improve access to 
recreational and educational resources. Black middle class residents believed Black men made for 
better crime fighters because they understood their neighbors’ plight and could earn trust. They 
would police “unencumbered by racism” and, in turn, be less likely to harass or abuse African 
American criminal suspects. Moreover, Black informants could help solve major crimes, which 
Black professionals saw as threatening to community survival. African American police would be 
 
147 These Black officers were Judson Minor, discussed in Chapter I, and detectives Calvin Moody, Lonnie Spencer, and 
Dewey Russ. 
148 As Chaney’s friend reminded him, “We need good policemen.” Although Chaney expressed reservations, conceding 
that some in the community viewed Black officers as “snitches,” he scored well on the test. Asked late in life why he 
became a police officer, Chaney’s answer was clear: “I had to eat.” Gregory D. Stanford, “NAACP Chief Learned Early 
to Fight for Rights,” The Milwaukee Journal, November 28, 1986, Part 2, 1-2; “I Remember Milwaukee,” Program 151, 
YouTube, accessed October 3, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=REiuO2GJcvg. 
149 See: Forman, Locking Up Our Own, 79; Dulaney, Black Police in America, 8-18. 
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capable of distinguishing “law-abiding” citizens from the real criminals in the community.150 
  Milwaukee’s Black middle class desired expanded police protection, but also safeguarding 
that was more responsible and accountable in the face of misconduct. Given the MPD’s history of 
class-based order maintenance policing, racial discrimination, and political insulation, some Black 
leaders were skeptical of overtures from police officials who stressed the improvement of “race 
relations” without shifting law enforcement tactics. As racial violence erupted in Detroit in 1943, 
Milwaukee’s Black middle class voiced concerns about riot-control and violence prevention. Then-
Captain John Polcyn pledged to the MUL in 1943 that the MPD would provide “fair treatment” to 
all Black citizens in the event of civil disruption. Black community leaders trusted Polcyn, pledging 
to do their part to support the department’s approach. However, they also prepared for unrest on 
their terms. At the direction of the national Urban League, the MUL established an Interracial War 
Council (IWC) to ensure adequate safeguarding in the Sixth Ward.151 That August, the IWC hired 
four Black Navy police officers to patrol in the community.152  At the same meeting, the Wisconsin 
Communist Party called for a mass rally to address police-community tensions, which drew police 
surveillance.153 
  The racist views of white police officials, that African Americans lacked the capacity for 
doing police work, contributed to Milwaukee’s low Black officer totals. In 1954, Chief Polcyn told 
Mayor Zeidler that despite their “satisfactory” performance, it was “the general consensus” of the 
 
150 Forman, Locking Up Our Own, 11-14. 
151 “Milwaukee Acts to Stem Riots,” The Chicago Defender, July 17, 1943, 3. 
152 The council believed Black citizens would respond more favorably to African American patrolmen. Earle H. Gray, 
“Milwaukee, Wis.,” The Chicago Defender, August 14, 1943, 21. 
153 The Wisconsin Communist Party called for a mass rally at the MUL meeting. Liberals and conservatives both blamed 
the Communist Party for provoking Black rioting in Detroit. The Milwaukee rally was held on June 29, 1943. The FBI 
said one hundred twenty people attended, thirty-two of them white. MNAACP leader James Dorsey spoke at the rally, 
condemning “vandalism and hoodlumism” among Black youth. He allegedly added that Black workers contributing to 
the war effort had to work harder to show white people that they are capable of performing comparable labor. The 
WCP, according to federal police, condemned Dorsey for his statements in a statement signed by trade unionists. Hill, 
The FBI's RACON, 165. 
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International Association of the Chiefs of Police that Black officers were “less efficient” and “not as 
impartial as the white policeman.” They had “a natural tendency to favor [their] race.” Polcyn 
agreed, noting it was “the consensus of opinion of supervisory personnel of this Department.”154 
White police leaders’ view that the department’s few Black officers were biased in favor of their own 
race served as a form of racial common sense.155 Still, Polcyn said he, “on numerous occasions,” 
asked the MUL, MNAACP, and Black clergymen “to interest themselves in urging young negro [sic] 
men of proper character, integrity, and intelligence to make applications for the position of 
patrolman.” Apparently the increasingly contested relationship between Black youth and white 
police did not factor in his thinking as to why “very few negroes [sic] participate in the Civil Service 
examinations for this position.” Black youth exhibited “an apparent lack of interest” in becoming 
Police Aides. There is “not much this office can do to promote their interest than what it has already 
done,” the chief said.156 
 Black men were not alone in seeking better job prospects through civil service employment, 
or the ability to serve their community. While Black women were not yet eligible to become 
patrolmen, some found employment with the MPD.157 In 1946, the MFPC appointed Vernice 
Gallimore as the city’s first Black “policewoman,” a classification designated for social workers in 
the department’s recently created Youth Aid Bureau.158 The Kentucky native migrated to Milwaukee 
via Chicago in 1944 to work in a social work position at the MUL.159 Chief Polcyn had asked Urban 
League Director William Kelley if he knew of any qualified women who might want to join the force 
 
154 Polcyn to Zeidler, January 28, 1954, Box 94, Folder 7, “Police Department (1953-1954),” Carl F. and Frank Zeidler 
Papers. 
155 Legal scholar James Forman notes that Black police officers had a tendency to internalize the racism of their white 
counterparts, and were often much harder on Black community members than expected. 
156 Polcyn to Zeidler, January 28, 1954, Box 94, Folder 7, “Police Department (1953-1954),” Carl F. and Frank Zeidler 
Papers. As late as 1954, the MPD employed just four Black detectives, eight patrolmen, and one “police woman.” 
157 “Policewoman” was a formally designated position. A U.S. federal district court consent decree finally enabled 
women to join the ranks of the MPD as patrolmen. United States v. City of Milwaukee, 395 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Wis. 1975). 
158 “Name a Negro Policewoman,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 7, 1946, Part 2, 1. 
159 Gallimore studied at Spelman College and Atlanta University's School of Social Work. 
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to work with Black youth in a crime prevention capacity. Gallimore served until state law forced her 
to resign after the birth of her son in 1956. She looked back fondly on her time with the MPD and 
was proud to have made a difference in the lives of Black migrant families.160 Black youth, Gallimore 
argued, were “caught up in the web” of the criminal justice system.161 
  For many African Americans, “repression and negligence” defined police-Black community 
relations in Milwaukee.162 The MPD’s self-avowed exceptionalism afforded the department cover as 
it “overpoliced and underprotected” Black citizens “in their lives and property.”163 Segregation, 
discrimination, and racist ideas about Black life and culture ensured that the vast majority of white 
residents did not see how racially differential policing took shape. Moreover, they could justify the 
disproportionate level of police attention and resources being directed towards the city’s increasingly 
Black, heavily criminalized near north side.164 But it was liberal law-and-order, and its primary 
objective of racial pacification through colorblind social control, that legitimized the policing 
enterprise to most observers.165 In effect, liberal law-and-order reproduced disproportionate rates of 
 
160 As Gallimore later recalled, “Working with my people was very fitting and rewarding because we were supposed to 
keep our children out of the children’s court…as I worked with each family, you began to know them, understand our 
plight…the experiences were varied…I had a few white families. They didn’t object to working with a black [social] 
worker...It was very hard for me to explain to some of the black youngsters that I was a policewoman. And we weren’t 
allowed to expose our guns, but we did carry guns.” Vernice Gallimore, interviewed by Shirley F. Leary, March 11, 1992, 
Transcript, Wisconsin Black Historical Society, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Vernice Gallimore, interviewed by Shirley F. 
Leary, December 21, 1991, Transcript, Wisconsin Black Historical Society, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
161 That said, she also noted years later that police “going into the school systems and trying to find out the problem” 
was not really a productive role for law enforcement. “You would probably see a principal or someone who would say, I 
don’t know why they had to turn this over to the police.” Gallimore saw police working in this capacity as “wrong,” 
noting later in life that “our black kids have really suffered…repeaters didn’t have to be repeaters, but, the law looked at 
these kids a little different…” She understood this from experience, working at Milwaukee Children's Court for thirty-
seven years after leaving the MPD. Vernice Gallimore, interviewed by Shirley F. Leary. 
162 Balto, “Occupied Territory,” 232. Christopher Agee also observes this dynamic in his book on policing in San 
Francisco. He argues, Black San Franciscans “attempted to balance their interest in compensating for police neglect with 
their desire to battle disproportionate police violence.” Christopher Lowen Agee, The Streets of San Francisco: Policing and 
the Creation of a Cosmopolitan Liberal Politics, 1950-1972 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 146-147. 
163 Joe Trotter traces this unfair treatment back to the 1920s. Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118. 
164 As Simon Balto argues: “After years of stereotyping, race-baiting, and frequent reckless reporting by the white dailies, 
the powerful and mythical imagery of the violent, pathological, and sexually predatory black man had seeped its way into 
the consciousness of many white Milwaukeeans.” Balto, “The Laws of the Land,” 100. 
165 As Christopher Agee writes, “Liberals spoke of harm in colorblind terms, but policy makers applied the principle to 
blacks and whites in very different ways.” Agee, “Crisis and Redemption,” 3. 
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Black surveillance, stops, and arrests through its emphasis on Black behavior, while using a coded 
racial lens. The approach held up the notion that, despite admittedly harsh living conditions, African 
Americans who defied Milwaukee’s established social and moral conventions made a personal 
choice to evade public order and resist acculturation. This was, ostensibly, a function of their social 
condition and economic circumstances. Systemic racism, perpetrated by white policymakers and 
private interests, did not really factor into this analysis. Similarly, expressions of white racism—
euphemized as “prejudice”— were themselves individual choices. They were not the poisonous fruit 
of existing power dynamics that routinely benefitted “those who call themselves white.”166  
  Vigorously attending to non-violent public order offenses, like drunkenness, disorderly 
conduct, prostitution, and gambling, was at the heart of the MPD’s strategy for preventing civil 
unrest, spatially containing crime, and appeasing white middle class reformers and civic leaders. 
However, it was violent crime—murder, aggravated assault, rape, and robbery—that really 
aggravated white racial fears and justified police over-saturation of Black Milwaukee. Anyone 
reading the city’s conventional dailies in the 1940s and 1950s would see that Black criminal suspects, 
who were racially singled out in the press, committed most major offenses. Black crime victims, 
however, were largely ignored. Black women murder victims, in particular, saw no public campaigns 
launched on their behalf for improved communal safeguarding.167 White women did, especially those 
who perished as a result of interracial violent crimes.168 While successful efforts were made by Black-
 
166 James Baldwin, “On Being White and Other Lies,” 169, The Cross of Redemption: Uncollected Writings, edited by Randall 
Kenan (New York: Vintage, 2010). Make no mistake about it, racist letters poured into City Hall from white residents 
who clearly differentiated their whiteness from Black migrants. Here is how one letter to Mayor Frank Zeidler began: 
“We white people of this area are wondering how long we must accept the indignities, the fears, insults, and crimes 
which this element of people are inflicting upon us.” Box 95, Folder 4, “Police Department (1957) (July-Dec),” Carl F. 
and Frank Zeidler Papers. 
167 Simon Balto notes the case of Rose Travis, a Black woman accused by police of prostitution who was brutally raped 
by a white man, Henry Thomas, in 1952. Balto, “The Laws of the Land,” 69. 
168 The September 1959 murder of a white woman, Sylvia Fink, by a Black criminal suspect with a history of mental 
illness, is a good example. The sensationalized crime saw Fink’s Dineen Park neighbors admit to the press that they were 
suspicious of all Black migrants. White aldermen demanded better police protection from the “spread of crime” in Black 
Milwaukee. Alderman Clarence Heiden attacked public “relief workers,” of which the suspect, Roscoe Simpson, was 
one. Simpson was violently shot to death by police in “a hail of bullets.” Some high profile Black community leaders 
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led organizations and white racial liberals in City Hall to remove race as an identifier in The 
Milwaukee Journal, ciphered racial language, such as “suspicious,” “disorderly,” and “lazy,” continued 
to signal the Black migrant crime threat.169 
 Milwaukee’s postwar liberal establishment held that the “great masses of Negroes” were 
“segregated in ghettos where the standards of personal morality, discipline and responsibility” were 
“lower than those in the white world outside.”170 Ghettoization bred, in the MCHR’s view, 
comparatively higher rates of criminality. The press amplified this assumption in its crime reporting. 
High reported crime rates on the near north side “tended to justify” anti-Black “attitudes and 
actions,” even among “people of good-will.”171 Black criminality, therefore, rendered it “extremely 
difficult” for people to “view crime statistics in perspective.” Black criminal offenders “predominate 
in impulsive, but not in long-range, planned crime,” the commission surmised. White liberals, 
therefore, called on “respectable” middle class African Americans to advocate for the cultural 
adjustment of southern Black migrants prone to criminality.172 To be accepted by white Milwaukee 
meant African Americans had to behave as white citizens presumably behaved—i.e. lawfully. White 
liberals saw the “overly harsh attitudes of constituted authority towards nonwhites who commit 
crimes against whites,” and the white public’s acceptance of segregation—so long as it confined 
Black criminality and “anti-social behavior” to the near north side—as inhibitors of Black cultural 
adjustment. It left “a residue” of undermining “habits and attitudes.” Most white liberal reformers 
chalked racial discrimination in employment, housing, and education up to interpersonal white 
bigotry, which gave shape to poor living conditions and, in turn, Black cultural pathologies and 
 
doubted the veracity of the MPD’s claims that Simpson was the murderer and, at the very least, questioned whether he 
needed to die so violently. Balto, “The Laws of the Land,” 91-93. 
169 The Milwaukee Sentinel, at this point, did not stop identifying criminal suspects by race. 
170 Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, 1958, 9. 
171 Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, 1958, 10. 
172 Those who, “for one reason or another, now occupy positions in the vanguard of progress of the group they 
represent,” had to “assist in helping others adjust to a society which offers greater opportunities than formerly and, at 
the same time, expects more.” Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, 1958, 10. 
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criminal behaviors. The psychological impact of assimilationist racism in individuals superseded the 
institutional racism that engendered uneven racial structures and outcomes. As issues of 
overcrowding, poverty, and crime worsened for Black Milwaukeeans during the city’s postwar 
housing crisis, an “emergent language of black moral failure” shaped police approaches to social 
control and order maintenance.173 
  Liberal law-and-order required Black middle class buy-in to behaviorally racist assumptions 
about urban inequality and criminality to succeed. As the white press, residents, and assorted civic 
interests positioned Black migrants from the South and Lower Midwest as ill-equipped for urban life 
and foreign to Milwaukee’s normative white moral and cultural aesthetic, they placed the onus for 
“adjusting” African American newcomers on established Black professional leaders. It was their 
responsibility, not white citizens’, to transcend prevailing white assumptions of Black racial 
inferiority. Racist perceptions, in the end, combined with Chapter 586’s “freeholder clause” and the 
institutional discrimination of the criminal-legal system to deter adequate redress whenever police 
engaged in acts of misconduct or overstepped their legal authority. Black middle class leaders found 
themselves caught between disrupting tenuous social, economic, and political connections to City 
Hall and defending the collective interests of African Americans for equality. Black middle class 
support for liberal law-and-order started to waver when aggressive police responses to crime on the 
near north side encouraged profiling and racist generalizations of criminality. 
  The most extreme forms of white resistance to Black migration were physical attacks and 
acts of terror. For example, young white vigilantes hurled a stone through the kitchen window of a 
middle class Black family’s recently purchased home on W. Capitol Dr., then burned a cross on their 
 
173 The MPD arrested Black adults and youth at higher rates than white offenders who engaged in similar activities. 
blackness was condemned and criminalized through the aggressive policing of leisure-time spaces, especially 
underground dance parties, jazz events, and gambling halls. Balto, “Of Harlots and Hoodlums,” 9. As Balto observes, 
“rather than indictments of infrastructural non-investment or systematic inequality, rhetorics of moral failure, personal 
accountability, and racial responsibility” characterized public debates around Sixth Ward conditions after World War II. 
Balto, “The Laws of the Land,” 25. 
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front yard.174 The Black family dared to move beyond the Sixth Ward’s prescribed racial boundaries. 
Police eventually arrested five white youths with apparent Ku Klux Klan ties. The discourse around 
this explicit hate crime reflected Milwaukee’s triangular struggle for order. It spoke to how race 
operated and competing forms of racism thrived in the segregated, socially conservative city.175 
White public officials responded out of both sides of their mouths. “Ku Klux Klan methods will not 
be tolerated in this community,” Milwaukee County’s District Attorney commented. Neither would 
“mob violence, either against white or colored people.” This suggested an equal power dynamic, or 
that discrimination went both ways. However, Black Milwaukeeans committed no reported acts of 
mob violence against whites. A white judge called out “prejudice” as “the greatest problem I think 
we as Americans face,” but still absolved the white aggressors of guilt, contending they were in fact 
victims of discrimination.176 Black leaders revealed their own knotty racial and class position. Rev. 
W. J. G. McLin promised to “take up the problem” of white violence with white politicians. 
However, he also denounced poor Black migrants. “If they were a hoodlum family, like some of our 
folks, I would be opposed to this sort of tactic…I would not come to their defense.” Because of the 
aggrieved family’s class position, they earned the right of a proper Black middle class defense. Such 
behavioral racism on the part Black professionals reinforced notions of poor and working-class 
Black criminality. 
  Panicked white residents wrote scores of racist letters to City Hall in the 1950s. Some 
delivered their critiques in terms of taxes and the denial of “white civil rights.” White folk, one 
disgruntled resident complained, lawfully abided by “fire regulations.” Why should they have to pay 
 
174 The couple and their two young children, among the first African Americans to move into the area, were eating 
dinner at the time. 
175 After the racial terror incident, no white neighbors visited the Black family “to express sympathy or disclaim 
knowledge of the affair.” The family told police no white neighbors had protested their presence in the six weeks 
between the time they signed a contract to purchase and when they moved in. However, their real estate agent said they 
reportedly received fifteen complaints from white residents. “Burning Cross at Negro Home,” The Milwaukee Journal, 
August 18, 1952, Part 2, 1. 
176 “Youths Admit Cross Burning,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 20, 1952, Part 2, 1. 
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higher taxes to support poor southern “negroes” who “send for all their relatives” and “occupy the 
entire house from basement to attic.”177 “How would you like to live in a block surrounded by 
Negro families,” another “taxpayer” asked Mayor Zeidler. These communications poured in from 
white north side business-owners, too. Some, remarkably, denied their “prejudice” before engaging 
in racist diatribes.178 It was clear many white citizens not only saw Milwaukee’s growing Black 
population as culturally backward or immoral, but as an undeserving, unacceptable tax drain on the 
city. While liberal white politicians refused to defend racist white proclamations, they worked to 
protect Milwaukee’s whiteness when they positioned it as a cultural standard for Black conformity. 
  An especially tense year for race and policing in Milwaukee was 1952. Police reported 
twenty-six murders, roughly half committed by African American suspects. Despite the city 
featuring one of the lowest violent crime rates in the U.S., those involving Black suspects amplified 
white racial fears about Black migration.179 One triple homicide especially shocked residents.180 In 
November 1952, a Black migrant from Alabama who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, shot 
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and killed a white dry-cleaner owner, his wife, and an employee.181 The seemingly arbitrary, no doubt 
ghastly murders encouraged many white people to see Milwaukee’s growing Black presence as the 
cause of a rash of criminal activity. While white residents committed a greater share of overall 
violent crimes, the discourse in the mainstream press and among civic officials remained profoundly 
racialized—stories of violence “centered largely on white victims and black culprits.”182 
  In the aftermath of these murders, Chief Polcyn requested and, in time, received more 
resources and personnel to direct towards the near north side. It was “in the colored section,” he 
remarked, that eighty percent of major crimes, including “aggravated assaults, murder, rape, and 
burglary,” occurred. There, he directed “five times as much manpower” than in other districts.183 As 
Polcyn informed Mayor Zeidler, “violent crimes can only be prevented by greater numerical strength 
of the Milwaukee police force, as has been frequently brought to the attention of our local legislative 
body.” The MPD’s 1953 budget request included fifty additional patrolmen and two additional 
squad cars “to cope with the rapidly rising incidents of serious crimes.” While responsibility for the 
1952 murders, Polcyn said, rested with military officials who released the perpetrator from a mental 
hospital, tempering the city’s crime panic required the unidirectional adjustment of Black and Latinx 
residents and respect for law-and-order. The MCHR should “bring about the cooperation of the 
colored people and other minority groups, particularly the Puerto Ricans, in educating them to be 
obedient to the laws and ordinances,” and “to conduct themselves in such manner as to be 
acceptable to society, impressing upon these people the necessity of respecting all rights, including 
property rights and moral rights of the individual, and practicing good citizenship.”184 While Polcyn 
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attributed “Negro crime,” in part, to “concentration of population” and “poor housing,” he also 
cited “Communist infiltration,” particularly efforts to “get to the kids—-15 to 21 years-old,” and 
“migration from the South.”185 Milwaukee manufacturers, the chief argued, posted local billboards 
attracting Black labor. New arrivals were evidently ill-equipped for northern life and became “drunk 
with freedom.” Conversely, established Black Milwaukeeans, were “peace loving” and “acclimated;” 
“more cooperative with police;” and took “pride in a crime free community.” 
  Because people arrived to the city via automobile and bus, rather than train, it was difficult 
to immediately apprehend and turn back allegedly criminal newcomers. This had been the 
department’s modus operandi in the 1920s and 1930s, when it first began to vigorously police vagrancy 
laws against African American newcomers.186 Some white civic leaders in the Milwaukee 
Metropolitan Crime Prevention Commission (MMCPC) echoed the chief’s concerns about the Sixth 
Ward’s over-population, but also said Black newcomers were “prone” to commit violent crime. The 
mainstream press reported the most alarming white perspectives on crime, further racializing the 
panic. For instance, The Milwaukee Sentinel speculated that Black residents might be plotting a “race 
war” against white citizens.187 In response, the liberal Mayor Zeidler blamed Sixth Ward crime on 
“real estate interests,” their “opposition to slum clearance” and commercial “exploitation of white 
reaction to Negro invasion of white neighborhoods.”188 He called for a MMCPC and MPD 
investigation “to formulate a policy to deal with the [crime] problem” that had support from both 
Black middle class and white civic leaders. 
  The 1952 murders and resultant crime discourse put Black professional leaders on the 
defensive. Not everyone agreed how to proceed. Some seventy-five Black residents met at Calvary 
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Baptist Church shortly after the murders to discuss crime perceptions and realities. Local clergy 
invited police administrators to help identify solutions and defuse racial tensions. Attendees 
expressed many opinions—most centered on calls for greater police attention in the Sixth Ward. 
Police officials were happy to oblige. As Inspector Hubert E. Dax responded, “I don’t believe your 
good people should resent our putting more policemen in this area.189 We all know it is good police 
work to put the men where they are needed. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” 
Some Black professionals bought into class-based arguments that blamed poor migrant behavior, 
including that of southern white migrants. Attendees pledged to reduce crime and invest “morally 
and financially” in the city’s human relations commission. But they also called on Milwaukeeans of 
all races to “reject rumors and hysteria in discussing the [crime] problem.”190 Others called for a 
“dispassionate study of crime and tensions.”191 The answer to police discrimination and the 
condemnation of Black migrants, in their view, was not resistance but participation in the electoral 
system and formal negotiation with white leaders in service of police-community relations. 
  When Black organizational leaders Ardie Halyard (MNAACP), William Kelley (MUL), 
Robert Starms (Northside YMCA), and James Dorsey (MNAACP) met with the MMCPC and police 
administrators in December 1952, they rejected the notion that they were responsible for Black 
migrant behavior. As Halyard commented, “The Negro does not feel it is his responsibility to be 
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responsible for every other Negro.”192 MNAACP leaders rejected links between blackness and 
criminality. “This crime wave is not a racial problem, and it should not be considered so by the 
public. All efforts to inject the racial angle into it should be rejected.” Halyard argued that Black 
representation was needed in City Hall. If most crimes were confined to Milwaukee’s Black sections, 
then Black politicians should be making decisions about the next course of action. She cited a lack 
of understanding on the part of white ethnics. Other Black professionals testified to structural 
factors that engendered insecurity. Rising crime stemmed from a “dense population restricted to a 
small area of poor and limited housing,” as well as a lack of recreational outlets and good-paying 
jobs. “The good, bad, and indifferent all share the same barrel,” MUL chair William Kelley affirmed. 
While these factors largely resided beyond the MPD’s control, they demonstrated the extent to 
which cultural adjustment only worked when economic racism was addressed in tandem with 
personal responsibility. Newspapers fanned the flames of social discontent in their view, making 
issues of overcrowding, inadequate housing, a lack of employment opportunities, and limited 
recreation worse. Some Black leaders pointed to the MPD’s whiteness as the problem. Reverend W. 
J. G. McLin suggested that rather than expanding the white police presence, the MFPC should 
appoint “more Negro policemen in this area.” He also called out real estate “block busting” as a 
contributing factor.193 White real estate agents appealed to white racial fears, persuading 
homeowners to sell at a discounted rate. They then marked up home prices for prospective Black 
buyers.194 
  Nonetheless, other powerful, conservative voices existed in Black Milwaukee. Some middle 
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class leaders, fed up with Sixth Ward moral decay, called for more rigid policing. Pastor T. 
Theophilus Lovelace, for instance, argued it was “embarrassing to pass one of these taverns, with 
the crowd standing out there half drunk and cursing…We need police vigilance, and the police 
should arrest anyone using profane language on the street. We need stiffer laws.” Lovelace 
demanded a punitive response, exclaiming that youthful offenders arrested multiple times should 
not be “turned back to the community.” Rather, they should be “put out of circulation.”195 The all-
white MMCPC welcomed Lovelace’s criticism of Black residents who complained about unfair press 
coverage. Black parenting and migrant propensities for drunkenness, loitering, and swearing, he 
believed, contributed to the entire Black community’s moral degeneration. Lovelace did not see 
aggressive policing as a problem, but rather the solution to “a dangerous and maddening situation.” 
His willingness to defend law-and-order policing “reinforced white city leaders’ claims that Blacks 
were to blame for crime.”196 Despite his own admission that white discrimination in the form of 
“bad housing, prejudices and injustices” created an untenable situation for poor and working-class 
Black folk, Pastor Lovelace joined the MPD and establishment liberals in blaming African American 
newcomers for social ills. Well into the 1960s, police bureaucrats pointed to conservative Black 
middle class charges of Sixth Ward moral decay to counter Black allegations of police misconduct. 
 Liberal law-and-order and the triangular struggle for order between white residents, Black 
professional leaders, and recent migrants continued to intersect in the mid-1950s. In addition to 
heightened racial anxieties over civil unrest, long-standing white fears about miscegenation and 
Black criminality merged when four white women were reportedly raped by Black male suspects. 
The alleged sexual assaults sparked mass police searches, arrests, and interrogations on the near 
north side from July 1956 through January 1957. Detectives rounded-up at least 260 Black men for 
 
195 Rod Van Every, “Crime Fight Organized,” The Milwaukee Journal, October 6, 1953, Part 2, 1, 3. 
196 Erica Metcalfe, “‘We Need to March!’: Black Working Class Protest Politics in Milwaukee, 1920-1970” (Ph.D. diss., 
Howard University, 2016), 137-138. 
 166 
questioning, instilling “feelings of terror” in Black Milwaukee.197 As historian Erica Metcalfe has 
observed, police restricted “the social space” of Black men, “treating their movement as a threat and 
criminal act.”198 Police officials warned Black men to “stay off the streets at night” to avoid 
profiling.199 Discriminatory MPD sweeps elicited criminal charges on a host of unrelated, less-serious 
offenses—from traffic violations to loitering to marijuana possession. Chief Polcyn justified mass 
racial profiling as a necessary precaution to ensure women’s safety. The Milwaukee Journal editorialized 
that “the attackers’ Negro coloring just happened to be the leading clue for identification…It is 
undeniably a distinctive feature. If the men had been slant eyed, or red haired, or one-legged, that 
would have been the clue.”200 Newspapers engaged in racial double-standards when covering the 
assaults. Because the alleged assailant was Black, the crime made front page headlines. The Journal 
and Sentinel both played on racist tropes, treating Black men as “hyper-sexed deviants with an 
insatiable appetite for white women.”201 Alternatively, violence committed against Black women, 
particularly sex workers, received scant coverage. Polcyn was clear about the role that newspapers 
played in supporting the MPD’s order maintenance agenda. “The well-being of a police department 
depends a great deal upon the press and their ability to keep the law in public favor.”202 Good 
relations with the press affirmed the MPD’s positive image and countered Black middle class 
charges of racial double-standards in policing. Sensational headlines justified racist police policies. 
 The 1956 sexual assault cases aggravated Milwaukee’s triangular struggle for order. Eager to 
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appear cooperative, yet unwilling to accept mass profiling, MNAACP leaders met with police 
administrators in January 1957. They demanded the MPD show “more discrimination” in whom 
they stopped and questioned, referring to deserving Black criminals as opposed to “respectable” 
Black citizens. The MNAACP’s Fred Hickman, Dale Phillips, and C.L. Golightly argued “race 
relations were being seriously disturbed,” that “police were violating civil rights.”203 Still, they 
emphasized that “no one wants this cleaned up more than [Black Sixth Ward residents].” White 
police administrators insisted that “the same police tactics would be used in any section of the city.” 
In addition to affirming the colorblind status of police regulations, Polcyn encouraged Black leaders 
to administer their own brand of social control among migrants—to “police themselves…be your 
brother’s keeper.” Such admonitions suggested it was the responsibility of Black middle class leaders 
to police poor and working-class Black behavior, while also implying a dual standard of protection. 
Moments like this, where police actions resulted in racist generalizing, exposed cracks in the MPD’s 
liberal law-and-order approach.  
 Criticism of how the MPD handled the 1956 rape investigations prompted additional 
community meetings among Black leaders, police administrators, and elected officials.204 Again, 
Chief Polcyn rejected Black middle class requests for the MPD to distinguish law-abiding African 
Americans from lawless individuals when engaging in stops, interrogations, and arrests. Polcyn 
insisted that their charges of police overreach only encouraged “the lawless elements of the Negro 
race to commit crimes.”205 Threatening the MPD’s image as a race-neutral arbiter of justice, in this 
view, undermined the ability of Black residents to garner accountability, while also generating more 
Black criminal activity. Polcyn’s focus remained on Black behavior; he refused to consider Black 
middle-class feelings of being disrespected as tax-paying citizens. That said, the MPD had Black 
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professional allies who directed the public discussion away from immediate concerns of police bias. 
Robert Taylor, a Black Republican candidate for Wisconsin’s State Assembly, for example, blamed 
violent crime on the limited recreational outlets for Black youth, not police actions.206 It was Black 
people themselves who were most afraid of lawlessness on the streets. Black criticism of police bias, 
in Taylor’s view, was unfounded. More than anything, the police round-ups were a threat to Black 
business owners’ ability to earn revenue. The Milwaukee Defender, a Black newspaper owned by Mary 
Ellen Shadd, clarified that Black middle class residents were “highly incensed” about the sexual 
assaults in general. Anxious about further racial stigmatization, Shadd initiated an effort to gather 
information on the alleged rapes of the white women. Responding to “many letters from Negroes 
deploring the attacks,” her newspaper editorialized that “the vicious behavior of a few criminals” 
threatened the “good race relations” built over a decade.207 
 Achieving racial pacification through Black cultural adjustment called for police 
administrators and established Black leaders to agree to a social compact. Liberal law-and-order 
required both conceptual and practical buy-in to work. When unruly Black behavior tested police 
legitimacy, MPD officials called on middle class African Americans to help them alleviate poor and 
working-class Black dissent. Doing so obscured the truth of discretionary policing across 
Milwaukee’s near north side, where the racial biases of white police officers were hard to rein in. As 
the MPD said itself before the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in 1960, “police officers are human 
beings, subject to personal prejudices and reactions, there is no doubt that some officers manifest 
racial prejudice in performing their duties.”208 The Black middle class was as a critical hinge in 
maintaining the status quo. Yet, they wavered between two consequential choices as Milwaukee’s 
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policing crisis deepened in the 1950s: defending their shared racial interests with a comparatively 
poorer, younger Black migrant population and aspiring to, what many in the community saw as 
interracial class interests cultivated over the course of decades. The latter held out hope for 
expanded social and economic Black power, albeit on white liberal terms. The social compact bent 
in the 1940s and 1950s, but it did not break. It was challenged by serious episodes of racial profiling, 
police crowd control, youth surveillance, and a senseless episode of lethal police violence in 1958 
that pushed some Black community leaders to the brink of civil disobedience. Racial pacification 
prevailed because Black middle class leaders were committed to the MPD’s liberal law-and-order 
vision and the cultural adjustment program espoused by City Hall. They too desired social control 
during a period social and economic disruption. This triangulation meant grassroots organizing for 
police accountability would be delayed until the 1960s. 
 Racially charged altercations between crowds of Black teenagers, young adults, and white 
officers on the near north side exacerbated Black ideological and class divisions throughout the 
postwar era. Such confrontations challenged white Milwaukee’s preconceived notion of policing 
exceptionalism. Black crowd resistance to the MPD’s “close surveillance” of the Sixth Ward’s 
“problem element” posed a threat to liberal law-and-order and the department’s professed racial 
neutrality.209 Lacking a viable mechanism for accountability in the face of intensifying police 
violence, Black poor and working-class youth confronted racialized order maintenance tactics 
directly because they saw no alternative. Between 1952 and 1955, the near north side experienced at 
least eleven incidents of Black crowd resistance against the MPD.210 In some cases, youth under 
arrest tried to escape the grasp of white patrolmen with the assistance of surrounding spectators. 
 
209 Bernard Toliver and Joseph Himden, “Research in Police-Community Relations in Inner-Core Area, Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, 1959–1960” (Master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 1961), 31-32. 
210 Six cases involved bystanders either yelling at the police or watching them make arrests without getting involved in 
physical altercations. The five remaining cases entailed active crowds, with police drawing their service weapons in three 
confrontations. Teter, “Report on a Survey of Social Characteristics of the Lower Northside Community,” 23-24. 
 170 
Police and crowd members suffered injuries, “lacerations and contusions.” The crowds ranged in 
size from seven to several hundred people. At least twenty-seven arrests were made, mostly of 
young Black men. These crowd retaliations signified “a rich layer of community resistance to the 
police” and remains under-appreciated in Milwaukee’s long history of civil rights struggle.211 
 University of Wisconsin researchers wrote that Black crowd resistance to police arrest 
stemmed from miserable neighborhood conditions— “congestion, poor housing, and low economic 
status”— as well as a lack of “wholesome commercial recreation.” This led to “manifestations of 
lack of respect for police authority.”212 Alternatively, police administrators cited “aggressive or 
socially unacceptable personal behavior, particularly arguments, fights, and intoxication.” Analysts 
stopped short of questioning police policies, like close surveillance, or the discretionary choices of 
individual patrolmen. They were keen to point out that police were “the only white persons” 
involved, meaning the department met its liberal law-and-order goal of preventing unrest between 
Black and white civilians. That distinction mattered, as it was white officers who signified white 
racial control to Black residents.213 They were not only visible symbols, but white supremacy’s most 
active agents. More episodes of crowd resistance occurred as the decade progressed. The MCHR, in 
1957, argued that the further deterioration of police-Black community relations was a function of 
how policing manifested in the Jim Crow South. Black migrants carried “anti-police feelings’” north 
and projected them onto Milwaukee’s ostensibly colorblind officer corps.214 It was inconceivable, in 
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the commission’s view, that the MPD could engage in a similar project of racial coercion. The 
department’s exceptionalism, its self-avowedly just intentions and crime control efficiency, overrode 
the aggressive order maintenance function perceived by a growing number of Black residents. 
 Although more and more Black professionals did not view the MPD as evenhanded, most 
believed mutual trust could be established. The Lapham-Garfield Neighborhood Council (LGNC) 
formed under the auspices of the MUL to “secure more understanding and trust” between police 
and Black residents. The umbrella organization coalesced in the wake of the MPD’s rough handling 
of Black youth. Despite citing numerous systemic factors, this sizable cohort of human rights 
advocates, Black middle class leaders, and racial liberals did not cite police brutality as an explicit 
issue.215 However, they called police “frisking” of African Americans “often unfair and 
unjustified.”216 The council also targeted the lack of Black representation on the Mayor’s Advisory 
Committee and Milwaukee Metropolitan Crime Committee, as well as City Hall’s ignorance of crime 
and safety issues facing Black residents. 
 Milwaukee further institutionalized liberal law-and-order and cultural adjustment against the 
backdrop of deteriorating police-community relations late in the late 1950s. Frank Zeidler, 
Milwaukee’s last Socialist mayor, commissioned a study to research “social problems in the Inner 
Core area” in Fall 1959.217 The “Zeidler Committee” formed in response to “group demonstrations 
against the police.” However, the liberal cohort also hoped to situate police-community conflict and 
Black misbehavior within a broader context of dangerous social and economic conditions.218 Some 
of these were poor infrastructure, housing exploitation, and overcrowding, but the committee also 
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blamed Black families, adults, and youth for their own problems.219 Housing “the major portion of 
the non-white population…those who are economically deprived or socially unacceptable 
elsewhere,” the near north side’s “unoriented newcomers to the community” were “incapable of 
meeting the complex demands of successful urban life.”220 Researchers did not criticize police 
aggression or the surveillance practices that were central to liberal law-and-order as causal factors. 
Near north side youth merely lacked sufficient outlets “for constructive use of energy” and needed 
“improved recreational facilities.” Aging housing stock, absentee landlordism, concentrated poverty, 
excess taverns, high traffic, and street congestion exacerbated a worsening urban crisis. The “sheer 
compression of people, forms a basic cause of group interference” with police “in the performance 
of their duties.”221 Black migration was the culprit, as the area seemed fixed in “a constant state of 
transition.” 
 The Zeidler Report called for a “concerted effort to spend funds to remedy educational and 
cultural deficiencies in people who live in the core area.” In other words, the ills facing Black 
residents stemmed from the community’s own behavior, as well as a lack of “understanding between 
cultural groups.” The report condemned Black residents for not understanding how policing works. 
The “ignorance of police procedures on the part of residents is another source of 
misunderstanding…a small segment of the population…is antagonistic toward the police.”222 City 
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part of youth,” “adults with poor education and no vocational skills,” “cultural hostility between races and within social 
groups in the races,” “families with a poor sense of economic values,” “whole social strata without any constructive 
leadership,” and “vandalism.” Caffrey, “The “Core” Report,” 2-3. 
220 “Final Report to the Honorable Frank P. Zeidler, Mayor, City of Milwaukee,” 1-4, Mayor's Study Committee on 
Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 15, 1960. 
221 The committee had little to say about the private real estate interests who determined Milwaukee’s segregated housing 
market through exploitative “block busting” and racial steering practices or private white homeowners who sabotaged 
Black home buying through intimidation and terror. “Final Report to the Honorable Frank P. Zeidler, Mayor, City of 
Milwaukee.” 
222 Caffrey, “The “Core” Report,” 12. 
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Hall liberals absolved the MPD of engendering racially differential policy outcomes, regardless of its 
own admissions that patrolmen conveyed racial animosities. While the MPD rulebook called for 
“treating all persons alike, regardless of race, color, religion or nationality,” the police-community 
relations study committee noted that individual patrolmen “exercised poor judgment on 
occasions.”223 Black interviewees argued “some individual police officers show racial prejudice…law 
enforcement is stricter in this area.” 
The truth was far worse. As the cover-up of a 1958 police murder revealed, police racism ran 
deeper than sporadic lapses in personal judgment and “bad apple” moments of prejudice. 
Institutional racism within managerial decision-making shielded the racial bigotry of white officers 
and protected them when necessary. The MPD leveraged the independent authority and freedom 
from municipal oversight granted by the 1911 policing statute at the expense of economically and 
politically vulnerable Black families who were unable to garner formal accountability when officers 
engaged in misconduct. Still, according to the Zeidler Report, police had “an impossible burden” of 
enforcing the law across an urban terrain that bred “crime and social disorder.” Addressing only the 
behaviors and individual bigotries of both white and non-white citizens would resolve the “hidden 
forces at work in a deteriorating environment” and replace them with “forces for good.” Poverty, 
the report continued, created a high demand for public services and welfare assistance, which was 
expensive for the city. It reflected a “loss of unrealized human potential.” Making matters worse, 
white taxpayers were moving out of Milwaukee in droves. “Total community action” to ameliorate 
“the physical and social problems” was needed. Therefore, the Zeidler Committee proposed urban 
renewal to augment the sustained acculturation of migrants of color to the conventional order.224 
 
223 “Committee on Police-Community Relations, “Report on Police-Community Relations in the Inner Core,” 1, Mayor's 
Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City Milwaukee, Wisconsin, March 18, 1960; 
Caffrey, “The “Core” Report,” 12. 
224 Zeidler Committee, 1-4. It is important to note that Mayor Zeidler stated: “I am not expecting any social agency or 
governmental unit other than the city of Milwaukee itself to assume the burden of these problems and the leadership in 
solving them. These problems are of community wide concern-no less—and the city government should take the lead in 
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 The 1958 police killing of unarmed Daniel Bell, mentioned above, remains the most 
consequential act of police violence in Milwaukee’s history. Not only did it represent “the signal 
shot” that ushered in the city’s postwar “civil rights insurgency,” but it laid bare underlying forces of 
institutional racism that grassroots activists are still confronting today—biased all-white inquest 
juries; district attorneys overly sympathetic to police officers “pursuing a felon;” little-to-no citizen 
input on police rule-making; and media accounts that focus almost exclusively on the assumed 
violent behavior and criminality of a Black person shot dead by law enforcement.225 The Bell case 
revealed the entrenched racism that permeated Milwaukee’s all-white police bureaucracy—the details 
of which only came into view after one of the complicit officers confessed to the truth in 1978.226 
The tragic circumstances of Bell’s death, the mixed community responses it generated, and the 
troubling details of how police conspired to hide the truth about the murder illustrated the 
challenges Black residents, migrant families in particular, faced in securing formal accountability for 
police mistreatment. 
 It is worth recounting the specifics of Bell’s murder because, in many respects, it sparked 
Milwaukee’s Black-led movement for police accountability. On the night of February 2, 1958, two 
white motorcycle patrolmen pulled 22-year-old Daniel Bell over for a broken taillight. Likely fearful 
that he would receive yet another citation or arrest for driving without a license, Bell fled. When 
police caught up to him, one officer, Thomas Grady, fatally shot the Louisiana native from a 
reported distance of, at first, just under twenty-four feet and, after revising his story, six feet. 
 
their solution, securing where necessary such cooperation from private agencies or other governmental bodies as may be 
deemed desirable.” When Zeidler’s successor, Henry Maier, responded to the same near north side conditions, he 
rejected the idea that Milwaukee city government could take steps to resolve problems. Action had to be anchored in 
surrounding municipalities and the state government. Caffrey, “The “Core” Report,” 3. 
225 For historical accounts of Daniel Bell’s 1958 killing by Milwaukee police and the subsequent cover-up engaged in by 
the MPD, see: Jones, The Selma of the North; Bell White and LePage, Sister; “DA Upholds Cops in Fatal Shooting,” The 
Milwaukee Sentinel, February 4, 1958, Part 1, 1. 
226 As later chapters of this dissertation mention, a successful legal battle for civil restitution and the clearing of Daniel 
Bell’s name ensued. It coincided with and contributed to the retirement of Police Chief Breier in 1984. 
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According to police reports, Bell ignored the patrolman’s warning shots and calls to halt. The 
officers said he was holding a knife in his right hand, and that he lunged at them with the weapon 
before curiously yelling out, “You sons of bitches will never catch me, I’m a hold-up man.” The 
police version of events was a lie. Bell’s family immediately suspected foul play after watching news 
reports of his death.227 The officers fabricated a story before detectives arrived. It became the official 
version of events and police administrators reported it at news conferences. Patrolmen Grady and 
Krause reinforced Bell’s assumed criminality, claiming he matched the description of an armed 
robbery suspect. They provided enough circumstantial evidence for an all-white inquest jury, 
handpicked by the Milwaukee County Sheriff, to rule in favor of “justifiable homicide.” Twenty 
years later, Krause testified in court that Grady made his true intentions clear that night: he set out 
to “arrest some niggers.” Soon after ending Daniel Bell’s life, Grady purportedly commented to 
Krause, “He’s just a damn nigger kid anyway.”228 
 After an all-white inquest jury ruled that motorcycle patrolman Thomas Grady had “made a 
lawful arrest” and “acted in self-defense” when he shot-and-killed Daniel Bell, roughly 450 African 
American residents participated in a mass meeting to determine how the Black community would 
respond. Multiple factions emerged, offering divergent views over who was at fault for Bell’s death 
and the role of police power in Black spaces.229 Mt. Zion Church Pastor T.T. Lovelace, who initially 
called the killing a “dastardly attack,” blamed the “unruly” behavior of Black migrants. Their 
disrespect for law and order, in his view, “created in the general populous disgust, shame and fear.” 
Lovelace preached moral betterment, placing the onus for change on Black migrant families rather 
 
227 For one, Bell was left-handed. The family knew he would not have wielded a knife with his right hand. Police 
descriptions of Bell’s actions were also suspiciously out of character. Twenty years later, the other officer involved, Louis  
Krause, said Grady pulled a pocketknife from his coat after he shot Bell dead. Grady then planted the knife in Bell’s 
right hand so as to establish cause for using lethal force. When Krause warned him the knife was too small, Grady 
produced a second, larger knife. Diane Schwerm, “Justice Done in 21-Year-Old Shooting Case, McCann Says,” The 
Milwaukee Journal, Part 1, 16; Bell White and LePage, Sister, 176-178. 
228 Bell White and LePage, Sister, 176. 
229 “Negroes Told to File Protest in Ballot Box,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 21, 1958, Part 1, 20. 
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than white officials. Meanwhile, Democratic Assemblyman Isaac Coggs stated that he could “not see 
any justifiable reason why a man running from a police officer has to be shot in the back.” Still, he 
warned street protests were not the answer: “You can protest the way the district attorney asked the 
questions, at election time.” The Bell killing “added friction” to police-community relations efforts, 
according to the LGNC. Black residents shared feelings of police neglect and mistrust. “There is 
evidence of a lack of understanding between [near north side] citizens and the police.”230 
 Black labor organizer Calvin Sherard, on the other hand, charged officers with using 
discriminatory intent when they pulled Bell over for a broken taillight on that snowy February night. 
He and Reverend R. L. Lathan, of New Hope Baptist Church, demanded Thomas Grady’s 
termination, incredulous that an all-white inquest jury found him innocent in just ninety minutes. 
While Lathan expressed support for the MPD in general, calling it “one of the best” in the U.S., he 
argued at a March community meeting that some officers were “dishonest” and “backsliders.”231 The 
minister called for moral retribution and for Black citizens to vote and “elect men of integrity and 
justice.” Sherard, himself a recent arrival, formed the Citizen Committee to Protest the Case of 
Daniel Bell in 1958. He and collaborators in the newly formed Crusaders Civic Social League did so, 
in part, to awaken indifferent Black clergy and middle class leaders to the MPD’s racialized 
enforcement double standards. The League aimed to challenge the disinterest of white city officials.  
In objection to the inquest jury’s verdict, Sherard and Lathan announced a “protest prayer 
march” and rally at MacArthur Square in front of the Milwaukee County Courthouse on March 23. 
Assemblyman Coggs supported the demonstration, commenting “there is no difference between 
shooting Dan Bell in the back than killing Emmett Till in Mississippi.”232 Sherard and Lathan hoped 
 
230 Grant Gordon to Mayor Zeidler, March 3, 1958, Box 89, Folder 3, "Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights (1955-
1960),” Carl F. and Frank Zeidler Papers. 
231 “Retribution Sought in Bell Case,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, March 11, 1958, Part 1, 4. 
232 “Retribution Sought in Bell Case,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, March 11, 1958, Part 1, 4. 
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to attract an interracial crowd numbering in the thousands. However, they called off the event at the 
behest of respected Black community leaders. Some bought the MPD’s line that Bell was a criminal, 
justifiably shot by Grady in self-defense. Others refused to mobilize Black dissent out of fear of 
disrupting tenuous political relations with City Hall. Milwaukee NAACP members, including the 
city’s only Black alderperson (and woman), Vel Phillips, talked Lathan and Sherard out of leading the 
demonstration.233 
 The truth of Daniel Bell’s murder would not have surprised many poor and working-class 
African Americans, given their responses to University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee researchers Bernard 
Toliver and Joseph Himden. Black citizens told the researchers that police patrolmen were “more 
strict in the inner core than elsewhere in the city.”234 Some “manifested racial prejudice” and were 
prone to “question and arrest for minor infractions, such as Jay-walking or loitering.” MPD policies 
of “close police surveillance” led to “questioning and even arrests” of many law-abiding citizens. 
Patrolmen engaged in “unnecessarily severe questioning for minor offenses or behavior,” according 
to some Black citizens. This was typically preceded by indignant and paternalistic language, like 
calling Black men “boy.” Resident testimony implied that the MPD did not follow its own liberal 
law-and-order regulations of treating all people fairly, in a colorblind manner. Black spaces and 
residents were condemned by white rank-and-file officers and police officials as criminally 
exceptional and in need of more stringent control. Toliver and Himden afforded police the excuse 
of “cultural misunderstandings.” White patrolmen were unaware of the “role” that “loitering” and 
“fun-seeking” evidently played in Black life.  
 The analysis of postwar academic researchers subscribed to a dominant liberal perspective 
that relied on behavioral and cultural explanations for why some groups struggled to survive in cities 
 
233 Phillips notably shifted in the 1960s to support grassroots protest in support of her own proposed open housing 
ordinance, participating in several demonstrations herself and risking arrest. 
234 “Report of Committee on Police-Community Relations,” 5-8. 
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and others did not. In pathologizing Black behavior, Toliver and Himden, for example, failed to 
account for how discriminatory police directives supported overcrowding or promoted a lack of 
recreational and employment opportunities. In explaining why some African Americans collectively 
resisted police, they rejected the notion that white officers themselves might be carrying out unjust 
policies informed by racist ideas. Conversely, Black crowd resistance was explained as a matter of 
individual ignorance, “intoxication,” and “fear of the consequences” of arrest.235 They concluded 
that “mutual understanding” through continual education would resolve Black crowd resistance to 
police arrest. The goal was to ensure “a better atmosphere of law and order,” not to seek justice for 
overpoliced and underprotected Black citizens.236 
 
Conclusion 
 In the 1940s and 1950s, Milwaukee police chiefs revised aspects of the MPD’s instructional 
practices, organization, and approach to social control to correspond with national liberal law order 
prerogatives: more closely observing civil rights laws, ensuring procedural justice, adhering to racial 
colorblindness, and strengthening relations with middle class leaders of color. This was, in large part, 
meant to improve the police image and to project to outside observers that U.S. policing was fair 
and impartial. The MPD instituted “race and human relations” trainings, created a Youth Aid 
Bureau to better manage youth crime, and hired a few more Black officers. As a result, the 
department emerged as a leader in the police-community relations movement, with its chiefs earning 
commendations for their innovation and foresight. City leaders and police bureaucrats positioned 
the MPD as an unbiased mediator of racial antagonism and conflict. They did so amidst great social, 
economic, and political change, most notably the acceleration of Black in-migration from the South 
 
235 “Report of Committee on Police-Community Relations,” 5-8. 
236 “Report of Committee on Police-Community Relations,” 5-8; Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 118. 
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and Lower Midwest. Milwaukee police administrators collaborated with other municipal institutions 
to help facilitate liberal social engineering programs in response to Black population growth. This 
effort, in effect, revolved around acculturating African American, and later Latinx migrants, to the 
city’s traditional, white-prescribed middle class cultural milieu. 
 The colorblind, or race-neutral, principles at the heart of liberal law-and-order converged 
with Milwaukee’s white assimilationist racism. That convergence deepened as Black migrants moved 
into the city in greater numbers during the late 1940s and 1950s. Although liberal law-and-order 
seemingly operated according to principles of racial fairness, the MPD did not operate in an 
equitable society. Individual officers were not free from individual biases and “race and human 
relations” training only went so far in shifting racial perspectives. Economic racism and the systemic 
outputs of racial capitalism guaranteed that criminal justice policies would continue to target 
disproportionately poor communities of color, relegated to segregated urban enclaves on the 
margins of industry and downtown commerce. Class-based, behavioral racism amplified the 
perceived need for expanded police resources and personnel to monitor and contain Black 
Milwaukee. 
 Anti-Black racism weakened the MPD’s nominally progressive institutional advances. 
Policing reflected the city’s increasingly fraught racial politics, which worsened against the backdrop 
of expanded Black migration and racist white reaction. Despite its best efforts to establish new 
training procedures, draft race-neutral regulations, and work with Black community leaders to 
reduce opportunities for civil unrest, the MPD engaged in policies and practices on the near north 
side that rationalized Black life and culture as, if not criminogenic, then in need of “close 
surveillance.”237 Police played a critical role in a “cultural adjustment” program rooted in behavioral 
 
237 Bernard Toliver and Joseph Himden, “Research in Police-Community Relations in Inner-Core Area, Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, 1959–1960” (Master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 1961), 31-32. 
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racism. The program was intended to alleviate pathologized Black behavior and bring minoritized 
groups more firmly into the city’s white prescribed order. Racist ideas about Black life and culture 
informed racially disproportionate policing outcomes, with Black citizens experiencing inordinate 
stops, interrogations, detentions, and uses of force. Liberal law-and-order’s practical application only 
exacerbated a developing crisis of police legitimacy and further undermined the ability of Black 
residents to garner accountability.  
  Established Black middle class elites, too, exhibited their own fears around the in-migration 
of poor and working-class Blacks from the South. These feelings translated into a sustained 
commitment to racial uplift, but also expressions of intra-racial class prejudice that showed the 
extent to which Black Milwaukee was not a monolith. Indeed, Black migration exacerbated a 
triangular struggle for order among Black professionals, southern Black newcomers, and assorted 
white interests, which helped undermine opportunities for institutional accountability as police 
repression worsened. Established Black professionals engaged in their own forms of behavioral 
discrimination when addressing physical and moral conditions on Milwaukee’s congested near north 
side. Some overtly criminalized, or morals-shamed poor and working-class Black residents in tandem 
with racist white actors. Others embraced racialized assimilationist prerogatives. Milwaukee’s Black 
middle class denounced “radicalism,” specifically Communist Party organizing, which police viewed 
as subversive and a contributor to Black political dissent and civil unrest. Members of the Black 
middle-class worked to distance community leaders from charges of “anti-Americanism.” 
Liberal articulations of racism and the criminalization of poor and working-class Black 
people challenged the MPD’s ability to uphold Milwaukee’s white middle-class reputation for moral 
rectitude. The city’s narrative of policing exceptionalism became more contingent on social control 
and discretionary order maintenance policing in comparatively poorer, civically neglected Black 
spaces. In the process, the police department struggled to keep up appearances of racial equity that 
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were central to liberal law-and-order as a strategic approach. Black middle-class buy-in to cultural 
adjustment waned in the 1950s. Troublesome police decisions and violent racial conflicts among 
African Americans and white police fractured an already precarious relationship. These included the 
widespread profiling of hundreds of African Americans in response to violent crimes; charged street 
confrontations between Black youth and white patrolling officers; and the controversial police killing 
of Daniel Bell in 1958. Declining Black perceptions of police legitimacy forced the department and 




Police Accountability Activism as Civil Rights Insurgency 
 Police brutality signified the worst of the “us-versus-them” mentality that characterized 
police-Black community relations in 1960s Milwaukee.1 What was true about police violence in the 
Cream City was true of other metropolitan areas undergoing pronounced racial demographic change 
and economic restructurings in the post-World War II period. City governments were compelled to 
manage worsening inequality as affluent and middle-class whites suburbanized and forced Black 
migrant workers and families to live in increasingly segregated central city neighborhoods. Police 
were called on to enforce social control and Milwaukee’s virtually all-white police department often 
did so with abrasive attitudes and a heavy hand. To a growing number of poor and working-class 
African Americans, the city’s widely heralded narrative of policing exceptionalism—the idea that the 
Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) impartially enforced the law while promoting sound 
community relations in service of efficient crime control—seemed terribly artificial. Black citizens 
felt progressively more vulnerable to crime and became concerned about how white police 
patrolmen and detectives utilized their ample discretion to forcefully monitor, control, and respond 
to the behavior of Black youth and under-employed workers at the expense of overall community 
safety.2 They feared for the security of their children and the livelihoods of their families, particularly 
 
1 This dissertation takes up historian Leonard Moore’s broad view of racialized police violence—that “police brutality” 
was not limited to homicides and beatings, but also unlawful arrests, the use of threatening and abusive language, racial 
slurs, sexual exploitation, racial profiling, and police “complicity in drug-dealing, prostitution, burglaries, protection 
schemes, and gun smuggling.” Police brutality was also the “lack of justice available to black defendants in the courts.” 
Leonard Moore, Black Rage in New Orleans: Police Brutality and African American Activism from World War II to Hurricane 
Katrina (Baton Rouge, LA, 2010), 1. On Milwaukee, see: Simon Ezra Balto, “‘Occupied Territory’: Police Repression and 
Black Resistance in Postwar Milwaukee, 1950-1968,” The Journal of African American History 98 (2) (Spring 2013), 248. 
2 Police discretion is the freedom that individual officers enjoy to act according to their own judgment during specific 
policing encounters and interventions. Discretion is the defining feature of policing. It can mean the difference between 
issuing a warning, delivering a citation, effecting an arrest, or engaging violently in response to a perceived threat. Trevor 
Jones, “Discretion,” Dictionary of Policing, edited by Tim Newburn and Peter Neyroud (New York: Rutledge, 2008), 82; 




as Milwaukee’s African American population mushroomed in the 1960s.3 Furthermore, they worried 
about civil violence touching-off as a result of increasingly tense police-Black citizen encounters. 
The latent rage of Black young people locked out of America’s postwar riches and locked into its 
segregated “ghettos” contributed to widespread anxiety and unrest.4 
 Fed up with “the increasing fear of  harassment, illegal arrests, not to mention brutality,” 
Black political leaders and civil rights advocates in Milwaukee began mobilizing around policing 
issues more deliberately.5 In challenging police brutality and the city’s rapidly deteriorating police-
Black community relations, they forged a fresh movement for police accountability. Participants did 
so within the context of  expanding national civil rights and Black Power struggles, urban rebellions, 
and federal amplifications of  police power. Black police accountability advocates and allies made 
direct connections between the MPD’s unchecked, often abusive discretionary authority and the 
rampant discrimination that permeated the city’s employment, education, housing, and commercial 
sectors. They argued that law enforcement served to protect the racial boundaries of  an outmoded 
civic order—one that positioned Black men and women as second-class citizens, denying them full 
rights and access to the fruits of  American democracy. This chapter spotlights the exertions of  
Black police accountability advocates and allies to garner a fairer law enforcement system in 
Milwaukee at a moment of  intensifying civil rights insurgency, national unrest, and racial backlash. It 
traces a series of  grassroots coordinating efforts, formal negotiations, and demonstrations conceived 
around the goals of  ending police brutality and addressing the lack of  institutional accountability 
afforded to African Americans and other racialized populations vulnerable to overpolicing and 
 
3 Milwaukee’s African American population expanded from 20,454 residents in 1950 to 62,458 in 1960, then to 105,088 
in 1970. In the process, the city’s Black community became younger, poorer, and more decidedly working-class. 
4 Mitchell Duneier, Ghetto: The Invention of a Place, the History of an Idea (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017). 
5 Lloyd Barbee, “Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee,” Box 21, Folder 9, “Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality 
Committee, 1964-1965,” Milwaukee MSS16, Lloyd A. Barbee Papers, 1933-1982, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
Archives. 
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underprotection.6 This chapter contends that police accountability advocates engaged in a dual 
process of  testing and discovery across Milwaukee’s law enforcement arena in the mid-1960s that 
clarified the underpinnings of  local police power and better revealed its differential applications.  
 Through a combination of  civic engagement and non-violent direct action protests, groups 
like the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality Committee, Human Relations Coordinating Council, 
Organization of  Organizations (Triple O), and Milwaukee NAACP Youth Council (YC) learned 
more about the existing impediments to cultivating a responsive and just policing system. Some of  
those hindrances were legal, like the property requirement barring most poor and working-class 
African Americans from filing a formal complaint against the MPD with the Milwaukee Fire and 
Police Commission (MFPC). Others were political and stemmed from a traditional racial order that 
was designed to benefit white working, middle, and upper-class residents. For example, elected 
officials were reluctant to embrace an independent civilian police review board because, as one white 
voter surmised, “they would handcuff  our police department with countless unfounded and invalid 
claims of  the old Communist slogan of  ‘police brutality.’”7 Police accountability advocates tested 
and discovered the legal and political boundaries of  police oppression, learning where the system 
could bend and where it was fixed. They looked to effect change and raise the MPD’s legitimacy 
with Black residents in the context of  national civil rights gains, as well as the onset of  urban 
rebellions against systemic racism, beginning with Harlem in 1964.8 The passage of  the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act presented a legal pathway to combatting police civil rights violations and further outlined 
 
6 Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2006), 118. 
7 Lawrence Galezewski, “Congratulations to Chief Breier,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 25, 1969, Part 1, 18. 
8 When uprisings broke out in 1964 and 1965, cities asked to reproduce the MPD’s human relations training guide. The 
department delivered more than 30,000 copies of the manual to outside police departments since it was introduced in 
1952. The guide read: “The average citizen’s respect for the authority of society is dependent upon the degree to which 
that authority is impartially exercised.” Ronald H. Snyder, “Chief for Life: Harold Breier and His Era” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2002), 130; “Police Here Understand Race Relations: Dahl,” The Milwaukee Journal, 
October 6, 1965, Part 3, 1. 
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institutional discrimination. Meanwhile, the liberal Warren Court’s Mapp (1961), Gideon (1963), 
Escobedo (1964) and Miranda (1966) decisions ushered in what many police officials saw as “a frontal 
constitutional assault on their authority, expertise, and discretion.”9 This wider context helped shape 
the direction of  police accountability advocacy in Milwaukee, as well as the outcomes of  civic 
negotiations. However, it was really local political dynamics—municipal, county, and state—that 
determined whether the city’s Black-led police accountability movement or countervailing forces that 
supported a white supremacist status quo would prevail in dictating the terms of  police power.  
 The salience of  social, political, and class diversity within Black Milwaukee and its 
organizational networks remains an important theme in this chapter. A diverse range of  ideological 
perspectives characterized Milwaukee’s budding police accountability movement and civil rights 
insurgency. Not everyone seeking to reform or more radically transform the city’s police bureaucracy 
agreed on tactics and outcomes. Black Milwaukee’s historically fragmented class politics persisted in 
the 1960s, undercutting the formation of  a more unified front in addressing racialized police 
violence and issues of  police legitimacy. Where police accountability advocates found the most 
common cause was in their shared desire to prevent civil unrest and establish a more equitable 
policing system that, in the process of  maintaining order, treated all people with dignity and respect, 
regardless of  racial or class background. Still, those willing to name police brutality and challenge it 
directly, either by working through the system or applying pressure via civil disobedience at street 
level, drew sharp rebukes from white liberal, moderate, and conservative actors; some Black 
community leaders joined them. White civic officials and everyday residents enjoyed a far healthier, 
 
9 As legal historian Risa Goluboff argues, the Supreme Court moved from a flat preoccupation with guilt or innocence 
to making sure procedural justice and civil rights law was carried out across the criminal-legal system. Mapp v. Ohio 
established the rule that illegally obtained evidence could not be used in court. Gideon v. Wainwright ensured that states 
would provide criminal defendants charged with serious offenses an attorney if they could not afford one. Escobedo v. 
Illinois ruled that criminal suspects had the right to a present attorney during police interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona 
required law enforcement to warn arrested people they had the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Risa 
Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional Change, and the Making of  the 1960s (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 199-200. Walker and Archbold, The New World of  Police Accountability, 45. 
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more responsive and protective brand of  law enforcement. Therefore, they were not willing to 
relent, let alone reform policing without a fight. Likewise, some old-guard Black professionals were 
not prepared to relinquish their class power within the city’s segregated system. 
 As this chapter illustrates, Milwaukee’s virtually all-white police bureaucracy refused to hear 
Black charges of  police brutality in the mid-1960s, or at least listen sympathetically when Black 
residents or their interlocutors recounted narratives of  police misconduct. If  the MPD, MFPC, and 
City Hall did not flatly deny the existence of  police brutality, then they abdicated any responsibility 
for proposing meaningful solutions. While some white public officials attempted to advance narrow 
reform proposals meant to curtail extra-legal or abusive police transgressions, the truth was they had 
little choice but to follow the guidance of  Harold Breier. State law granted the police chief  lifetime 
tenure and final rule-making authority—thus, full control over police discretion and internal 
investigations. Again, police accountability advocates were just now discovering the full weight of  
that authority. At the same time, Chief  Breier actively undermined Milwaukee’s most visible 
advocates for a revised policing system. The MPD engaged in targeted press denunciations, hostile 
encounters, and, increasingly, counter-insurgent campaigns of  harassment, intimidation, and arrest 
against civil rights organizations. These actions are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
The department’s capacity for reactionary law-and-order was supported by a powerful white 
backlash against the city’s insurgent Black freedom movement. Thousands of  white residents 
believed in the MPD’s narrative of  exceptionalism and Chief  Breier was content with leveraging 
decades of  goodwill generated by his liberal law-and-order predecessors when it suited him.10  
 
10 That said, it should be noted that previous police chiefs, indeed, led the MPD at a time when Black Milwaukee was 
smaller and more easily (or less noticeably to white residents) managed through racist order maintenance policing and 
“close surveillance” tactics. Racial conflicts between white police and Black residents had intensified by the mid-1950s. 
But they were successfully contained before any mass civil violence could break out. To be clear, African Americans in 
the immediate postwar period did resist police mistreatment—overpoliced Black youth in particular. However, they did 
not collectively channel their deepening frustration with and mistrust of the MPD into coordinated, organizational 
activism. While their protestations denoted an important mode of grassroots dissent, they lacked the numbers and 
institutional support of the 1960s generation. Black middle-class leaders, meanwhile, were more organized institutionally. 
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Mobilizing Against Police Brutality 
 As the sun rose on the morning of June 21, 1964, a woman observed four young men 
peering into car windows on Milwaukee’s near west side. She called out to the group, but they 
dispersed. The youths, all Black, reconvened near the intersection of N. 15th St. and Wells. The teens 
admittedly stole some fishing rods, two tackle boxes, and tubes of hair cream from a parked 
vehicle.11 While walking south on N. 15th St., a police cruiser approached. Alarmed by the cruiser, 
they dropped the items and fled. One of the patrolmen exited the oncoming squad car and gave 
chase, drawing his revolver as he ran. Maneuvering between houses, three of the boys successfully 
traversed a picket fence. The pursuing officer caught up with the fourth, whose leg had gotten 
caught in the barrier.12 
 What transpired next made for disputed testimony in the first federal police brutality lawsuit 
filed in Milwaukee’s history.13 According to William Coates, white patrolman Arthur Young pulled 
him down from the fence, lifted him up from the ground, and struck him on the head with his 
service weapon, “causing a deep scalp wound.” The officer proceeded to punch Coates in the 
stomach, walked him over to his parked squad car and forcibly bent the young man over the 
vehicle’s trunk, tightly holding his right arm behind his back. “You better start talking,” Young 
instructed, before shoving Coates onto the backseat. Officers reportedly called the 14-year-old a 
“Black nigger,” “bastard,” and “trash,” as they questioned him in the cruiser about the theft. “I smell 
 
However, they still supported racial acculturation and accommodation well into the 1960s, despite raising issues of 
differential policing. See Chapter II; Balto, “Occupied Territory.” 
11 The youths confessed to stealing these items. 
12 Officer Arthur Young testified in court that he took his service weapon out of its holster because he was nervous he 
would lose it as he ran. 
13 The plaintiffs sought monetary damages under “Section 1983” of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, a section of the law 
frequently invoked in cases of alleged excessive police force. Micah Schwartzbach, “What Is a “Section 1983” Lawsuit 
against the Police,” NOLO, accessed April 8, 2019, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-is-a-section-1983-
lawsuit-against-the-police.html. 
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animal blood,” driver Gordon Hessel allegedly remarked. When the youth asked for a towel to wipe 
the blood streaming down his face, he said an officer replied, “Wipe your head with your shirt.”14  
 According to police testimony, William Coates never resisted arrest. He complied when 
questioned about the assumed robbery and location of his accomplices. Belying the myth that 
cooperation with the police necessarily resulted in fair treatment or due process, Coates said one of 
the white patrolmen struck him twice more, this time in his right eye, as the other drove to find 
another suspect. When the police found Michael Thomas, the plaintiffs’ affidavit said an officer 
punched him “repeatedly with a closed fist,” before placing him under arrest. After transporting him 
to District One station, a patrolman allegedly hit the 14-year-old again in the chest and stomach, 
then threw him onto a table, cutting his lip, before striking him multiple times on the neck and back. 
Further violence ensued, both at the station and again in the squad car as Young and Hessel left to 
round up additional suspects. 
 The excessive use of police force Coates and Thomas recounted was far more common on 
Milwaukee’s near north and west sides than either the MPD or the city’s white majority cared to 
admit. That same week, Jerry Holland experienced a similar episode of police aggression when he 
was stopped by a white patrolman for jaywalking across N. 3rd St. The officer, Holland said, took 
umbrage at the 13-year-old’s refusal to empty his pockets on command.15 He arrested him, pulled 
him over to a police call box, and summoned a squad car from nearby District Five station.16 
Milwaukee Star publisher Ken Coulter witnessed two patrolmen pummel the youth, then push him 
into a cruiser.17 Coulter trailed the vehicle to the District Five station at N. 4th and Locust St., joined 
 
14 “CORE Lawyer to Prosecute First Milwaukee Police Brutality Case,” The Milwaukee Courier, August 8, 1964, 1; Thomas 
and Coates v. Young and Hessel, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, No. 64-C-203 (1964). 
15 Holland was carrying some cash. He feared the officer might take his money. 
16 Milwaukee beat patrol officers, starting in the 1880s, used neighborhood call boxes in districts to report specific crimes 
to police headquarters. Initially, the public could also use the communication devices to summon police. Rachel Morello, 
“What’s the Story with Milwaukee’s Police Call Boxes?” WUWM, March 23, 2018, 
https://www.wuwm.com/post/whats-story-milwaukees-police-call-boxes#stream/0.  
17 The Star’s offices were located nearby on N. 3rd St. (present-day Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive). The Black-run 
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by Holland’s mother. The officers made little effort to conceal their racism on the drive: “I’ll have 
you in a cage swinging like a monkey,” one apparently said. Such dehumanizing comments were not 
isolated to rank-and-file “bad apples,” but echoed the verbiage of recently appointed police chief, 
Harold Breier. “Any breakdown in law and order can turn any community into a jungle,” Breier told 
reporters in 1964.18 More name-calling and “slaps” followed. The quick arrival of Holland’s mother 
at District Five station may have prevented a more severe in-house beating.19 He was released with a 
date in Milwaukee Children’s Court and a jaywalking ticket—one of many petty citations unevenly 
dispensed to Black citizens; these also helped to fund public safety expenditures. State violence, such 
as that committed against Holland, has always been “more than a problem of rogue cops—it was an 
institutional problem.”20 Racialized violence perpetrated by the state transcended policing. Assorted 
actors within Milwaukee’s criminal-legal system—from elected officials and the Milwaukee County 
District Attorney to Milwaukee County Circuit Court judges and the MFPC—routinely minimized 
Black concerns around crime, safety, and law enforcement. Institutional racism and segregation 
ensured that Black citizens remained vulnerable, not just to a disproportionate share of urban 
dangers and illicit activities, but also to police mistreatment and neglect.  
 A cohort of Black community leaders and select white allies concerned about the protection 
of civil and human rights formed the Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee (CAPBC) in August 
1964 to address racial inequities across the law enforcement arena. Labor leader Calvin Sherard 
organized the ad hoc committee in direct response to the police beatings of William Coates, Michael 
 
newspaper routinely reported on allegations of police brutality committed against African Americans. It played a critical 
role in publicizing Milwaukee’s emergent Black-led movement for police accountability. 
18 “Baiting of Police Called Problem,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 10, 1964, Part 1, 21. Numerous white authorities, 
citizen’s groups, and commentators referenced poor, predominantly Black urban neighborhoods in the postwar period 
as “jungles,” often in reference to the assumed lawlessness and cultural degradation of their Black migrant inhabitants. 
Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, 1957, 3. 
19 Holland’s injuries required hospital attention, probably adding economic injury to physical pain. No charges were filed 
against Holland in Children’s Court. “Brutality,” Milwaukee Star, August 15, 1964, 12. 
20 Clarence Taylor, Fight the Power: African Americans and the Long History of Police Brutality in New York City (New York: New 
York University Press, 2018), 6. 
 190 
Thomas, and Jerry Holland.21 The group coalesced to reform the criminal-legal system at the point 
of police-civilian contact, when law enforcement employed its discretion in a ways that ranged from 
reckless directives to brutal treatment.22 Recalibrating the terms of police discretion, in this sense, 
carried the potential for improved police-community relations and crime control, the easing of 
simmering tensions and the elevation of police legitimacy. While the CAPBC was not the first Black-
led organization that focused on the improvement of police-community relations in Milwaukee, it 
was the first to dedicate its energies towards resolving the police department’s brutalization of 
African Americans.23 Unlike the Sixth Ward Law and Order League of the 1930s or the Lapham-
Garfield Neighborhood Association of the 1950s, the committee emphasized police misconduct and 
the role that law enforcement played in eroding neighborhood safety. From 1964 to 1965, it helped 
advance the city’s growing police accountability movement. Above all, the CAPBC worked to enact 
swift changes on the MPD by compelling police bureaucrats to limit the likelihood that police 
officers could ever act violently while on patrol in Black spaces, responding to crimes involving 
Black suspects, or answering service calls requested by Black citizens.  
 The CAPBC positioned itself as both a protest organization and “negotiating committee”—
one that operated “independent of the city administration.”24 The interracial committee was 
essentially reformist in that it did not deny the legitimacy of policing as an enterprise.25 Its members, 
instead, saw the MPD as a flawed, if perfectible civic agency capable of meting out law enforcement 
properly, i.e. without bias and in ways that served all residents. Unlike white city officials, police 
 
21 Sherard believed these cases of police brutality would ultimately result in disciplinary action against the officers 
involved. “Committee Formed to Investigate Police Brutality Charges.” 
22 Lloyd Barbee, “Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee,” Box 21, Folder 9, “Citizens' Anti-Police Brutality 
Committee, 1964-1965,” Lloyd A. Barbee Papers. 
23 Historian Joe Trotter traces this “contradictory” relationship back to the early Black migrations of the World War I 
era. Trotter, Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 118. 
24 “Brutality,” Milwaukee Star, August 15, 1964; “Police Brutality Probe by Outsiders Rejected,” The Milwaukee Journal, 
September 10, 1964, Part 1, 22; “Ban Police Bias, New Group Asks,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 23, 1964, Part 2, 13. 
25 Few police accountability organizations actually did so in this period. 
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administrators, and even many Black middle-class leaders in the 1940s and 1950s, the CAPBC did 
not blame poor African Americans for the MPD’s over-zealous policing and the comparative 
underprotection it afforded Black residents. The committee saw officers who engaged in police 
brutality as contributing forces to a fraying social fabric. This was a fresh perspective within Black 
Milwaukee human rights organizations. African American professionals historically considered the 
MPD a fair arbiter of “right” and “wrong”—a rather neutral agency that existed above the messiness 
of urban politics. Conversely, the CAPBC argued that the police department “created any distrust” 
that existed between a growing Black migrant population and law enforcement “by insisting on 
being prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner.”26 This critique was, at the time, unheard of in a city 
that had long prided itself on its crime control efficiency and community-minded policing strategies. 
 The CAPBC represented the vanguard of Milwaukee’s struggle for police accountability at a 
critical juncture in America’s civil rights and policing history. Outbreaks of civil violence in northern 
cities, which began occurring shortly after Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, transformed 
municipal discourses around race, policing, and human rights. In this context, the CAPBC 
articulated a reform vision that reflected both the urgency of Milwaukee’s advancing Black freedom 
movement and the rising anxieties that urban rebellions engendered. The committee did so well 
before the city wrote its own chapter in the “long hot summer” of 1967.27 Sparked by episodes of 
racialized police brutality and swirling rumors of police violence, these politically charged conflicts 
suggested widespread Black dissatisfaction with the economic racism embedded in urban liberalism. 
 
26 “Statement of the Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee before the Milwaukee Police and Fire Commission, 
January 21, 1965.” 
27 The press, political leaders, activists, and scholarly observers simultaneously describe the episodes of civil violence that 
touched-off in the mid-1960s as “riots,” “uprisings,” and “rebellions.” One’s socio-political perspective, proximity to the 
event in question, or level of participation often determined use of language. On the scholarly debate around how to 
appropriately characterize, what Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once notably called, “the language of the unheard,” see: 
Heather Thompson, “Urban Uprisings: Riots or Rebellions?” in David Farber and Beth L. Bailey, eds., The Columbia 
Guide to America in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University press, 2003); Michael B. Katz, “Why Don’t American 
Cities Burn Very Often?” Journal of Urban History 34 (2) (January 2008): 185-208; Amanda I. Seligman, “But Burn—No”: 
The Rest of the Crowd in Three Civil Disorders in 1960s Chicago,” Journal of Urban History 37 (2) (2011): 230-255. 
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They also reflected the limits of federal civil rights laws that did little to directly alter the day-to-day 
inequities experienced by Black families hemmed into racially segregated urban enclaves. For the 
CAPBC, securing a more equitable level of police service and protection was part and parcel of 
preempting civil violence. Its members were wary of what Harlem’s August 1964 uprising meant for 
Milwaukee’s growing and disproportionately poor Black community. Near north siders faced a 
similar set of discriminatory socio-economic and socio-political constraints as Black Harlemites. 
Drawing on more than a decade of intensifying racial discord between white patrolmen and Black 
youth, the CAPBC’s activism around tempering police-Black community conflict implied that 
Milwaukee’s foray into the “Great Uprising” of the 1960s was not inevitable.28 Some CAPBC 
members observed the city’s troubling policing dynamics and their potential for unrest as early as the 
late 1950s. However, demands for change were tempered by established Black middle-class leaders 
as concerned about rankling the community’s white liberal benefactors as pursuing justice.  
 Unwilling to wait and see if Milwaukee would be the next city to burn, metal finisher, labor 
organizer, and civil rights activist Calvin Sherard spearheaded the CAPBC’s formation in August 
1964. As he argued then, “such a committee is a necessity…if we don’t want to experience a Harlem 
right here in Milwaukee.”29 Sherard was among the first Black leaders in the city to advocate for 
non-violent civil disobedience as a response to police brutality. He embodied the shift taking place 
among civil rights organizations after the 1958 police murder of the unarmed Black migrant Daniel 
Bell. It was after a white police officer shot-and-killed the 22-year-old Louisiana native that Sherard 
made a name for himself in local social justice circles. In the process of organizing the community 
 
28 Peter B. Levy, The Great Uprising: Race Riots in Urban America during the 1960s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2018). White city officials and police bureaucrats had plenty of opportunities to recognize and reform the city’s racially 
differential law enforcement arrangements. They could have chosen to attack the root causes of racialized civil violence: 
white anti-blackness and the residential segregation, educational inequities, disinvestment, employment discrimination, 
joblessness, and poverty it facilitated. As Black police accountability advocates and allies discovered, Milwaukee’s 
criminal-legal system was actually working as planned; it supported a racial politics that preserved white hegemony and 
the dictates of racial capitalism. 
29 “Committee Formed to Investigate Brutality Charges,” The Milwaukee, August 14, 1964, 1. 
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against police violence, the Georgia native moved segments of Black Milwaukee from its restrained 
politics of racial accommodation to a more confrontational approach. Sherard’s articulations of 
solidarity for the adverse economic conditions facing poor and working-class Black migrants shaped 
a militant protest politics and his subsequent efforts to secure Black civil rights through boycotts and 
street protests. Despite the availability of low-level manufacturing jobs in Milwaukee, the city 
presented Black newcomers from the South and Lower Midwest with a hostile, discriminatory 
terrain.30 That meant frequent encounters with an overwhelmingly white police force.31 As an 
industrial laborer and recent migrant, Sherard understood first-hand the routine disrespect, 
harassment, and brutality that white officers meted out against African Americans. 
 The CAPBC’s formation embodied more than a decade of Black resistance to police 
violence and grassroots organizing around public safety. Since arriving in Milwaukee in the mid-
1950s, Calvin Sherard made economic justice central to his political analysis.32 Identified by one 
historian as “the father of Black working-class militancy in Milwaukee,” he mobilized pickets and 
“don’t buy where you can’t work” campaigns directed against discriminatory retailers who catered to 
Black clientele.33 Sherard did so as co-founder of the Crusaders Civic and Social League in 1959 and, 
after 1960, as president of the Milwaukee chapter of A. Philip Randolph’s Negro American Labor 
Council. Most Black labor and civil rights advocates who joined Sherard worked alongside him at 
Milwaukee’s American Motors Company plant. The Crusaders and MNALC critiqued what they saw 
 
30 Patrick D. Jones, “‘Get Up Off Your Knees!’: Competing Visions of Black Empowerment in Milwaukee during the 
Early Civil Rights Era,” in Neighborhood Rebels: Black Power at the Local Level, ed. Peniel Joseph (New York: Palgrave 
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University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee School of Social Work, 1963, 2. 
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Sherard,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 6, 1964. 
33 These included a local ice cream parlor, Woolworth’s, and A&P grocery stores Erica Lashanda Metcalfe, “‘We Need 
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as the limitations of urban liberalism for advancing civil rights. The organization framed middle-class 
advocacy for racial accommodation as an insufficient tactic when it came to securing economic 
justice for poor and working-class African Americans. The Crusaders became an outlet for 
demonstrating against workplace discrimination, in addition to police misconduct. Black community 
historian Reuben Harpole once called Sherard “the Malcolm X of our city.”34 The label fit. 
Milwaukee’s NAACP branch even considered him “too radical” to join its board.35 When a “near 
riot” erupted between white police and Black youth outside a rock concert in 1960, Milwaukee’s 
“Malcolm X” told a community meeting: “Get up off your knees! There’s a time for praying and a 
time not to pray…These folks out here are hurting us. Let's go march!”36 Sherard was one of the few 
Black leaders in the city advocating for street protests in the early 1960s.37 
 The CAPBC’s agenda, as its name suggests, centered on the pressing issue of police 
brutality—an “all-encompassing” force for African Americans in the postwar period.38 As such, the 
group endeavored to end racialized police violence through a combination of civic negotiation, legal 
redress, and direct action protest. It pursued these ostensibly divergent tactics with varying degrees 
of success. To make its case before white police bureaucrats, the committee fused existing liberal 
law-and-order concepts popularized during the World War II era, such as expanded “human 
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relations” training for police officers and the recruitment of more African Americans to patrol Black 
districts, with strident demands that reflected the urgency of the current civil rights moment, such as 
psychological evaluations of new police hires.39 In carrying out its agenda at public meetings with 
white police bureaucrats, the CAPBC exposed structural forces that, for decades, had undermined 
police accountability for African Americans. These included intra-racial class tensions, the 
institutional hubris of white city officials who bought into Milwaukee’s narrative of policing 
exceptionalism, and the state law that barred most Black citizens from filing grievances with the 
MFPC. Learning about and then bringing Chapter 586 (1911) to light for a wider Black public eager 
to curtail police abuse and neglect of service was an important legacy of the CAPBC and a key 
development in the city’s police accountability movement. 
 The committee positioned itself as a liaison between vulnerable African Americans and the 
city’s police bureaucracy. Black Milwaukee, while growing rapidly, remained small compared to other 
large northern cities at roughly 10-12 percent of the total population. Consequently, forming 
alliances with white elected officials mattered if the CAPBC was to shift local police procedures in a 
meaningful way. However, in highlighting police brutality as a civil rights issue, the committee 
diverged from the conciliatory responses of Black clergy and old-guard middle-class leaders when 
police-Black community tensions led to racial violence. While the CAPBC believed in negotiating 
with City Hall to effect change, they also embraced non-violent, direct action protest. In other 
words, the CAPBC combined middle-class civil rights leaders with the gaining militancy of a 
younger generation of Black freedom fighters. Historians should consider the committee as a driver 
of the movement’s insurgent turn and a critical voice in framing police violence within the broader 
nexus of racial injustice. The CAPBC’s advocacy conferred a measure of institutional cover when 
 
39 This dissertation defines Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy as the Milwaukee Police Department, the Milwaukee Fire and 
Police Commission, and City Hall, or the Mayor’s office and Common Council. 
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younger Black activists engaged in civil disobedience. In this way, they bridged generational, 
socioeconomic, and ideological gaps within the local freedom struggle.  
 Since the 1910s, the Milwaukee Urban League (MUL) and Milwaukee NAACP (MNAACP) 
represented the city’s civil and human rights leadership. These moderate-led organizations relied on 
deferential negotiations with white city officials to advance modest Black social, economic, and 
political gains. In the process, they accepted white espousals of acculturation. Increasing Black 
migration, hardening racial segregation, and staunch white resistance to Black civic and market-
economic entry rendered cultural adjustment strategies untenable by the mid-1960s. Calvin Sherard 
and Lloyd Barbee—the two most radical CAPBC voices—signaled the shift away from 
acculturation. They helped direct Milwaukee’s civil rights establishment toward tactics of civil 
disobedience and litigation as effective means of addressing racial injustice. While the CAPBC drew 
scorn from MUL and MNAACP officials—both organizations were loath to upset their tenuous 
foothold in Milwaukee’s “white power structure”—they nonetheless elevated the city’s gaining crisis 
of police legitimacy within Black-led organizations.40 The struggle for police accountability was, 
therefore, not merely about compelling white power brokers to come to terms with Milwaukee’s 
dual law enforcement system. Mitigating racialized police violence also meant convincing established 
Black leaders to reconsider their own political identities and class-based interests in service of aiding 
a comparatively poorer and vulnerable Black migrant community. While some middle-class leaders, 
indeed, held that embracing a more confrontational protest politics was necessary in building a just 
society, many continued to advocate for cultural adjustment policies. These more conservative-to-
 
40 Discussed in more detail next chapter, the Common View, a collective organized following the eruption of civil 
violence in Milwaukee in 1967, referred to elected white political leaders in the city as the “white power structure.” The 
group’s description was apt, considering that only one African American served on the Common Council. And, aside 
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Group, “Statement to the White community,” Box 6, Folder 7, “Administrative Subject Files, Common View Group, 
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moderate Black voices were content with blaming southern migrants for Black community ills. And 
they embraced the MPD’s existing order maintenance approach. In key respects, the “triangular 
struggle for order” among Black professionals, recent Black arrivals, and assorted white interests 
endured.41 
 With or without the full support of all moderate racial liberals, CAPBC members laid out the 
principles of what would become the committee’s seven-point reform program soon after their first 
meeting.42 The group reflected the desire of Black leaders for a measure of community control over 
police decision-making. The CAPBC platform demanded the immediate dismissal of any officers 
found to have engaged in “racial or religious bias.” The committee called for expanded human 
relations training for District Five personnel and the recruitment of more Black officers, especially 
youth, onto the MPD.43 At their second meeting, the CAPBC added “an honest reappraisal” of the 
police department’s “human rights practices,” psychological screenings of officers assigned to 
majority Black districts, and a prohibition on “the employment of racial bigots” to their platform. 
Lloyd Barbee, the committee’s legal counsel, drafted the initial policy statement presented to city 
 
41 As the previous chapter lays out, intensive Black movement from the South and Lower Midwest produced a triangular 
struggle for order in Milwaukee among existing Black residents, assorted white interests, and newer Black migrants. 
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an interracial “cross-section of the community.” Reverend B.S. Gregg was nominated to chair the group and served as 
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CAPBC’s protest arm, or “Action Committee.” Civil rights attorney Lloyd Barbee, fresh off of being elected to 
Wisconsin’s Assembly, volunteered as legal counsel. Barbee evaluated citizen reports of police misconduct and 
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efforts, publicizing instances of police brutality. In some cases, police brutality victims walked directly into the Star’s N. 
3rd St. headquarters right after experiencing an attack. “Cop Rips Jacket off 14-year-old,” The Milwaukee Star, December 
19, 1964, 1. Northcott Neighborhood House Director and Organization of Organizations founder, Reverend Lucius 
Walker, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee sociologist Hugo Engelmann, Dr. William E. Finlayson, a respected medical 
doctor and community leader, and MUSIC Vice Chair Earl Calvin also participated in the first CAPBC meeting. 
“Statement of the Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee.” 
43 “Ban Police Bias, New Group Asks,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 23, 1964, Part 2, 13. 
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officials. The committee looked to relay their concerns about “muscle-happy officers” directly to 
Chief Breier.44 At a public meeting, Barbee called for citizen instruction on their rights in police 
interactions and asked that local social scientists “assist in communicating to both officials and the 
general public the damage accruing from police brutality.” He also called on elected officials to 
pressure the MPD “to cease its double standards and protection of cowards in uniform who 
intimidate.” Everyday citizens, Reverend Gregg added, “had a role to play as well in reporting 
misconduct as soon as it occurred.” If negotiations with City Hall faltered, the CAPBC insisted that 
“direct action should follow.”45  
 The committee’s call for increased Black representation on the MPD was a core demand of 
Milwaukee’s police accountability movement.46 The city’s lone Black Alderperson, Vel Phillips, had 
argued in 1962 that hiring more African American police officers would help shield Black 
constituents from undue police harassment and abuse, while more effectively protecting them from 
crime.47 Speaking before the MFPC and Police Chief Howard Johnson, she argued that racial biases 
existed in the MPD. Giving voice to the less than thirty-five Black officers on the force, Phillips 
targeted the department’s promotion policies. In response, the MFPC dismissed her claims.48 
Nevertheless, Phillips’ voice on this issue was notable; it marked the first time an elected Milwaukee 
official connected the MPD’s whiteness to the racially disparate treatment of African Americans.49 
Black middle class leaders, including recent migrants, assumed that African Americans were better 
suited to meet the needs of Black communities and better respect Black citizenship rights. They held 
that Black officers would enforce the law with greater impartiality. Whether or not African American 
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49 “Ald. Phillips Discrimination Charges are out of Line,” Box 138, Folder 27, “Police Department, 1962-1963,” Records 
of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Milwaukee Series 44, University of Wisconsin-
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police operated more fairly was an open question, as the community had limited data to rely on. 
There were few real-world examples to parse through, especially in Milwaukee, where token Black 
police employment was the norm. “As long as the hiring of Black officers remained a distant 
dream,” legal scholar James Forman Jr. has argued, “there was no way to test any theory about the 
changes they would bring to law enforcement.”50 The hiring of African Americans continued to be 
seen as a viable reform option to alleviate the mistrust powering the near north side’s evolving crisis 
of police legitimacy well into the 1980s. 
 After the Harlem uprising in July 1964, and subsequent episodes of civil unrest in Jersey 
City, NJ and Rochester, NY, Black middle-class leaders in Milwaukee shared concerns about civil 
violence touching off in their own city. Speaking before a national Urban League assembly, branch 
director Wesley Scott said Milwaukee was “on the verge of much that has happened elsewhere.”51 
North Side YMCA director Robert Starms, likewise, noted the “acute” frustrations of young Black 
men aged twenty-one to twenty-five, many of who were unemployed or struggling to maintain 
employment. Black youth were dropping out of high school at comparatively high rates, and also 
looking to support their families. This “ten percent” of the community, Starms reasoned, was 
“likely” to engage in civil violence if given a reason. Corneff Taylor, the Executive Secretary of the 
Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations (MCCR), argued that civil violence was more 
“situational.” However, he too saw that Milwaukee was suffering from many of the same underlying 
causes of civil unrest: unemployment, housing discrimination, and inequitable schooling. That said, a 
number of Black middle-class elites insisted the MPD’s human relations capacities were sound, “in 
spite of the conduct of a few officers.” Against a national backdrop of escalating civil unrest, the 
 
50 The benefits seemed obvious enough. Hiring Black patrolmen was a path towards civil service employment, economic 
advancement, and political power. It also held the potential for enhancing community control, more effectively resolving 
crime in predominantly Black spaces, and better maintaining neighborhood stability. James Forman Jr., Locking Up Our 
Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2017), 80. 
51 “Scott Fears Riots Here,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 5, 1964, Part 2, 1. 
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MPD issued its own statement: “law and order” would prevail in Milwaukee, regardless of the socio-
economic issues facing “different population groups.” The police department assured Black leaders 
it would act impartially “as agents of the law and of the government—not as men.”52 
 The above warnings sparked vigorous debate within the Milwaukee Commission on 
Community Relations in the summer of 1964. So too did the formation of the CAPBC that year, the 
committee’s charges of racialized police violence, and the federal civil suit that was filed by the 
families of William Coates and Michael Thomas.53 MPD Chief Harold Breier argued the MCCR 
“should back the Police Department” against the CAPBC’s, in his view, unfounded charges. 
Attacking police would “destroy the power that can protect [citizens] from the forces of evil,” Breier 
intoned. The chief clearly saw the CAPBC as a threat to his executive authority and the institutional 
independence that undergirded the MPD’s reputed exceptionalism in the arena of crime control 
efficiency. Fortunately for Breier, the MCCR expressed little desire to depart from his zero sum 
perspective, at least in the years and months that preceded the outbreak of civil violence in 1967. 
Some members questioned the CAPBC’s “negative attitude” towards police-community relations. 
One commissioner, for example, implied that the CAPBC was a militant organization that had lost 
legitimacy after separating from moderate white parishioners at St. Elizabeth Church.54 Corneff 
Taylor warned his MCCR colleagues—all Maier appointees—that the CAPBC formed as a 
“vigilante-type operation.” They should “protest loudly and long” its approach to police reform.55  
 
52 “Starms Hears Rumblings of Milwaukee Race Riots,” The Milwaukee Star, August 15, 1964, 1. 
53 The MCCR was appointed by the mayor and served on his behalf. It acted as the City of Milwaukee’s civil rights 
watchdog and as an occasional clearinghouse for public discrimination complaints. Chief Breier was a member, but 
rarely attended meetings unless they directly involved the police department. “Milwaukee Commission on Community 
Relations, Executive Committee Meeting,” September 3, 1964, 3, Box 45, Folder 21, “Commission on Community 
Relations, June - December, 1964,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
Milwaukee Series 44, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. 
54 Reverend Charles Hammer, St. Elizabeth’s pastor, was an early co-chair of the CAPBC, volunteering to lead the 
organization alongside Reverend B.S. Gregg. However, he left the committee after Chief Breier and one of his 
lieutenants paid the white cleric a personal visit. “Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations, Executive 
Committee Meeting,” September 9, 1964, 5. 
55 “Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations, Executive Committee Meeting,” September 9, 1964, 5. 
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 Although it sought to distance itself from the CAPBC, the MCCR did acknowledge that the 
MPD’s controversial actions on the near north side presented a public relations challenge that could 
lead to disorder. Black perceptions of police illegitimacy and the looming threat of unrest forced the 
commission to concede that Milwaukee needed a revised police complaint procedure. One MCCR 
member went so far as to suggest the city establish a “police civilian board” to “handle complaints 
against the Police Department.”56 Breier, on the other hand, vigorously opposed the concept, 
arguing complaints “should be referred to the department for investigation by trained personnel.” 
The MCCR countered that they should be present to “determine substance” on all police complaints 
and whether referrals were necessary for internal investigations or finding “some other means of 
handling the complaint.” Essentially, these deliberations resulted in Breier establishing a revised 
“Internal Affairs Bureau” (IAB).57 The IAB’s creation ensured that all investigations into citizen 
complaints against the police would remain under the chief’s purview. The move gave the 
appearance of reform, but did nothing to empower the MCCR or non-police agencies. Its purpose, 
according to the chief, was to interrogate complaints made against officers, to look into possible 
derelictions of duty, and to supervise background checks of police candidates. In the end, Breier 
largely utilized the IAB to investigate possible rules violations committed by police personnel. It was 
rarely employed to investigate civilian allegations of police misconduct. The IAB inevitably served as 
a powerful mechanism for an autocratic chief to tighten the reigns of his authority and to expand 
local police power. 
 
Limits of Reform 
 The CAPBC’s efforts to reconstitute police rules and oversight through civic negotiation 
 
56 “Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations, Executive Committee Meeting,” October 1, 1964, 2. 
57 The IAB was previously known as the “Investigations Bureau.” Breier staffed the bureau, at least in its first 
incarnation, with two detectives, a detective sergeant, and a stenographer. 
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highlighted the limitations for police accountability advocates seeking substantive change through 
formal municipal channels, where the priority remained upholding traditional power arrangements 
and ensuring racial pacification. Deflection, subterfuge, false promises, the proposal of study 
commissions and other forms of deferred action comprised the toolkit of white police bureaucrats 
when responding to Black demands for accountability. Established relationships between old-guard 
Black professionals and white public officials helped preserve existing racial and class hierarchies of 
authority. The CAPBC’s engagement with Milwaukee’s all-white police bureaucracy in 1964 and 
1965 revealed the powerful influence of the city’s existing narrative of policing exceptionalism. 
Segregation ensured that most white residents were blind to the MPD’s racial containment and order 
maintenance practices on the near north side. More constructive forms of policing in white urban 
spaces affirmed the political currency of the police department’s exceptionalism narrative. “High 
crime” Black areas received sufficient police attention, while white neighborhoods merited more 
responsive police safeguarding. As such, the MPD received the benefit of the doubt from white 
elected officials, the MFPC, and community organizations, who were increasingly anxious about 
Black law enforcement proposals. Milwaukee Circuit Court judges, too, almost always supported 
police actions, particularly in cases involving civil rights activists. They often conflated Black 
movement activism with criminality. White police leaders and the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney, meanwhile, defended police discretion and framed the MPD as a noble agency committed 
to defending law-abiding (white) Milwaukeeans from the (Black) criminal element. If shining a light 
on racialized police misconduct felt like an uphill battle for groups like the CAPBC, then advancing 
substantive change must have felt like scaling a mountain. 
 The CAPBC first attempted to meet with Chief Breier to discuss ways of improving police-
Black community relations in August 1964. Breier had scheduled a meeting with the committee in 
early September. “The lines of communication are always open to my office to any responsible 
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committee,”58 the chief said. “Responsible,” in this context, meant deference to police authority and 
subservience to “law and order.” As such, the MPD refused the CAPBC’s entreaties once it became 
clear the committee was pursuing litigation, in addition to greater civilian control over police 
functions in response to police brutality. Publicly, Breier argued that he could not meet with the 
group because his schedule was “too heavy.” The chief defended his patrolmen and rejected the 
premise of police brutality, arguing that the department sufficiently processed brutality charges.59 
Under the MPD’s internal review system accused officers investigated their own alleged 
wrongdoing.60 External review, civilian or otherwise, was off limits in Breier’s view. He told the 
MCCR that September that “he wouldn’t care to have anyone else making an investigation or 
second guessing” his officers.61 Complying with Breier’s calls for subservience was not acceptable to 
Calvin Sherard. He responded to Breier’s refusal to meet with the CAPBC, arguing that “actions by 
police officers are detrimental to the image of the whole department.” Something had to be done 
about “the alleged beatings of Negro children by police officers.” Invoking the MPD’s racial double-
standard, Sherard avowed that Black youth were being beaten “in such a manner that the children’s 
parents would have been subjected to jailing had they committed the act…If these matters cannot 
be negotiated across the table, they will be negotiated in the streets in the form of demonstrations.” 
CAPBC members called for a sit-in at Breier’s office.62 
 After the police chief rebuffed their request to meet, the committee turned its attention to 
Mayor Maier. For a month, the mayor had delayed meeting with the CAPBC. On October 20, 1964, 
 
58 Emphasis added by the author. Both Chief Breier and CAPBC Chairman Rev. B.S. Gregg had scheduling conflicts 
that postponed their initial meeting. “Breier Meet 'Next Week,’” The Milwaukee Star, September 26, 1964, 3. 
59 “Breier Too Busy, Seek Meeting with Mayor,” The Milwaukee Star, October 10, 1964, 1; Milwaukee Police Department, 
Annual Report, 1963. 
60 The MPD appointed its first two detectives to the newly created Bureau of Internal Affairs in October 1964. The 
bureau was to investigate complaints of alleged police misconduct, derelictions of duty, and candidate investigations. 
“Breier Too Busy, Seek Meeting With Mayor.” 
61 “Police Brutality Probe by Outsiders Rejected,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 10, 1964, Part 1, 22; “A Look at the 
Police,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 14, 1964, Part 1, 14. 
62 “Seek Meeting with Mayor,” The Milwaukee Star, October 10, 1964, 2. 
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ten committee members appeared at City Hall to impress upon him the urgency of the MPD’s 
declining legitimacy among African Americans on the near north side and to deliver the group’s 
seven-point platform.63 Maier’s staff kept the committee waiting, then said he was sick with the flu 
and could not meet. When the CAPBC finally convened with the mayor on November 10th, they 
presented themselves as tax-paying citizens who were concerned about the “growing disrespect for 
local policemen.” The CAPBC explained that the near north side’s “rising tension” sprang from “the 
double-standard constantly used to measure citizens in that community.”64 Significantly, however, 
the committee focused on the disrespect that poor and migrant Black youth sometimes conveyed to 
white patrolmen. This had the effect of placing the onus for change on Black young people and 
economically vulnerable residents, not on the law enforcers wielding power at street level. 
Seemingly, against the wishes of its militant members, the CAPBC under-emphasized the 
dehumanizing nature of police violence that had brought the group to City Hall in the first place. 
Instead, the committee focused on the need for an improved human rights training program and the 
hiring of more Black patrolmen to police in Black neighborhoods. The CAPBC, in this sense, met 
Maier on his ideological terms. This was not entirely surprising, given the committee’s largely 
middle-class composition and the influential voice that Black professional leaders, like Rev. B.S. 
Gregg, marshaled within the group. In this sense, the committee reflected the transition towards 
Black militancy, not the end result of that shift. The meeting with Maier provided a lesson for police 
accountability advocates: Telling elected officials that Black citizens did not need “different 
treatment,” but “equal treatment” from the MPD would not to be enough to prevent police violence 
and reduce racial tensions.65 
 
63 Present were Reverend B.S. Gregg, Assembly-elect Lloyd Barbee, Marilyn Morheuser, Calvin Sherard, Dr. William 
Finlayson, Earl Calvin, Reverend Lovell Johnson, Professor Rudolph Morris, Reverend Lucius Walker, and Marvin 
Hannah. “Mayor Maier Meeting Postponed,” The Milwaukee Star, October 24, 1964, 2. 
64 “Maier ‘Passes Buck’ in Committee Meeting,” The Milwaukee Star, November 14, 1964, 1. 
65 “Negro Police Called Need in Inner City,” The Milwaukee Journal, November 11, 1964, Part 3, 1. 
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 The CAPBC’s discussion with Mayor Maier proved ineffective from a reform standpoint, as 
it allowed City Hall to affirm rhetorical control over the direction of what a growing number of 
Black residents perceived as a crisis of police legitimacy. Maier sanitized the committee’s urgent 
message about the MPD’s racialized brutality, neglect, and enforcement double-standards, as well as 
the role that police played in escalating social tensions. Controlling the narrative helped City Hall to 
reinforce a policing status quo that emphasized law and order at the expense of garnering procedural 
justice and officer discipline for aggrieved Black citizens. The Maier administration, like Chief Breier 
and, subsequently, the MFPC, refused to acknowledge that police violence really existed on the near 
north side. They both acted on and reinforced the MPD’s exceptionalism narrative. 
In a statement issued following the mayor’s meeting with the CAPBC, Maier shared his 
respect for the committee’s “universal respect for the principles of law and order.” These were “men 
of good will,” able to “tackle and solve mutual problems” through the “peaceful petition for redress 
of wrongs.” He added that negotiation through government channels was essentially the “time-
tested method of democracy.” As such, Maier decried those taking “to corner soapboxes.” The 
mayor castigated civil rights activists, who he saw as agitators seeking “violence and disorder.” Maier 
rebuked seemingly combustive modes of Black political dissent, which were building momentum 
nationally. In the process, he minimized the hard, often dangerous work that many grassroots 
activists employed to change discriminatory laws. The goal remained pacifying potential disruptions. 
I am convinced that they have the most to gain from law and order. The school 
integration decision from 1954 is law and order. The civil rights bill, [that] just passed 
Congress, is law and order. Where would the civil rights movement be without these 
acts, without this law and order? Well, the answer is that they would be set back 
some considerable distance. Law and order are the northsiders’ best friend, make no 
mistake about it, because the opposite of law and order is mob rule, and that’s the 
way of the Ku Klux Klan, the night riders, the bombers, and the lynch mob.66 
 
 
66 “Mayor Maier’s Statement Following a Meeting, November 10, 1964, with the Citizen’s Anti-Police Brutality 
Committee.” 
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This was a misinterpretation of recent history—all the more stunning in that Maier issued his 
remarks in the same year as Freedom Summer and the founding of the Mississippi Freedom 
Democratic Party. The violent, in some cases deadly struggle to register Black voters in the Deep 
South demonstrated that “law and order” was the mob, it was the Klan, it was white supremacy. 
Prevailing white conceptions of law-and-order were the inverse of the Black freedom struggle and 
the system that civil rights insurgents, from Selma to Milwaukee, fought to upend. 
 Maier’s response affirmed what often happens when Black police accountability advocates 
downplayed the harsh realities of racialized police violence in meetings with the white-controlled 
political establishment. Whether the CAPBC did so out of what some members viewed as a need for 
political expediency was not clear. Ostensibly, Calvin Sherard believed that a more confrontational 
approach with white police bureaucrats had a better chance of garnering substantive reforms. 
Regardless, the mayor’s rejoinder showed that a tempered message only fueled the MPD’s long-
standing exceptionalism myth, which continued to predominate. The widespread belief in the police 
department’s infallibility helped undermine the capacity of police accountability advocates to move 
the mayor, MFPC, and chief of police to action in service of Black law enforcement demands. Until 
Milwaukee experienced a sizable outbreak of civil violence as a consequence of police-Black 
community tensions, white police bureaucrats gladly held onto the notion that the MPD was still 
among the nation’s most effective police departments. The disturbing reality of police brutality 
known to the CAPBC and other Black near north side residents belied this notion. At this point, 
however, police accountability advocates still believed that white city officials might act on their 
behalf if they reasonably stated their concerns. All the same, there was no guarantee that a Black 
uprising would even impress upon City Hall the need for change either. White elected officials, like 
Maier, already blamed the behavior of Black individuals and Black-led organizations working to end 
discrimination through activism for their own civil rights shortcomings. Indeed, in his response to 
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the CAPBC, the mayor labored to make a distinction between the “decent, law abiding citizens” on 
the near north side, who “do not approve of violence and disorder,” and those willing to resort to 
“riots” or “the destruction of property” when expressing their “anguish.”67 
 While Maier reportedly found his meeting with the CAPBC “constructive,” it did little to 
move the committee’s platform forward or to convince the mayor and Common Council that 
political action was necessary. Maier deferred responsibility to the MFPC and Chief Breier, claiming 
no authority to issue orders that met the CAPBC’s seven demands. As the Milwaukee Star reported, 
he “gave excuses why he couldn’t (or wouldn’t) act, and started talking politics.”68 The meeting 
further revealed the legal-institutional barriers to police accountability that obstructed local political 
action. For instance, during their discussion, Mayor Maier referenced the 1911 state law that 
empowered the police chief to set rules for the MPD. That same Wisconsin statute endowed the 
MFPC with a civilian oversight function. The meeting with the mayor, therefore, was useful in that it 
helped to clarify for police accountability advocates the institutional arrangements that constituted 
Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy and the legal foundations of police power. 
 Delayed action from city officials meant young Black folk on the near north side continued 
to experience unchecked police violence. Two teenagers, aged sixteen and fifteen, alleged that white 
officers beat them in separate incidents in November 1964.69 Once again, the MPD’s District Five 
station was the scene of police intimidation and brutal mistreatment. The CAPBC called an 
 
67 “Mayor Maier’s Statement Following a Meeting, November 10, 1964, with the Citizen’s Anti-Police Brutality 
Committee.” 
68 “Maier ‘Passes Buck’ in Committee Meeting,” The Milwaukee Star, November 14, 1964, 1. 
69 In the first case, a group of young Black men were stopped by four-to-five police detectives while walking down a 
street on a Saturday night at around 8:00pm. One of the youths said a detective threw his parole card on the ground. For 
protesting this action, the youth was tossed into a squad car and transported to District Five station. He was taken to the 
hospital, but refused treatment. The teen was released after his mother contacted their parole officer. The other incident 
involved a young Black male walking in a group of six persons. He was making a phone call in a telephone booth when 
multiple patrolmen yanked him out and started beating him. The entire group of six was taken into custody. The 
complainant was taken to District Five station and subsequently beaten again during questioning. “Police Brutality 
Committee Has Call Meeting in Wake of Two New Complaints,” The Milwaukee Star, November 21, 1964, 1, 13. 
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emergency meeting at St. Matthew Church, inviting parents of the victims to recount their children’s 
experiences for the record. MCCR program director William Parish joined the meeting, which 
resulted in the organization of a picket outside of District Five on December 21, 1964.70 CAPBC 
demonstrators called for an investigation into District Five and for the MCCR or some other 
municipal agency to investigate the MPD’s treatment of Black citizens. Addressing this issue did not 
mean “creating a double standard,” but “alleviating the double standard that we are presently 
confronted with.”71 The MNAACP, in a rare turn, allied with the more militant CAPBC. The 
venerable civil rights organization announced it would boycott all businesses encompassed by 
District Five if the committee’s requests went unheeded by the MPD.72 “We will extend it to the 
downtown area, including all utilities and public services,” recently-elected president John Broadnax 
remarked. Under new leadership, the MNAACP made more explicit connections between racialized 
police violence in Milwaukee and other forms of discrimination.73 Calvin Sherard, Action Committee 
chairman for the CAPBC, clarified that the committee was “not attacking the individual officers,” 
but protesting “a policy” that allowed them to “exercise their personal view and strong racial feelings 
under the disguise of law and order.”74 This distinction mattered; the committee understood that 
without challenging police practices as outlined in the MPD rulebook, more unabated violence 
would transpire against African Americans. It was police policy and the whims of the police chief 
that protected the department’s “bad actors,” granting them ample discretionary room to enforce 
the law as they saw fit. 
 
70 The group also discussed a sit-in at Breier’s office and proposed a mass demonstration at the Milwaukee Safety 
building. “Police Hit by Pickets,” The Milwaukee Star, December 19, 1964, 1. 
71 “Protest Scheduled Friday, December 4,” The Milwaukee Star, November 28, 1964, 2. 
72 “To Channel 6 Editorial,” Box 21, Folder 9, Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee, 1964-1965, Lloyd A. Barbee 
Papers, 1933-1982, Milwaukee Mss 16, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives; “Store Boycott Considered by 
NAACP,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 21, 1964, Part 2, 4. 
73 “Boycott Likely Says New NAACP Pres.,” Milwaukee Star, December 26, 1964, 3. 
74 The protest was initially scheduled for December 4th, but held December 11th. “Protest Schedule Friday, December 
4,” The Milwaukee Star, November 28, 1964, 2. “Brutality Committee Considers Sit-in, Other Action,” The Milwaukee Star, 
December 12, 1964, 1. 
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 No investigations or official actions resulted from the demonstration. However, the rally did 
put Chief Breier on high alert; he saw his department as under attack. “Baiting police officers has 
become a problem in Milwaukee as in other cities,” Breier told a sympathetic crowd in rural Wausau, 
Wisconsin.75 Rights activists and everyday Black citizens in northern cities—mostly poor and 
working-class—were ramping up their criticisms of law enforcement in the wake of 1964’s urban 
rebellions. Many had grown disaffected with urban liberalism, as well as middle-class African 
American leaders.76 They began to demand control over institutions that traditionally engendered 
racially discriminatory outcomes, like police departments engaged in disproportionately high rates of 
surveillance, stops, and arrests in Black neighborhoods. For Breier, citizens who challenged police 
authority were “inviting the breakdown of the forces that can protect them from disorder.” Groups 
like the CAPBC, the chief surmised, were “confusing brutality with the lawful use of force.”77 
Although Calvin Sherard insisted that Breier had “no understanding of the problem” or its impact 
on near north side residents, the chief’s own words suggested that he knew exactly what was 
occurring: Black citizens were boldly challenging white supremacy. He advised that his officers 
“need not and should not knuckle down, need not and should not take any abuse.”78  
 With Chief Breier unwilling to listen and the mayor deflecting any responsibility, the CAPBC 
moved to convince the MFPC to assert its assumed influence over Milwaukee’s policing apparatus. 
The committee was giving civic negotiation a final chance. Rev. Gregg sent a letter to the 
commission asking to “discuss ways of eliminating police brutality and affecting a better relationship 
between the police department and near north side residents.”79 The two parties eventually 
convened in a public meeting on January 21, 1965. The CAPBC asked that all Milwaukee citizens 
 
75 “Baiting of Police Called Problem, The Milwaukee Journal, December 10, 1964, Part 1, 21. 
76 Eric C. Schneider, Christopher Agee, and Themis Chronopoulos, “Dirty Work: Police and Community Relations and 
the Limits of Liberalism in Postwar Philadelphia,” Journal of Urban History 46 (5) (2017), 2. 
77 “Baiting of Police Called Problem, The Milwaukee Journal, December 10, 1964, Part 1, 21. 
78 “Baiting of Police Called Problem, The Milwaukee Journal, December 10, 1964, Part 1, 21. 
79 “Fire, Police Commission to Meet,” The Milwaukee Star, January 2, 1965, 2. 
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interested in eliminating police brutality and forging better relations be present.80 Supporters of both 
the police department and committee attended—the latter, mostly Black, the former, 
overwhelmingly white.81 The convening was scheduled to occur at the MFPC’s Safety Building 
offices, but was moved to Judge Christ Seraphim’s courtroom after nearly two hundred people 
attended.82 This courtroom was an inhospitable place for Black activists and arrestees seeking justice 
within the criminal-legal process. As civil rights attorney Terrance Pitts observed, the Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court judge, “backed the police without question.” Judge Seraphim once advised an 
officer to “go back to school” and “learn how to use his Billy club” in reference to handling Black-
led civil disobedience.83 The CAPBC now sat in hostile territory, eager to challenge the brutal results 
of Seraphim’s advice in conversation with a part-time municipal agency seemingly empowered to 
answer its pressing demands.  
 Rev. B.S. Gregg, the CAPBC’s Chairman, served as spokesman for the ten-person 
delegation. The committee drew from a broad cross-section of moderate-to-progressive liberal 
voices in Milwaukee’s civil and human rights community.84 After introducing the committee 
members on hand, Gregg opened with remarks that emphasized the consequences of unbridled 
police violence in other U.S. cities. He emphasized not only how police brutality and mistreatment 
threatened public order and community safety, but how it also encouraged opportunities for reform 
 
80 “Police Brutality Meet Set Next Thursday,” The Milwaukee Star, January 16, 1965, 1. 
81 Robert Taylor, a Black Republican challenging Democrat Henry Reuss’ Congressional seat, was in attendance to 
support the MPD. He commented to reporters that police should be monitoring the “beatings and muggings” taking 
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84 Representing the CAPBC at the meeting were Father W. J. Miles, Reverend Lucius Walker, Dr. William Finlayson, Dr. 
Hugo Engelmann, Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee, Calvin Sherard, Earl Calvin, Marilyn Morheuser, Marvin Hannah, and 
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as initiated by the police: 
The problem which Milwaukee faces is not peculiar to this city. It is a problem which 
all America faces. It is a problem which is one of the poisonous outgrowths of racial 
prejudice, and one which must be faced before it causes racial tensions to erupt. It is 
the problem of police brutality in the ghetto areas of large cities.85 
 
The CAPBC made the point that Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy should be learning from what took 
place in Harlem, North Philadelphia, Rochester, and other riot-torn cities in 1964. These 
municipalities were now initiating “extensive training programs in human rights, human relations, 
and the techniques and purposes of civil rights groups.” In contrast, the MPD, at present, offered 
just five hours of human rights training to new recruits. Gregg referred to the high cost of civil 
violence and the threat it posed to Black lives. African Americans were “not safe to peaceably move 
about” their own neighborhoods. He recounted instances where Black youth were “beaten by 
policemen while being transported” to holding cells and “sadistically punished prior to being 
charged with a crime.” The discretionary authority of overzealous white police officers not only 
promoted mistrust and fear, but inflicted serious physical harm. “Make no mistake about it,” Gregg 
charged, “we have some law officers in this city who consistently insult, harass, and brutalize 
Milwaukee Negroes…who act on the assumption that every Negro is a second-class citizen, a 
person to be treated with contempt, a person without rights before the law.” The CAPBC criticized 
Breier’s MPD for shunning preventative strategies, while prioritizing tactics of racial suppression. 
Rev. Gregg even cited the use of “police dogs” in crisis trainings at District Five station, in addition 
to other “techniques of quelling riots.”86 In Milwaukee, he said, “tensions are rising to the point of 
explosion.” Rev. Gregg concluded the CAPBC’s opening statement by calling for “responsible, 
speedy execution” of its platform by police bureaucrats. He reiterated the committee’s core 
 
85 “Statement of the Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee before the Milwaukee Police and Fire Commission, 
January 21, 1965,” 2. 
86 Chief Breier claimed to know nothing about the use of police dogs, stating that a demonstration was the prerogative 
of the District Five Sergeant on duty. “Police Brutality Meet Set Next Thursday.” 
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demands, which “sprang from our day-to-day awareness of a problem of great magnitude.”87  
 As the meeting progressed, it became clear that the MFPC was not willing to take the 
CAPBC at its word. Despite the testimony of a respected community organization, the commission 
required proof that police brutality on the near north side was real. The CAPBC had not brought 
affidavits, no formal complaints to file with the MFPC. Regardless, CAPBC member F. Marvin 
Hannah said he would personally testify to being brutalized by Milwaukee police in 1963. In 
response, MFPC member Judge Francis X. Swietlik bristled, “We want no ex parte testimony.” 
Charges of brutality needed to be sworn under oath and “taken through due process of law,” he 
said.88 Other comments from Judge Swietlik suggested that rumors about law enforcement and 
improving the police department’s image were more important than securing justice for victimized 
residents. “The word has gone out that our policemen are a bunch of brutes…if they are we will 
clean it up, Swietlik concluded towards the end of the meeting.”89  
 The MFPC said it would review the CAPBC’s proposals. Two weeks later, it rejected the 
CAPBC’s demands as an undue request for special treatment. The commission did, however, agree 
that unaddressed police misconduct could lead to civil violence. Still, it made no specific efforts to 
mitigate alleged police abuses against African Americans. “All citizens must be treated equally,” one 
MFPC member stated. “None are to receive special privileges and none are to be mistreated.” The 
commission basically relied on a reverse discrimination argument to deny Black complainants 
redress for their claims of police misconduct. This reflected the wider tendency of Milwaukee 
 
87 Those demands were the immediate removal of patrolmen “found guilty of violating the human rights of citizens.” 
Psychological screenings of new recruits and existing officers, particularly those assigned to “the core area.” Enhanced 
“human relations” training for all officers and reappraisal of current practices. Review of the police complaint process, 
when law enforcers engage in misconduct or neglect their sworn duties. The recruitment of African-American patrolmen 
as “a preventative measure.” The “active recruitment” of Black youth for the Police Aide program, which needed to be 
“continuous and vigorous.” “Statement of the Citizens’ Anti-Police Brutality Committee before the Milwaukee Police 
and Fire Commission, January 21, 1965,” 4-5. 
88 “Commission Says Prove It,” The Milwaukee Star, January 30, 1965, 1. 
89 “Spell Out Brutality Claims,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, January 22, 1965, Part 2, 1. 
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officials to downplay and delegitimize Black grievances as human rights abuses. The MFPC 
presumed that the impartiality of the law as written, its inherent “colorblindness,” ensured fair 
treatment. The laws that police enforced, they said, were “designed and enacted to preserve the 
rights of all citizens…The rights of all citizens are human rights.” MPD training was “designed to 
afford equal protection to the public.” Changing how police enforced the law for one group created 
a “double-standard,” violating the MPD’s ability to police “on an equal basis to all persons 
throughout the city.”90 
 The MFPC’s critique of the CAPBC’s requests not only applied to allegations of undue 
police violence, but to issues that they themselves had direct control over, such as the MPD’s racial 
composition. As the board stated, “The rules provide that no recognition may be given to any 
entrance or promotional applicant because of race, creed, or color.”91 Commissioners maintained 
that “merit and merit alone” would determine success on “all entrance and promotional 
examinations.” Staffing District Five was not under the MFPC’s purview. “Personnel are assigned by 
the Chief to districts and duties on the basis of need—where they can best serve the public.” Acts of 
aggression, name-calling, and neglect did not qualify as urgent needs. Likewise, the commission held 
that psychological screenings were non-essential to police hiring and denied “officers on the 
department…demonstrate in their performance that they are intolerant in their opinions.” On the 
threat of “riots,” the MFPC said past civil rights demonstrations had not resulted in disturbances 
and that police adequately controlled such dissent. There was little reason, they presumed, that civil 
unrest would occur in Milwaukee.92 
 The MFPC also noted that according to the 1911 Wisconsin statute governing municipal 
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police departments in the state, it had no power to control how Milwaukee’s police chief “regulated” 
or “prescribed rules” for their department. It was Chief Breier’s responsibility, the commission 
explained, to preserve “the public peace” and “see that all laws and ordinances of the city are 
enforced.” The MFPC’s authority lay in its capacity to select employees for hire and arbitrate select 
internal or public grievances, not to decide or rule on the treatment of officers by the department. 
When “a valid complaint is submitted by a freeholder,” that individual may “order a hearing.” The 
commission then “acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.” The MFPC elucidated for the CAPBC and other 
police accountability advocates that it was “an administrative tribunal,” not a civilian oversight body. 
It could not “act as an investigator, prosecutor or defender.” The “freeholder” clause prevented 
non-property owners from filing grievances against police officers. Disqualified complainants had 
no other choice but to register their grievances with the MPD itself.93 
 Notwithstanding the growing number of civilian complaints against the police, the MFPC 
insisted that “proper training” made the MPD “very successful in PREVENTING RIOTS.”94 It was 
Chief Breier’s responsibility to “prevent unlawful disturbances,” and not to “quell” them after the 
fact. The department’s training procedures for crowd control were more than adequate, 
commissioners insisted. The MFPC refuted that District Five officers were being trained on how to 
use police dogs, or that the police department emphasized the “quelling” of riots over their 
prevention. The MPD was “doing its job in teaching all of its members to avoid any discrimination 
in dealing with the public.”95 While the commission admitted that “racial prejudice” may exist on the 
force, they refused to believe that such bias could spark civil violence and further denied that the city 
stood at the precipice of unrest. New police recruits, the MFPC argued, did not need to be screened 
for bigoted views—hiring standards already weeded out racially biased applicants. 
 
93 “The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Milwaukee statement.” 
94 Emphasis in the original. “The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Milwaukee statement.” 
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 As requested, the CAPBC documented first-hand accounts of police abuse and failed them 
with the MFPC. Rev. Gregg delivered three affidavits in March 1965 that supported fifteen-year-old 
James Spivey’s account of police violence. This particular complaint demonstrated the immense 
bureaucratic hurdles that police accountability advocates had to transcend in order to garner justice. 
The Black north side youth alleged white officers beat him at District Five station.96 Spivey’s injuries 
were so severe that the police checked him into Milwaukee County’s emergency hospital. There, 
doctors treated him for a serious head wound, telling the officers he should stay overnight for 
treatment. The police refused, bringing him to a youth detention facility instead.97 Spivey alleged that 
patrolmen called him racist names on the drive to the detention center. Breier offered no comment 
on the complaint.98 The MFPC tabled the CAPBC’s claim to allow the commissioners time to review 
Spivey’s allegations. Their eventual response underscored the crux of the police accountability issue: 
plausible deniability and the abdication of institutional responsibility. Judge Swietlik questioned 
whether the CAPBC was in compliance with the freeholder’s clause in bringing their complaint.99 
Because the committee did not name a specific officer or note the complainant’s property owner 
status, the MFPC moved to submit the complaint before the City Attorney, who also represented 
the MPD. The commission evidently expressed no empathy for James Spivey. The CAPBC’s F. 
Marvin Hanna attended the MFPC’s March 4th meeting. When the commission entered its usual 
“red tape routine,”100 he stood up to voice an objection. On the identification of the officers 
involved, Hanna argued that the MPD refused to provide the names of the arresting patrolmen. The 
MFPC allowed the CAPBC more time to retrieve the officer names and then amend their complaint. 
 
96 James’ father and brother provided descriptions of his injuries. He was arrested with his brother. 
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In the meantime, the commission sent the existing complaint over to the City Attorney’s office. Not 
surprisingly, the City Attorney communicated at the next MFPC meeting that the CAPBC’s 
grievance did “not comply with provisions of law and is therefore not a valid complaint.”101 Hanna 
appeared at the City Attorney’s office to explain the circumstances. However, he did not bring an 
amended complaint; he could not do so. The police department had refused to provide him with the 
officers’ names because “juveniles were involved.”102 Still, he was able to retrieve their badge 
numbers. However, these were deemed insufficient. The Spivey complaint was formally dismissed at 
the next MFPC meeting for “not constituting a complaint within the law.”103 To say that 
Milwaukee’s existing police oversight system benefitted accused officers was an understatement.  
 That the Spivey family even came forward to register James’ complaint was a rare 
occurrence. Few police brutality victims brought complaints against the MPD out of fear of 
retaliation. Publicly reporting acts of police violence was dangerous. Doing so could lead to police 
harassment, intimidation, arrest and incarceration, or worse, violence. It brought stress and added to 
the existing traumas of navigating Milwaukee’s uneven racial landscape. At a Milwaukee Commission 
on Community Relations meeting, F. Marvin Hanna publicly stated that “his committee knew of 
several instances where complainants’ families were threatened with removal from welfare aid if the 
complaints were not dropped.”104 Many Black families did not trust white city officials to engage in 
fair investigations. The CAPBC understood this, attempting to position itself as a liaison between 
aggrieved Black residents and a powerful criminal justice system. However, this approach failed to 
improve accountability for Black residents, in no small part because of the Catch 22 described 
above. Public fears of registering complaints against the MPD meant that few police grievances 
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made their way into the public record. Without a formal record of racialized police violence, police 
bureaucrats saw little need for action. City officials, namely Chief Breier, the MFPC, and Mayor 
Maier, mistrusted the intentions of police accountability advocates. They refused to grant them the 
benefit of the doubt when they raised issues of police brutality because they posed a challenge to the 
city’s white racial order. 
 After the MFPC refused to honor the CAPBC’s affidavits in the Spivey case, the committee 
largely disappeared from public view. In May 1965, the CAPBC dropped “police brutality” from its 
name, rebranding as the “Committee for Better Police-Community Relations.”105 The name change 
marked a symbolic victory for Milwaukee police bureaucrats, who hoped to minimize the issue of 
police brutality. That phrase, B.S. Gregg admitted, seemed to hinder the committee’s ability to 
improve “police-community relations.”106 By mid-1965, the CAPBC had dissolved. Individual 
members continued to struggle for police accountability. Most notably, recently elected Wisconsin 
State Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee made ending racialized police violence and limiting the power of 
Milwaukee’s police chief central to his political agenda at the State Capitol in Madison over the 
course of the next decade. Most CAPBC members turned their attention to the intensifying civil 
rights issue of school integration, including Barbee and Marilyn Morheuser, co-chairs of Milwaukee 
United School Integration Committee (MUSIC). Calvin Sherard, the CAPBC’s most outspoken, 
radical voice, left Milwaukee for New York City.  
 Ultimately, the committee’s platform initiated a long-term process of unsettling Milwaukee’s 
policing status quo. The CAPBC was among the first organizations to challenge the city’s powerful 
narrative of policing exceptionalism. They were also the first to record the racially differential, often 
brutal treatment of Black citizens by the MPD. Rather than identify police violence as a significant 
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problem worth fixing, white police bureaucrats essentially cloaked themselves in the comfort of the 
MPD’s vaunted reputation for crime control efficiency and professionalism. They deflected 
responsibility after listening to clear-cut, often disturbing accounts of police brutality. Milwaukee’s 
police bureaucracy aimed to reinforce existing law enforcement structures, which clearly benefited a 
white majority. Chief Breier rejected the very premise of the CAPBC’s demands, denying the 
existence of police misconduct. Mayor Maier, meanwhile, praised the group’s willingness to work 
through formal channels, but claimed he had no power to enact law enforcement changes. He 
cautioned the CAPBC that rule-changes were, according to state law, the exclusive purview of the 
police chief. The all-white MFPC revealed its own skepticism of police brutality complaints, despite 
its position as a quasi-judicial civilian oversight body. 
 
Gaining Civil Rights Insurgency 
 The CAPBC was not alone in seeking to alleviate racial tensions on Milwaukee’s north side 
in the 1960s. A more moderate, Black-led coalition called the Human Relations Coordinating 
Council (HRCC) tried to pressure Chief Breier and the MPD into incorporating a community 
relations program in 1966. The council’s advocacy, like the CAPBC’s, revealed the limits of formal 
negotiation with the city’s white-controlled police bureaucracy. The council was a product of 
Milwaukee’s liberal establishment. It formed under the auspices of the Milwaukee Commission on 
Community Relations in August 1964 following the Harlem uprising. Eight separate organizations 
comprised the council, which identified “a need for increased consultation and exchange of views” 
among citizens concerned about human rights in the city.107 However, the HRCC reflected the same 
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anemic civil-rights agenda as Mayor Maier. It called for the improvement of “inter group relations,” 
“equal opportunity,” and “unity of purpose” across civic agencies without specific enforcement 
objectives.108 The HRCC operated at the behest of City Hall liberals, who only sought to tame 
individual “prejudices,” not address the institutional and economic racism that undermined Black 
homebuyers, workers, and students. The HRCC had little interest in documenting police brutality. It 
looked to hold the city’s police bureaucracy accountable in the interest of preventing civil unrest, 
advocating a modified return to the MPD’s liberal law-and-order approach. HRCC members 
expressed dismay when the CAPBC criticized the MPD. The group warned against “radicals” 
fomenting an uprising in Milwaukee. The council opposed the creation of a civilian review board 
and was hesitant to accuse the MPD of engaging in the excessive use of force against African 
Americans. Instead, they argued for an improved police image through “community relations” 
enhancements. The group did not demand justice for the growing number of Black citizens alleging 
police misconduct.  
 A key difference between the CAPBC and HRCC was that the latter shunned direct action in 
favor of political arbitration. Council members did not consider themselves “activists,” and opposed 
civil disobedience as a method for achieving racial equality. The HRCC was strictly reformist, its 
approach non-confrontational. The group called for meetings with police bureaucrats to discuss 
community relations improvements. Continued eruptions of civil violence in U.S. Cities and the 
possibility of unrest in Milwaukee informed the HRCC’s advocacy. As Rev. Louis Beauchamp, the 
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council’s chairman, wrote to Chief Breier in January 1966, “Our national experience makes it clear 
that inadequate communication produces distrust of law enforcement, especially on the part of those 
segments of the community which feel themselves aggrieved by alleged inequities in the 
administration of the law.”109 The policing status quo, according to Beauchamp, was unfeasible and 
unrest imminent if the MPD failed to institute community relations reforms immediately. The 
HRCC embraced emerging federal “police-community relations” guidelines, including the 
integration of police departments and establishment of distinct internal units ordered to address 
“problems of community tension.” The council lobbied for a voluntary police-community relations 
committee comprised of police, clergy, business, civic, education, and minority group 
representatives, and pushed for two pilot committees at the district level to mediate complaints. 
Members stressed close cooperation with police administrators in an effort to “achieve community 
understanding.” Their primary objective was for responsible community organizations to share 
public safety information, largely in service of racial pacification. Like the CAPBC, the HRCC called 
for an expanded human relations training program. They also followed the federal government’s 
lead in supporting continuing educational opportunities for police personnel. The council suggested 
the MPD apply for Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funding.  
 Nevertheless, the HRCC faced resistance from Chief Breier, particularly after its members 
called for the establishment of an internal police-community relations unit. Ostensibly because of its 
more moderate, hands-off approach, the chief was initially willing to meet with HRCC 
representatives. Five delegates met with Breier and the MFPC to discuss police-community relations 
issues in April 1966. The meeting, held in Judge Christ Seraphim’s courtroom, saw white police 
bureaucrats fixate on the HRCC’s claim that “many citizens who come into frequent contact with 
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the police” viewed law enforcement in “the same manner as minority groups are viewed…faceless, 
inhuman, and as scapegoats for many of the community’s problems.”110 Not surprisingly, Breier and 
the MFPC responded defensively to the implication that police could be viewed as little more than 
“faceless” agents. They questioned the council’s intentions and cast allegations of police isolation 
from the Black community as generalizing and inaccurate. Although the HRCC expressed empathy 
for the police, directly acknowledging the challenges officers faced, Breier and the MFPC insisted 
that the police department could not be held liable for the near north side’s ills. In June 1966, the 
chief rejected the HRCC’s proposal for a police-community relations program and refused to attend 
any future meetings with the council.111 State law afforded him that right. 
 
The Organization of Organizations 
 The Organization of Organizations took up Calvin Sherard’s mantle of Black working-class 
advocacy for police accountability in the mid-1960s, as intensifying police-Black citizen tensions and 
consistent civic inaction pushed Milwaukee towards civil violence. The group pressed police 
bureaucrats to establish a “citizens review board” to adjudicate brutality complaints. A review board 
would not only “give citizens the assurance that their complaints would be fairly heard,” but also 
“protect police officers if they properly enforce the law.”112 The umbrella organization’s chairman, 
John Franks, wrote Chief Breier directly. He stated that “officers of the law failed to fulfill their 
obligations to the community through acts of negligence.”113 The creation of independent police 
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oversight boards in cities like New York and Philadelphia influenced the Triple O’s proposal. “In 
our position,” Franks said, noting the effects of Milwaukee’s worsening racial apartheid, “we are 
often able to discover such cases whereas you may not be aware of them.” Franks criticized the 
MFPC’s failure to conduct even a single hearing on a police brutality complaint since it became 
empowered to do so in 1885. According to the Triple O, fire and police commissioners had not 
heard or acted on any citizen grievances since 1952.  
 Chief Breier responded as he did when the CAPBC first called out his department for police 
brutality in 1964. Milwaukee officers patrolling on the city’s near north side did “the same kind of 
job as anywhere else.” The chief was right; police regimes across the country aggressively defended 
their city’s racial boundaries and upheld white supremacy in comparatively poorer Black 
neighborhoods and mixed-race environs. It was a position supported by conservative elected 
officials, who made no effort to conceal their racist views when it came to matters of civil rights and 
policing. For instance, after learning about a specific case of police negligence outlined by the Triple 
O, a Democratic state senator from Milwaukee wrote to Chief Breier:  
I want you to know that I trust you and your department and that your men will not 
abuse their police powers. I also know that restraints must be used to the degree of 
resistance, and though an error may occur from time to time, it is beastly and jungle-
like to demand resignations. I am against the establishment of a Citizen Review 
Board, because if you have to make allowances to such a group, certainly you will 
have to make the same allowances to all nationalities and ethnic groups of which we 
have an abundance. Too bad you can’t sue for harassment of the police 
department.114 
 
 That June, Mayor Maier responded to the Triple O’s call to establish a citizen review board. 
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He insisted that the MFPC already served that function.115 In a WITI-TV interview, Maier said the 
commission was open to all citizens in need of a case review. But the MFPC first required proper 
documentation. Some Black residents said that the MFPC’s location, in the “intimidating 
atmosphere” of the Milwaukee Safety Building, dissuaded residents from coming forward with 
police brutality complaints.116 A Milwaukee Star reporter challenged the mayor’s contention and 
contacted the MFPC. Secretary George Ruger told them, only “freeholders” could file police 
complaints as required by Wisconsin law. That rule, according to Ruger, was meant to “show you’re 
a substantial citizen and not a fly by night who just came into town and is trying to cause trouble.”117 
The statute undermined the mayor’s argument that the complaint review process was democratic. As 
the Star editorialized, “This provision of the law clearly denies the right of complaint to the ghetto 
dwellers who need it most while giving it to the landholders who least likely to use it.”118 The 
MFPC’s responsibility was “not to serve as a review board…but to recruit, hire and promote the 
nearly 3,300 positions in the Milwaukee fire and police departments.” Should a hearing occur, 
accused officers faced the threat of punishment in the form of paid suspensions. If the MFPC 
administered a suspension of fifteen days or more, an officer was entitled to an appeal and trial in 
the Safety Building. The MPD conducted investigations into alleged police misconduct and, under 
Chief Breier, refused to disclose the results of “internal matters.” The Star reiterated that police 
heightened tensions through their actions: “An ignorant policeman with a gun on his side, a night 
 
115 Mayor Maier also defended the MFPC’s all-white composition, adding that he appointed several “labor men” to the 
board who were “grassroots citizens.” He implied a working-class background meant they understood issues facing the 
“core area.” 
116 As the Star wrote, “police are distrusted by slum dwellers as a symbol of oppression and unchecked brute power.” 
Police “frequently resort to force in a minor infraction of the law and claim ‘resistance to arrest’ as a handy catchall 
excuse…An urgent need exists for an independent bi-racial civilian review board to investigate and rule on charges of 
police abuses of power.” “Review Board Needed,” The Milwaukee Star, June 11, 1966, 4. 
117 “Mayor’s Claim of  Police Board Untrue,” The Milwaukee Courier, June 11, 1966, Part 1, 1. 
118 “Review Board Needed,” The Milwaukee Star, June 11, 1966, 4. The commission also approved applications for 
“private detective agencies and individual agents.” “Mayor’s Claim of  Police Board Untrue,” The Milwaukee Courier, June 
11, 1966, Part 1, 6. 
 224 
stick in his hand, and lacking restraint and discipline, is as dangerous a source of potential trouble in 
an area of racial conflict as cane imagined.”119  
 
Civil Rights Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies 
 Civil rights mobilizations, victories, and setbacks permeate the existing literature on Black 
Milwaukee. Histories document the African American community’s social, economic and political 
development, as well as the long civil rights movement that both professional Black citizens and the 
working poor engaged in from the 1940s through the 1970s. Confrontations between the MPD and 
residents of  color are interwoven throughout narratives of  Black proletarianization, migration, 
education reform, and open housing activism.120 Indeed, the fraught relationship between Black 
residents and law enforcement is an important thread connecting this burgeoning scholarship.121 
 A flurry of  Black-led civil rights campaigns between 1963 and 1968 captured news headlines 
in Milwaukee, as well as the attention of  a restive white public. Organizations like the Milwaukee 
Congress on Racial Equality (MCORE), MUSIC, and the YC reflected the 1960s turn away from 
accommodation and towards a more confrontational approach to securing racial justice. Late in 
summer 1963, MCORE organized sit-ins against a Milwaukee County Social Development 
Commissioner who made racist comments about Black migrants. MUSIC organized student 
boycotts in May 1964 and again in October 1965 in response to biased practices in the public school 
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system. That committee—led by the CAPBC’s Barbee and Morheuser—established “Freedom 
Schools” for protesting Black youth. Educators at the schools taught Black history, culture, and 
activism to Milwaukee youth for the first time. During the school boycotts, police officers visited 
Black ministers who made their churches available to African American students. The police told 
them not to cooperate with MUSIC, alleging its protests were organized by “communists” and 
“rabble rousers.” Such police intimidation proved successful, as some church leaders withdrew from 
the movement.122 MUSIC members also vied with police as they participated in human “chain-ins” 
to protest educational injustices and the “stunning practice” of  “intact busing.”123  
 In 1965, Milwaukee’s NAACP Youth Council demonstrated against Big Boy restaurant's 
racist hiring practices. And, in February and August of  1966, they rallied outside the Fraternal Order 
of  the Eagles Club in protest of  its exclusionary membership policy. The YC called out elected 
officials—nearly all of  who were Eagles members—and marched in front of  Milwaukee County 
Judge Robert Cannon’s Wauwatosa residence. In June 1967, the Youth Council turned its attention 
to housing discrimination. They marched again in Wauwatosa, this time against housing segregation. 
The 200 straight nights of  protest that the YC and advisor Father James Groppi led from August 
1967 to April 1968—described by local historians as the “March on Milwaukee”—induced violent 
white reactions and a mix of  police behavior that ranged from the dutiful allowance of  
demonstrators to engage in lawful protests to the infliction of  police brutality once marchers 
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crossed the 16th St. viaduct into the chaotic atmosphere of  Milwaukee’s all-white south side.124 
 As Milwaukee’s civil rights insurgency intensified, the MPD kept a watchful eye on Black 
freedom fighters and allies. The police occasionally used their discretion to strong-arm civil rights 
activists, who they characterized as a threat to public order and traditional white middle-class 
sensibilities. Civil rights demonstrations in Milwaukee, and across the country, targeted the 
willingness of  police to use force against Black men and women engaged in non-violent civil 
disobedience. They also called out the militarized police violence used against Black dissenters 
engaged in urban uprisings. On March 13, 1965, Milwaukee civil rights organizations staged a 
massive solidarity march in support of  Black and white activists marching in Selma, Alabama. State 
police brutalized members of  the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and other coalitions while attempting to cross 
the Edmund Pettis Bridge from Selma to Montgomery the previous week. Nearly 2,500 people 
marched from MCORE’s headquarters to the Milwaukee County Courthouse. National episodes of  
police violence and eruptions of  civil disorder also provided cause for local mobilizations.  
 The “Milwaukee March toward Freedom and Independence,” for instance, commemorated 
the second anniversary of  the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom.125 Held to 
dramatize local grievances around “the absence of  equality of  opportunity in housing, jobs, and 
schools,” the event doubled as a vehicle to communicate solidarity with Black men and women in 
Watts who recently experienced civil violence and conflict with Los Angeles police. Flyers created 
 
124 “Timeline,” March on Milwaukee Civil Rights History Project, accessed July 20, 2019, 
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125 The march took place on August 28, 1965. An umbrella committee representing more than 50 human rights, church, 
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like the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), rankled organizers, who wanted to keep the demonstration’s focus on racial 
inequality. SWP activists carried signs that protested U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and passed out handbills in 
support of a Black Milwaukee soldier, Pfc. Winstel Belton, who was engaged in a hunger strike abroad. Milwaukee 
March toward Freedom and Independence flyer, August 28, 1965, Box 1, Folder 5, Other Projects and Miscellany, 1964-
1966,” MUSIC Records, Milwaukee Mss 5, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives; “March toward Freedom and 
Independence Set Saturday,” The Milwaukee Star, August 28, 1965, 1, 4, 8. 
 227 
for the demonstration asked, “Do Northside Milwaukee police have the same contempt” as LAPD 
Chief  William Parker, whose racism “sifted down though his department?” A cartoon of  a white 
officer choking and striking a man on the head with a Billy club adorned the leaflet, which directly 
connected housing segregation to police violence: “How much is Milwaukee segregation costing 
YOU and ME?”126 Police brutality was an integral part of  urban America’s worsening racial 
apartheid. The interracial assemblage, estimated between 400 and 800 people, marched from N. 12th 
St. and Lloyd St. to MacArthur square. Protesters sang freedom songs and chanted civil rights 
slogans along the route. The St. Matthews C.M.E. Church drill team led the procession; comedian 
Dick Gregory and Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party delegate Fannie Lou Hamer addressed the 
crowd. “For you to be free, my Caucasian friends, I must be free,” the Mississippi native Hamer 
declared. In his speech, Gregory brought up the unrest in Los Angeles, “If  a child cried, you 
wouldn’t ask him why—you changed his wet diaper.” Police brutality need not entail physical force, 
he continued. A verbal insult was enough. “Police brutality is the way [an officer] talks to me and the 
way he handles me.” At the same time, Gregory observed that police were underpaid and had 
difficult jobs. That they took their resentment out on others was unacceptable. “If  the cop ever 
wakes up and realizes he’s in the same boat, he’ll march with me,” Gregory proclaimed in a gesture 
of  solidarity. “The brick is not the answer…It’s not a problem of  Black against white, it’s a problem 
of  right against wrong.”127 
  During the 1965 rally, a Milwaukee Star reporter asked the CAPBC’s Calvin Sherard for his 
opinion on the Watts uprising. It was not long before he left the city. Sherard stressed paying more 
attention to the fire than to the manmade tinderbox that fueled the blaze. “This is like being more 
critical of  an explosion and the noise produced by the explosion than of  the fuse lighter, the 
 
126 The leaflet also stated: “Don’t talk it. DO IT! MARCH Fight POLICE BRUTALITY and EVERYTHING ELSE…” 
127 “Hundred in Orderly Rights Rally,” Milwaukee Journal, August 29, 1965, Part 1, 1, 20. 
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instigator of  the explosion.” Riot prevention, for Sherard, meant addressing “unjust systems” of  
political racism and economy: “There must be a complete eradication of  the ingredients that are 
compounded to bring about such rioting…police brutality, job discrimination, and the double 
standard that is exercised in many of  the courtrooms around the country.” The chronic abuse of  
“people’s minds and bodies” over time had translated into heightened disrespect for “manmade 
laws.” Rioting was to be expected, “the law of  nature is greater.” As he continued, “The mind and 
body can only take so much…the only provocation the system has in carrying out these injustices 
are class and color of  skin.” Lawlessness was not the sole preserve of  repressed Black citizens, but 
also “penetrated our law enforcement agencies,” subjecting African Americans to police violence. It 
was the police who “served as a nucleus to disorder.”128 
 White counter-protestors, representing a group called the Los Angeles Memorial Committee 
(LAMC), met civil rights demonstrators on the steps of  Milwaukee County Courthouse the day of  
the Milwaukee March toward Freedom and Independence. Picketers, like insurance salesman 
Bernard White, were eager “to protest the riots and anarchy that seemed to have gripped the 
nation.” The LAMC’s signs implied that civil rights protests were unpatriotic. Like the police, they 
blamed communism. “Is This Another Communist Controlled Demonstration?” one read.129 This 
white citizens group aligned with others mobilizing in counter-protests of  Black charges of  police 
brutality and discrimination. The Committee on Police Support (COPS), for instance, offered the 
most forthright defense of  Chief  Breier and Milwaukee police. COPS vigorously denied that police 
brutality existed, calling Black allegations of  police abuse on the near north side “fraudulent” and 
“sloganeering.”130 Foreshadowing the white calls of  “reverse racism” to come in the aftermath of  
 
128 “NALC Critical of Riot Critics,” The Milwaukee Star, August 28, 1965, 3. 
129 “Hundred in Orderly Rights Rally,” Milwaukee Journal, August 29, 1965, Part 1, 1, 20. 
130 Chadbourne H. Williams to Assemblyman Frederick P. Kessler, “May 30, 1965,” Box 11, Folder 16, “1965-66 
Committee on Police Support,” Frederick P. Kessler Papers, 1958-1992. Milwaukee Mss 211, University of Wisconsin-
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Affirmative Action, the committee insisted that it was Black citizens, not the police, who were the 
true agents of  harassment. “Decent citizens everywhere,” i.e. white, were to “honor” the police 
“who protect us,” the group claimed. There were other organizations present in the city taking 
public stands against the civil rights movement. Former Milwaukee Mayor Frank Zeidler reported a 
large number of John Birch Society members in the city. Society co-founder, William J. Grede, of 
Milwaukee’s Allen-Bradley Company, contributed heavily to the organization. Three Wisconsin 
legislators were Birchers and three of the society’s executive board members lived in Milwaukee 
County.131 Another prominent right wing group was called Truth About Civil Turmoil. Anti-
Communist downtown business organizations screened the film “Anarchy, USA.” 
 In May 1967, retiring District Five Captain George Sprague said he did not believe any 
“riots” would occur in Milwaukee. He decried the “willingness” of  “minority groups” to “follow the 
so-called leaders…into any tension situation” in a speech delivered before a COPS-sponsored event 
at the Wisconsin Athletic Club.132 Captain Sprague—a known John Birch Society member—blamed 
the press for inflaming racial tensions and not supporting the city’s police force. From Sprague’s 
perspective, news outlets like The Milwaukee Journal were the real “harassers.” Sprague rejected the 
possibility of  “police harassment” against African Americans. Other speakers at the dinner, like 
former FBI agent and then Salt Lake City Police Chief  W. Cleon Skousen, traded anti-communist 
conspiracy theories. “Communists,” Skousen suggested, “have made more progress in our country 
in the last 20 months than they had in the last 20 years.” It was “Communists” who “fomented and 
exploited unrest,” he claimed; they would make 1967 a year “America will never forget.”133 Skousen 
and Sprague’s comments reflected widespread feelings among white police administrators that social 
 
131 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-
August 6, 1967,” 3, Folder, 001346-024-0871, Civil Rights during the Johnson Administration, 1963-1969, Part V, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas. 
132 COPS honored the 25-year MPD veteran with its “Outstanding Local Policeman Award.” 
133 Indeed, 1967 provided an unforgettable summer of unrest, however not due to Communist plots to undermine law-
and-order. “Police Captain Doubts Riots This Summer,” Milwaukee Sentinel, May 12, 1967, Part 1, 5. 
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fragmentation, moral decay, and misguided liberal policies and court decisions were “crippling police 
officers in their work and destroying police morale.” The men cited recent Supreme Court decisions 
and called liberal police review boards conspiratorial inventions designed to undermine police and 
reduce their effectiveness. Riots in Watts, Los Angeles were communist-inspired and plotted, 
victimizing “the good people” with “tragedy, despair, and violence.” Meanwhile, in Sprague’s view, 
America’s prison populations were [regrettably] diminishing “almost as fast as the crime rate was 
going up.”134 Because of  Chief  Breier and the MPD’s reactionary law-and-order approach, there was 
not “any large degree of  tensions” in Milwaukee. 
 Other conservative organizations backed the police in this racially charged climate, 
denouncing the legitimacy of  Black civil rights activism along the way. The Milwaukee Citizens’ 
Crime Committee (MCCC) organized “to promote safety from crime on city streets” and support 
“the present conduct of  police” and the “firm manner in which it handles arrests of  criminals and 
hoodlums.”135 Their formation was a direct counterpoint to the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality 
Committee. The MCCC explicitly denied that the “mistreatment of  Negroes by police” existed, 
calling the CAPBC’s allegations “false and shameful.” The MCCC, a sub-committee of  the racially 
conservative Citizens’ Association of  Wisconsin, Inc., opposed a state open housing law and efforts 
to integrate Wisconsin public schools.136 The conservative body held its first meeting in January 
1965, where six “directors” outlined a seven-point platform. The group endorsed the police 
department’s “conduct and performance;” it affirmed its support of  the rank-and-file “as friends 
and neighbors,” encouraging “good citizens” to “be friendly, courteous and cooperative” to MPD 
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personnel; it denied the existence of  police brutality, citing “individual misconduct” to be 
investigated by the Chief  of  Police, and not “any civilian review board;” it “censured” and 
“condemned” the CAPBC’s likening of  the MPD to a “Gestapo” police force at a District Five 
protest; it demanded greater police protection in “high crime,” (i.e. Black) neighborhoods, including 
“firmer control of  demonstrators who many times block pedestrian and vehicles’ traffic and cause 
loud disturbances;” it favored laws that compelled persons 16-years-of-age or older to “be tried in 
criminal court for violent crimes;” and it said it would hold “citizens’ meetings to combat crime.”137  
 Although the MCCC maintained that its actions were “not pinpointed towards negroes” or 
“motivated by any racial considerations,” the committee’s chairman stated that it met because of  a 
news report that three Black youths had beaten a white youth on a city bus traveling down 3rd St.138 
Clearly the all-white MCCC saw Milwaukee’s crime problem through a racial lens and believed that 
white residents were the victims. In its view, local political leaders were also guilty of  “condoning 
and fostering lawlessness.” At a March 1965 meeting called “to protest violence on Milwaukee’s 
streets,” one MCCC member asked a sympathetic alderman, “How can we get Police Chief  Breier to 
use police dogs.” The group demanded more officers, more street lighting, and an end to the news 
media’s “belittling” of  the MPD. Black youth crime was the main point of  discussion at the meeting, 
which drew roughly 300 attendees. Some of  the committee’s members were more vocal in their 
retributive law-and-order rhetoric than others. State Senator Norman Sussman, an elected official, 
called for revising of  the children’s code so that 16 and 17-year-old minors would be criminally 
prosecuted. The Milwaukee Democrat called for “no more hanky-panky, no more kissing ‘em, no 
more loving ‘em; they must go into criminal court.”139  
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 Five days before the CAPBC met with the MFPC in January 1965, William Coates and 
Michael Thomas learned their police brutality case would be heard in the U.S. District Court of the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin. The federal bench had reversed a decision made by the City Attorney 
to dismiss all charges on jurisdictional grounds. The Coates and Thomas families officially alleged 
that officers Young and Hessel had violated the teens’ “right not to be deprived of their lives, 
liberties, and property, without due process of law.”140 Despite their vivid descriptions of police 
heavy-handedness, a liberal judge, former Wisconsin Governor John Reynolds, dismissed Coates 
and Thomas’ complaint “on the merits” in April 1968. He cited a lack of direct evidence that police 
brutality occurred. In the end, it was the word of two Black youths against two white police officers. 
The latter’s standing as agents of the state afforded them the benefit of the doubt in court.141 
 Collectively, Milwaukee’s white police bureaucracy, elected officials, and citizen-led 
organizations denied the legitimacy of Black grievances against the MPD’s racially disparate 
treatment. Pointing to the city’s comparatively low crime rate and the department’s vaunted national 
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status, they saw little reason to second-guess what was, in their view, an exceptional law enforcement 
agency. Hardening residential segregation exacerbated white perspectives around race, crime, and 
public safety, as fewer-and-fewer white residents bore witness to the differential policing that the 
CAPBC and other accountability advocates highlighted. While some white observers acknowledged 
that overzealous policing occurred on Milwaukee’s near north side, most characterized it as a 
necessary response to presumed criminality. The mainstream press supported this vantage point, 
often emphasizing the racial dimensions of urban crime and, in turn, reinforcing racist perceptions 
of Black life and culture. 
 While long-standing civil rights organizations, like the MUL and MNAACP, saw improving 
police-Black community relations as essential to building a more equitable society, the CAPBC was 
the first grassroots organization concerned about policing in Black Milwaukee to explicitly build on 
the “institutional and organizational frameworks” of 1960s civil rights insurgents. The committee 
challenged police bureaucrats to reimagine how Black near north side residents experienced the law, 
advocating a bolder reform agenda that took on the city’s dual law enforcement system.142 While the 
CAPBC’s charges of police brutality and warnings of civil unrest, fatefully, did not convince 
Milwaukee’s all-white police bureaucracy to act in a substantive fashion, they nonetheless pushed the 
struggle for police accountability forward. Significantly, the CPABC’s activism showed that racially 
disparate policing was not simply the byproduct of bureaucratic intransigence, but it also reflected 
City Hall’s lack of institutional and legal control over the MPD, its rules and governing practices. 
 Indeed, the CAPBC launched what would become a decades-long, multi-organizational 
process of exposing and documenting police abuse against African Americans in service of garnering 
accountability. Although its negotiations failed to produce meaningful change, the committee 
proved influential in the city’s Black freedom movement. For example, before civil violence erupted 
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in Milwaukee on July 30, 1967, the Triple O worked with the Catholic Archdiocese’s Council on 
Urban Life and the Milwaukee Community Relations-Social Development Commission to 
coordinate public hearings meant to record alleged cases of racialized police brutality. The Triple O 
was an umbrella coalition of civil and human right organizations working to end poverty and build 
economic power in Black Milwaukee.143 The documentation process added to the growing narrative 
that policing looked different across the city’s color line. These hearings also dredged up pain and 
discomfort for Black citizens who had arrived in search of economic opportunity and freedom from 
Jim Crow. Targeted order maintenance policing helped belie much of the promise of northward 
migration and revealed that Black people’s subordinate status as citizens was a national problem. 
 The CAPBC also encouraged Milwaukee police bureaucrats to take a public stance on Black 
allegations of police abuse. It forced city leaders to, at the very least, consider what a rising number 
of north side residents viewed as an unfair law enforcement system. White civic leaders—whether 
they chose to admit it or not—stood at a crossroads over how they would enforce police power 
across an increasingly multiracial, yet segregated and unequal metropolitan landscape. Would they 
continue to support (or accept) police practices that generated disparate rates of Black surveillance, 
brutality, and arrests? Or, would they reconstitute police authority in humane ways that accounted 
for Milwaukee’s rapidly changing social and economic demographics and the civil rights revolution? 
The CAPBC’s interactions with Chief Breier, Mayor Maier, and the MFPC provide insight into how 
white city officials understood matters of race, policing, and violence. Their limited interactions with 
the CAPBC made plain that institutional tactics of denial, deflection, blame, and criminalization 
would endure until civil violence forced new modes of action. 
 Although short-lived, the CAPBC’s drive to garner a more responsive and just policing 
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system for Black residents deserves more attention in Milwaukee’s civil rights historiography. While 
the committee perhaps placed too much faith in negotiation, it nonetheless played an influential role 
in moving the struggle for accountability forward. The CAPBC articulated a multi-pronged strategy 
for police reform that shaped future efforts to transform Milwaukee’s uneven criminal justice 
terrain. As the committee’s seven-point program enumerated, police bias was a constituent element 
in the wider nexus of racial injustice that Black professional leaders, poor and working-class activists, 
and everyday citizens confronted in the “late migration era.” Yet the struggle for police 
accountability still holds a tertiary or quaternary place in the literature as compared to struggles for 
employment and marketplace access, education desegregation, or open housing. The truth is, law 
enforcement was ever-present and contoured all of these campaigns. White city officials tasked the 
MPD with defending public order, safeguarding life and property against what most white 
constituents saw as the lawless actions of civil rights agitators. As such, white police brass and rank-
and-file officers positioned Black citizens demonstrating against racial injustice as radicals willing to 
flout the law for their own disruptive, self-serving ends. 
 African Americans fed up with Milwaukee’s dual law enforcement system worked to expose 
the MPD’s racist narrative of policing exceptionalism. In doing so, they exhibited a range of 
overlapping ideological and class positions, as well as competing strategies to effect change within 
the public safety arena. The CAPBC, in particular, featured both racial liberals convinced that civic 
negotiation was the best means of generating reform and more assertive working-class activists 
willing to apply direct pressure in the streets. How police accountability advocates responded to an 
abusive police power correlated with the militancy of their respective political vantage points and the 
level of attention they received from the city’s antagonistic, all-white police bureaucracy. For 
instance, the NAACP Youth Council and their advisor, Father James Groppi, experienced regular 
police harassment, brutality, and arrests as a consequence of direct action protests and a 
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comparatively militant racial and class politics. The YC’s radicalism shaped its clear denunciations of 
the MPD as an occupying force that was more concerned with countering civil rights demonstrators 
than protecting all citizens equally. Conversely, more reformist, middle-class coalitions, such as the 
HRCC, deferred to Milwaukee’s white power structure. They eschewed civil disobedience as a 
tactical approach to advancing equality and exhibited a greater unwillingness to lose white patronage, 
despite their growing preoccupation with differential policing. 
 As Milwaukee’s civil rights movement intensified in the mid-1960s, so too did police 
surveillance, harassment, brutality, and arrests. Much of it was directed against Black civil rights 
activists. Preserving law and order remained imperative for the city’s white power structure during 
this combustive period. Chief Breier’s increasingly reactionary brand of law-and-order served as an 
effective instrument in countering civil rights insurgents. And, as the counter-organizing of white 
racial conservatives demonstrated, reactionary law-and-order also served as a potent tool for rallying 
the city’s white ethnic majority. Concurrently, Black civil rights activists and residents increasingly 
viewed the MPD as the most visible symbol of white control. This perspective was grounded in a 
deeper history of racial and class conflict, often mediated by law enforcement. Black migrants and 
more established African Americans alike experienced intensifying police mistreatment and neglect 
over the course of the 1960s, in part as a consequence of cyclical patterns of migration, segregation, 
criminalization, and the MPD’s strategic over-saturation of Black spaces. 
 In the end, Black and allied police accountability advocates failed to impress upon 
Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy the urgency of their demands for change in the mid-1960s. After 
years of City Hall ignoring Black complaints of police brutality and calls for more diverse police 
representation, input, and oversight, the city experienced its own version of civil unrest in late 
Summer 1967. Violent racial confrontations among white counter-protestors and an interracial 
cohort of open housing demonstrators followed that consequential event. Discussed in greater detail 
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in the next chapter, the eruption of civil violence in Milwaukee at a politically charged moment of 
civil rights insurgency had the net effect of reauthorizing Chief Breier’s power and legitimizing the 
MPD’s reactionary law-and-order turn. The narrative of policing exceptionalism was maintained 
locally, as Breier and Mayor Maier consolidated white support in the aftermath of unrest. They 
utilized the political capital they gained in suppressing Black dissent to steer the direction of police 
accountability activism away from transformative policy outcomes, which might have generated 
“community control” for Black residents, as some activists began demanding in the late 1960s. At 
the same time, white police bureaucrats gave the impression of progressive police reform when they 
applied for and received federal law enforcement assistance grants intended to improve police-Black 
community relations and minority hiring. Ironically, Breier resisted these efforts to better coordinate 
and centralize police power. He believed they, too, threatened his institutional control. By the close 
of the decade, Milwaukee’s corrosive racial politics persisted, rendering the enactment of even 




Reactionary Law-and-Order in Milwaukee 
 Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism was rooted in an assumption—that the 
police department’s (MPD) independence from City Hall facilitated a high degree of 
professionalism, reform innovation, and crime control efficiency. Whether that assumption bore 
out, however, was contingent on the personality, leadership style, and strategic agenda of the person 
in charge. Historically, the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission had (MFPC) appointed either 
disciplinarian, headstrong police chiefs, like John Janssen, or more ostensibly forward-thinking, 
liberal administrators eager to maintain public order through artful projections of police power as a 
force for democracy, such as Joseph Kluchesky. All five police chiefs hired from 1888 to 1964 
existed somewhere along that spectrum, which leaned just left of center to far-right ideologically. All 
of them were police officials who understood their role of preserving Milwaukee’s traditional 
capitalist, white cultural order. As a body, the MPD reflected the character of its head from the top-
down; they alone diagramed, managed, and executed the city’s law enforcement hierarchy and 
mission. They did so free of political interference, as provided for by state law. Striking workers, 
wayward youth, and poor people, especially of color, remained vulnerable to violent police abuses of 
power and aggressive order maintenance practices. These occurred despite the MPD’s exemplary 
reputation. Still, most residents seemed to favor the end result of the police chief’s sovereign vision, 
which for decades produced one of the lowest reported crime rates in the U.S. and a reform 
orientation that was the envy of outside police agencies.   
 Intensive postwar Black population growth and the white racism it unleashed across all 
segments of society shifted the above dynamic.1 It pierced a widening hole in an already precarious 
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exceptionalism narrative that, for better or worse, relied heavily on the police chief’s inviolable 
administrative discretion. Mounting Black community demands for fair police treatment, equitable 
representation, and meaningful accountability complicated prevailing assumptions about a value-
neutral police power, as well as the utility of the MPD’s widely admired reform approach. African 
Americans—young and old, bourgeois and poor—not only revealed dual standards of justice that 
tracked lines of race and class, but, after the 1958 police murder of Black migrant Daniel Bell, began 
challenging police oppression through ever more confrontational modes of civil rights activism. 
Black accountability advocates, in their diminished efforts to negotiate an end to police brutality on 
Milwaukee’s segregated north side, learned that the MFPC did far more than stabilize police 
recruitment and arbitrate personnel disputes. It acted as a regulatory firewall that shielded the police 
chief from criticism and an honest hearing of citizen complaints against the MPD, while maintaining 
a virtually all-white police force. In the mid-1960s, the commission defended Harold Breier—an 
autocrat and avowed racist firmly situated on the John Janssen side of the local police chief 
spectrum. Following Breier’s lead, white police bureaucrats denied the potential for the civil violence 
then spreading across urban America, with a strong belief in the exceptionalism narrative Breier 
inherited. Yet, the new chief showed no desire to uphold a historically liberal law-and-order record 
that, while nominally democratic, served to obscure racism’s growing centrality to police power and 
public perceptions of the MPD’s validity. 
 This chapter argues that Black Milwaukee’s deepening crisis of police legitimacy in the late 
1960s was tied to how Chief Breier approached police administration. Breier served from 1964 to 
1984, the longest tenure for an MPD chief since John Janssen (1888-1921). His imperious 
leadership, shored up by the state-sanctioned authority outlined in the Progressive Era statute 
(1911), was the clearest reason why police accountability remained so elusive for African Americans 
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and other minoritized groups unduly victimized by police violence. During a period of momentous 
national progress on civil rights, the MPD endured as an antagonistic, oppressive force for citizens 
of color relegated to the margins. The frustrations of Black Milwaukee residents, even after 
Congress’ passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, reflected the limited scope of federal civil rights 
gains and liberal anti-poverty programming, which never went so far as to guarantee the economic 
justice needed to instill full equality. As historians have demonstrated, the liberal Johnson 
administration’s anti-poverty agenda was rooted in the same racist ideas about Black life and culture 
that undergirded the MPD’s liberal law-and-order agenda and “cultural adjustment” programs in the 
1940s and Cold War 1950s. Despite briefly empowering community action agencies with resources 
and decision-making power—a highly contested process politically—eruptions of civil violence in 
the 1960s elevated public fears.2 The uprisings shifted the federal state’s urban agenda towards 
punitive policies of racial suppression, and away from alleviating the structural causes of Black 
dissent and issues like police brutality. Liberal and conservative political voices alike, local and 
national, conflated peaceful mobilizations for justice, urban rebellions, and everyday street crime as 
disorderly behavior, particularly Milwaukee’s latest police chief. This perspective held implications 
for Milwaukee in Summer 1967 when Black leaders’ prophetic vision of civil violence came true. 
North side unrest, aggressively put down by the MPD, led to the city’s white power structure 
reckoning with “police-community relations” enhancements as a means of ensuring order. The 
question was, to what extent, given the state-sanctioned authority of the police chief? Moreover, 
how much progress could Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability make given the 
limitations of state law? 
 Sensing his profession and Milwaukee’s white cultural order was under attack from radical 
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civil rights “agitators” and racial liberals in the 1960s, Breier eschewed government-backed efforts 
that seemed poised to disrupt Milwaukee’s law enforcement status quo. Rather than embrace federal 
liberal law-and-order reforms aimed at enhancing procedural justice within the criminal-legal system, 
Breier doubled down on reactionary law-and-order policing. In turn, he ignored guidelines proposed 
by the Johnson administration that encouraged municipal police departments to establish 
“community relations units,” install police review boards, and expand racial diversity in their ranks. 
The chief declined to support federal grant applications that often served preventative policing 
goals. He argued that the MPD already had a community relations plan that worked well for citizens, 
African Americans included. When civil rights groups and federal agencies pressed Breier to resolve 
his department’s discriminatory practices, he leveraged the state-sanctioned authority afforded him 
by the 1911 statute. The chief successfully scorned outside political interference well into the 1970s. 
Breier was supported in doing so by Milwaukee’s political establishment, which recognized his 
immense sway over a mostly white constituency that generally subscribed to the era’s backlash 
politics. He exceptionalized Black-led civil rights organizations like the Milwaukee NAACP Youth 
Council (YC), Organization of Organizations (Triple O), and the city’s Black Panther Party chapter 
(MBPP). Breier framed them as “communists” in need of aggressive policing, vigilant monitoring, 
and, from time-to-time, a heavy hand. His legal impunity was a necessary pre-condition for curbing 
left-wing political upheaval. The 1911 statute continued to reinforce the MPD’s legitimacy with “law 
abiding” Milwaukeeans during Breier’s tenure, while guaranteeing that elected officials hesitated to 
defy their city’s popular police chief.  
 Since Milwaukee maintained a comparatively low crime rate, its national reputation for a 
high level of public safety remained intact. Still, federal officials and other external observers took 
notice of the overt racism that came to typify a police force once heralded for its strong 
relationships to policed communities. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
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(NACCD), which argued that white racism and a lack of resources, jobs, and equitable schooling in 
segregated Black communities fueled America’s urban rebellions, sent a research field team to 
investigate conditions in the city.3 For the first time, a federally-commissioned agency sought out, 
listened to, and trusted local Black perspectives on what racial liberals saw as a dual policing system 
organized around privileging and protecting white interests. Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order 
ethos was notable in the aftermath of the city’s 1967 “civil disturbance.” The relatively small uprising 
followed more than a decade of police-aggravated tensions between city officials and Black young 
people, racialized “close surveillance” policies, and mounting brutality on Milwaukee’s north side. 
Although Mayor Henry Maier and Breier emerged from the conflict as victors for their assertive 
response, some local officials began to take Black demands for police accountability more seriously. 
Recent appointees to the MFPC, including its first African American member, and liberal voices on 
the Common Council and in the Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations favored 
advancing select procedural reforms. These included making it easier for non-property owners to file 
civilian complaints against the MPD, hiring a new “community relations specialist” to rebuild trust, 
and emphasizing minority police recruitment. Still, the Mayor continued to go slow on civil rights. 
His post-civil disturbance plan offered hollow pronouncements with little teeth. White constituents 
made-up an overwhelming majority of  Maier’s political base, informing this political calculus. When 
asked to explain why he did not oppose Breier’s reactionary response to civil unrest, such as 
outfitting a new Tactical Squad to repress civil rights activists, the mayor pointed to the 1911 statute 
that upheld the police chief ’s authority. 
 Once valorized by the U.S Justice Department for its liberal “reform era” innovations, 
 
3 These researchers reported what they learned from Milwaukee activists, organizational leaders, police personnel, elected 
officials, and others into summaries and policy recommendations that helped flesh out the Johnson administration’s 
most comprehensive report to date on the nation’s urban crisis. For a historical account of  the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders, see: Steven M. Gillon, Separate and Unequal: The Kerner Commission and the Unraveling of  
American Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 2018). 
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NAACD field team interviews showed that the MPD was perceived by Black-led organizations, 
community leaders, and civil rights groups as a highly regressive police department. This was, in 
part, reflected in the work of  police accountability activists. Organizations like the Ad-Hoc 
Committee on Police Administration (AHCPA) and Catholic Archdiocese’s Council on Urban Life 
(CUL), for example, elevated issues of  police reform in the local civil rights movement. They spotlit 
critiques of  Milwaukee’s discriminatory police function, detailed biased law enforcement practices, 
and explained why the MPD remained so isolated from the city’s heavily policed communities of  
color. The AHCPA and CUL hoped to bring Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy more firmly into the 
ambit of  the federal government’s police reform program. Washington D.C. was investing millions 
of  dollars into a massive project of  police modernization, coordination, and civil rights compliance. 
The War on Crime, ironically, laid the foundations for a punitive carceral state that, over time, 
wreaked havoc on African Americans in Milwaukee. The priority for the Johnson administration and 
U.S. Justice Department in the late 1960s was taming dissent, restoring order, and controlling crime. 
Conversely, police accountability advocates on the ground in Milwaukee wanted to secure procedural 
justice for Black and Latinx residents vulnerable to police mistreatment. Neither federal agencies or 
local accountability activists paid enough attention to police discretion and the capacity of  officers 
to inflict unchecked violence. 
 
1967 Civil Disturbance 
 On Saturday, July 29, 1967, National Urban League Director Whitney M. Young, Jr. warned 
readers in a syndicated column that “the reason for riots is not mysterious. It is obvious to anyone 
with eyes to see with and ears to hear with. But too many civic leaders act blind and deaf when it 
comes to the Negro’s just grievances. They say ‘it can’t happen here’ and when it does, they blame it 
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on outside agitators.”4 Less than twenty-four hours after Young’s piece ran in The Milwaukee Star, the 
nation’s “long hot summer” came home to Milwaukee. A multi-day outbreak of civil violence, 
mostly involving white police and Black young people, touched off on the city’s north side on the 
morning of July 30, 1967. The embers of Detroit’s uprising had only begun to cool when the 
sparking incident, a late-night skirmish between two young Black women outside a Milwaukee 
CORE-sponsored dance, turned into a larger disturbance involving police and several hundred 
spectators. Frustrated Black youth eventually converged with officers. Some bombarded baton-
wielding police with debris.5 Police ordered folks to disperse. While walking home, some people 
broke glass storefront windows. The collective anger of Black young people reflected years of 
building tension and resentment towards the MPD. Patrolmen and special unit reinforcements 
arrived, adorned in riot gear and armed with shotguns. They were prepared to quell the escalating 
disorder by force. The MPD’s militaristic bearing, and later that of the Wisconsin National Guard, 
intensified a small uprising that fanned out across Black Milwaukee’s core business district.6 Police 
funneled a raucous crowd down N. 3rd St., seeking to contain and control the mass of people before 
they reached downtown. Physical articulations of Black dissent and forceful police reaction lasted 
well into the morning, then repeated the following evening as rumors of police brutality swirled. 
More violence transpired—shooting, looting, and burning—sporadically throughout the week. The 
violence included the police killing of an 18-year-old college student, Clifford McKissick. The MPD 
argued McKissick was suspected of firebombing a paint store.7 According to Father James Groppi, 
however, the innocent McKissick was “killed unnecessarily and irresponsibly,” just outside of his 
 
4 Whitney M. Young, Jr., “To Be Equal,” The Milwaukee Star, July 29, 1967, 4. 
5 Karl H. Flaming, Who 'Riots' and Why? Black and White Perspectives in Milwaukee (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Urban League, 
1968), 8-10. 
6 Mayor Henry Maier had quietly prepared for “rioting” since the previous year. 
7 McKissick was shot and killed by police at approximately 10:00pm on August 2, 1967. “Flash Point,” The Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel, July 30, 2007, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/32420114.html; “Bitter 
Crowd, 500 Strong[,] Attends McKissick Funeral,” The Milwaukee Star, August 12, 1967. 
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own home. 
 In the end, Milwaukee’s civil disturbance did not meet the federal government’s criteria for a 
“riot,” according to investigators, “at least in the sense that Detroit and Newark were riots.”8 
Nevertheless, it generated four deaths, over one hundred injuries, 1,450 arrests, two destroyed 
buildings, and more than $570,000 in unrecoverable losses.9 Localized property damage included a 
few overturned cars, one a police vehicle.10 Law enforcement intensified the clash, according to 
many African Americans, by reacting “out of misinformation or panic…much more strongly than 
the situation warranted.”11 The show of police force was strong, as 750 MPD officers, 250 state 
troopers, and 950 Wisconsin National Guardsman had closed off an 840-square-block area of the 
primarily Black north side by Monday morning.12 Most “riot” participants were reportedly young 
Black men. A majority of  the damage was window and plate glass breakage, with some minor fires. 
Looting was minimal.13 Only one “sniper” was confirmed and apprehended, despite police-reported 
gunfire. Most bullets emanated from police weapons. Racist media depictions of  wanton shooting, 
looting, and burning at the hands of  “roving gangs of  Negros” gave the impression of  a more 
serious conflict.14 Frenzied news stories fueled pathologizing narratives that blamed Black youth 
 
8 Bernard Dobranski, 1, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967,” 
Folder, 001346-025-0001, Civil Rights during the Johnson Administration, 1963-1969, Part V, Lyndon Baines Johnson 
Presidential Library, Austin, Texas. Milwaukee’s uprising was relatively tame. In Detroit, for example, 43 people died, 
police arrested 17,000, and tens of thousands of buildings were destroyed. Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore and Thomas J. 
Sugrue, These United States: A Nation in the Making, 1890 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2015), 438. 
9 Historians Thomas Sugrue and Kevin Mumford make important connections between the civil violence that erupted in 
Newark and Detroit, respectively, and how racial inequality was exacerbated by the larger economic and political shifts 
taking place in metropolitan America after World War II. Kevin Mumford, Newark: A History of Race, Rights, and Riots in 
America (New York: NYU Press, 2007); Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis. The most thorough historical account of 
Milwaukee’s 1967 uprising is featured in Patrick Jones’ history of the city’s civil rights movement. Patrick D. Jones, The 
Selma of the North: Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
10 Ashley M. Howard, “Milwaukee Revisited,” The Black Scholar, August 17, 2016, Accessed June 20, 2020, 
https://www.theblackscholar.org/milwaukee-revisited-ashley-m-howard/. 
11 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-
August 6, 1967,” 85, Folder, 001346-024-0871, Civil Rights during the Johnson Administration, 1963-1969, Part V, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas. 
12 Howard, “Milwaukee Revisited.” 
13 An early morning rainstorm that occurred on July 31st helped ease the night’s unrest. 
14 The NACCD deemed the looting and fire damage minimal and found most of the property destruction to be 
“window and plate glass damage.” Twelve police officers were injured, one killed. Most arrests were curfew violations 
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criminality ahead of  poor living conditions and differential policing. Such portrayals minimized the 
severity of  longstanding Black grievances with police and the political potency of  Black youth 
resistance to police mistreatment. Milwaukee’s uprising, on the whole, was “a metaphor for the lack 
of  connection” that poor and working-class Black citizens felt towards failed urban policies, more 
specially liberalism’s failure to address either systemic inequality or day-to-day racial indignities.15  
 Whether characterized as a “riot,” “uprising,” or “rebellion,” Milwaukee’s “civil disturbance,” 
as city officials named it, reflected America’s ongoing policing crisis in the 1960s.16 It conveyed 
accumulating Black frustrations with white racism and questions about the legitimacy of  police 
power. And it showed how far the country still had to go in terms of  realizing its commitment to 
democracy. Although police directly enflamed racial tensions, Chief  Breier described the event as “a 
case of  plain lawlessness.”17 Sapping the comparatively small uprising of  any political legitimacy 
ensured that it would not “rise to the level of  formal politics.”18 Breier shielded the police 
department and his forceful response from outside criticism. Alternatively, bodies like the Milwaukee 
Commission on Community Relations (MCCR), the Milwaukee Urban League (MUL), and the 
 
within police cordoned near north side. Father Groppi and nine Milwaukee NAACP Youth Council members were 
arrested on July 31, 1967. The city’s estimate of unrecoverable losses included property not covered by insurance and 
extra police, fire and National Guard expenses. Frank Aukofer, “A Night of Riot—and Afterward—in Milwaukee,” The 
Milwaukee Journal, August 11, 1967, Part 2, 1, 11; Jones, The Selma of the North, 148; National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August 6, 1967,” 17, 80, 105. 
15 Matthew J. Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2006), 155. 
16 On the use of language by historians to describe the civil violence of the 1960s, see: Amanda I. Seligman, “But Burn—
No”: The Rest of the Crowd in Three Civil Disorders in 1960s Chicago,” Journal of Urban History 37 (2) (2011): 230-255. 
According to a follow-up study on Milwaukee’s 1967 civil disturbance, “Civil disorder” and “racial conflict” were 
popular terms employed by both Black and white residents, while “revolt” and “insurrection” were not. J. A. Slesinger, 
“Community Opinions Concerning the Summer 1967 Civil Disturbances in Milwaukee,” University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, April 1, 1968, 5. Sugrue has argued the term “uprising” is most appropriate for portraying the civil violence 
of the 1960s. It encapsulates a “spontaneous upsurge of protest or violent expression of discontent, something with 
political content, but short of a full-fledged revolutionary act.” Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten 
Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House, 2008), 334. 
17 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August 
6,” 44. “Lawlessness” was a term commonly employed by police administrators to inflate communism and crime in 
response to the urban uprisings of the 1960s. Stuart Schrader, Badges without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency 
Transformed American Policing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019), 114. 
18 Schrader, Badges without Borders, 239. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on disturbances in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August 6, 1967,” 44; Schrader, Badges without Borders, 114. 
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University of  Wisconsin-Milwaukee’s School of  Social Welfare revealed stark divisions in how white 
and Black residents understood the causes of  civil unrest. Professor Joseph A. Slesinger analyzed 
decisions made by public officials to re-impose order.19 His report further exposed the depths of  
racial inequity in the city. For most white observers, the “riots” amplified the need for “law and 
order.” Respondents cited a “breakdown of  social control,” rebellious youth, inadequate parental 
supervision, “Communist” and “Black Nationalist” political agitation, and the rhetoric of  civil rights 
leaders as precipitating factors.20 White respondents also “supported measures designed to control 
deviant behavior and violence.”21 Conversely, most Black participants in the study saw “poor 
housing, job discrimination, unemployment, unequal educational opportunities, and police brutality” 
as primary determinants. The outbreak of  civil violence was a consequence of  protracted racial 
discrimination in housing, employment, education, and public accommodations. Moreover, they 
viewed the MPD as “responsible for turning what would have been a minor blowing-off  of  steam 
into a full scale riot.”  
 This perspective was largely corroborated by researchers working for the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders, which visited Milwaukee in September 1967.22 A field team 
investigation of  the city’s civil disturbance revealed deep polarization between the MPD and Black 
residents. Their report on Milwaukee detailed Chief  Breier’s reactionary, almost counter-insurgent 
approach to police administration and the department’s racialized discretionary tactics on the 
ground. Such findings belied the liberal law-and-order ethos that typified Milwaukee’s narrative of  
 
19 Twenty University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee social scientists contributed to this report. Among the UW-Milwaukee 
social scientists was George Kelling, future co-author of the 1982 Atlantic Monthly article outlining “Broken Windows 
Theory.” See: Introduction; Slesinger, “Community Opinions Concerning the Summer 1967 Civil Disturbances in 
Milwaukee”; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 
30-August 6, 1967,” 1. 
20 Slesinger, “Study of Community Opinions Concerning the Summer 1967 Civil Disturbance in Milwaukee,” 37. Jones, 
The Selma of the North, 161. 
21 Slesinger, “Study of Community Opinions Concerning the Summer 1967 Civil Disturbance in Milwaukee,” 37. 
22 NACCD field team interviews and research were conducted from September 27 to October 3, 1967. “Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.” 
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policing exceptionalism in the 1940s and 1950s, which outwardly emphasized “community 
relations,” but still encouraged racial control and close surveillance tactics. The thirteen-person team 
surveyed conditions on the ground, seeking to explain the causes of  civil unrest. Their findings 
reflected the NACCD’s conclusion that America was “moving toward two societies, one black, one 
white—separate and unequal.”23 On the MPD, investigators said police were “virtually anonymous in 
fact and in law. It is the general impression of  the white community that the department performs 
its function competently and efficiently. However, the Negro community views it as brutal, corrupt 
and segregated.”24 The field team proposed elected officials take on a larger role in Milwaukee’s 
police bureaucracy, to “exert an influence on the chief  to improve the department” and raise 
accountability. Until then, the MPD would “remain a bone of  contention”25—no small task given 
Breier’s state-sanctioned authority and the political influence he wielded as defender of  the city’s 
white cultural order. 
 As NACCD investigators underscored, Mayor Maier had spent close to fifteen months 
preparing to manage a riot and no time trying to prevent one.26 Many Black citizens expected future 
outbreaks of  violence to occur, lest the city begin “redressing the legitimate grievances of  the Negro 
community” that provoked police-Black citizen tensions. The mayor’s response to civil violence 
affirmed white political support and, consequently, popular approval for the MPD’s reactionary law-
and-order approach. The mayor’s swift declaration of  a “state of  emergency,” issuance of  a nine-day 
curfew around the “Inner Core” disturbance area, and request for 1,200 National Guard troops 
 
23 The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, The Kerner Report (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2016), 1. 
24 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-
August 6, 1967,” 81-82. 
25 “Adequacy to City’s Response to Grievances,” 2, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip 
Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.” 
26 The city published a “Manual of Procedure in Civil Emergencies” in June, 1966. Box 139, Folder 1, “Police 
Department, January - May 1967,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
Milwaukee Series 44, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. 
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reinforced white support and easily tempered Milwaukee’s small uprising.27 The response earned him 
the enmity of  some Black civil rights activists, who alleged racial double-standards in enforcement. 
Maier refused to take the same actions when 13,000 white counter-protestors confronted only a few 
hundred Black and allied open housing marchers in August, 1967.28 To many white residents, Maier’s 
decisiveness proved he was willing to defend their interests against those of  seemingly unruly Black 
malcontents, whose protests they linked to a rising crime rate. The mayor reinforced conflations of  
street crime and non-violent protest when he argued the civil disturbance was “deliberately planned 
in advance” by “militants” to make him “look bad” for going slow on civil rights.29 While he 
successfully fought for a change in Wisconsin’s formula for aid to cities, Maier also deflected 
criticism of  his own inaction and failure to curb white discrimination and advance integration.30 
Fears of  crime were real, for both white and Black residents. Each demanded more police 
protection, as the city saw a 90.7 percent increase in “serious crime” from 1963 to 1967.31 However, 
 
27 The curfew, ratified by the Milwaukee Common Council on July 31, 1967, included the closing of all liquor stores, 
taverns, and service stations. Sales of alcoholic beverages, gasoline, weapons and ammunition were immediately 
restricted. The “riot control area” extended across 984 square blocks, with 1st St. (East), 27th St. (West), Capitol Drive 
(North), and State St. (South) perimeters. Aukofer, “A Night of Riot—and Afterward—in Milwaukee.” 
28 Jones, The Selma of the North, 184. 
29 Jones, The Selma of the North, 165. 
30 Historically, Mayor Maier equivocated on Black freedom demands, advocating a conservative approach to social 
change that blamed racial segregation, the near north side’s comparatively poor economic conditions, and white 
discrimination on suburban prejudices and Black behavioral issues. The mayor did not support Alderwoman Vel Phillips’ 
fair housing ordinance, arguing it placed too much onus for change on city institutions and not enough on outside 
municipalities attracting white Milwaukee residents and businesses. As he often noted, white flight diminished the city’s 
property tax base. Lost revenues then weakened City Hall’s capacity to administer social services and aid to indigent 
residents. Maier called out suburban lawmakers unwilling to support Milwaukee financially but happy to enjoy its cultural 
and entertainment amenities. He argued they deserted the city and refused to see their role in maintaining segregation by 
shutting out Black home buyers. To offset his city’s diminishing tax base, the mayor embraced federal aid as a means of 
generating economic growth. Administering federal dollars to cities would eventually become a critical means for 
strengthening local criminal justice agencies in response to the 1960s urban crisis. Jones, The Selma of the North; John 
Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee, 3rd ed. (Milwaukee: Milwaukee County Historical Society Press, 1999), 370. On Maier 
securing state and federal aid to cities, see: Samantha Fleischmann, “Redistributing Resources: Henry Maier, the 
Wisconsin Alliance of Cities, and the Movement to Modify Wisconsin’s State Shared Revenues” (Master’s thesis, 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2020). 
31 Chief Breier blamed rising robberies, burglaries, larcenies, and auto thefts on juvenile criminality, a lack of parental 
control, the need to assign beat patrolmen to monitor civil rights demonstrations, and the “teaching and preaching of 
disrespect by certain elements of the community.” David N. Mitchell, “Flood of New Crime Shows No Sign of 
Cresting,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 30, 1968, Part 1, 1, 12. 
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this data was misleading for technical and political reasons.32 Maier backed Breier’s conservative 
approach to crime control, lest he face the “strong backlash of  public opinion” from white south 
side residents and political figures.”33 He was “astute” in that he never undertook political actions 
“likely to be unpopular with the majority of  his constituency,” Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee noted.34 
Black voters barely factored into the mayor’s political coalition. His fiercest critics described him as 
“disinterested in constructive action toward alleviating the problems of  the Negro community.”35 
Most blue collar and professional white residents saw the MPD chief  as a bulwark against Black 
activism and crime. Therefore, the mayor approached him with cautious deference.36 Breier boasted 
decades later that Maier could make suggestions about policing, but never give him orders.37 
 Mayor Maier’s high approval rating among white residents, including labor and business 
interests, combined with Chief  Breier’s state-sanctioned authority and the MPD’s social isolation 
from poor and working-class Black residents, ensured that Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy would 
 
32 Rising crime in the 1960s can be attributed to a number of factors. For one, police professionalization meant law 
enforcement was, as Stuart Schrader notes, “better prepared to discover and respond to a range of new, as well as 
traditional, crimes.” Radios and squad cars expanded police coverage, “leading to additional interactions with the public 
and thus higher rates of police observation or public reporting of lawlessness.” Revised data collection methods led to 
more accurate crime reporting to the FBI. It is also likely that local police regimes artificially inflated crime statistics to 
attract great federal funding after 1965. Stuart Schrader, Badges Without Borders, 137. Former Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Frank Gimbel and Attorney James Shellow recognized that new police techniques for documenting and responding to 
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economic disparities plays. Mitchell, “Flood of New Crime Shows No Sign of Cresting.” 
33 The all-white south side was a center of political power in Milwaukee. As Assistant U.S. Attorney Frank Gimbel 
stated, the mayor “looked good from a theatrical standpoint,” but was “a hack” when it came to human relations. 
“Interview with Frank Gimble [sic],” 3, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 
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34 “Interview with Lloyd Barbee,” 3, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field 
Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.” According to Barbee, City Hall was generally willing to “buy peace at any price 
so long as that price presented no real concession by the city government.” “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, July 30-August 6, 1967,” 1. 
35 Assemblyman Barbee called him “extremely conservative,” a “sick man and an “egomaniac.” Likewise, the director of 
the Northtown Planning and Development Commission characterized the mayor as “extremely thin skinned” and 
“maladjusted.” National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
July 30-August 6, 1967,” 3; “Interview with Ray Alexander, Associate Director, Northtown Planning and Development 
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36 Ronald H. Snyder, “Chief for Life: Harold Breier and His Era” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 
2002), 69; Aukofer, City with a Chance, 20. 
37 Snyder, “Chief for Life,” 70. 
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continue to sidestep the “community relations” issues that liberals in the federal government saw as 
foundational to the urban unrest of  the 1960s. Perceptions of  effective crisis management shaped 
local prescriptions. To a growing number of  African Americans, City Hall had abdicated its 
responsibility to Black voters. Elected officials ignored how white racism structured north side living 
conditions and aggressive policing in the area. Political cover enabled Breier to double-down on 
hostile law-and-order tactics, engendering fear and distrust of  the MPD among Black residents and 
intensifying Milwaukee’s crisis of  police legitimacy. Mayor Maier took a hardline stance on “rioting,” 
but moderated his approach according to his audience. As the mayor said in a press conference, he 
would “not stand by and permit violence…it was his responsibility to do everything in his power to 
save life and property in Milwaukee.”38 Civil unrest not only posed a threat to the public good, but 
also to Maier’s downtown economic development and neighborhood improvement projects. These 
schemes relied on federal subsidies, so the mayor was eager to maintain a good working relationship 
with the Johnson administration and federal bureaucrats. Still, white city officials perceived the Black 
“Inner Core” as, if  not innately disordered, then prone to disorderly behavior based on the same 
racist “culture of  poverty” arguments that undergirded urban liberalism and prolonged the urban 
crisis. “The only hope we have is an orderly society,” Maier argued. “It is my responsibility,” he 
continued, “to look after orderliness in our society and in Milwaukee and to look after the interests 
of  our citizens.” While the mayor generally subscribed to the “harm principle” embraced by liberal 
city governments dealing with intersecting issues of  inequality and public safety in the postwar 
period, it was clear whose “orderliness” he saw as in need of  supervision: the poor and working-
class African Americans provoked into police-citizen confrontations.39 
 
38 “Mayor Maier press conference concerning local religious leaders and civil disturbances, August 30 1967 (partial),” 
March on Milwaukee Civil Rights History Project, accessed November 15, 2018, 
https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/march/id/1771/rec/7. 
39 The harm principle held that “the state was justified in policing only activities that physically or materially harmed 
others. It signaled a turn away from the overpolicing of status offenses. However, because white “cosmopolitan liberals,” 
in cities like San Francisco, had a tendency of “rooting Black violence in Black culture,” the harm principle was applied 
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 Civil rights activists offered an alternative perspective on the 1967 uprising. They sought to 
leverage civil violence into political action that addressed the structural inequality at its heart. A 
coalition of  leaders from Black-led organizations and churches outlined reform proposals. The 
“Common View,” an umbrella coalition of  civil rights organizations and Black leaders, requested a 
meeting with Mayor Maier to press its demands. The group cited the “indifference projected by the 
white power structure” and City Hall’s failure to establish programs that substantively addressed 
local conditions.40 The Common View’s proposals touched on housing inequality, unemployment, 
educational disparities, biased judicial procedures, and limited recreational facilities. On policing, the 
coalition made eight demands for procedural reforms that expanded Black police representation, 
community input, and oversight. Specifically, they called for the hiring of  a Black District Five 
Captain, a Black “community relations specialist,” the installation of  a “joint citizen-police grievance 
system,” a Black MFPC member, the suspension, without pay, of  any officer involved in a 
questionable shooting, a Police Aide program that catered to Black students, the appointment of  a 
Black judge, and a public defender system for people accused of  violating the law.41 After some 
delay, the mayor eventually met with the group. But he rebuffed their calls for civilian oversight, 
insisting that the MFPC already had “the power to hire, fire, and promote policemen” and “hear 
charges of  misconduct.” Milwaukee, unlike other cities, had “a civilian review board with power for 
more than fifty years,” he stated. The mayor rejected the notion of  MFPC bias, insisting the 
commission was a “fair and impartial” body. Instead, he faulted civil rights leaders for their “studied 
effort…to avoid bringing a case” before the board.42 Regarding the Common View’s demand for a 
 
unevenly in poor spaces of color. Christopher Lowen Agee, The Streets of San Francisco: Policing and the Creation of a 
Cosmopolitan Liberal Politics, 1950-1972 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 14, 157. 
40 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-
August 6, 1967,” 17, 69. 
41 “Riots Called Reaction to Whites' Indifference,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 2, 1967, Part 1, 10. 
42 All they had to do was ask the MFPC “on its own motion to take the case,” Maier said. Recall that the Citizens Anti-
Police Brutality Committee had brought alleged cases of police abuse but were denied legal authority to make their 
claims. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-
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Black fire and police commissioner, Maier said he would “not make an appointment simply to 
appoint a Black man. He must be qualified and carry a lot of  weight.” In a statement demonstrating 
the MFPC’s fealty to the mayor, Maier said any future commissioners “must be willing to push my 
objectives and be able to execute the many detailed steps required to make my program come 
true…he must be a supporter of  mine.” 
 Maier refused to work with the Common View. Instead, he devised a thirty-nine-point plan 
with another group of  African American leaders. The Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance 
(IMA), according to the mayor, was the true voice of  Black Milwaukee, as the Common View 
allegedly did not represent the people’s interests. The “moderate-to-conservative” faith leaders in the 
IMA had “long-standing ties to the mayor.”43 Meeting with Maier on August 5, 1967, they worked 
out a response to civil violence. Dubbed Milwaukee’s “Little Marshall Plan,” the scheme emphasized 
racial inclusion within the existing white order. It called for no direct economic aid or revised power 
arrangements that benefitted poor and working-class Black citizens. The centerpiece was a “crusade 
for resources,” which reflected the mayor’s argument about resolving urban ills through 
metropolitan and state cooperation.44 The plan’s criminal justice measures reflected proposals 
outlined by the federal Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of  Justice (PCLEAJ), 
and even some of  the Common View’s proposals, namely the recruitment of  more Black police and 
improved “community relations.” But it was short on specifics of  how to get there. Racial 
pacification was City Hall’s focus. Yet, Maier and the IMA conveyed no assurances of  even 
implementing racial diversity on the MPD and the improvement of  the police image.45 One element 
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43 Jones, The Selma of the North, 166. 
44 Property taxes, according to Maier, were “never intended to carry the problems of today—poverty, blight, and special 
educational needs.” Therefore, county, state, and federal governments, well-funded by suburban property and corporate 
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National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August 
6, 1967,” EX-3. 
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of  the plan that the mayor and Common Council had the authority to enact was commissioning yet 
another study on the “Inner Core” and devising ways to alleviate poverty, unemployment, and 
crime—labor that the Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations (MCCR) already performed 
in the late 1950s and whose findings Maier rejected upon taking office in 1960.46  
 Civil rights activists decried the IMA-supported plan. The thirty-nine points could have 
marked an inflection point in terms of  how white city officials approached race, crime, and policing. 
Yet, the enactment of  more gradualist reforms that only appeased a small sub-set of  Black middle 
class residents trumped the public safety concerns of  the city’s Black majority. Milwaukee CORE 
leader Cecil Brown, Jr. called the plan “asinine,” arguing the mayor would only “use it for his 
purposes.”47 Maier had forged a program headlined by toothless measures that brought no 
immediate relief. Improved police-community relations through Black police hiring was the 
administration’s response to the crisis of  police legitimacy.48 According to the mayor, it had to be, as 
he claimed no power to make internal changes on the MPD and showed little interest in doing so. A 
 
establish a “bi-racial council” that would meet with the MFPC “to examine police hiring and promotion practices and 
examine citizens’ complaints.” The MCRR was supposed to “establish curricula to train youths 14 years and older for 
eventual positions in the Police Department,” with the assistance of the Superintendent of Schools and vocational 
school director. 
46 Other proposals required the mayor to “seek,” not guarantee, state and federal aid for new manufacturing jobs and 
programs that would specifically cater to Black workers. These and other housing, mortgage insurance, zoning, and 
urban renewal proposals had little chance of passing Wisconsin’s Republican-controlled legislature. The plan included 
federal policies on “rat control” and “air and water pollution” abatement, laudable goals in theory, but again, reforms 
that City Hall had no power to authorize. Finally, the program called on the Common Council to introduce a county-
wide open housing measure, ignoring Alderwoman Phillips’ three unsuccessful attempts to pass a municipal fair housing 
ordinance. Each time, Phillips was denied in the Common Council on a vote of 18-1. While Maier’s plan carried the 
pretense of change and interracial cooperation, it represented more of the same for struggling poor and working-class 
Black residents. 
47 Brown also alleged the mayor held a grudge against the city’s three heavily Black voting wards because he did not carry 
them in the 1964 election. “Interview with Cecil Brown, Jr., Director of Milwaukee CORE,” 4, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.” 
48 The mayor recognized the dearth of Black police personnel. But he blamed Black residents, citing their lack of interest 
in becoming police officers. “You cannot expect a Negro to reach the highest levels of command if there are only a 
handful willing to work in the department. Missing from the mayor’s analysis was any appreciation for the profound 
mistrust Black Milwaukeeans felt towards the police department. African Americans were “suspicious, afraid, and bitter 
toward the police department,” with complaints ranging “from a lack of tact and common sense on the part of the 
police to extreme harassment and brutality. Maier’s “community relations” proposals were at odds with the harsh reality 
of police power and discretion, which it wielded unevenly predominantly Black areas. National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August 6, 1967,” 15-16, EX-8. 
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reconfigured MCCR focused on “building bridges of  understanding,” creating “open lines of  
communication,” and “preserving diversity without endangering the social order.” As such, the 
commission failed to target racialized power imbalances enforced by the MPD.49 The city’s focus on 
equal opportunity hiring and “education and conciliation” further ensconced Breier’s reactionary 
law-and-order approach. 
 Maier’s Little Marshall Plan reflected his mastery of  what historian Michael Katz once 
termed “mimetic reform.”50 The mayor responded to Black civil rights demands in ways that 
imitated the rhetorical thrust of  racial liberalism. However, his responses signified an incomplete 
realization of  Black civil rights demands in that they created the mirage of  new programs that, even 
if  actualized, maintained inequitable structures of  power and patterns of  resource allocation. For 
example, at the height of  the direct action campaigns led by Lloyd Barbee and Milwaukee United 
School Integration Committee against the discriminatory practice of  “intact busing,” Maier 
proposed a “War on Prejudice.” That plan, a reference to the Johnson administration’s “War on 
Poverty,” called for metropolitan cooperation, acculturation, and a voluntary public relations 
campaign that would “make discrimination unpopular, so unpopular…that those who practice it will 
find themselves in an ostracized minority.”51 The War on Prejudice was little more than a revised 
appeal for attitude adjustment—a liberal “hearts and minds” approach. It not only targeted white 
residents, but also African Americans, implying that discrimination flowed in two directions and was 
a problem of  equal racial contribution. Nor did Maier press the Milwaukee Common Council or 
state legislature to enact policies that addressed white discrimination in any systematic fashion. 
Consequently, Black civil rights leaders saw the mayor’s policies as a continuation of  the 
 
49 Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations, “Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations Progress 
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50 Michael B. Katz, “Why Don’t American Cities Burn Very Often?” Journal of Urban History 34 (2) (January 2008), 193. 
51 “Mayor Hopes to Hire Expert to Direct War on Prejudice,” Milwaukee Journal, November 14, 1965, Part 2, 1. 
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accomodationism of  the 1950s, embracing a political gimmick that relied on hollow promises and 
the veneer of  action on racial injustice in the form of  study committees, reports, and interracial 
convocations.52  
 
Contours of Reactionary Law-and-Order 
 Milwaukee’s 1967 civil disturbance reflected over a decade of accumulating, under-addressed 
police-Black community tensions. Public frustrations were compounded by City Hall’s 
unresponsiveness to growing Black demands for economic justice and an end to discriminatory 
employment, education, and housing policies. Civil violence was a likely outcome, as Milwaukee’s 
white-controlled police bureaucracy remained comfortable refusing Black claims of police abuse. 
The unwillingness of the MFPC to accept Black complaints, and the limited authority of other 
institutions, like the Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations, to guarantee accountability 
for overpoliced and underprotected African Americans reinforced the racial double-standards at the 
heart of the city’s narrative of policing exceptionalism. Chief Breier, empowered by state law, freely 
administered reactionary law-and-order against Black political “agitators” and their “communist” 
sympathizers. He did so with no fear of impunity and little desire to improve “community relations.” 
His order maintenance approach emphasized controlling the activities of Black civil rights activists 
and youth, who comprised more than half of the city’s African American population. The 
exceptionalism narrative and racist ideas about Black living conditions reinforced one another. 
When the 1967 civil disturbance erupted, it most white Milwaukeeans did not question the MPD’s 
legitimacy to restore order or the utility of police authority. Instead, most white power brokers 
chided Black freedom fighters and allies. Liberals in city government placated Black discontent. 
They promised to update the MFPC’s recruitment and oversight practices, to satisfy Black police 
 
52 Jones, The Selma of the North, 76. 
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accountability demands, meet federal civil rights requirements, and hopefully prevent further unrest. 
Liberal appeasement in service of procedural justice and limiting opportunities for political dissent 
was part of the equation when it came to legitimizing police power at the community level. 
 Divergent conceptions of safety and disorder fueled public debates. Some Milwaukeeans felt 
less safe because they held racist views about crime, which they unevenly attributed to poor and 
migrant African Americans. Others, particularly Black residents, felt increasingly vulnerable to 
discretionary police violence, as much as they did crime. In truth, people living on Milwaukee’s 
segregated north side were disproportionately vulnerable to both crime and over-zealous policing. 
Still, resolving interrelated concerns around interpersonal and state violence resulted in government 
reform solutions that expanded police power and investments in law enforcement as the primary 
agent for maintaining social order. White commentators and policymakers never probed the MPD’s 
history of terrorizing poor and working Black and Brown folk. Consequently, federal and local 
solutions stressed increasing racial diversity, developing interagency cooperation, improving 
“community relations,” and upgrading police hardware and “soft power” capacities. Shoring up the 
MPD as a response to civil violence supplanted efforts to alleviate poverty on the north side through 
federal interventions. The War on Poverty had begun to empower Black-led community agencies in 
the mid-1960s. The lack of local political pressure to shift how the police functioned, civil unrest, 
and subsequent episodes of racial violence surrounding the Milwaukee NAACP Youth Council’s 
grassroots campaign for a fair housing ordinance saw Chief Breier double-down on his department’s 
aggressive, response-oriented crime control and order maintenance tactics. Civil violence, amplified 
by an intensifying national conversation around race and public safety, reinforced the assumed need 
within Milwaukee’s white power structure for a stronger police presence on the north side and 
vigilant monitoring of Black civil rights activists, who showed no signs of letting up on challenging 
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white supremacy through direct action, “not violent” protests.53 
 The MFPC appointed Breier chief during a critical juncture in U.S. criminal justice history. 
Police regulations were shifting in the 1960s. The “procedural revolution” transformed state criminal 
procedures and re-authorized the application of police discretion in ways meant to limit abuses of 
power. The Supreme Court moved from a flat preoccupation with guilt or innocence to ensuring 
that the procedural, or due process rights of criminal defendants were better recognized throughout 
the justice system. The liberal Warren court decided cases that dealt with processes of arrest, 
investigation, and adjudication. Their decisions favored criminal suspects, who were historically 
rendered vulnerable to police misconduct, such as when officers violently questioned suspects using 
the “third degree.” Police administrators, on the whole, saw the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 
Mapp (1961), Gideon (1963), Escobedo (1964) and Miranda (1966) cases as attacks on their authority, 
the discretion of officers, and police expertise. With reported street crime rising, many police chiefs 
believed the federal government was being too protective of “criminals” and ignoring the safety of 
“law-abiding” citizens. The court had undermined “reform era” crime control strategies that relied 
on procedural efficiency in the criminal justice system. As a result, it became harder for police to 
arrest and convict individuals.54 This process was central to Milwaukee’s narrative of policing 
exceptionalism. Both the civil rights revolution occurring in the streets and in the criminal-legal 
system informed Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach. 
 It is impossible to separate the MPD’s reactionary turn from Harold Breier’s upbringing and 
professional evolution. The chief was “old-school”—the product of a pre-World War II era when 
white civic elites and defenders of the traditional racial order entrusted law enforcement to preserve 
 
53 As historian Patrick Jones has shown, Milwaukee NAACP Youth Council Commandos engaged in “not violent” 
protest. The group did not use weapons or deploy violence as a tactic, but it was willing to defend itself when attacked 
by white power groups and police. Jones, The Selma of the North, 133. 
54 Risa Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional Change, and the Making of the 1960s (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 199-200. 
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the peace free from the corrosive influence of politics. Breier once professed that his job was to 
protect “the good people” of Milwaukee from the “bad.”55 This dichotomy tracked lines of race and 
class and built on decades of discriminatory structures. As a Black newspaper columnist noted just 
after the chief’s death in 1998, “Breier never saw blacks as ‘good people.’”56 His stubborn, hard-
nosed leadership style was comparable to overtly racist law-and-order proponents, like Frank Rizzo 
in Philadelphia or Bull Connor in Birmingham.57 But it also reflected the more covert, racialized 
order maintenance instincts of reform era heavyweights, such as O. W. Wilson in Chicago or 
William Parker in Los Angeles.58 Like the latter, Breier looked to maintain order and control crime 
through response-oriented automobile patrols and sound detective work following the commission 
of crimes. He did not believe the police should serve a dedicated social relations function. Reform 
era chiefs who emphasized “crime suppression, technological innovation, and administrative 
efficiency,” like Breier in Milwaukee, “tended to shunt aside community relations work.”59 Liberal 
reformers, on the other hand, believed that centralization and improving community relations were 
not mutually exclusive developments. Enhanced technology, crime detection, and policing efficiency 
could coexist with greater community involvement and police responsiveness to community-
identified problems. 
 Chief Breier’s rigid approach to police administration was forged during his early life on 
Milwaukee’s south side. There, he developed a conservative understanding of morality and society. 
 
55 Eugene Kane, “Sadly, Breier Never Saw Blacks as ‘Good People,’” Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, September 15, 1998. 
56 Kane, “Sadly, Breier Never Saw Blacks as ‘Good People.” 
57 Timothy J. Lombardo, Blue Collar Conservatism: Frank Rizzo’s Philadelphia and Populist Politics (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018). 
58 These two chiefs engaged in law enforcement policies that produced racist outcomes as well. Though they did so 
under the guise of liberal law-and-order and a willingness to embrace professionalizing reforms that brought African 
Americans more closely under the purview of law and enforcement and deeper into the criminal justice system. See: 
Simon Balto, Occupied Territory: Policing Black Chicago from Red Summer to Black Power (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2019); Max Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles: Race, Resistance, and the Rise of the LAPD (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2018). 
59 David Riley, “Community Control of Police,” Civil Rights Digest 2 (4) (Fall 1969), 34-35. 
 260 
Like countless other blue-collar white ethnics, Breier typified the mostly Polish-American south 
side’s parochial views on race. He grew up in a strict Lutheran household in the 1910s and 1920s—
one of three children born to German immigrant parents.60 The Great Depression encouraged the 
young Breier to forego college and help support his family. From 1929 to 1939, he worked industrial 
jobs to earn money.61 Breier entered law enforcement as a Sheriff’s Deputy in 1939. In 1940, he 
accepted a position as patrolman with the MPD. In three year’s time, he made Acting Detective and 
soon ascended the bureau’s ranks.62 Throughout his life, Breier lived in the same neighborhood, 
eventually buying a home with his wife Eleanore in 1941.63 A provincial upbringing and conservative 
values shaped Breier’s leadership style. While he considered himself a “hard-headed professional,” 
NACCD investigators described him as an “anti-intellectual”—a man “opposed to education,” who 
discouraged officers from attending college to gain new skills.64 The MFPC named Inspector of 
Detectives Breier Milwaukee’s twelfth police chief on February 15, 1964.65 He earned the position 
based on his reputation as a “strong disciplinarian,” an “active and aggressive officer.”66 
Commissioners believed him capable of “rectifying conditions” on a police force dealing with a rare 
 
60 Breier was born on August 29, 1911, the same year the Wisconsin legislature passed the influential policing statute. He 
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corruption scandal.67 Most MFPC members saw Breier as unflappable in demeanor—well-suited for 
maintaining internal and external order as Milwaukee pursued its economic growth and 
redevelopment agenda in a socially combustible postwar context.68  
 Four factors shaped Breier’s lifelong skepticism of external forces: police suspicion of 
civilians, his “contempt for non-professionals,” a desire to protect his statutory authority, and his 
confusion over why citizens desired change when, in his view, Milwaukee was already one of the 
safest cities in the U.S.69 Breier was known as “a cop in the traditional sense of the word.”70 From an 
external vantage point, the chief vigorously maintained the MPD’s institutional independence, 
refusing to allow predecessors’ achievements in police professionalization “go to hell” as a result of 
political interference.71 Internally, he demanded loyalty from all subordinates and rewarded faithful 
officers with administrative cover when they faced outside scrutiny, especially those alleged to have 
engaged in racialized misconduct. Strategically, he subscribed to the three “r’s” that defined reform 
era policing: “random patrol, rapid response, and reactive investigation.”72 The chief prioritized 
enforcing the criminal code, arresting law violators, and closing-out cases, all while running an 
airtight department in which power flowed from the top-down. 
 Having spent decades in the Detective Bureau, Breier favored a reactive “detective 
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culture.”73 This penchant for reacting to crime rather than preventing it served to weaken the MPD’s 
beat patrol services. As one criminologist argues, Breier focused little on developing relationships 
with Black business-owners, churches, and community organizations in service of order 
maintenance.74 He worked to guarantee Milwaukee’s exceptional status as a “crime free” city by 
arresting and processing a high volume of criminal offenders.75 That meant engaging in aggressive 
order maintenance policing in predominantly Black “high crime” areas. The chief assigned white 
police recruits from the south side to “the toughest police beats” in the city to “prove themselves 
from the beginning.” Breier’s district commanders charged line officers with neglect of duty if they 
returned to district stations without meeting daily arrest quotas. Consequently, the “police routinely 
questioned people in advance of accusing them for crimes.”76 Some officers relished working north 
side beats, not to protect people, but, as one African American leader put it, to “take advantage of 
the situation” for “their own betterment and promotion.”77 Like his predecessors, the chief directed 
most department resources towards Black Milwaukee neighborhoods and employed racialized crime 
data to justify the MPD’s crime control strategy and reinforce ideas about racial difference . 
  Thanks to the 1911 statute, Breier wielded his power over rank-and-file officers with little 
concern for institutional blowback. He imposed strict standards and expected rank-and-file officers 
to obey all of his rules and commands. The chief forbade all police personnel from speaking publicly 
on law enforcement matters without his approval. Violators faced immediate reprisal—threatened, 
disciplined, or fired depending on the offense. Early in his administration, he punished rules-
violators with two-week suspensions. This policy remained in effect until the Milwaukee Police 
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Patrolmen’s Protective Association (MPPPA) “legislated the maximum non-appellate suspension 
period to five days.”78 Chief Breier punished rule violators by occasionally forcing them to work on 
scheduled off days without pay “until he was satisfied.” One researcher likened this practice to 
“involuntary servitude.”79 Breier was cold, but shrewd, only suspending officers when he was certain 
they would not appeal to the MFPC. His regimented internal policies inadvertently facilitated the rise 
of police union power in Milwaukee, as the MPPPA largely defined itself against their boss’ strict 
disciplinary practices, his antagonism towards educational development, and his reluctance to engage 
in community relations improvements.80  
 Chief Breier differentiated himself from his liberal law-and-order forerunners in terms of 
how he envisioned “police-community relations.”81 He shunned bringing officers into dialogue with 
Black and Latinx community groups, refused to actively push for integration, and scorned the 
concept of community relations units, bureaus, or programs within the MPD. When civil rights 
organizations challenged Breier’s decision-making when it came to engaging with minoritized 
communities, he not only distanced himself on policy, but rhetorically undercut his critics’ moral 
position by labeling them as criminal subversives. The chief pursued ad hominem attacks against 
perceived opponents, while denying non-police stakeholders a role in shaping the direction of 
policing in Milwaukee. Knowing that substantive reforms would only be enacted through statutory 
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revision, the chief felt free to insist that both racialized police violence and any need to work with 
community groups in resolving crime was a myth.82 Furthermore, the MPPPA outflanked him from 
the left on the community relations issue. Union president Robert Kliesmet said the MPPPA was 
willing to collaborate with community organizations to improve public safety. While the union’s core 
objective was defending the interests of rank-and-file officers, they also saw a public safety value in 
revising the police department’s image. 
 Breier’s sense of impunity was reinforced by his “great popularity among whites in the 
greater Milwaukee area.”83 A high level of support from white blue-collar and middle-class 
professionals “probably neutralized any influence” elected officials had over Breier’s MPD.84 This 
esteem only grew in the wake of the 1967 civil disturbance and subsequent Black-led demonstrations 
for open housing—campaigns that notably penetrated the chief’s native south side. Breier further 
proved his racial bona fides when he rebuffed Black police brutality complainants, rejected calls for 
citizen review of the MPD, and conflated civil rights demonstrators with violent criminals. He 
defended police officers who roughed up fair housing marchers after protests at Kosciuszko Park 
descended into chaos. White residents expressed their “general gratitude” for the “absence of 
serious riots,” despite some having committed acts of racial violence.85 The urban uprisings of the 
1960s focused white attention “on the role of the police as protector of property and master of 
order.”86 This strengthened Breier’s resolve. Civil rights “militants,” in his view, refused to follow the 
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law or work through established grievance channels. Then they initiated violence when his men 
attempted to lawfully re-impose order in the community.  In stubbornly resisting Black dissent, 
Breier embodied a white folk hero persona—a powerful avatar for those eager to conserve white 
hegemonic power in a proud white ethnic city. 
 Breier’s comprehension of “race relations” shaped a strategic approach that centered Black 
surveillance, subversion, and suppression. He addressed “civil rights insurgents” through a domestic 
“counterinsurgency” agenda that aimed to stamp out political dissent and any perceived “socialist,” 
“communist,” or “revolutionary” infiltrations of society.87 Breier’s logic was not new. It stemmed 
from decades of discriminatory policies and practices that hardened racialized dichotomies of 
“good” (white) and “bad” (Black) space and citizens.88 Such racially-coded moral distinctions were 
founded in white racial and class biases that were not unique to Milwaukee. Blue-collar white 
Philadelphians, for example, “used class distinctions as rhetorical qualifiers to explain who they were 
not willing to share urban space with.”89 Police liability was less of an issue for Breier than law 
enforcement being attacked by racial liberalism run amok. He thought the nation was, more broadly, 
losing its moral footing and traditional values. Liberals were too eager to coddle “criminals.” This, in 
turn, fueled revanchist white demands for law-and-order, a sentiment that spread in the mid-1960s, 
particularly in the suburban and exurban communities that comprised an important base of support 
for Richard Nixon in 1968. To many white voters, liberalism had failed in its “ability to ensure 
 
87 Historian Patrick Jones first characterized Milwaukee’s civil rights movement, particularly the activism of the 
Milwaukee NAACP Youth Council, as a “civil rights insurgency.” Jones, The Selma of the North. As Jordan Camp and 
Jennifer Greenburg argue, “counterinsurgency” has had a long history in the U.S., serving as “a central force in the 
‘restoration of class power’ in the face of recurrent challenges to capitalist imperialism.” Jordan T. Camp and Jennifer 
Greenburg, “Counterinsurgency Reexamined: Racism, Capitalism, and U.S. Military Doctrine,” Antipode (2020), 2. 
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space.” Lombardo, Blue Collar Conservatism, 89. 
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neighborhoods. Perhaps some might, but this served to erase the discriminatory intent and outcomes of public and 
private housing policies. Lombardo, Blue Collar Conservatism, 89. 
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personal security,” creating political space for a conservative backlash.90 
 Chief Breier’s subordinates reflected his parochial views on race, which emanated from the 
top. District Five Police Captain George Sprague embodied the most prominent example. Sprague 
was a known John Birch Society member who, according to Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee, was 
“openly contemptuous of Negros.”91 Chief Breier put him in charge of the police district with the 
largest African American population: District Five. In 1967, approximately 90,000 Black residents 
lived on the near north side, which District Five largely encompassed. Captain Sprague rejected a 
federal grand jury complaint of alleged violations at his precinct. He denied complaints were even 
filed, blaming “rabble rousers” for District Five’s external scrutiny.92 The avowed racist “dismissed” 
police brutality charges against police officers “out of hand.” His attitude was “an excellent 
reflection of the attitudes and beliefs of the Police Chief, Harold Breier,” according to Lloyd Barbee, 
“a racist and a bully.”93  
 Chief Breier understood issues of police accountability through a similarly racialized lens. 
His reactionary law-and-order regime undermined police misconduct complaints. Breier denied 
accountability for Black claims of police brutality with special vigor. NACCD researchers described 
“inadequate” “channels of communication for grievances.”94 Citizen complaints were “an exercise in 
futility,” according to Black residents. When the public filed a complaint of “police brutalization,” 
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Breier oversaw in-house investigations. Several complainants observed that “nothing was done,” as 
if the chief’s officers could “never tell a lie and therefore [could] do no wrong.”95 Not “a single 
conviction or reprimand” for “alleged [police] mistreatment” occurred from 1964 to 1967—Breier’s 
first three years in office.96 External investigations simply did not happen. The Milwaukee 
Commission on Civil Rights lacked the “powers to do anything” in response to police 
discrimination.97 The MFPC “served the function of a Review Board for the adjudication of 
complaints,” but, according to people interviewed by the NACCD, never brought one to trial. While 
residents occasionally filed civil litigation against the MPD or individual officers, none were 
“pursued to judgment.”98 Interviewees described “a do-nothing attitude” when it came to City Hall’s 
capacity to curb police misconduct.99 Mayor Henry Maier euphemized police violence, proudly 
describing the MPD as “pretty tough.”100 While Breier apparently disciplined officers “from time to 
time,” he did nothing to stem the flow of police violence being administered on Milwaukee’s north 
side.  
 The deadly police shooting of 44-year-old Lee Wilson on December 30, 1967 illustrated that 
eruptions of civil violence that summer had done nothing to raise police accountability standards. 
Wilson was killed following the enforcement of a petty crime: jaywalking. Yet another ruling by the 
Milwaukee County District Attorney of “justifiable homicide” frustrated Black citizens.101 
Conflicting accounts from police and witnesses at the scene renewed tensions and deepened 
 
95 “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August 6, 1967,” 80. 
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mistrust.102 Civil rights groups rallied around the Wilson killing, lending urgency to growing demands 
for civilian police oversight, improved police-Black community relations, and the hiring of more 
Black MPD officers.  
While Black leaders were livid, they were largely powerless to obtain justice. Some saw police 
integration as the only viable solution—a means of mitigating against the racist discretion of white 
patrolmen. Integrating historically white police regimes, like the MPD, was one of several enduring 
liberal responses to police brutality and elevated racial tensions. Many African Americans perceived 
Black officers as “reformers” in their own right, arguing their race made them intrinsically sensitive 
to the community’s needs and, therefore, less likely to harass and abuse.103  
The NAACP Youth Council circulated a petition calling for an inquest into Wilson’s 
“murder.” YC members described Wilson as “industrious and dedicated to his [four] children.” 
Commando Milton Latson warned that his group would “retaliate” if police ever tried to use lethal 
force against open housing demonstrators as they had against Wilson and Clifford McKissick.104As 
he continued, “We are no longer nonviolent toward the police department.” County Supervisor 
Isaac Coggs connected the MPD’s aggressive policing on the near north side to the issue of 
residential segregation, urging the YC to march on the statehouse in Madison and demand a state 
 
102 Police stopped John T. Smith, for jaywalking. 44-year-old Lee Wilson then interfered as they were issuing Smith a 
ticket. There was a struggle. Wilson was shot and killed. The officer who ended up shooting Wilson said he heard the 
suspect fire two shots while he was attending to Smith’s jaywalking ticket. He rushed over to inspect the commotion. 
Then, he fired his service weapon at Wilson’s shoulder, claiming to have fired only a single shot. However, a coroner 
later found two bullets in Wilson’s body. Conversely, witnesses said Wilson tried to leave the scene, but police grabbed 
him from behind. A police-instigated struggle ensued before Wilson was shot. One witness, a Black cab driver, said he 
heard shouting. He saw at least three white officers pummeling Wilson in the head “with a hard dark object.” Then he 
heard the crack of an object, “with sufficient force, in his judgment, to kill.” As Wilson lay on the street, badly beaten, a 
crouching patrolman evidently drew his gun and fired two shots from no more than a foot-and-a-half away. Another 
witness shouted, “Don’t kill him! Don’t kill him!” Then, “Look what you did…you shot him.” An officer was said to 
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fair housing law.105 Outraged African Americans and allies rallied for justice. “It is time for the 
community to act against the police killing of Negroes for no reason at all,” Coggs exclaimed. “If the 
police want war they will get it,” he added. Coggs called out the District Attorney for “covering up” 
police misconduct.106 Roughly 300 demonstrators marched down Center St.—the scene of the 
killing—to Wisconsin Ave, then up N. 8th St. to the Milwaukee Safety Building. The Wisconsin Civil 
Liberties Union requested a federal probe into Wilson’s death ten days later. Breier imposed no 
discipline on the officer who shot Wilson. “As far as I’m concerned, the air is clear,” Chief Breier, 
said, defending their actions.107 
 African American police spoke candidly to the NACCD about Chief Breier’s explicit 
toleration of racialized police violence. A former Black officer, Charles Densford, worked under 
Breier’s command while serving as Inspector of Detectives in the early 1960s. The fifteen-year 
veteran confirmed that his boss condoned police brutality in front of personnel. Densford told 
NACCD researchers that detectives began their day shifts questioning individuals arrested during 
the previous night. “On many occasions,” it was “quite obvious” they had experienced violence at 
the hands of police.108 When Densford reported police brutality incidents to Inspector Breier, he was 
told to “mind his own business.” Another Black detective made notations of in-house beatings on 
interview cards. Breier reprimanded that officer for documenting what he witnessed. As Inspector, 
he made light of officers using lethal force. During a roll call, as the bureau discussed a police 
brutality incident that occurred on Milwaukee’s north side, Densford said Breier commented, “Well, 
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I guess we’ll have to shoot a few of the bastards.”109 He also characterized Breier as “a bully and a 
dictator who does not permit his officers to think at all.” MPD personnel had to obey the chief’s 
orders “without deviation.” Many feared him, according to the officer.  
 White officers perceived to have transgressed the MPD’s “us-against-them” mentality when 
it came to policing Black Milwaukee faced retaliation from department administrators. In one 
instance, a white officer assigned to patrol a beat in a majority Black district built a rapport with 
Northcott Neighborhood House Director Rev. Lucius Walker. The Organization of Organizations 
founder asked the officer, who hailed from Milwaukee’s south side, to teach Northcott youth about 
police regulations and how the beat patrol function worked. After speaking about his experiences 
working in law enforcement with Black Head Start school children, kids affectionately embraced the 
white officer. Chief Breier received word, as newspapers reported on the hug. Soon thereafter, 
Special Assignment Squad (SAS) officers questioned the white patrolman about his relationship to 
Northcott Neighborhood House, which they knew to be an organizational base for planning civil 
rights demonstrations. An hours-long interrogation ensued, whereby the SAS beat the white 
patrolman to the point of needing hospitalization. He was subsequently forced to resign due to “so-
called civil rights activity,” according to attorneys Jim and Gilda Shellow.110 Chief Breier apparently 
wrote the patrolman a recommendation letter for a job in Florida on the understanding that he 
would not publicize his beating at the hands of police co-workers. 
 Perpetrating and covering-up racist police violence was as much a function of the MPD’s 
command structure as it was the discretionary choices of police personnel. Breier revised the 
department’s administrative hierarchy in ways that facilitated and protected rank-and-file officers 
 
109 Interview with Charles Densford, 1-2, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 
1967-Oct. 3, 1967.” 
110 “Interview with James and Gilda Shellow and William Coffey,” 4, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from 
Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.” 
 271 
known to employ violent methods. As Milwaukee Sentinel reporter Gene Cunningham told NACCD 
researchers, “a certain portion of the police force employed brutal methods.”111 The MPD’s twelve-
member SAS reported directly to the chief of police. It was drawn from across the department and 
“responsible only to Breier for whatever purposes he wished.” He was, Cunningham suggested, 
“fully aware that such methods were used.” The NACCD field team concluded that Breier ran “a 
tough department” that was “impervious to all charges against its offices of brutality.” The 
“widespread complaint” of police mistreatment produced “no justification and no redress.”112 Class 
position made little difference. As youth program director Mel Hall told NACCD researchers, police 
committed “brutality against all Negroes in Milwaukee…middle-class or not, as long as he is black, 
police treat him the same.”113 Breier was strict about enforcing the law, even minor offenses, like 
parking violations and jaywalking. Because he was so rigid, officers “appeared tougher than they 
were before.” 
 Chief Breier’s disdain for civil rights activists and conflations of political dissent with 
lawlessness shaped the MPD’s operational adjustments in the late 1960s. The most notable was his 
formation of the Tactical Enforcement Unit (TEU) on August 7, 1967. Breier established the unit 
before the embers of the 1967 civil disturbance had cooled. He assigned the all-white “Tactical 
Squad” to monitor violent crimes, public demonstrations, crowd control situations, and illicit 
behavior on Milwaukee’s Black near north side, Latinx near south side, and “the hippie section” of 
the mostly white east side.114 The unit featured seven sergeants and forty-five officers, who cruised 
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“troubled areas in unmarked cars,” searching for events that might “spark a riot or lesser civil 
disturbance.”115 They applied what one police administrator called “selective enforcement,” whereby 
police saturated a particular area with “all of the available manpower.”116 The goal was to “suppress 
trouble before it gets out of hand” with just one or two cars.117 This was the essence of Breier’s 
reactionary law-and-order ethos. The chief handpicked personnel with the highest arrest totals and a 
penchant for intimidation for the Tactical Squad. He formed the unit around the same time that the 
Los Angeles Police Department established its famed Special Weapons and Tactics unit.118 The TEU 
administered a similar “get tough” version of “riot control” in Milwaukee’s “high crime” areas.119 It 
brandished intimidating weaponry. According to researcher Kenneth Feit, the TEU “patrolled 
ghetto neighborhoods with shotguns openly displayed and functioned in a military fashion by 
making summary arrests.”120 The TEU was notorious for harassing and arresting Black youth and 
radical-left activists on minor, often contrived offenses. The NAACP Youth Council and other Civil 
Rights-Black Power organizations referred to the unit as the “Goon Squad.” Its aggressive react first, 
ask questions later ethos hardened negative Black perceptions of the MPD “as an occupational army 
in a subcultural colony.”121 
 The TEU symbolized Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach for accountability 
advocates. Like the Special Assignment Squad, the unit reported and was directly accountable to the 
chief alone. Other cogs in the police bureaucracy had no control over its actions. When Social 
Development Commission (SDC) members Jeanetta Robinson and Alderwoman Vel Phillips 
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questioned the Fire and Police Commission about the Tactical Squad’s repressive tactics, its 
seemingly exclusive assignment to Black sections, and its lack of African American or Latinx 
officers, commissioners said they were “unfamiliar with the inner operations of the police 
department.”122 The MFPC, again, deflected responsibility to Breier, who said the SDC had “no 
authority to investigate the procedure of the police department.” Armed with his state-sanctioned 
authority and the support of most white residents and elected officials, Breier refused to placate his 
critics. Instead, the chief attacked the SDC for “condoning crime rather than trying to prevent it.”123 
The TEU was, according to the chief, made up of “crime fighters” who operated “strictly according 
to the law.” Legal or not, the Tactical Squad’s daily operations personified the MPD’s most 
discriminatory practices. It exacerbated media narratives of crime, violence, and disorder on 
Milwaukee’s north side. “Instead of the tactical squad preventing a riot from occurring, they are 
contributing to the possibility of a riot,”124 Jeanetta Robinson argued. The Tactical Squad’s 
oppressive function amplified white fears and racist ideas about Black criminality, indirectly 
contributing to harmful cycles of poverty and despair. According to the Milwaukee Star, there was an 
upsurge in crime and murder on the north side as a direct result of the TEU’s harsh tactics.125 Breier 
had little use for such complaints, exclaiming that “if a citizen does not violate the law, he will never 
come in contact with this tactical squad.” Yet, plenty of “law-abiding” Black residents still 
encountered the unit’s aggression.126 
 A biased criminal-legal system shielded the police chief’s reactionary law-and-order regime. 
African Americans experienced “unequal justice” in Milwaukee County courts—disproportionate 
punishments, stricter sentencing, and “exorbitant bail for minor offenses.” According to 
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Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee, it was well known in the community that Black families could “not 
obtain justice in the courts.”127 Judicial discrimination was “an explosive issue.” Civil rights 
advocates regarded Judge Christ Seraphim as the worst offender. He had “a non-judicial 
temperament,” Barbee reported to NACCD researchers. Seraphim was “extremely severe with 
people…arrested in demonstrations or any other sort of activity with which he [did] not personally 
approve.”128 The long-time judge attempted to coerce arrested activists into pledging that they would 
never again demonstrate for civil rights in public—a constitutional right—before imposing severe 
sentences.129 He applied a “double-standard of justice,” levying higher fines, stricter and longer 
punishments to Black defendants. Moreover, state prosecutors purportedly charged white and Black 
arrestees differently, despite similar offenses. White residents received lower charges that carried 
lighter penalties, while Black defendants faced more serious charges with harsher sentences.130 
 The court assigned public defenders only to citizens charged with felonies, attorney Alan 
Eisenburg said. It rarely advised people charged with misdemeanors of their legal rights. Milwaukee’s 
Legal Aid Society advised indigent defendants to take guilty pleas.131 The system “very definitely” 
discriminated against poor citizens of color. There had not been “one single conviction of police 
brutality in Milwaukee.”132 As of 1967, Milwaukee officials had never held a public inquest hearing 
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following any police killing or in-custody death. Had the city called for one after officers shot and 
killed Clifford McKissick during the “civil disturbance,” U.S. Attorney Thomas Brennan believed it 
would have alleviated racial tensions and Black mistrust of the police.133 When law enforcement 
“brutalized” Black Milwaukeeans “without any provocation,” City Hall failed to grant relief. Without 
of “a fair and impartial judicial system,” Barbee asserted, efforts to garner police accountability 
proved futile. As Eisenburg detailed, Milwaukee police enjoyed the benefits a biased court system 
that enabled them to escape prosecution. The attorney once defended a Black police brutality victim 
who had seventeen witnesses testify to an officer’s misconduct. The accused patrolman simply told 
the court that the defendant was lying and they lost the case. “There has to be some kind of check 
on the police,” beyond the press, a strong “civilian review board,” Eisenburg noted.134  
  State law established an independent Fire and Police Commission. But the MFPC did not 
operate in isolation from local politics. A south side political club, the Milwaukee Metropolitan Civic 
Alliance (MMCA), influenced the city’s police bureaucracy in postwar decades. The MMCA 
supported pro-growth candidates committed to maintaining the traditional order. This included 
Henry Maier in his campaigns for mayor and Wisconsin’s state assembly. As mayor, Maier appointed 
at least three MMCA members to the MFPC. That commission’s Chief Examiner/Executive 
Secretary, George Ruger, was also a club member. The alliance traded on its connections with City 
Hall to get Inspector of Detectives Harold Breier appointed police chief in 1964, ahead of internal 
candidates who were more closely aligned with the police department’s liberal law-and-order era. 
Breier was an affiliate of the south side civic alliance. The MFPC, comprised of a retired business 
executive, local union officials, and an attorney representing the interests of south side 
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manufacturers, saw value in Breier becoming chief. This also helps explain why the commission was 
so defensive when the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality Committee demanded accountability in 1964. 
The MFPC was, to an extent, beholden to the MMCA and “careful to work within the boundaries” 
of “archaic law,” according to researcher Carl Hamm.135 While the MMCA supported Democrats 
nationally, it flexed a powerful conservative voice in Milwaukee politics. As such, the MFPC 
“exemplified the [civic alliance’s] desire to preserve the status quo and the ‘right’ if not the ‘far right’ 
in politics at the local level.”136 The mayor’s club allegiances also neutralized City Hall’s efforts to 
expand police accountability, as he ignored the Martin-Weber Committee’s 1968 call to establish a 
new public safety review board that was more accountable to citizens. 
 When the MFPC appointed Harold Breier as police chief  in 1964, Milwaukee civil rights 
organizations had only just begun challenging anti-Black racism through direct action street 
demonstrations. The city’s burgeoning civil rights insurgency magnified issues of  racialized police 
violence and lax accountability. Efforts to address policing intersected with and gave shape to related 
campaigns to end employment, education, and housing discrimination. Civil rights mobilizations 
reciprocally intensified white racial animosities, especially among blue-collar workers, merchants, and 
professionals on the south side and other all-white sections of  the city. Chief  Breier showed little 
regard for the physical mistreatment of  activists. He once commented about those who resisted the 
police, “If  they get up again, we’ll knock ‘em down again.”137 In Breier’s view, Black protestors 
undermined police-community relations, and not the other way around. Civil rights activists not only 
inspired civic disorder, but were responsible for Milwaukee’s rising crime rate. It was because the 
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MPD had to “control last summer’s riot and subsequent demonstrations,” distracting them from 
standard assignments, that reported crime increased thirty-three percent Breier said in 1968. Civil 
rights marches, in Breier’s view, harmed the MPD’s “patrol potential,” as they diverted personnel and 
resources away from crime-fighting. To “promote harmonious police-community relations,” he 
argued that civil rights groups should teach their followers “the rights and duties of  citizens.” Breier 
blamed urban ills on the “self-appointed pseudo community leaders” who “taught and preached 
disrespect for law and order.”138 
 The MPD intimidated and surveilled African Americans at Breier’s direction. The chief  
expanded the “close surveillance” tactics of  his predecessors. Patrolmen interrogated dozens of  
Black residents on a routine basis “to know who was on the street in case a crime was committed.”139 
For Breier, overt racial profiling was the most effective means of  preventative patrol. Former Police 
Captain Carl Hamm, who oversaw the Youth Aid Bureau before being removed by Breier, said it was 
informal policy to stop and question any Black residents “discovered after dark outside the area 
which most Negroes lived.”140 African Americans, journalist Frank Aukofer wrote, felt “watched” in 
their own communities. Suburban white residents, on the other hand, felt protected by the police.141 
Patrolmen were instructed to arrest any Black people who “talked back to a police officer” and 
detain on a traffic infraction “any Negro stopped or seen with a white woman in his car.”142 Chief  
Breier instructed subordinates to track the movements and telephone calls of  civil rights leaders, 
including Lloyd Barbee and Father Groppi. In August 1966, he put the NAACP Youth Council and 
 
138 He suggested that Father Groppi and the YC ordered Black youth to skip school in favor of demonstrating and 
rioting. “Breier Says Police Force Has Served Public Well,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 13, 1968, Accent, 1. 
139 National Commission on Civil Disorders, “Report on Disturbances in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 30-August 6, 
1967,” 16. 
140 “Interview with George Pazik, Northtown Planning and Development Council,” 2-3, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.” 
141 “Interview with Frank Aukofer,” 4, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field 
Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.” 
142 “Interview with George Pazik, Northtown Planning and Development Council,” 2-3. 
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its “Freedom House” headquarters under surveillance. The YC reported seeing SAS officers 
photographing its members.143 Breier argued that police monitoring of  Freedom House was in the 
group’s interest, speciously arguing they needed “protection” from outside threats. The YC knew the 
MPD was conducting surveillance as “a pretext to bully and intimidate.” Under the watchful eye of  
plainclothes officers, the department photographed, hassled, and arrested YC members over trivial 
non-violent offenses, such as littering, “interfering,” or playing dice. The group said white officers 
verbally incited them to riot.144 Police claimed they could “shoot off  a few” without any 
consequence. In response to the MPD’s scrutiny, the YC conducted its own “surveillance” of  
Breier’s home residence.145 
 Breier’s racial politics informed administrative, or structural decisions he made as police 
chief. He refused to establish an internal community relations unit tasked with developing 
partnerships with Black and Latinx residents, or neighborhood associations concerned about 
interpersonal crime and police violence. Partnering with communities of  color to ensure stability 
undermined police authority and posed a threat to public order in his view. Breier was hesitant to 
champion minority recruitment and refrained from nominating Black patrolmen, detectives, and 
ranking officers (two) for promotion. The chief  rejected grassroots demands for enhanced civilian 
input on devising enforcement strategies, whether offered by civil rights activists or political liberals 
and moderates. While Breier insisted that MPD personnel acted without bias, his administrative 
choices suggest otherwise. The chief  de-emphasized human relations training in the police academy. 
New recruits received sixty-two hours of  training total, yet only four explored “human relations” 
 
143 This direction followed the firebombing of the Milwaukee NAACP’s offices, as well as an anonymous bomb threat 
called into City Hall. “Anonymous Call Sparked Evacuation, Bomb Hunt,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, August 10, 1966, Page 
10, Part 1; “Curious Onlookers Visit Bomb Site,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, August 10, 1966; Jones, The Selma of the North, 
150. 
144 Police also allegedly told YC members that they hoped they would have to serve in the Vietnam War—a global 
conflict that saw a disproportionate share of poor and working-class Black citizens killed. 
145 They held two “protective vigils” on September 30 and October 1, 1966. Shortly thereafter, the YC announced the 
formation of its “Commando” unit, which Breier viewed as a direct provocation. Jones, The Selma of the North, 150-152. 
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issues. Those that did failed to address minoritized perspectives, racial discrimination, or the 
troubled relationship between Black and Latinx communities and law enforcement. The only 
training film that remotely dealt with “prejudice” emphasized Polish-American experiences. Here, 
the MPD diverged from previous liberal law-and-order administrations. During the 1950s and even 
early 1960s, former Inspector Raymond Dahl said the MPD built strong working relationships 
between the MPD and Black community leaders, in service of  crime prevention.146 Dahl saw “race 
relations” as a “problem” just starting to be “scratched” by the MPD when Breier was named chief. 
After 1964, this programming was almost entirely ignored. 
 
The War on Crime and Milwaukee 
 In the wake of the 1960s urban uprisings, the Johnson administration invested heavily in 
policing. Concurrently, it hoped to reign in racist law enforcement practices that threatened to 
destabilize Black communities and further undermine the police image. Racialized police violence 
and misconduct threatened the administration’s efforts to empower inner city neighborhoods 
through “Great Society” employment training and economic development programs. Federal 
officials planned to compel America’s thousands of individual police agencies to be more democratic 
and value-neutral in their discretionary enforcement practices, ensuring that police better complied 
with civil rights laws and were held accountable to all citizens. The federal state built on a liberal law-
 
146 Dahl retired from the MPD in 1965. The 31-year MPD veteran was proud of his work. He strongly backed the 
MPD’s beat patrol program, which he saw as “the answer to juvenile delinquency and to traffic enforcement…the 
answer to crime prevention.” Still, like Breier, Dahl bypassed police discretion as a factor in generating “the recent wave 
of civil disobedience,” asserting that “law and order” was “a community problem, not a police problem.” Schools and 
parents had to do more to teach “respect for the law.” “How One City Keeps Its Streets Safe,” U.S. News & World 
Report, September 28, 1964, 70. Dahl retired from the MPD to become an instructor at the University of Louisville’s 
Southern Police Institute. There, he organized a seminar on “race relations and riot control” that was partially funded by 
a $500,000 Ford Foundation grant. Dahl had competed with Breier, among others, for the chief of police position. 
“Police Here Understand Race Relations: Dahl,” The Milwaukee Journal, October 6, 1965, Part 3, 1; Milwaukee Police 
Department, Annual Report, 1965, 23. 
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and-order agenda proposed by the Truman administration after World War II.147 Yet the 
administration’s overarching goal was to strengthen law enforcement, so as to better manage periods 
of civil unrest and political dissent.148 Police militarization, via grant-funded technology and weapons 
upgrades, helped advance this process. While most police leaders rejected law enforcement 
liberalism in the 1940s, “revisions and renovations” to policing amid the social crises of the 1960s 
drew in “practitioners and expert counselors” shaped by global experiences with anti-communist, 
counter-insurgency missions.149 To assure public safety, the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice proposed establishing criminal justice planning agencies, 
standardizing the collection of crime data, and investing millions in police professionalization 
through a dedicated federal agency—the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).150 
 
147 The Truman administration aimed to shore up the “first civil right” of citizens: freedom from violence.” See: Naomi 
Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
148 Eruptions of civil violence exposed the limitations of Johnson’s Great Society platform as a political vehicle for 
advancing equality. Intensifying Black frustration with structural racism and police violence led to mounting episodes of 
civil unrest in America’s cities. State and local governments looked to restore order through force. Some mayors called in 
the National Guard, including Milwaukee’s Henry Maier. Federal troops marched into Detroit. The Johnson 
administration framed Black dissent as a phenomenon grounded in social pathologies rather than as an outcome of 
systemic anti-blackness. Equal opportunity for jobs, employment training, and expanded recreation underscored its anti-
poverty program, not direct economic aid or wealth redistribution. “Community behavior” was framed as “the root 
cause of poverty, and, by extension, crime.” This view was pervasive on Johnson’s “Crime Commission.” In formulating 
its 1967 report, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (PCLEAJ) rejected 
input from poor residents of color exposed to intensifying poverty, crime, and police violence. Federal policymakers 
expanded police and state supervision capacities. The PCLEAJ put the onus for changing “negative attitudes” between 
the police and Black citizens on Black residents themselves. It was the people’s job to make law enforcement feel 
welcome and understood. Humanizing law enforcement as “officer friendly” would, as Elizabeth Hinton has written, 
“soften the impact of the increased patrols” in Black neighborhoods. Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 
86, 102. 
149 The police, as historian Stuart Schrader argues, were “key actors who put crime on the national political agenda and 
benefitted” from the shift towards building “an apparently unbiased policing apparatus.” Schrader, Badges without Borders, 
114. 
150 The Johnson administration announced it would wage its War on Crime in tandem with the War on Poverty in Spring 
1965. It introduced a bill in a Democratic-controlled U.S. Congress that established the Office of Law Enforcement 
Assistance (OLEA). The new agency played a significant role in steering local police, judicial, and correctional decision-
making through the allocation of millions of dollars in federal grant money to state, county, and municipal criminal 
justice agencies. Among the projects that the OLEA championed were community relations, education, and diversity 
hiring initiatives intended to build trust between local police and minoritized citizens. The administration’s goal was to 
restore order and re-authorize police power in impoverished urban neighborhoods of color, while also shoring up civil 
rights compliance and eliminating the discriminatory police actions that so many economically vulnerable and frustrated 
Black citizens were protesting against. The OLEA became the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration following 
passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. President Johnson called for the nation’s War on 
Crime to be “thorough, intelligent, and effective” in his initial presentation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Act to 
Congress on March 8, 1965. Elizabeth Hinton, “Why We Should Reconsider the War on Crime,” Time, March 20, 2015, 
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The commission argued for aligning police with government institutions focused on social and 
economic development, including the Community Action Programs established as part of the War 
on Poverty.151 Police participation, in theory, helped control crime, tempered youth delinquency, and 
mitigated prospective civil disorders.152  
 The Johnson administration framed the War on Poverty and War on Crime as twin 
enterprises—equality and order as two sides of the same coin. However, making connections 
between law enforcement and federal anti-poverty programs did more to aggravate inequality than 
aid distressed urban communities. As historian Elizabeth Hinton has argued, the liberal 
administration “operated from the assumption that black community pathology caused poverty and 
crime.” It “supported a punitive transformation of urban social programs” founded “on the 
principle that saturating a targeted area with surveillance equipment and police officers performing 
both social welfare and crime control functions would effectively restore order.”153 Even as they 
contributed to social welfare programs, the government held municipal police responsible for 
 
accessed January 20, 2020, http://time.com/3746059/war-on-crime-history. 
151 The Challenge of Crime served as the basis for the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which, among 
other provisions, established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration within the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society: A 
Report by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1967). 
152 The Johnson administration shored up police power through criminal justice interventions that fiscally supported law 
enforcement and prioritized the rehabilitation of the police image ahead of administering direct economic aid to poor 
and working-class citizens exposed to excessive poverty, crime, and police violence. The administration waged both of 
its domestic “wars” on liberal terms. For example, the War on Crime paired the expansion of police power with calls to 
increase Black and Latinx police hiring and implement police-community relations and sensitivity training programs. 
While these measures, were intended to expand access and promote police-civilian trust in segregated Black 
neighborhoods, they “largely translated to public relations efforts to improve the image of law enforcement.” The state 
insisted upon the flawed logic that “federally subsidized police recruitment and training could become racially fair.” 
Murakawa, The First Civil Right, 73-74. 
153 The NACCD shared this view about Black pathologies and their relationship to crime and poverty, despite 
recognizing that white racism conditioned urban ghettos. It advocated for jobs creation programs and a guaranteed 
minimum income alongside policing solutions. The NACCD argued that empowering police officials in helping to 
devise and participate in urban social programs would improve police-community relations, reinforce law enforcement, 
and guarantee social control. Elizabeth Hinton, “From ‘War on Crime’ to War on the Black Community: The Enduring 
Impact of President Johnson’s Crime Commission,” Boston Review, accessed February 16, 2020, 
http://bostonreview.net/us/elizabeth-hinton-kerner-commission-crime-commission. 
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“identifying criminals and removing them from the streets.”154 The economic costs of civil violence 
and the “paramilitary response” that a small percentage of Black residents engaged in convinced 
federal officials that the War on Poverty’s “housing, education, and training programs” were 
indefensible spending priorities.155 As the administration began closing War on Poverty programs in 
Black communities, scaling back funding for “autonomous grassroots organizations,” local police 
departments filled the void. The bulk of federal domestic aid to cities was soon being directed 
towards punitive criminal justice solutions as opposed to rehabilitative, non-violent public health 
solutions.156 The transition of the federal War on Poverty to the War on Crime in the late 1960s and 
into the 1970s was supported by the same racist, criminogenic ideas about Black life and culture that 
characterized the Great Migration era.157 Not only did federal officials ignore the institutional racism 
that conditioned the postwar urban crisis, but they cataloged Black civil disobedience alongside 
lawless white resistance. This helped reinforce a thorny middle ground that allowed both racial 
liberals and conservatives to argue for enhanced policing and punishment in response to civil unrest 
rooted in racism and inequality.158 In this way, the Johnson administration helped lay the 
foundations for the nation’s late-century “carceral state.”159 
 
154 Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 113-114. 
155 Paramilitary responses also likely “made militant appeals more attractive to young people living in segregated 
poverty.” Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 112. 
156 Seventy-five percent of Safe Streets Act funding went to municipal police forces. Courts, corrections, and community 
control initiatives supported by civil rights and Black Power advocates were either secondary concerns or disregarded. 
Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 113. 
157 These ideas had serious implications for Black citizens grappling with racism, injustice, and inequality. As with the 
police-community relations movement of the 1940s, the federal government did not really value Black citizens as equal 
partners in restoring order in cities. It positioned African Americans as incapable of self-control, as evidenced by so-
called “rioting.” 
158 Consequently, police departments continued to enforce the law aggressively in “high crime” Black and Latinx 
neighborhoods. The War on Crime resulted in a growing number of Black citizens being brought into closer contact 
with “the punitive arm of the state.” This increased “the likelihood of their eventual incarceration.” Hinton, From the War 
on Poverty to the War on Crime, 113. 
159 On the origins of the carceral state, see: Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the 
Making of Modern Urban America, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019); Heather Ann Thompson, 
“Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History,” The 
Journal of American History no. 97.3 (December 2010): 703–734; Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime; Balto, 
Occupied Territory. Such dynamics worsened under Republican administrations, which worked with Congress to grant state 
governments more control over funding disbursements. Richard Nixon’s “New Federalism” served “as a bulwark 
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 In Milwaukee, the War on Crime converged with the police bureaucracy’s mixed efforts to, 
on the one hand, impose law and order amid rising reported crime and, on the other, gradually 
democratize police hiring, build mutual trust in predominantly Black and Brown neighborhoods, and 
improve accountability structures in the face of sustained police violence. Chief Breier’s reactionary 
law-and-order ethos contrasted with the Johnson administration’s liberal “community relations” 
recommendations. Milwaukee police chiefs had embraced liberal law-and-order reforms in the 
1940s. Yet, Breier eschewed any that called for closer working relations between police and 
communities of color vulnerable to police violence, poverty, and crime. This contrasted the outward 
pronouncements of police chiefs addressing similar public safety concerns in racially segregated U.S. 
cities. Breier joined police leaders who “decried federal encroachment” while they “craved federal 
dollars.”160 He was willing to apply for police equipment and computer upgrades that improved the 
MPD’s technological and weapon’s capacities. But Breier was skeptical of interventions from 
Washington, D.C., or Madison for that matter, that he believed might weaken his authority. He saw 
the creation of “community relations units,” independent civilian oversight boards, and racial 
diversity in police hiring and promotions as a threat to his ability to control MPD regulations, 
procedures, and outcomes. Therefore, he refused to apply for federal criminal justice planning grants 
that went towards police-community relations improvements and opening lines of communication 
 
against reform” in the criminal justice arena, “enabling all manner of repressive policing and wanton violence to go 
unchallenged.” As Stuart Schrader has argued, federalism “was the same force that “sanctioned passivity amid lynchings 
and other racist outrages.” Schrader, Badges without Borders, 118-119. Grafting the War on Crime onto city governments, 
like any national project of its size and scope, was a knotty process. Local dynamics threatened to undermine the intent 
and application of federal criminal justice directives. Significantly, conservative political forces at the national level relied 
on the ideology of federalism to ensure state control over War on Crime implementation and expenditures. This blocked 
some municipal criminal justice planning agencies form receiving direct federal aid, in addition to CAPs eligible for War 
on Crime funding. The Johnson Crime Commission argued that Black-run social institutions that had received federal 
anti-poverty funding had failed urban youth. As a result, Black young people expressed their discontent in a disorderly 
fashion. The commission subscribed to Labor Department undersecretary Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s thesis that, despite 
racial discrimination and inequality, a lack of “strong and loving parental guidance” had produced a generation of Black 
youth prone to criminality. Such racist assumptions influenced the PCLEAJ’s “battle plan.” Hinton, From the War on 
Poverty to the War on Crime, 101. 
160 Schrader, Badges without Borders, 114. 
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with residents living in “high crime” areas. Milwaukee’s police chief worked to rhetorically and 
administratively limit opportunities for outside meddling into the department’s affairs. This 
presented a problem, as the Department of Justice mandated state and local police agencies 
receiving any federal aid comply with the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s anti-discrimination provisions. 
Breier’s resistance to federal directives, in turn, hardened Black and Latinx perceptions of police 
illegitimacy and unaccountability. 
 Breier insisted in the press and before police accountability advocates that the MPD already 
had an effective “community relations” program. The department printed and distributed “crime 
prevention brochures” on auto theft, muggings, women’s self-defense, and burglaries. Police 
lectured to school children, handed out pamphlets, recognized citizen contributions to crime 
control, and set up event booths for police recruitment. To the chief, these activities generated the 
“personal contact” among police and community groups that reformers demanded. The MPD 
developed “citizen cooperation” in support of the city’s “crime fighting program.” In other words, 
“community relations” for Breier relied on one-way communications of police policy to citizens 
interested in the police function. There was no preventative imperative to involve the community in 
the day-to-day work of controlling crime; police responded after it occurred. Citizens were 
responsible for answering police questions when asked, then moving out of the way. Residents did 
not help shape crime control or order maintenance strategies, set rules, or impose discipline. The 
MPD’s “excellent” community relations program was, according to Chief Breier about “a common 
understanding of teamwork, fair play, and wholesome living.”161 That was “community relations of 
 
161 All patrolmen and detectives were “trained to be courteous and to use good judgment and common sense in their 
every contact with citizens.” Breier authorized select personnel to deliver speeches and conduct tours of the Milwaukee 
Safety Building. Officers volunteered time lecturing on crime prevention, “the dangers of drug abuse,” “women’s self-
defense,” and “citizen-police cooperation.” They did so at parent-teacher gatherings, business events, and church and 
fraternal association meetings. Feit, “The Milwaukee Police Department, March-April, 1970,” 9; “Breier Says Whole 
Force Works on Community Relations,” The Milwaukee Journal, April 18, 1966, Part 3, 1. 
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the highest form.”162 
 Milwaukee’s policing history shows that the relationship between federal law enforcement 
experts and local police officials was not always one of collaboration, as scholars have suggested. 
Chief Breier rejected the main problem areas outlined by the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders in its 1968 report.163 He did not see psychological or cultural sensitivity screenings as 
necessary in determining who patrolled in predominantly Black spaces. Police review boards, 
likewise, were anathema to police administrators in Milwaukee and a threat to the chief’s legal 
authority. Breier saw no use for detailed policy guidelines that provided officers with discretionary 
guidance on determining whether criminal offenders should be arrested according to contextual 
factors. Lawlessness was lawlessness and the chief wanted his officers to arrest all violators. Breier 
did not support Black police recruitment for the sake of diversity. The “best” applicants should be 
hired, regardless of race, based on exam scores and job fitness. The chief paid little mind to federal, 
state, and local coordination around police planning, preferring to set his own strategic direction for 
his department. He eschewed federal aid for community-based crime control agencies staffed by 
social workers, city employees, and police. Breier also rejected social welfare agencies that 
functioned outside the purview of the criminal justice system, like Youth Service Bureaus. While he 
opposed bringing communities into closer contact with the MPD, that did not mean Breier refrained 
from monitoring populations he viewed as criminal and potentially rebellious. While the federal 
government expressed concern about a vulnerable police image and law enforcement’s perceived 
 
162 According to Breier, the MPD logged 3,200 hours of community relations work in the first four months of 1968. The 
previous year, he added a mandatory 12-hour training course on “the importance of proper decision making by line and 
staff supervisors,” a video for supervisors titled “Police-Minority,” and concert performances by the MPD band at 
schools. Breier also noted that the MPD’s Youth Aid Bureau coordinated discussions between young people and 
professional athletes. Children in police custody received special attention from the MPD, he maintained. Commanding 
officers evaluated cases and brought in parents for conferences intended to “reach an understanding of the law.” “Breier 
Says Police Force Has Served Public Well,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 13, 1968, “Accent,” 1. 
163 The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, The Kerner Report (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2016). 
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legitimacy in a charged political atmosphere, Breier saw the MPD’s image as strengthened by 1967’s 
civil unrest.  
 Advancing police reforms, to the extent that they had any control over the implementation 
process, fell to Mayor Maier, the Common Council, and the MFPC. For City Hall, enacting even 
minimal police reforms without alienating white voters who supported the status quo upheld by 
Breier and his allies was a delicate process. While all three institutions historically backed the 
independent authority of Milwaukee’s police chief, they, unlike him, saw opportunities to make 
piecemeal adjustments that appeased both accountability advocates and besieged Black residents 
mistrustful of the police and eager to more responsibly curtail rising crime. Still, they struggled 
mightily to institute federal community relations guidelines with Breier in charge of the MPD. As 
studies on Los Angeles and Chicago illustrate, Milwaukee was well behind in creating a revised 
“community relations philosophy” as it grappled with its crisis of police legitimacy.164 The city also 
diverged from San Francisco, St. Louis, Atlanta, and Baltimore, where neighborhood centers 
received citizen complaints, involved “the community in analyzing and correcting its own 
problems,” and emphasized “self-determination, communication of grievances, department 
feedback, civilian crime prevention and revised training programs for recruits.”165 In this way, 
citizens were brought into the process of expanding—and further legitimating—police power. 
 Against this backdrop, Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy applied for criminal justice funding to 
shore up its policing system. The recruitment, training, and assignment of Black officers signified the 
most palatable reform in the wake of the 1967 civil disturbance. The Johnson Crime Commission 
had listed Black police hiring among its policy recommendations, finding that “for police in a Negro 
community to be predominantly white can serve as a dangerous irritant.”166 The NACCD echoed 
 
164 See: Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles, 113; Balto, Occupied Territory. 
165 Feit, “The Milwaukee Police Department, March-April, 1970.” 
166 Ad Hoc Committee on Police Administration in Milwaukee, “The Problem of Police Community Relations in 
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calls for police diversification, among other structural recommendations in its 1968 report. The 
LEAA awarded state criminal justice agencies federal dollars to meet specific policing objectives. 
Following passage of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Governor Warren 
Knowles established the Wisconsin Council on Criminal Justice (WCCJ).167 The council conducted 
state criminal justice planning and administered Safe Streets Act funds in Wisconsin. Recruiting 
Black patrolmen became part of a larger plan to alleviate police-Black citizen tensions on 
Milwaukee’s north side. For racial liberals, the approach corresponded with the equal opportunity 
and “maximum feasible participation” provisions guiding the Johnson administration’s Great Society 
platform.168 Yet expanding Black participation in the system without challenging law enforcement’s 
basic charge of defending white capitalist interests, or preserving the subordinate status of poor and 
working-class people of color, meant racialized police violence would persist.169 The federal 
government only superficially addressed the street-level discretion, oversight, and disciplining of 
 
Milwaukee,” 6, Ad Hoc Committee on Police Administration in Milwaukee, Milwaukee SC 177. 
167 Governor Warren Knowles originally established the WCCJ in the Wisconsin Attorney General’s office, but soon 
brought the 21-member body under his direct authority. Police Isolation and Community Needs, 38-39. 
168 Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation (New York: Haymarket Books, 2016), 40-41; 
Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 84-86. Federal responses to urban inequality and civil unrest after 
1964 shaped policy responses in Milwaukee. Community Action Programs (CAP) were an important part of the Johnson 
administration’s anti-poverty agenda. They called for the “maximum feasible participation” of poor people living in 
designated poverty areas. This included Milwaukee’s north side. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) 
distributed grants to local community action agencies responsible for planning and dispersing federal funds to grassroots 
antipoverty agencies. CAPs were intended to empower poor people to lift themselves up out of poverty on their own 
initiative. However, they left vulnerable Black residents liable for the War on Poverty’s success or failure. Federal 
officials failed to name white racism or hold to account the federal, state, county, and municipal agencies responsible for 
historical patterns of injustice. The Johnson administration maintained a liberal rationale for conducting CAPs, 
emphasizing poor Black behavior as the primary driver of metropolitan inequality. The federal government located the 
onus for change on poor people themselves, asking them to fix entrenched economic conditions of the white majority’s 
making. The state expected African Americans to “cope with their own experiences of marginalization” in order to gain 
freedom from repressive ghetto conditions. White elected officials, meanwhile, bore no responsibility for remediating 
urban poverty and inequality, while continuing to run governing institutions. Although the Johnson administration did 
not hold white-controlled institutions responsible for engendering inequality, there was some value in articulating and 
funding a vision of Black self-empowerment that, even if short-term, provided grassroots organizations with resources 
and the confidence needed to take on pressing economic issues. Elizabeth Hinton, “Stop Blaming the Victims,” Miller 
Center, accessed April 24, 2019, https://millercenter.org/issues-policy/us-domestic-policy/stop-blaming-victims. 
169 This is not to say that the federal government was wholly ineffective at affirming racial equality in policing; it also 
served the vital function of upholding civil rights compliance among grant recipients. This often came at the behest of 
Black officers, who were eager to make good on the protections outlined in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. 
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officers that enabled discriminatory enforcement, abuses of power, and lax accountability. 
 Chief Breier avoided race-conscious recruitment drives engaged in by other big city police 
departments. Civil Rights Attorney Terrance Pitts noted that he removed Black patrolmen from the 
civil disturbance area.170 A number quit the department because they had to be “Uncle Toms” to 
make it professionally. In 1968, the chief addressed Black police recruitment and its place in the 
police bureaucracy’s public relations efforts. Although he said it was the MFPC’s job to oversee 
employment, Breier said he “made it a matter of policy to urge all our law enforcement people to ask 
qualified persons to make application for the position.” While he insisted this “solicitation” was “to 
all people regardless of color or creed,” the chief could not say how many Black men served on the 
department. Estimates for June 1967 pointed to thirty-five to forty of 2,000 sworn officers, with 
Captain Dewey Russ being the highest ranking Black employee.171 Attrition rates were high. The 
MPD was only two percent Black, “with little chance of improvement in the foreseeable future.”172 
Breier’s racist attitudes “permeated the entire department,” a NACCD field team representative 
wrote. The chief denied that Black officers possessed cultural fluency, or that their experiences and 
familiarity with the Black community diverged from the white rank-and-file. All personnel 
comprised “a vital part of our community relations program,” Breier insisted. Black recruitment 
“would help any police department’s community relations program,” he reasoned. Yet, Breier made 
no direct effort to recruit African Americans and undermined the MFPC’s efforts. Black personnel 
had to genuflect to white superiors in order to advance in rank. Breier, some said, undermined 
 
170 “Interview with Terrance Pitts,” 3, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-
Oct. 3, 1967.” 
171 “Breier Says Police Force Has Record of Service to Public,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 13, 1968, “Accent,” 2. Of 
1,800 sworn personnel on the MPD, the NACCD field team reported “only 70” were Black. Assemblyman Barbee 
counted no more than forty. These counts varied because the police department and MFPC did not track race in 
employment. “Adequacy to City’s Response to Grievances,” 1, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field 
Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.” 
172 “Potential after Riot,” 1, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 
1967.” 
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promotional opportunities.173 Promotion had little to do with “professional abilities.” Officers 
advanced because they agreed with Breier and were deemed “controllable.”174 
 The city appeared to take demands for improved police accountability structures, minority 
recruitment, and the need for culturally responsive policing seriously as the War on Crime ramped 
up. However, it inevitably sabotaged its own narrow reform proposals as a result of the police chief’s 
immense power. A prime initiative was hiring a “Community Relations Specialist” (CRS) to handle 
citizen police complaints, lecture on “human relations” at the police academy, speak to community 
groups about the police function, and recruit Black and Latinx officers.175 The first CRS was 
appointed in November 1967, in the wake of civil unrest. The position was initially approved by 
Mayor Maier and the Common Council in 1966.176 Richard Artisan, a Black police officer with FBI 
experience, got the job but resigned within six months. He stated in a public letter that “community 
relations programs require the involvement, cooperation, and assignment of uniformed personnel 
who are committed to its success.” The MFPC, Artisan alleged, delayed the implementation of new 
procedures, held hearings behind closed doors, and deprived its own specialist of a “functional role 
in processing complaints.”177 He said he could not adequately represent the interests of the 
community. 
 
173 The MFPC once ranked former Black detective Charles Densford second out of six officers applying for Detective 
Sergeant. Fifty applicants applied and six passed the examination. The chief allegedly conferred with MFPC members 
and lowered Densford to sixth in promotion rank without explanation. He was passed over, in his view, because he 
“refused to Tom.” Interview with Charles Densford, Former Detective of the Milwaukee Police Department,” 1-2, 
“Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967 - Oct. 3, 1967.” 
174 Densford called for an MFPC “representative of the community,” with at least one Black member, “a community 
relations division within the department,” and “a civilian review board to investigate complaints of police brutality.” 
Interview with Charles Densford, Former Detective of the Milwaukee Police Department,” 1-2, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-Oct. 3, 1967.” 
175 Within six months, the city’s first specialist had resigned, stating that “community relations programs require the 
involvement, cooperation, and assignment of uniformed personnel who are committed to its success.” Police Isolation and 
Community Needs, 69-71. 
176 The position was eventually funded in a 1969 Safe Streets Act grant for $77,973. That money was matched by a state 
contribution of $51,983. The 1969 grant totaled $129,957. Police Isolation and Community Needs, 25. 
177 Reverend Kenneth Bowen replaced Richard Artisan in February 1968. Feit, “The Milwaukee Police Department, 
March-April, 1970,” 23-25. 
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Likewise, Rev. Kenneth Bowen, a Black pastor and respected community leader, referred to 
the job as “a sinecure to appease the black community.” The new CRS “resented the intimidation” 
that police bureaucrats exerted. The position lacked authority to follow up on public grievances. The 
department blocked the CRS from contacting accusers, even to inform them of a complaint status. 
When CRS Bowen criticized Chief Breier for his personal obstruction, the MFPC admonished him 
behind closed doors, urging Bowen not to speak to reporters. The local press objected to this 
exclusion, citing a freedom of information violation. Rev. Bowen began referring cases to the 
Wisconsin Civil Liberties Union over the MFPC. Protecting the police image and cooling 
opportunities for dissent seemed to be the commission’s sole priorities, not instilling justice for 
aggrieved citizens.  
 Chief Breier deliberately undermined the CRS’ utility. He offered little to no institutional 
support to Richard Artisan or Rev. Kenneth Bowen. Breier refused to assist on dispute resolutions 
between police and community members that the CRS mediated. Without the chief’s backing, and 
thus rank-and-file support, the CRS failed to repair damaged community relations, instill trust, and 
encourage Black young people to join the MPD. Breier declined to appoint the few existing Black 
officers on the force to help the CRS and MFPC recruitment efforts. In addition, he squandered 
federal money earmarked for Black and Latinx Police Aide recruitment by directing the bulk of the 
grant towards lecturing lower-to-intermediate elementary school children; he avoided high school 
students who might presently seek a police career. As CRS Bowen observed with frustration, the 
Breier downplayed the extent to which Black people “identified [the police] with the arm of 
repression.”178 When the Common Council Judiciary Committee held a hearing in 1970 about 
strengthening the CRS and including a stronger oversight function, Breier testified that he opposed 
civilian review of police complaints and argued it would hinder police morale. The motion was 
 
178 Bowen resigned as Community Relations Specialist in 1973. 
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shelved; more than half of the Common Council was beholden to Breier. As Louis Miller, the 
MFPC’s first Black commissioner stated after his 1973 resignation, “None of the actions we’ve taken 
have done anything to slow down citizen complaints…the same things are being done by the police 
department.”179  
 Consequently, the police bureaucracy’s community relations strategy foundered. It was 
difficult to enact substantive reforms when the police chief possessed so much authority. 
“Community relations” improvements had to correspond with Breier’s willingness to participate. 
This led to wasteful spending. For instance, federal grant money was used to purchase and outfit a 
“community relations mobile unit” in 1969.180 Police patrolmen drove the vehicle—a customized 
bus—into communities of color. There, they lectured to the public on the benefits of policing 
careers and people’s responsibilities in helping law enforcement control crime and maintain order. In 
1971, an evaluation team determined that the community relations mobile unit “did not meet goals 
of minority recruitment or specialized training.”181 This failure, along with a growing number of 
violent police-citizen encounters, encouraged Black community leaders to take a far more active role 
in police testing, hiring, and training.  
 Administrative intransigence was not the only reason Milwaukee’s police-community 
relations program failed to meet its objectives; the MFPC had a credibility problem. Many Black and 
Latinx folk saw the commission as withdrawn and beholden to the mayor and police chief. As a 
1975 Milwaukee Journal series documented, all but one Fire and Police Commissioner had politically 
donated to Mayor Maier’s political campaigns as of 1974.182 Residents pondered the commission’s 
capacity for hearing alleged grievances and fairly assessing police misconduct violations. The MFPC 
 
179 “1st Black on Police Board Quits,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 9, 1973, Part 1, 1, 13. 
180 The community relations mobile unit was eventually dedicated in February, 1970. Box 81, Folder 27, “Fire and Police 
Commission, January-June, 1970,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
181 Police Isolation and Community Needs, 25-27. 
182 “Value of Police Commission Questioned,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 25, 1975, Part 1, 1, 6. 
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had not dismissed a single police officer based on a citizen complaint since it gained the authority to 
do so in 1911, despite several known cases of police brutality and abuses of power. The MPD’s 
Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA), handpicked by Chief Breier, investigated the few police complaints 
that the commission heard.183 The bureau denied the CRS access to police records and reports when 
conducting investigations into police brutality. The BIA also conducted investigations on public 
complaints brought by citizens to police district stations. The BIA was said to be chronically 
“understaffed,” its employees “overworked and untrained for the subtleties of following through 
with complaints.” Breier only appointed aging officers to the bureau who professed loyalty to the 
chief and the MPD’s existing structures. No officers with college degrees served in the BIA. Their 
job, according to one researcher, was to “erase problems,” nothing more. Chief Breier, Newspaper 
publisher Irwin Maier stated, oversaw all charges of police brutality to ensure that the truth remained 
concealed.184 
 One reason the MFPC struggled to remove abusive officers was the “freeholder’s clause” in 
the 1911 statute, which stated that only property owners could file grievances with the commission. 
The Common Council voted to change the City Charter in 1968 to expand the pool of potential 
complainants to “qualified electors.”185 The Wisconsin State Assembly also approved its own 
procedural reform measure. Nonetheless, the MFPC continued to deny youth, passersby, and people 
unable to vote due to a criminal conviction from filing complaints. The Ad Hoc Committee on 
Police Administration (AHCPA) fought to change the verbiage from “electors” to any “person” 
 
183 Barbara Dembski and Monroe Walker, “A Look Beyond the Badge,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 23, 1975, Part 1, 
1, 20. 
184 “Interview with Irwin Maier,” 2, “Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-
Oct. 3, 1967.” 
185 The Common Council’s judiciary-legislation committee recommended changing the state law preventing all people 
from filing misconduct complaints against police and fire personnel. The law had been changed from authorizing 
property holders to file complaints to authorizing “electors” in June 1966. The MFPC was against the change to allowing 
anyone to file a complaint. Alderwoman Vel Phillips said barring minors, new immigrants, suburban residents, city 
visitors, and “insane” people from filing complaints was “morally wrong.” “Panel Urges Complaints Law Change,” The 
Milwaukee Sentinel, October 1, 1968, Part 1, 5. 
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with a complaint, as it made a series of accountability recommendations in November 1968.186 
 The MFPC was historically secretive. When the WCCJ awarded the commission $35,000 in 
Safe Streets Act funds to write a comprehensive plan for criminal justice improvements, a draft was 
submitted and adopted in a closed Common Council session. The MFPC held hearings on police 
misconduct behind closed doors as well. The City Attorney objected to this practice on the grounds 
that citizens deserved a fair hearing. The commission was not legally obligated to do so, however. 
Back-and-forth delayed implementation of a revised complaint procedure.187 “Mired in the status 
quo,” the MFPC put more energy towards defending an outmoded, ineffective oversight model than 
towards proposing reforms that allowed the people to determine “how the department was run.”188  
 
Struggling for Police Accountability 
In rejecting “police-community relations” reforms that saw a more proactive role for law 
enforcement in improving the social and economic conditions facing his city’s Black and Brown 
populations, Chief Breier and the MPD indirectly strengthened the arguments of critics who 
supported liberal law-and-order. His reactionary approach to police tactics and administration 
rendered preventative policing strategies a more attractive solution, even if these too called for a 
high rate of taxpayer investment and rested on precarious public perceptions of police legitimacy. 
This was the goal for most African Americans in Milwaukee. Black citizens wanted to be included in 
the police bureaucracy, believed in law enforcement’s capacity for change, and hoped to have a 
meaningful role in the police decision-making and oversight process. Moreover, few accountability 
advocates hoped to “abolish” the MPD. Rather, they aimed to reconstitute the department around 
 
186 Freda Kellams to Betty McJunkin, November 6, 1968, Ad Hoc Committee on Police Administration in Milwaukee, 
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187 Feit, “The Milwaukee Police Department, March-April, 1970,” 23-25. 
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liberal principles of access, fairness, and inclusion. And yet, Chief Breier and Milwaukee’s white-
controlled political establishment treated even reformist police accountability advocates as radical 
leftists seeking to overthrow the established order. 
In the summer of 1968, after two hundred straight nights of marching for an open housing 
ordinance, Milwaukee’s NAACP Youth Council turned its attention towards the issue of racialized 
police violence. The group implored Breier to meet and discuss “police-community relations” 
improvements. That the chief negotiate with “the poverty stricken, the ghetto minority and the 
youth generation…venting their wrath upon the only identifiable image of their government, the 
police officer,” in his view, was “hogwash.”189 Yet, this was the crux of the problem—police were 
often the only state agents that many segregated Black residents encountered on a daily basis. The 
YC took special issue with the department’s TEU, which they perceived as a repressive unit 
authorized by the chief to stamp out civil rights activists and aggressively impose racial control on 
Milwaukee’s north side.190 The council gathered more than two thousand signatures for a petition 
that demanded one particularly violent TEU officer be removed from the unit, as well as from 
policing Black neighborhoods. That July, the MPD arrested two YC members at a tavern. Following 
this incident, the council urgently called for a meeting with the MFPC, which was evidently working 
with the Milwaukee Commission on Community Relations to find solutions to the inner city’s 
policing crisis. For the YC, it was important that Black police officers, “who have an understanding 
of the people and their problems,” take the lead in any new community relations program.191 The 
group attended an MFPC meeting on July 26, 1968. There, they demanded the removal of Tactical 
Squad officer Armando Brazzoni. Father James Groppi and YC members accused him of using 
 
189 “Breier Says Police Force Has Record of Service to the Public,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 13, 1968, Accent, 2. 
190 “Core Youth Taking Up New Cause,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 21, 1968, Part 2, 1, 6. 
191 Frank A. Aukofer, “Police New Target of Core Protestors,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 21, 1968, Part 2, 6. 
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“threats and coercion” and “inciting violence by his attitude and action.”192 Residents shared first-
hand accounts of Brazzoni’s aggression, as well as the brutality of TEU officers in general. Breier, 
meanwhile, said he investigated the complaints and, not surprisingly, found no wrongdoing. The 
MFPC continued to act as a firewall for the chief. Commission chair Francis Swietlik informed the 
YC they had no power to tell the chief where to assign his personnel. If a qualified citizen registered 
a “lawful” complaint against an officer, they would conduct a trial. Alderwoman Vel Phillips 
attempted to compel action in the Common Council, such as transferring police officers “considered 
to be hostile or contemptuous toward black people.” However, her all-white colleagues voted down 
the proposal.193 
Assemblyman Barbee, at the time Wisconsin’s only Black legislator, documented the MPD’s 
surveillance and often brutal practices as evidence in legislative bills that addressed Milwaukee’s 
unchecked police authority. This included police “tapping telephone lines,” following civil rights 
leaders,” “parking around their homes,” “excessive scrutiny of private lives,” “keeping police 
dossiers on civil rights activists,” “photographing demonstrators and those present at public 
hearings.”194 Barbee outlined the need for Black “community patrols” on the north side, where 
residents “overwhelmed by invading white armies in blue” would feel safe navigating their own 
neighborhoods. In one of the earliest articulations of Black “community control” of the police in 
Milwaukee, Barbee argued that patrolmen could train Black youth and attorneys on how to educate 
 
192 “Police Board Urged to Remove White Policeman from Core,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 26, 1968, Part 2, 1, 3. 
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residents on their civil rights, register grievances, and deal with abusive police and a biased criminal-
legal system that was “either unwilling or unable to believe that policemen lie.” Those who “daily 
experienced the ongoing denial of justice” were best prepared “to operate programs to alleviate the 
misadministration of justice.” As Barbee’s work with the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality Committee in 
1964 and 1965 revealed, city officials ignored police brutality complaints, “regardless of the person 
or group to whom they were presented.” The inability to right police wrongs “through conventional 
channels” amplified Black community mistrust and established a dire need for reform. Barbee joined 
in calling for Black police recruitment and training. However, added that these programs should also 
educate white residents, so they would not over react to seeing African American police. Black youth 
must also be included in the MPD’s Police Aide program, Barbee noted. 
Milwaukee newspapers confronted Chief Breier’s hands-off approach to police-community 
relations before civil violence struck in 1967. The Milwaukee Journal called for a reform program that 
embraced preventative approaches to controlling crime. It editorialized that white patrolmen 
symbolized a wider system of racial injustice to many Black citizens, who needed to feel understood 
in order to properly value the police function. To “help prevent trouble before it starts,” the door 
must be open to “persons the police regard as trouble makers.”195 Police, moreover, should value 
citizen contributions to order maintenance. The MPD could not rely on “crowd control and riot 
regulation” alone. Still, the Journal and others making the case for police reform did not make 
connections between structural racism, police “boundary work,” and the persistence of poverty and 
crime on Milwaukee’s segregated north side. Updated human relations training programs and district 
level “police-citizen liaison committees” would not address policing’s core function of repressing 
 
195 The editorial continued: “The police function can sometimes mean the difference between community harmony and 
community hate, between area calm or upheaval. Intimidation, badgering, the contemptuous remark, the hasty arrest for 
the slightest infraction—such tactics tend to aggravate the situation.” “The Police and the Negro,” The Milwaukee Journal, 
May 16, 1967, Part 1, 16. 
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vulnerable workers and the poor whose discontent was seen by elites as a threat to the traditional 
social and economic order. 
A study committee formed by the Wisconsin legislature following the release of the NACCD 
report chided the Milwaukee police chief’s “Pollyanna” attitude towards “police-community 
relations.”196 Legislators concluded that there was “as much desire for law and order” on the near 
north side as there was in surrounding communities. Police had to work harder to earn the respect 
of “the ghetto community” in order to resolve tensions. Breier’s refusal to cooperate with the 
Governor’s Commission on Law Enforcement to procure federal aid and his unwillingness to attend 
the 1968 International Police Chiefs Association meeting rankled investigators, who also chastised 
Milwaukee’s Common Council for not concerning itself with police rules and practices. Aldermen 
historically passed resolutions on routine decisions, like changing fiscal allowances for police 
uniforms and transferring funds through city coffers. Increasing racial tensions between the police 
and Black citizens, as well as a rise in reported street crime in the late 1960s, encouraged the 
Common Council to debate police-community relations and the city’s civilian police complaint 
structures. Aldermen discussed Milwaukee’s lawful controls over the chief of police and the need for 
a rigorous police department study. Between 1965 and 1972, the Common Council introduced at 
least six ordinances related to police-community relations and the pacification of racial tensions. 
Most followed the “storm of riots” around the country from 1967 to 1968.197 
 
196 The Wisconsin Legislative Council Advisory Committee was led by state senator Walter Chilsen (R-Wausau). 
Reflecting the MPD’s turn away from the MPD’s once robust investment in its Youth Aid Bureau, the Chilsen report 
noted that the department only staffed one office to deal with the now 70,000 youths in Milwaukee’s “poverty area.” 
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against Black citizens. In response to this criticism, Breier denied that the department had a strategic issue in connecting 
with Black youth on the near north side. “Our community relations program certainly reaches out to them. Westburg, 
“The Socio-Political Matrix of the Milwaukee Police Department,” 59. “Breier Called Blind to Police Problems,” The 
Milwaukee Journal, October 23, 1968, Part 1, 1, 24. Breier responded, arguing “We are relating to them…But we do not 
reach the militants, certain clergy, certain bleeding hearts, certain do-gooders, and certain other dissidents.” The problem 
was not the police, but the community. “Breier Says Police Serve Well in the Core,” The Milwaukee Journal, October 24, 
1968, Part 1, 1, 11. 
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 298 
While government studies did nothing to alter the legal parameters of police power in 
Milwaukee, Mayor Maier nevertheless insisted on commissioning a new one to determine how the 
city might reduce police-community tensions and improve the police function. Many in Milwaukee’s 
Black community saw this as a face-saving measure. In 1968, Maier appointed the Martin-Weber 
Committee (MWC) to improve the organizational function of city government.198 The body 
recommended several notable public safety improvements. Its members agreed with the growing 
consensus among police accountability advocates that the MFPC should have the power to remove 
fire and police chiefs “at its pleasure,” while also setting “indefinite terms” of employment.199 The 
MWC lamented the commission’s “limited authority” on rule-making and personnel matters. 
Furthermore, it saw Breier’s concentrated power as “a serious organizational flaw.” The chief was 
“neither elected nor accountable to an elected official or body, directly or indirectly.”200 The public 
was blocked from offering input on how their communities were policed and lacked any institutional 
mechanism to address perceived misconduct. 
The Martin-Weber Committee implicitly denounced the existing statutory framework of 
police power that privileged Milwaukee’s police chief. Bringing the community into the decision-
making process, the MWC argued, would provide the MPD with “a broader base than would 
otherwise exist for the acceptance and support of enforcement policies.” Among its proposals, the 
committee called for a more comprehensive police function that went beyond “apprehending law 
breakers.” Its proposals for enhanced “visibility” and oversight mirrored the Johnson Crime 
Commission’s 1967 recommendation for more “effective legislative, executive, and judicial review 
 
198 In January 1968, Mayor Maier appointed a 9-member committee to study and draft a proposal for the reorganization 
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and control” of the police.201 The MWC wrote that “civilian control” of the MPD be “substantially 
increased.” To do so, it called for the MFPC to function as a true “policy board.” “Personnel 
matters”—the “selection, appointment, promotion, demotion and discharge of fire and police 
officers”—required bureaucratic oversight, well outside of the MPD’s purview. This revised “Public 
Safety Board” “would exercise policy-making authority over many aspects of the Department” and 
be liable for “budgeting, community relations, physical facilities, organization, compensation, rules 
of conduct, research and evaluation of performance.”202 Breier opposed the concept as “destructive 
of police morale.”203 Around this time, the Common Council and Wisconsin Assembly both 
introduced bills that limited Milwaukee Police Chiefs to terms of five to six years, subject to renewal. 
Neither measure passed. 
Racial liberals remained at the vanguard of Milwaukee’s police accountability movement in 
the late 1960s. A grassroots coalition, the Ad Hoc Committee on Police Administration (AHCPA), 
formed after the release of NACCD report in February 1968. The committee of veteran civil rights 
activists sought to change law enforcement policies in ways that increased Black representation, 
input, and oversight in Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy. They identified approaches to reforming 
local police administration: passing ordinances, revising statutes, applying community pressure, and 
enacting “test cases.” The AHCPA was rooted in Milwaukee’s legal and Catholic civil rights 
community. The Milwaukee Archdiocese’s social justice arm, the Council on Urban Life (CUL), 
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galvanized the AHCPA. A legal and ethical responsibility drove the group’s police-community 
relations proposals. Attorney Jack Eisendrath chaired the committee, which advocated six main 
objectives: First, revising the 1911 statute so that all persons in first-class cities could file lawful 
grievances against the police, not only electors or property-holders. Second, establishing judicial 
review of MFPC decisions. Third, creating an independent staff with subpoena powers to review all 
police complaints. Fourth, expanding the MFPC from five to seven members, each serving three-
year terms. Fifth, passing a statute that would limit police and fire chiefs to five-year 
appointments.204 Finally, recruiting and promoting more Black police officers.205 
The reformist AHCPA believed in procedural justice and the fair imposition of public order 
by law enforcement. The phrase “police brutality” was notably absent from the committee’s 
demands. The group did not single out white racial violence committed against Black demonstrators, 
nor did it highlight the MPD’s surveillance of civil rights activists. Alternatively, the AHCPA saw it 
as “essential to the maintenance of law and order in any community that citizens live with respect 
for the police.” In turn, “an effective police force must have respect for and understanding of the 
people in a community in which the police seek to enforce the law.”206 The AHCPA noted the 
MPD’s exceptional status, observing that people “pointed with pride to a police force which had 
gained a preeminent position in the Nation.” However, the department’s community relations 
program had become “sorely strained,” aggravating tensions “between citizens and police in the 
Central City.” “Riots and destruction” were not the answer, but neither was the “sheer force and 
violence” employed by police against groups of color “yearning…for social acceptance.”207 The 
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AHCPA delivered its recommendations to Mayor Maier’s Committee on City Government 
Reorganization on February 29, 1968.208 For the first time, Milwaukee police accountability 
advocates looked to set term limits on the police chief, as well as a mandatory performance review.  
The support of Black elected officials helped further the AHCPA’s agenda. Alderwoman Vel 
Phillips worked with the committee to draft ordinances and introduced them in the Common 
Council. She argued that Chief Breier was “accountable to no one but himself,” that he possessed 
“vast powers” in need of being reined in.209 On July 12, 1968, Phillips proposed a measure that 
empowered any person eligible to vote in the state, a “qualified elector,” to register a police 
complaint with the MFPC. This measure would supplant the “freeholder” requirement written into 
state law. It passed the Common Council and informed the legislature’s subsequent decision to 
remove the property requirement from the 1911 statute. Unfortunately for Philips, her colleagues 
shelved the remainder of the AHCPA’s recommendations. One required the MFPC to investigate all 
police complaints and establish an independent staff within the commission to assist with processing 
citizen grievances. The Community Relations Specialist would also gain access to police misconduct 
files.210 Another proposal would have established “a proper police-community relations program 
inside the MPD,” as lobbied for by the AHCPA. Finally, Phillips had proposed that the police chief 
assign more Black officers to north side districts. 
The Council on Urban Life, beyond its leadership capacity in the AHCPA, worked to 
address the “deep hostility” and “abrasive relationships” between Black citizens and the police.211 
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The “social planning and urban affairs” non-profit played an active role in supporting Black-led 
struggles for school integration, open housing, and welfare rights. Father Patrick Flood, its 
Executive Director, was a staunch human rights advocate inspired by the civil rights movement and 
the Catholic Church’s Vatican II reforms.212 He sat beside Father Groppi in September 1967 when 
the YC advisor testified to the MPD’s brutal treatment of Black citizens before the NACCD in 
Washington, D.C. The two priests joined YC Commandos and community representatives from 
Watts, New York, and Omaha.213 When it came to policing, the CUL’s Social Action Committee 
acknowledged that grassroots activists lacked coordination on police reform. “Fragmentation” and a 
lack of “organization and unity” frequently undermined change. The CUL spoke out in support of 
Milwaukee’s new Black Panther Party chapter, which was experiencing police intimidation and 
retaliation from the MPD and FBI. The police “are not repressive because they are sadistic 
monsters,” Flood remarked. Rather, “they are because they sense that repression is what society 
expects from them in regard to blacks, browns, the poor and the politically unpopular.” The CUL 
admonished the MPD and MFPC’s “unparalleled secrecy.” It was no wonder that the public had a 
“complete lack of faith” in the criminal justice system. The council criticized Breier’s lifetime tenure 
and his refusal to cooperate with investigative and regulatory bodies, such as the Johnson Crime 
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substantive action in dealing with entrenched economic racism. Groppi detailed the MPD’s conflation of non-violent 
civil rights protest with the more confrontational and destructive dissent displayed during the civil disturbance. Chief 
Breier “identified a demonstration and a picket line as being synonymous with a riot.” Groppi then castigated the racial 
double-standard used by the press and city officials to describe violent behavior: “When we talk about preaching 
nonviolence, I think we ought to do it in the white community first.” Milwaukee’s Black community, Groppi cautioned, 
was grappling with “the effects of the white man’s problem.” It was white discrimination and segregation that relegated 
African Americans to “the secondary status in the American system.” White-contrived policies created the “frustration 
and hopelessness” that spilled out into rioting and police-community violence. Groppi continued, “When we teach him 
nonviolence, then I think we ought to talk about nonviolence in the black community. If he is not going to be 
nonviolent, I don't think the black man should be told to be non-violent.” “Commission Meeting, September 21, 1967,” 
1518-1615, Folder, 001346-003-0538, Civil Rights During the Johnson Administration, 1963-1969, Part V, Lyndon 
Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas. 
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Commission, the NACCD, and the WCCJ, which administered Safe Streets Act funding.214 
Carrying on the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality Committee’s legacy of documenting the 
MPD’s racialized violence, the CUL gathered testimony from Black residents who experienced 
police mistreatment. It used this evidence to support federal police brutality complaints and court 
filings. For instance, the council documented the case of Mattie Shaw, a Black mother living on 
Milwaukee’s north side. Shaw saw two white police officers enter her house without a warrant. 
Inside, they threatened her sons with physical violence. Another individual, Avelardo Valdez, said an 
MPD officer brutalized him while walking on the all-white South Side. He filed a complaint with the 
police department, but never heard back. Police questioned Mattie Gulley Westbrook’s son for 
several hours over a purse snatching he did not commit. Agnes Copeland’s son Michael was 
“detained, roughed up, handcuffed, and questioned by police for no reason.” James Coleman 
claimed he was “severely beaten by police.” He filed a police brutality claim with the MFPC, but it 
was rejected because he did not own property.215 Charges against Coleman were dismissed by a 
Milwaukee County court. Soon after, the Wisconsin ALU then filed a federal lawsuit on Coleman’s 
behalf. Mary Robinson’s daughter was “roughed up” by law enforcement. Police kicked in her front 
door and chased her kids around their own house. Sherry Walden was “beaten and sworn at,” then 
arrested and thrown into a police wagon outside the Milwaukee Arena. Walden was charged with 
disorderly conduct after inadvertently striking an officer. Barbara Mabra was several months 
pregnant when police barged into her home without a warrant. They knocked her over while trying 
to arrest her husband on gambling charges. James Simmons was bitten by an officer at the 
Milwaukee Safety Building and had his jaw broken.216 These troubling accounts of police brutality 
 
214 “The Police Problem in Milwaukee,” 1-2, Box 2, Folder 13, Council on Urban and Rural Life Records, Subject Files, 
1966-1984, Police Community Relations, 1967-1971. 
215 Barbara Dembski and Monroe Walker, “Justices Upheld Penalties,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 3, 1975, Part 1, 10. 
216 “The Police Problem in Milwaukee,” 1-2. 
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illustrate the profound disrespect, dehumanization, and violence that the MPD meted out against 
Black and Latinx residents, as well as the consequences of lax accountability. Police had license to 
use violence, knowing full well the department had their back. 
The grassroots struggle for police accountability became more cross racial in the late 1960s. 
Latinx migrants and some Afro-Latinx people and their descendants also faced police brutality and 
challenged it accordingly, often working in partnership with Black-led Civil Rights-Black Power 
organizations. Mexican-American activist and labor organizer Ernesto Chacon helped establish 
Milwaukee’s Latin American Union for Civil Rights (LAUCR) in 1968. The organization, composed 
mostly of  Mexican-American and Puerto Rican residents, fought to increase social services for 
Latinx Milwaukeeans. The group confronted a familiar set of  conditions—labor exploitation, 
housing discrimination, and education bias. The LAUCR collaborated with the NAACP Youth 
Council and was supported by Assemblyman Barbee and Alderwoman Phillips.217 La Guardia, a 
bilingual community newspaper published by Avelardo “Lalo” Valdez, railed against Chief Breier 
and the MPD’s oppressive authority on the city’s near south side. While conservative Latinx 
residents largely supported law enforcement, a number of Brown youth, young adults, tavern 
patrons, and members of rights-based organizations “working to correct racism and deprivation” 
related experiences of police harassment and brutality.218 The MPD engaged in a “police riot” against 
Latinx demonstrators in March 1971. Militant Latinx organizations on the left, including the 
LAUCR, Young Lords, and Spot Centro Nuestro, decried reformist approaches that framed policing 
as “workable in general.” They refused to accept liberal arguments about the “maladjustment” of 
Latinx newcomers over the “racism and bad administration” at the heart of the policing system. 
 
217 Black and Brown activists joined forces on a seven-month protest of Allen-Bradley Corporation for the firm’s 
discriminatory hiring practices in 1969. Joseph A. Rodriguez, “Mexicans,” Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed February 17, 
2020, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/mexicans/. 
218 “Some People Call Him Pig, because That’s What He Is!!!,” 1, Folder 72, Box 1, La Guardia Records, in possession of 
Sergio Gonzalez, Marquette University. 
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Many argued the MPD reflected the white ruling class’s desire to suppress “working people, welfare 
people, youth minorities,” and other “stepped on” groups. Those who fought for “civil rights, 
human rights, justice, and freedom for Spanish Speaking people and poor people” were “enemies of 
the existing social order.”219 
Few studies critiqued the police power like Kenneth Feit’s two-part investigation, published 
in 1971. The 29-year-old seminarian researched the MPD for nine months under the auspices of  the 
CUL. His research anticipated the criticisms leveled against Chief  Breier and the police bureaucracy 
by the Wisconsin State Committee of  the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in 1972. Feit provided “a 
systematic analysis” of  the department, advocating for structural changes to police operations.220 His 
study evaluated police recruitment and training, assignments and promotions, citizen complaints and 
police-community relations, police administration, and the coercive actions of  the TEU. It expanded 
on the NACCD’s 1968 findings, revealing an operationally flawed, racist structure that functionally 
undermined reform. Feit identified two fundamental issues. First, civilians had virtually no role in 
the day-to-day affairs of  the MPD. Second, police personnel were prevented from showing 
“professionalism and self-determination” in the workplace.221 Breier’s reactionary leadership, Feit 
ascertained, was the reason for the department’s internal and external deficiencies, especially on 
matters of  oversight, community relations, and minority recruitment. The MFPC, he determined, 
was not an adequate civilian review board. It deferred power to the police chief  and failed to 
adjudicate charges of  police violence. The CRS lacked authority to set and implement community 
 
219 “Some People Call Him Pig, because That’s What He Is!!!,” 1. 
220 Feit was also a Marquette High School history teacher. He maintained that he did not write the report to criticize the 
department or attack Chief Breier personally, but to explain why police abuse and exploitation endured. Feit said his goal 
was to improve police services and the work experiences of individual officers. As with all other external investigations 
of the MPD and its conduct, Breier chose not to cooperate in the study. Many rank-and-file officers, the MPPPA, 
various south side aldermen, and several prominent white residents objected to the CUL’s account of the MPD’s internal 
dynamics. Kenneth P. Feit, S.J., “To the Editor of the Sentinel,” June 19, 1970, “Police Community Relations, 1967-
1971,” Council on Urban and Rural Life Records, Subject Files, 1966-1984, Marquette University Archives. 
221 Feit, “The Milwaukee Police Department, March-April, 1970,” 28-29. 
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relations policies. Instead, they experienced intimidation from both the police chief  and MFPC.222 In 
regards to the MPD’s lackluster record of  Black recruitment, Feit identified four barriers: the 
department’s negative public image, the relative scarcity of  African Americans in command 
positions, the frequent disqualification of  Black and Latinx recruits for “economic” and “culturally-
determined” reasons, and the pervasive racism on the force.223 As the seminarian concluded, “all of  
this pointed to a structural problem within the Police Department itself…a conspiracy of  
silence…too much secrecy and too much power in the hands of  one man.” Chief  Breier’s 
consolidated power isolated the MPD from the communities it overpoliced and underprotected. 
This not only affected residents, but encouraged low morale on the department.224 Reforms that 
failed to directly address the chief ’s power would provide only “an illusion of  change.”225  
 
Conclusion 
 Through his reactionary application of law-and-order, ironclad grip on police power, and 
racist dog whistles, Chief Breier undermined police accountability and the Black-led struggle to 
transform Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy into a more equitable, culturally responsive law 
enforcement system. His symbolic authority derived from his white south side roots and parochial 
attitudes on race, gender, and sexuality.226 That influence was reinforced by a criminal-legal system 
and police bureaucracy that reflected white south side political, business, and labor interests. 
 
222 After leaving the position, Bowen said the CRS represented nothing more than a superficial attempt by white city 
officials to appease disgruntled black residents. He called out the city’s “unimaginative” police recruitment program, 
which relied on “outdated” physical and educational requirements and limited hiring to state residents only. The position 
itself was not financially rewarding, offering low pay and “little promise of advancement.” 
223 He also connected the harmful effects of racial segregation—inequitable and under-resourced schools, “poor 
nutrition,” and a greater likelihood of possessing a “criminal record”—to the failure of many Black applicants testing for 
patrolmen. Feit, “The Milwaukee Police Department, March-April, 1970,” 14-16. 
224 “Police System Here Likened to Papacy,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, June 6, 1970. 
225 Feit, “The Milwaukee Police Department, March-April, 1970,” 29. 
226 The MPD’s Vice Squad was known to “harass” and “bait” gay Milwaukeeans through entrapment before making 
disorderly conduct arrests. “Enticement” by police was a legal maneuver. “Vice Squad Zeroes in on Gays,” Kaleidoscope 3 
(10) (1970), 4. 
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However, Breier’s legal authority stemmed from the 1911 statute that granted Milwaukee public 
safety chiefs life tenure and near-absolute policymaking and regulatory power. Revising that statute, 
which the police chief  defended at every turn, emerged as the principal goal of  accountability 
activists in the 1970s. Breier’s commands over police operations, opposition to external review and 
federal interventions, and racist perceptions shaped the strategic direction and reputation of  his 
department in lasting ways. He maintained an insulated, militarized, and reactive police force. The 
MPD manufactured consent to police counterinsurgency through Breier’s acts of  rhetorical 
criminalization, violent police boundary work, and the effecting of  arrests.227 No public figure was 
more consequential in fomenting mistrust of  the police and denying the reality of  Black claims of  
racialized police violence than Harold Breier. 
 Breier’s tenure did not mark a complete disjuncture with the past, as some scholars have 
suggested.228 While it is true that the “chief  for life” clung to “the unfettered authority that his 
lifetime tenure and total control over police policy and procedures gave him,” previous MPD chiefs 
enjoyed the same privileges.229 Where Breier differed was in his rejection of  law enforcement 
liberalism—both in terms of  his rhetorical leadership and administrative practices. Breier 
exacerbated an existing set of  racialized criminal-legal and law enforcement arrangements. Chiefs 
Joseph Kluchesky and John Polcyn, for instance, masked racist understandings of  Black life and 
culture in a more liberal, assimilationist veneer that reinforced the MPD’s progressive national 
standing. Breier, on the other hand, lifted any pretense that the MPD must adhere to liberal 
administrative principles, police training, or departmental rule-making. Unlike his predecessors, 
 
227 Racism within counterinsurgency helped to ensure the survival of capitalism in the face of recurrent threats to the 
traditional social and economic order. Camp and Greenburg, “Counterinsurgency,” 2. 
228 Kelling, Policing in Milwaukee. Historian Simon Balto has filled portions of this narrative gap. See: Simon Ezra Balto, 
“The Laws of the Land: Race, Policing, and Public Narratives of Working-Class Black Criminality in Post-World War II 
Milwaukee” (Master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2010). 
229 George Kelling, “Milwaukee Police Department,” Encyclopedia of Milwaukee, accessed November 9, 2019, 
https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/milwaukee-police-department/. 
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Breier refused to embrace the guidance or policy proposals of  outside experts, or to participate in 
public safety discourses and commissioned government studies that challenged his views. Anything 
threatening to limit his sole authority was out of  bounds. In turn, Breier no longer concealed the 
MPD’s reliably poor treatment of  poor and working-class Black and Latinx residents behind a veil 
of  social progress. Instead, he quashed public dissent from white supremacy through openly 
coercive policing tactics marked by routine harassment, surveillance, and intimidation. Breier 
preserved Milwaukee’s reputation for efficient crime control through a no-nonsense, counter-
insurgent projection of  police power. His leadership style was closer to Chief  John Janssen’s: 
secretive and unyielding. Only for Breier, the MPD’s perceived enemies were no longer European 
immigrant workers, but rather low-income Black “militants” and civil rights activists. 
 The timing of  Breier’s reactionary law-and-order turn matters; he resisted liberal police 
reform proposals at a critical juncture of  federal statecraft in the late 1960s. To better maintain order 
in America’s riot-torn cities, federal officials tried to reign in discretionary police power and ensure 
civil rights compliance across the nation’s intricate criminal justice system through commissioned 
studies, the introduction of  new policing guidelines, and highly coordinated and massive taxpayer 
investments in the policing and penal initiatives that comprised the War on Crime. Breier’s 
reactionary law-and-order tactics contradicted liberal efforts to globally project police power in 
America as racially inclusive, democratic, and lawful.230 He refused to move on civil rights demands 
for diverse police representation, input, and oversight; bypassed federal and state investigations into 
the causes of  its 1967 “civil disturbance”; and dismissed criminological findings that recommended 
more preventative public safety measures. The data that social scientists gathered in the late 1960s 
shaped national policing debates and policies, including the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
 
230 As historian Nikhil Pal Singh argues, this vision was a myth considering the numerous proxy and covert military 
campaigns that the U.S. engaged in throughout the Cold War period in an effort to maintain global supremacy. Nikhil 
Pal Singh, Race and America’s Long War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2017), 5. 
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Streets Act of  1968. Alternatively, Breier fought to preserve the MPD’s state-sanctioned 
independence. This encouraged his staunch defense of  “law-abiding,” i.e. white Milwaukee residents 
and informed his forceful calls to maintain the city’s “good order.” At the same time, Breier 
welcomed government investments in police militarization and “riot control.” Emboldened by 
conservative public support, Chief  Breier readily embraced federal law enforcement assistance when 
it aligned with his reactionary program to counter civil rights insurgency and aggressively control 
crime, particularly on Milwaukee’s north side. 
 Racial demographic shifts, gaining civil rights insurgency, and federal interventions revealed 
the limits of  urban liberalism as a vehicle for change in Milwaukee. It exposed the myth about the 
city’s narrative of  policing exceptionalism that many Black residents knew already. Given the extent 
to which coercive order maintenance policing strategies like over-saturation, “close surveillance,” and 
stop-and-frisk already disrupted Black lives on Milwaukee’s north side, Black community leaders saw 
continuities in the MPD’s tactics under Breier. Liberal or reactionary law-and-order tended to 
produce similar results. The sustained direction of  police resources and attention towards Black and, 
to a growing extent, Latinx spaces engendered a steady stream of  stops, arrests, and violent police-
citizen encounters. The MPD helped advance the criminalization of  Black and Brown people in the 
eyes of  a fearful white public, while further provoking an “us versus them” policing mentality. The 
department’s occupational presence and aggressive order maintenance function exacerbated 
deteriorating economic conditions in tandem with employment, housing, and education 
discrimination. While the police were not the only agents of  the state responsible for diminishing 
Black life chances, civic access, and structures of  opportunity, they clearly stood as the most “visible 
and easily accessible symbol of  a society that many Negroes feel is unjust.”231  
 
231 This quote comes from a Milwaukee Journal editorial. It continues: “The police function can sometimes mean the 
difference between community harmony and community hate, between area calm or upheaval. Intimidation, badgering, 
the contemptuous remark, the hasty arrest for the slightest infraction—such tactics tend to aggravate the situation.” 
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 Whether the MPD was viewed as exceptional for its efficient crime control and reform-
orientation or it counter-insurgent aggression and resistance to police-community relations 
programs, Black Milwaukeeans experienced a more coercive and severe brand of  law enforcement 
during Chief  Breier’s tenure. His reactionary approach underscored the urgency for Black civil rights 
activists to address police power. Discriminatory treatment remained a through line for Black and, 
increasingly, Latinx citizens relegated to a segregated and unequal urban terrain that demanded race-
conscious, non-punitive safety measures. Intensifying police violence raised the sense of  urgency 
among Black and allied police accountability advocates, who mostly sought reformist objectives, like 
increasing Black police representation, input, and oversight. Police accountability advocates saw 
raising access and opportunity as the most effective means of  curbing ongoing challenges around 
police violence and unresponsiveness to Black public safety concerns. From racial liberals in the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Police Administration to Milwaukee’s more radical Black Panther Party chapter, 
accountability advocates expressed a range of  ideological vantage points. All fought to remake 
policing so that it would better serve those living on the social and economic margins. Garnering a 
greater measure of  control over who applied police discretion, enforced the law, and regulated police 
actions across heavily-policed spaces of  color made sense as movement objectives.  
 Chief Breier’s reactionary approach re-contoured Milwaukee’s narrative of  policing 
exceptionalism around his rejection of  police reform. The narrative’s 180-degree shift developed in 
tandem with Black Milwaukee’s gaining civil rights insurgency, just as its liberal law-and-order hay 
day relied on the suppression of  poor Black migrants. Chief  Breier’s aggressive handling of  the 1967 
civil disturbance and subsequent civil rights demonstrations affirmed his legitimacy among a 
majority of  white residents and civic elites. He stubbornly denied that Black residents faced a unique 
policing crisis and saw police misconduct allegations and complaints of  abuse as a subversive threat 
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to police legitimacy. Breier presented a dramatic foil for Black and allied accountability advocates. 
But his presence was also a double-edged sword. His authoritarian rule of  the MPD, repressive 
street-level tactics, and broad political influence complicated the public safety landscape. Breier’s 
rejection of liberal law-and-order obscured the fundamental problem that policing itself functioned 
as a tool of racial and class suppression. No reform had ever transformed this dynamic. His overall 
resistance to federal policing recommendations, such as establishing an internal community relations 
bureau or strengthening police-community partnerships, narrowed the focus of  accountability 
groups. Breier’s stewardship of  the MPD delayed the ability of  police accountability activists to 
overhaul Milwaukee’s policing structures in ways that more meaningfully served Black community 
health and safety concerns. Scrutinizing where Breier’s authority emanated from, curtailing his 
power, and thus rendering the MPD more amenable to liberal procedural reforms occupied much of  
the movement’s energy in the 1970s. This focus eventually resulted in tangible statutory reforms, 
including the empowerment of  the MFPC and City Hall to set police rules and implement oversight. 
But it also meant continued government investment in policing as a solution to urban ills rooted in 
race-based economic inequities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Envisioning Community Control of the Police 
 With Police Chief  Harold Breier, police bureaucrats, and elected officials shielding police 
misconduct, the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) continued to surveil, neglect, and brutalize 
Black citizens with impunity during what historians have termed the “long 1970s” (1969-1984).1 In 
response, civil rights and Black Power organizations persisted in challenging unchecked police 
violence and indifference, while waging new battles over internal discrimination and minority 
recruitment. However, in this post-Civil Rights Act period, Milwaukee’s policing system remained 
broadly immune to change. State law still empowered Chief Breier to run the MPD free of  political 
interference and oversight. An abiding faith in the necessity of  law enforcement as a means of  
managing inequality, containing social discord, and regulating street crime endured. Support from 
Milwaukee’s white majority reinforced the police department’s sense of  legitimacy and 
imperviousness to change. Breier was a near immovable object to both liberal reformers and Civil 
Rights-Black Power groups demanding a radical overhaul to the public safety apparatus. He even 
refused to coordinate with federal agencies trying to advance a national War on Crime that was 
injecting millions of dollars into local law enforcement.  
 Still, the long 1970s saw a diverse range of citizens and government actors alike chip away at 
Chief Breier’s authority, while also visualizing new modes of neighborhood safety that derived from 
the self-determined needs of “overpoliced and underprotected” people themselves.2 “Community 
control” of the police emerged as a rallying cry for Black Power activists and allies engaged in 
Milwaukee’s struggle for police accountability. This chapter focuses on the emergence of community 
 
1 Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2001), 4. 
2 Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of  an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of  
Illinois Press, 2006), 118. 
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control in the late 1960s and 1970s, locating its place in the longer movement and tracing its 
relationship to more moderate reform efforts. At the same time that Black Power groups articulated 
their vision for community control, racial liberals sought to harness federal civil rights law to force 
the MPD into compliance on its hiring and oversight practices.  
 Community control activists and liberal reformers alike strove to overcome Chief Breier’s 
reactionary stewardship of the MPD. However, they approached that task with different goals in 
mind. The former articulated a vision for community control out of life-or-death urgency, 
particularly given the disproportionate rate with which Breier’s regime was ending Black lives. 
Recurrent police violence on Milwaukee’s north side from 1968 to 1975 reinforced longstanding 
frustrations with the city’s whitewashed police bureaucracy. Survival was the first concern, as law 
enforcement was legally empowered to kill. Locating police authority in the hands of the 
marginalized, mauled, and murdered was the only recourse. Community control advocates 
understood the MPD’s “us against them” mentality emanated from the top-down. Breier showed no 
desire to change course; therefore, poor and working-class Black folk had little choice but to 
envision an entirely different system that located power at the grassroots. Community control was a 
counter-argument to reactionary law-and-order. But it also marked a departure from liberal law-and-
order in its affirmation of  Black humanity, dignity, and self-empowerment. The concept rejected 
Black exceptionalization by the police. In an era of  worsening deindustrialization, budget austerity, 
and retributive statecraft, community control reflected Black peoples’ will to solve urban problems 
on their own terms. It brought together Black Power activists, civil liberties advocates, and Black 
political representatives. Their collective struggle mattered, in part because it helped move the state 
legislature to act on redirecting police power in Milwaukee away from the police chief  and towards 
democratically elected or appointed bodies.  
 Liberal reformers, on the other hand, prioritized the democratization of the MPD in the 
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interest of preserving public order. As Black Milwaukeeans outlined their vision for community 
control of  the police, federal officials continued to wage a War on Crime that was designed to 
expand police power on liberal terms. The federal state was investing huge sums of  money in local 
policing and criminal justice initiatives. At the same time, the U.S. Justice Department and other 
federal agencies wanted to ensure that local police departments were more representative of  
historically overpoliced communities of  color, more value-neutral in their discretionary practices, 
and more preventative in their crime control function. As the U.S. Civil Rights Commission detailed 
in a 1972 study, and as Black and Latinx residents knew all too well, the MPD had a long way to go 
in terms of  meeting the expectations of  federal bureaucrats. Washington D.C.’s interests—as well as 
most racial liberals in Milwaukee—centered on preventing unrest and diminishing crime. The federal 
government prioritized upholding the social and economic order and limiting opportunities for 
dissent, especially from radical Black political organizations like the Black Panther Party. Expanding 
minority recruitment was seen as a means of  improving “police-community relations” and 
preserving order. Diverse representation in law enforcement was a top priority, as well as an 
overlapping demand with community control activists. Officers who lived in the neighborhoods they 
patrolled and looked like the citizens they policed were, both parties held, more likely to keep the 
peace free of  violent conflict. Police and citizens would, ideally, build trust, minimize tensions, and 
effectively prevent crime together. 
 Acting at the behest of  Black citizens and Black police officers, federal agencies and the 
courts played an important role in moving the MPD towards a more democratic system in the 1970s. 
Federal officials in the U.S. Justice Department rendered the MFPC’s recruitment process, if  still 
imperfect, more racial and gender inclusive by mandating affirmative action. But they also 
emphasized civil rights compliance to help shore up the machinery of  policing, strengthening public 
perceptions of  law enforcement’s legitimacy. In the process of  investigating Milwaukee’s police 
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department and ruling on the civil rights complaints of  MPD personnel, they further exposed the 
city’s historically racist law enforcement system. Here, federal agencies held up the liberal law-and-
order era (1930s-1950s) as exceptional, without considering the extent to which police discriminated 
against and criminalized Black residents in this period. In any case, federal bureaucrats looked to 
create pathways of  access and opportunity in the current moment. One way the courts did so was by 
filing binding orders, called “consent decrees,” that mandated affirmative action hiring and set goals, 
checkpoints, and conditions for police bureaucrats to meet. Local officials either fell in line with 
federal civil rights provisions or lost valuable block grant funding. City Hall needed federal aid to 
equalize property tax shortfalls, so it supported compliance. Unfortunately for reformers, they still 
had to contend with a strong-willed chief  who was, at least as he saw it, entitled to disregard federal 
interventions. Breier fought hard to preserve his autonomy, whether that meant challenging various 
recruitment directives or resisting a U.S. Attorney’s investigation into the MPD’s history of  racialized 
violence. 
 Both community control advocates and liberal reformers shared the goal of  hiring more Black 
officers as part of  transforming local policing. For community control advocates, Black police 
patrolling in Black districts signaled a greater likelihood for respect and, thus, survival. Decades of  
repressive enforcement tactics administered at the direction of  white police officials encouraged 
Black activists to demand more law enforcers who looked like them. They desired responsive 
peacekeeping from individuals who understood their culture and history in relation to white 
supremacy. In truth, Black police recruitment totals fell below their anticipated number. Reformers 
encountered a lack of  support from City Hall, feeble MFPC recruitment campaigns, and internal 
police racism so vehement that it either precluded Black applications or forced African American 
officers from the job, sometimes before they could finish probationary periods. A lack of  
accountability inside the MPD reflected lax accountability structures outside. 
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 As community control advocates and racial liberals reimagined police power in Milwaukee, 
two forces also gained political influence in the city’s public safety discourse during this period. First, 
a growing neighborhood movement coalesced. Led by liberal homeowners in racially transitioning 
neighborhoods, it featured a diverse set of  middle-class voices. Community associations prioritized 
crime and safety issues at a moment when residents were losing faith in municipal institutions. 
Neighborhood groups believed police bureaucrats, especially Chief  Breier, could do more to help 
communities proactively control crime and reign in police violence. They supported “community-
oriented” policing, an emerging approach to crime control that threatened to up-end “reform era” 
policing.  
 Second, the Milwaukee Professional Policemen’s Protective Association (MPPPA) loomed as 
a dominant voice of  opposition to calls for procedural reform and the disciplining of  officers 
accused of  misconduct. The association first organized in 1909 to defend MPD personnel who 
faced civil litigation. In the early 1970s, it used the arbitration process to establish itself  as a 
powerful foil to Chief  Breier and police accountability advocates. While ranking association 
members backed the chief ’s wider agenda and valued his support when police came under attack 
from critics, the MPPPA dissented from Breier’s strict rules and opposition to making “community 
relations” improvements. To union leaders, the status quo left rank-and-file officers vulnerable to 
violent crime, especially on the north side. Both the MPPPA and Milwaukee’s neighborhood 
movement found inspiration in rights-based campaigns meant to build political power for interest 
groups. Whether defined by race, profession, or residential status, Milwaukeeans of  all stripes 
organized self-help units dedicated to advancing their interests amid waning faith in technocratic 
governance. 
 
The War on Crime in Milwaukee  
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  Historical context is key when tracing Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for community control. 
Most importantly, the long 1970s saw an unprecedented federal expansion of  police power. First 
initiated by the liberal Johnson administration in the wake of  the 1960s urban rebellions, the national 
War on Crime grew under President Richard Nixon and his successors.3 The Republican candidate 
won election in 1968 calling for a return to “law and order” in response to public anxieties around 
urban crime, civil violence, the counterculture, identity-based activism, campus revolts, and protests 
against the war in Southeast Asia.4 Rising fears about crime, disorder, and protest had been a subtext 
of  the final Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of  1968. Nixon vowed to prevent further 
unrest in America’s cities and, like his Democratic predecessor, saw law enforcement as critical to 
restoring order within low-income African American communities. Nixon unified working- and 
middle-class white suburban voters under a shared message organized around racialized fears of  
continued political upheaval. As historian Christopher Agee writes, “conservatives would unleash the 
police to enforce traditional standards of  citizenship in the streets and would exclude untraditional 
perspectives from government debate.”5 
  In this context, liberals worked to convince the “law-and-order administration” that 
affirmative action policies would serve as “a bulwark against urban disorder.”6 The executive branch 
upheld the provisions of  the 1964 Civil Rights Act and supported efforts to diversify police 
 
3 As historian Elizabeth Hinton has shown, the roots of the 1960s War on Crime can be traced back further, to the 
Kennedy administration’s “juvenile delinquency” control initiatives in the early 1960s. Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on 
Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). 
4 The Nixon campaign pursued a “Southern Strategy” to win over “Dixiecrats” in the former Confederacy, trafficking in 
racist dog-whistles that also appealed to white middle class suburban and urban blue-collar voters anxious about similar 
racial, social, economic, and cultural issues. See: Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis 
of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Nixon appealed to some Black conservatives and 
disaffected liberals eager to garner more control over inner city neighborhoods, free of patronizing government 
interventions. Gesturing towards “Black capitalism” and race-conscious entrepreneurship, candidate Nixon appeared to 
support efforts to build Black economic self-sufficiency. But his administration offered no direct federal aid. Keeanga-
Yamahtta Taylor, From #Black Lives Matter to Black Liberation (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016), 85. 
5 Christopher Lowen Agee, The Streets of San Francisco: Policing and the Creation of a Cosmopolitan Liberal Politics, 1952-1972 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 12. 
6 Timothy J. Lombardo, Blue Collar Conservatism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 123. 
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agencies. However, that did not mean Nixon supported liberal law-and-order reform goals. In fact, 
the administration’s “get tough” approach largely reflected Chief  Breier’s hardline views on race and 
policing. Both Nixon and Breier opposed Supreme Court decisions that protected the rights of  
criminal suspects and decriminalized status offenses, diminishing police discretionary authority.7 
Nixon was clear about what he saw as the root cause of  crime, arguing it was “insufficient curbs on 
the appetites or impulses that naturally impel individuals towards criminal activities.”8 As such, 
“surveillance, sentencing, and incarceration strategies” grew more punitive under his direction.9 The 
Nixon administration increased criminal convictions and imposed harsher sentencing guidelines, 
particularly on drug crimes, while strengthening U.S. courts and prisons.10 In the process, “the 
nation’s incarcerated population transformed from majority white to majority black and Latino.”11 
Nixon’s team worked to roll back domestic social welfare and anti-poverty spending. Alternatively, 
the Johnson administration had emphasized growing police power, while continuing to support 
rehabilitative criminal justice outcomes and funding cities in ways that addressed economic inequality 
and poverty. 
  The Nixon administration’s War on Crime, like Johnson’s, focused on containing poor and 
potentially “rebellious” urban communities of  color. Both administration’s targeted “segregated 
 
7 Supreme Court rulings, like Miranda v. Arizona (1966), recognized the civil liberties of criminal suspects. Conservatives 
viewed these decisions as too permissive. The decriminalization of local status offenses, like vagrancy, also nurtured “the 
conditions for more unrest,” requiring a “reassertion—and expansion—of police power and discretionary authority” in 
poor and working-class urban spaces. Max Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles: Race, Resistance, and the Rise of the LAPD 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 43. 
8 Quote in James Forman, Jr. Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2017), 76. 
9 For instance, the Nixon administration built hundreds of new prisons and jails at state and federal level, introduced 
mandatory minimum sentencing in the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, “sanctioned the practice 
of holding suspects in jail without formal charges” and established new offender categories to ensure longer terms of 
incarceration. Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 138. 
10 In 1971, President Nixon declared a “War on Drugs” that targeted “hard” illicit drug use, abuse, and trafficking, 
especially in poor communities of color. Forman, Jr., Locking Up Our Own, 20-21. 
11 The problem of crime for Nixon was the problem of “street” crime, or urban Black crime. “In a direct and systematic 
way,” Elizabeth Hinton argues, “Nixon recognized that the politics of crime control could effectively conceal the racist 
intent behind his administration’s domestic programs.” Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 142. 
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urban areas as a means to dispel civil disorder and manage the effects of  the country’s urban 
crisis.”12 However, Nixon’s “New Federalism” platform tackled America’s urban crisis with a 
different set of  objectives in mind. It granted states control over the use of  federal anti-crime 
funding to meet state, county, and municipal criminal justice needs. Federal money was distributed 
through a familiar block grant system.13 But it put mostly conservative state administrators, as 
opposed to grassroots organizations and liberal city governments, in charge of  directing the fight.14 
The U.S. Justice Department invested tens of  millions of  dollars in state and local War on Crime 
initiatives through the newly created Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).15 While 
most federal grant money went to white suburban and rural municipalities, which reported less 
crime, a large share of  federal dollars still went to shoring up the power of  police in cities.16 The 
president supported projects that expanded law enforcement’s “punitive authority in Black urban 
neighborhoods” through “discretionary” crime control funding.17 This discretionary executive 
funding was essentially unregulated. Federal investments in municipal crime control, through state 
 
12 Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 136. 
13 “Federal policymakers used block grants to empower state planning agencies to develop their own path for the War 
on Crime by finding local projects and programs of their choice. But the Safe Streets Act forced states, if they had not 
done so already, to develop long-term strategies for their respective law enforcement programs, providing federal 
funding for such efforts at 90 percent of their cost.” Eligibility for LEAA grants required local and law enforcement 
officials to devise criminal justice improvement plans that dealt with “training, detecting, and apprehending criminals, 
and improving prosecution and the courts.” Grants were rarely turned down; some were poorly conceived. Hinton, From 
the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 143. 
14 With the election of Carl Stokes in Cleveland in 1968, Black candidates started to win elections in cities with growing 
Black populations and liberal politics. 
15 The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act established the LEAA. “Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 42 U.S.C. §3789d,” United States Department of Justice, accessed April 2, 2020, 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/omnibus-crime-control-and-safe-streets-act-1968-42-usc-3789d. 
16 Peter Constantine Pihos, “Policing, Race, and Power in Chicago” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2015), 213-
214. 
17 This discretionary spending maintained an “enduring” and “highly repressive” federal function in segregated urban 
neighborhoods. The Nixon administration relied on “the discretionary portion of the crime control budget to fund law 
enforcement initiatives of its own choosing.” Congressionally authorized discretionary funds allowed the administration 
to continue the block grant process while also paying directly for local crime control programs they deemed necessary in 
cities. Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 137. Prior to 1968, the federal government used discretionary 
spending programs under a tax structure dating to the 1930s. Federal revenues grew by nearly five times from 1932 to 
1970. State and municipal resources—comprised largely of property and sales tax revenues—fell dramatically in that 
span. The federal government contributed limited criminal justice resources and oversight to states and municipalities, 
which exclusively underwrote police departments themselves. Pihos, “Policing, Race, and Power in Chicago,” 215. 
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block grants and discretionary spending, accelerated the decline of  social welfare and anti-poverty 
programs.18 The administration cut the funding authority of  community-based organizations headed 
by poor Black and Latinx citizens through the federal government’s newly decentralized revenue 
sharing program. This diminished “the relationship between the federal government, municipalities, 
and poor Americans.”19  
  The War on Crime’s expansion coincided with growing national unease around stagnant 
markets and rising inflation. A recession from 1973 to 1975, for instance, devastated industrial cities 
like Milwaukee. Deteriorating economic conditions in cities hit poor and working-class African 
Americans the hardest. Black workers experienced meager industrial employment and wage gains in 
the long 1970s. Rising Black male un- and under-employment paralleled the steady out-migration of  
heavy manufacturers, exacerbating deindustrialization and white suburban growth.20 Creeping 
industrial decline leveled Milwaukee’s Black working-class in the late 1970s and into the 1980s.21 The 
regional labor market, historian Marc Levine argues, developed a “spatial mismatch” in the last third 
of  the 20th century. In this period, suburban and exurban municipalities experienced net employment 
 
18 Under Nixon, the LEAA also facilitated corruption in its criminal justice spending. Millions of federal dollars went to 
“public organizations, private companies, and individual researchers who could develop technology, hardware, and 
theories that would help the federal government prevent future crime.” Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on 
Crime, 136. Corporate backers, friends of the administration, and influential private companies invested in the nation’s 
punitive carceral turn at the state, county, and municipal levels, often receiving preferential treatment. State Senator Jerris 
Leonard, a Republican representing the Milwaukee suburbs, chaired the LEAA from 1971 to 1973. “Jerris G. Leonard, 
Jr. Papers, 1956-1968, 1998-2000,” Finding Aid, Milwaukee Mss 115, Wisconsin Historical Society, Division of Library, 
Archives, and Museum Collections, accessed March 5, 2020, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi/f/findaid/findaid-idx 
location=wimiugma;c=wiarchives;cc=wiarchives;q1=Jerris%20Leonard;rgn=main;view=text;didno=uw-whs-mil00115. 
19 Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 137. 
20 Industries with “less specialized product lines and stiffer price competition” moved facilities “to lower-wage 
communities” in suburban and rural Wisconsin, non-union states in the Sunbelt South, and overseas. John Gurda, The 
Making of Milwaukee, 3rd ed. (Milwaukee: Milwaukee County Historical Society Press, 1999), 414. 
21 Although manufacturing remained “a critical source of jobs” through the early 1980s, nearly all heavy manufacturers 
closed their city plants for good or relocated by the 1990s. Between 1972 and 1992, forty-six percent of industrial 
manufacturers disappeared from Milwaukee’s local economy, including iconic corporations like International Harvester, 
A. O. Smith, and Allis-Chalmers. Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 299. Milwaukee’s industrial economy declined sharply in the 
early 1980s. A strong dollar, high interest rates, and increasing price competition from foreign manufacturers made it 
more expensive to produce goods. Fifty-six thousand industrial workers in the four-county metropolitan area lost their 
jobs between 1979 and 1983 after reaching a high of 220,200 workers in 1979. Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee, 418. 
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gains.22 As industrial job losses in the city intensified, Milwaukee’s population of  working-age Black 
men grew by 30,000.23 They had few options to turn to for work. Concomitantly, the city’s Black 
poverty rate rose from 28.4 percent in 1980 to 41.9 percent in 1990.24 
  Thousands of  Black workers, relegated to poor central city neighborhoods, were unable to 
compete in a segmented labor market that largely bypassed Milwaukee’s north side. Enduring 
metropolitan segregation added to a racialized politics of  public safety that continued to target Black 
people struggling to stay afloat financially. Many were forced to engaged in informal economic and 
illicit activities.25 Reported crime data in this period continued to reinforce criminalizing perceptions 
of  Black life and culture. As America’s punitive turn worsened in the Nixon era and beyond, the 
stain of  a criminal record made it exceedingly difficult for African American workers to secure 
adequate employment. The above factors combined to produce a racially disproportionate, high rate 
of  Black joblessness. In 1970, Black male unemployment in Milwaukee reached fifteen percent—
nearly twice the rate of  white city dwellers and quadruple that of  white suburbanites.26 Well over 
half  of  all Black workers in Milwaukee held industrial positions at the start of  the decade, compared 
to 42 percent of  white workers. Automation played a role in limiting Black industrial employment, as 
new machinery and technologies allowed corporations to expand production levels while keeping 
pace with fewer personnel. Consequently, the metropolitan area’s total industrial output value 
increased from $2.98 billion in 1967 to $8.5 billion in 1980, despite net job losses in Milwaukee.27  
 
22 Marc V. Levine, “The Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: Trends, Explanations, and Policy Options” 
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Center for Economic Development, 2007). 
23 This figure reflects Black working-age male population growth between 1970 and 2000. Levine, “The Crisis of Black 
Male Joblessness in Milwaukee,” 33-34. 
24 Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee, 421. 
25 Housing segregation confined more than ninety percent of Black male workers to the city proper. Gurda, The Making 
of Milwaukee, 421. 
26 This joblessness rate tracks Black men in the prime of their working lives, between 25 and 54 years of age. Levine, 
“The Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee,” 9, 33-34. By 1986, Black male joblessness in the city reached 26 
percent—nearly three times the metropolitan average. By 1987, the city lost 28,386 jobs while the suburbs gained more 
than 30,000. Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee, 421. 
27 The city was able to escape the worst aspects of the 1973-1975 recession. 
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  Meanwhile, class was becoming more salient within Milwaukee’s Black community, much as 
it was elsewhere in urban America. In the 1970s, Black citizens entered both the public and private 
sector in large numbers. Some individuals turned to policing careers, since law enforcement offered a 
living wage, job security, and a decent pension. As historian Peter Pihos has noted, “an upwardly 
redistributive but formally race-neutral political project led to new opportunities for black 
advancement combined with a collapse of  the bottom end of  the labor market.” The end result of  
that liberal project was a sizable increase in “black class stratification from what existed under Jim 
Crow.”28 In turn, class dynamics played a more central role in delineating intra-racial conversations 
around public safety and U.S. criminal justice policies. A growing literature has documented the role 
that powerful, middle-class and affluent Black community leaders in cities like New York, Atlanta, 
and Washington, D.C. have played in supporting the growth of  America’s late-century carceral 
state.29 Although a rising chorus of  Black professionals and newly elected politicians called for an 
“all of  the above” approach that blended rehabilitative and retributive measures in controlling crime, 
“each incremental step” in the War on Crime’s advance “resulted in dishing out more punishment.” 
This was, in large part, a result of  “racialized state failure.”30 The nation’s divided federal state had 
favored an inequitable tax structure that made it virtually impossible for liberals to pursue 
redistributive social policies. The disparate mass incarceration of  Black criminal offenders was not 
“wholly foreseeable” at the time, even if  African American experiences with the U.S. justice system 
rendered it predictable. 
  Against a depressed economic backdrop, crime became more of  a “material reality” for 
Black Milwaukeeans, as it disproportionately harmed poor and working-class families of  color. Still, 
 
28 Peter C. Pihos, “The Inclining Significance of Crime,” The Journal of Urban History (2019), 3-4. 
29 See: Michael Javen Fortner, Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Politics of Punishment (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2015); Forman, Jr., Locking Up Our Own. 
30 Lisa L. Miller, The Myth of Mob Rule: Violent Crime and Democratic Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
100. 
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despite the gaining prominence of  “law and order” as a slogan, public anxieties around crime and 
safety appeared to factor less in the city during the early 1970s than issues of  “taxation and 
housing.”31 The Milwaukee Urban Observatory (MUO) attributed this to Milwaukee’s powerful 
“local and national reputation as a safe city.”32 However, not all residents felt safe.33 Reports of  
elevated street crime, particularly in Black inner city neighborhoods, raised alarm among community 
leaders. Black residents both bore the brunt of  urban crime and experienced an undue share of  the 
police response. Chief  Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach did little to address the root 
causes of  crime and too often failed to resolve cases involving Black crime victims. Public framings 
of  Milwaukee’s north side as crime-riddled fed a fear-driven public safety narrative. White state 
officials used this account to justify harsher criminal justice policies that failed to treat poverty and 
inequality with economic aid and enhanced welfare assistance. The white public’s obsession with 
“the specter of  black crime” fueled America’s carceral turn in the late 20th century.34 Racialized crime 
discourses carried political weight, as many Black voters supported increased spending on the MPD 
and favored more street patrols to control the spread of  crime.35 At the same time, they advocated 
for culturally responsive policing that adequately observed the civil rights of  policed citizens. 
  As suggested above, Milwaukee’s narrative of  policing exceptionalism still held currency in 
 
31 Henry J. Schmandt and Harold M. Rose, “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee…A Further Look,” Milwaukee Urban 
Observatory (Summer 1972), 33. 
32 The Milwaukee Urban Observatory at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee published a report, “Citizen Attitudes 
in Milwaukee,” in September 1971 based on surveys conducted with 443 households during July and August 1970. The 
Wisconsin legislature funded a second study conducted by the Milwaukee Urban Observatory and UW-Milwaukee that 
expanded the project’s scope to include data of race, age, income, homeownership status, and neighborhood of 
residence. It reflected deeper racial polarization. Henry J. Schmandt and Harold M. Rose, “Citizen Attitudes in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Summer, 1970” (September, 1971), 1-3, 56. 
33 The MUO found that about 80 percent of residents favored public agencies “stopping” drug selling and using over 
“education,” providing “better medical treatment,” or “dealing with underlying causes.” “Citizen Attitudes in 
Milwaukee,” 64. 
34 As historian Simon Balto argues, that “specter” did so well before the postwar era. Simon Balto, Occupied Territory: 
Policing Black Chicago from Red Summer to Black Power (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2019), 128. 
“Youths and youth gangs,” “Blacks,” “Hippies,” “radicals,” and “agitators” were perceived as “the biggest problem” in 
Milwaukee, all far above “the Mafia.” “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee,” 65. 
35 “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee…A Further Look,” 43-44; “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee,” 56. 
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the 1970s. It influenced public understandings of  crime and safety. According to a 1972 MUO 
survey, residents were satisfied with the MPD’s overall performance.36 A 1972 U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission study also showed that “a substantial percentage” considered the department to be 
“the best police force in the country.”37 Again, however, this satisfaction was not uniform. Variables 
like income, education, occupation, age, and race mattered when determining who favored the MPD. 
People “of  lower economic status,” many living in communities “where the crime rate was highest,” 
were “more likely” to be “disenchanted” with the police and “to have unfavorable contacts.” 
Residents in this group were frequently renters who felt “less safe” walking through their 
neighborhoods at night. Women constituted a higher percentage than men of  those “dissatisfied” 
with the MPD. Likewise, people with “little formal education,” who worked in “semi-skilled, 
unskilled, and service worker” positions showed higher rates of  disenchantment than 
“businessmen.” Milwaukee youth were more inclined to believe that law enforcement did “not treat 
people in their neighborhood well.” “Elders” expressed concern about “crime and the safety of  the 
streets,” but were generally satisfied with their police protection. 
  A “sizable proportion” of  African Americans “in all socio-economic categories” believed 
the MPD enforced the law unfairly. Respondents said Black people were “not treated in the same 
manner as whites” and that “the system of  justice discriminates against them.”38 Of  those who 
expressed the greatest dissatisfaction with the police, roughly five times as many were Black than 
white.39 Forty-one percent of  Black citizens felt “unsafe,” while 63 percent of  white respondents felt 
“safe.” Forty-three percent of  surveyed Black people responded that the MPD as not good at 
 
36 Eighty-five percent of Milwaukeeans surveyed by the Urban Observatory in 1972 expressed satisfaction with law 
enforcement, thirty-four percent of whom were “highly satisfied.” “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee…A Further Look,” 
34. 
37 Wisconsin State Committee of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Police Isolation and Community Needs (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 2. 
38 “Citizen Attitudes in Milwaukee…A Further Look,” 44. 
39 Only 8 percent of Black respondents were “highly satisfied” with law enforcement. “Citizen Attitudes in 
Milwaukee…A Further Look,” 39. 
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“protecting residents.” A majority said police “took a while” to respond to service calls, while two 
thirds of  white residents said police arrived “right away.” Black dissatisfaction with the MPD also 
“cut across all income groups.” This contrasted the “highly favorable rating” of  all white residents. 
Furthermore, Black discontent with police translated into a wider dissatisfaction with the criminal 
justice system as a whole. Forty-one percent of  Black respondents saw the courts as “unfair,” versus 
sixty-two percent of  whites.  
Ultimately, War on Crime funding did little to alter police conduct. Instead, the LEAA 
strengthened state and local police patronage systems.40 Before Congress passed the 1968 Safe 
Streets Act, local police departments relied almost exclusively on property and sales tax revenues to 
operate. Suburbanization diminished Milwaukee’s annual budget. Public property holdings declining 
from forty to thirteen percent of  individual and corporate holdings from 1950 to 1980.41 After the 
conservative Democrat Henry Maier was elected mayor in 1960, he increasingly turned to the federal 
government to help pay for social and economic programs and emergency services, like the police. 
As Milwaukee struggled to balance annual budgets in the long 1970s, agencies like the LEAA 
offered necessary relief. Between 1968 and 1975, agencies in the city received almost $3.8 million in 
federal criminal justice funding.42 Police bureaucrats, namely the MFPC and City Hall, applied for 
nearly $600,000 to recruit and train police personnel. LEAA grants focused on “minority 
recruitment” and ways of  improving “community relations.” The MPD spent just over $618,000 
federal dollars on “computerization,” which went towards upgrading the police department’s data 
collection and surveillance capacities.43 Computer-based technologies helped the MPD forecast 
 
40 Pihos, “Policing, Race, and Power in Chicago,” 213-214. 
41 The city’s suburban periphery grew by more than three times, from 234,000 residents to 761,000 between 1950 and 
1980. Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 284-285. 
42 Of this, $235,000 went to planning grants between 1969 and 1973. “Department of Fiscal Liaison, Law Enforcement 
Assistance Grants to Milwaukee,” Box 104, Folder 17, “Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1972-1975,” 
Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
43 “Department of Fiscal Liaison, Law Enforcement Assistance Grants to Milwaukee”; 
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crime patterns, while also bolstering statistical data collection in “high-crime” neighborhoods. It also 
facilitated militarized police crackdowns on radical Black activists and low-income criminal offenders 
of color. Almost no federal investments went to upgrading police weaponry in this period, although 
the city received $28,500 for “riot control” in 1968. Milwaukee police received ample funding at a 
time when federal and state governments severely curtailed investments in housing, health, and jobs-
training resources. 
The Wisconsin Criminal Justice Council (WCCJ) administered LEAA funds in the state. The 
20-member body was one of  the first state planning agencies in the country set-up to apply for and 
receive Safe Street Act funds.44 Under a Republican governor, Warren Knowles, the WCCJ initially 
prioritized police training and juvenile delinquency. Members recognized criminal justice funding 
alone would not “eradicate the causes of  crime.” Partnering with agencies and “professionals in 
other fields,” they surmised, would help address public safety issues in a “rapidly changing society.”45 
In 1970, the council resolved to dramatically expand criminal justice spending in the state. Federal 
LEAA disbursements increased from $3,795,000 in 1970 to $7,309,000 in 1971.46 The WCCJ had 
more money to pursue a dual racial pacification and crime-fighting agenda.47 Most funds went to 
Milwaukee, where police reported about one third of  all crime in Wisconsin.48 When Democratic 
Governor Patrick Lucey took office in 1971, he appointed new WCCJ members. Liberals reoriented 
the council’s focus on police-community relations and fighting the War on Drugs in Wisconsin. 
 
44 “Governor Makes Corrections and Courts Priorities in Charge to New Council,” “Wisconsin Council on Criminal 
Justice Bulletin,” 1, Box 104, Folder 16, “Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1969-1971,” Records of Mayor 
Henry W. Maier Administration. 
45 Thomas Lubenow, “Milwaukee Has Third of State Crime,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 9, 1970, Part 2, 1-2. 
46 WCCJ estimated it would spend $12,735,000 in Safe Streets Act funding in 1972, $17,000,000 in 1973, $22,887,000 in 
1974, and $26, 934,000 in 1975. Thomas Lubenow, “Milwaukee Has Third of State Crime,” The Milwaukee Journal, 
December 9, 1970, Part 2, 1-2. 
47 The WCCJ proposed distributing more than $235,000,000 in federal, state, and local funding from 1970 to 1975. Task 
forces were also appointed to address the criminal courts and corrections. Thomas G. Lubenow, “Lucey Ready to 
Resume State’s War on Crime,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 20, 1971, Part 2, 14. 
48 The council recognized that crime was not limited to Black neighborhoods. In fact, it noted in 1970 that that there was 
a “dramatic upturn” in “non-ghetto” crime among white middle-class youth. Thomas Lubenow, “Milwaukee Has Third 
of State Crime,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 9, 1970, Part 2, 1-2. 
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Governor Lucey expanded the WCCJ from twelve to eighteen members, adding six people from 
Milwaukee. Chief  Breier was notably absent from this delegation; he largely refused to participate in 
state War on Crime programming. Former Urban League Director Walter Kelly, however, served as 
the council’s executive director. The re-constituted WCCJ crafted policies, reviewed LEAA grant 
applications, and authorized funding requests. 
 
The Demand for Community Control  
 Community control in the long 1970s was, according to one historian, a “radical agenda of 
reorienting the relationship between residents and the police.”49 Ideally, it located decision-making 
power in the hands of  people historically persecuted by state violence and white racial terror, and 
called for “rigorous external oversight” of  a revised law enforcement system. Black Power activists 
focused on community survival framed its agenda. The Oakland Black Panther Party for Self 
Defense (BPP) perhaps articulated the best known vision for community control of the police in 
June 1969.50 Monitoring and reimagining law enforcement was part of the organization’s larger 
program to, as Robin D.G. Kelley writes, “provide for the social needs of Black communities where 
the state failed.”51 The BPP called for separate public safety departments in Black, Brown, and white 
communities. These agencies were to be headed by a full-time police commission, not individual 
chiefs. “Neighborhood Police Control Councils” comprised of community members would 
democratically select police commissioners. These councils would have the power to discipline 
officers and direct commissioners to change policies by a popular vote as needed. They could also 
fire appointed police commissioners deemed unresponsive to the community’s needs at any time. 
 
49 Max Felker-Kantor, “The Coalition Against Police Abuse: CAPA’s Resistance Struggle in 1970s Los Angeles,” The 
Journal of  Civil and Human Rights 2 (1) (Summer 2016), 79. 
50 “Petition Statement for Community Control of the Police,” The Black Panther, June 14, 1969, 16. 
51 Robin D.G. Kelley, “What Abolition Looks Like, From the Panthers to the People,” Abolition for the People, 
October 26, 2020, accessed October 27, 2020, https://level.medium.com/what-abolition-looks-like-from-the-panthers-
to-the-people-6c2e537eac71. 
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The people would hold the authority to recall neighborhood council representatives. Finally, all 
police had to live in communities they safeguarded. 
 Black Power activists and allies in Milwaukee articulated a similarly far-reaching vision for 
overhauling Milwaukee’s policing infrastructure. These more radical police accountability groups not 
only advocated for Black representation, input, and oversight within the city’s police bureaucracy, but 
for community control of  an entirely new law enforcement system. In the aftermath of  the 1967 
civil disturbance and the civil violence meted out by police and white south side fascists against 
Milwaukee’s NAACP Youth Council during the group’s fair housing marches, ideas about communal 
self-determination animated Milwaukee’s civil rights insurgency. The concept extended to Latinx, 
Indigenous American, and Women’s organizations, sparking a host of  identity-based groups. Self-
determination infused the city’s political left with a more revolutionary politics that rejected 
liberalism and conservatism’s white heteropatriarchal and imperialistic policy prescriptions. Existing 
within Milwaukee’s white power structure, which forcibly contained its own internal colonies in the 
city’s ghettoized near north and south side communities, was no longer feasible. Public cynicism 
deepened as elected officials brushed aside or placated Black and Brown complaints of  police 
violence. The MPD, Father James Groppi warned, was “the most imminent problem in the Black 
community…nothing more than an occupation army.”52 The department’s “oppressive nature” was 
meant to “keep the Black man in line.” Mounting distrust of  police bureaucrats and their capacity to 
change facilitated ideas about community control at the base of  Milwaukee’s civil rights insurgency. 
 Communal self-determination emanated from Milwaukee’s blossoming Black Power 
organizations. The movement surfaced locally in October 1966, a few months after Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee Chairman Stokely Carmichael famously declared in Greenwood, 
Mississippi: “We been saying freedom for six years and we ain’t got nothin’. What we got to start 
 
52 “500 Stage Largest Housing March Here in 2 Months,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, February 12, 1968, Part 1, 5, 14. 
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saying now is Black Power!”53 However, Black nationalist organizing in the city extends back to the 
1920s, when Milwaukee featured an active United Negro Improvement Association chapter.54 As the 
revolutionary Black Panther Party for Self-Defense was forming in Oakland, California, the 
interracial NAACP Youth Council established its militant “Commando” unit to help protect civil 
rights demonstrators from white vigilante and police violence. Police had joined white counter-
protesters in attacking YC activists and allies at open housing marches, especially when they crossed 
over to the city’s south side. Roughly 16,000 angry residents, for instance, greeted some eight 
hundred civil rights marchers on the second night of  the YC’s lengthy open housing campaign.55 
Police brutality followed the arrests of  demonstrators, who comprised a multi-racial contingent. The 
Commandos formed after white supremacists bombed the YC’s “Freedom House” headquarters on 
the north side. The young Black men wore black berets, black boots, and a customized 
“Commando” sweatshirt.56 Rather than claiming to be disciples of  “non-violence,” they upheld a 
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principle of  “not-violence.” The “security unit” was not afraid to use force, but only when necessary. 
“If  the police or the white crowds came after us or the marchers, we weren’t afraid to mix it up,” 
former Commando Prentice McKinney said. “We fought back.” As such, many white observers 
viewed them as “a violent, militant organization.”57  
 Milwaukee’s short-lived Black Panther Party chapter (MBPP) shared a vision for community 
control that extended beyond law enforcement. The group, which reached between seventy-five and 
one hundred members, organized in the winter of  1968.58 Its members ideologically opposed city 
officials and Black moderates, whose liberal politics catered more to Black bourgeois interests than 
the Black poor and proletariat.59 The MBPP saw liberalism as complicit in processes of  Black 
ghettoization and economic exploitation. In response, they advocated for, as co-founder Kenny 
Williamson put it, “community control of  community institutions” and “cooperative economic 
endeavors.”60 Via the provisioning of  social services, Milwaukee’s Panthers established a 
“community-oriented organization.”61 On the issue of  police brutality, the MBPP’s goal was never to 
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use violence or cause a civil disturbance. “The gun,” member Walter Chesser stated, was used 
“merely as a defensive tool.” The chapter’s community service initiatives included a free breakfast 
program for school children, free healthcare clinic, and prison visitation program that supported the 
families of  incarcerated north side residents. The MBPP collaborated with radical-left white and 
Latinx organizations.62 As historian Yohuru Williams argues, their willingness to build a multiracial 
coalition “moved [the MBPP] closer, in theory at least, to the model already established by Father 
Groppi and the Commandos.”63 However, the Black Panthers’ willingness to “intervene” and 
“rectify” problems through armed self-defense distinguished it from the YC’s “not-violent” 
approach.64 
 Milwaukee’s Panthers articulated a vision for community control of  the police that drew on 
the legacy of  Black working-class resistance to the MPD’s racialized violence.65 It was part of its 
“larger efforts to improve police-African American relations.”66 The group’s community control 
plan emphasized decentralization of the city’s police bureaucracy. Chief Breier had far too much 
power in the current system. Like the Oakland Party, the MBPP conceived of a police hierarchy that 
located managerial authority with independent police districts demarcated by race. Fifteen-member 
neighborhood councils, elected by community residents, would vote on a district commissioner, 
who would be subject to recalls by citizens as needed. “The people should control everything,” 
Dakin Gentry added.67 Lieutenant of Information Nate Bellamy said the MBPP’s goal was to 
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“alleviate from the black community all these fascist, racist storm troopers and, in turn, replace them 
with respectable new police officers.”68 He recognized there were “some people on the police 
force…dedicated to the people’s needs,” but these officers were “caught up into the system” and 
trapped by “fear of losing their jobs.” The Black community, party members held, were prepared to 
police themselves on their own terms and had to have oversight of the process. Furthermore, 
community control would “lessen the case-load of overburdened courts,” which saw Black 
defendants appearing on charges that were “petty or trumped-up” as a result of police discretion.69  
 The MBPP barely got their self-defense program off  the ground before the chapter’s initial 
iteration was dissolved, largely as a result of  conflicts with police and subsequent legal cases. 
Because of  the Black Panthers’ national reputation for armed confrontations with law enforcement, 
the MPD made eradicating the local chapter its top priority.70 Chief  Breier moved to eradicate the 
group from the city entirely. In his view, the Panthers posed a dangerous, highly subversive threat. 
Therefore, the MPD amplified an already combustible atmosphere on Milwaukee’s predominantly 
Black north side. The chief ’s approach aligned with other law-and-order regimes, who targeted Black 
Panther branches throughout the country.71 On occasion, clashes between law enforcement and the 
Panthers resulted in bloodshed. The MPD’s Tactical Squad targeted, harassed, and arrested the 
Milwaukee branch. Outfitted with “overly aggressive,” “outcast officers,” the TEU specifically 
targeted the MBPP. The paramilitary unit rolled three-to-four people deep in squad cars on the 
north side, its officers visibly armed with shotguns and rifles.72 Meanwhile, the MPD’s Red Squad 
conducted surveillance and maintained a file on the group.73  
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 While the MBPP tried to avoid confrontations with the MPD, they did not shy away from 
them either. Milwaukee police arrested three MBPP members who allegedly tried to murder a white 
police officer with a shotgun blast after he pulled over their vehicle in September 1969. The three 
Panthers denied the charge, insisting that police had framed them and planted a shotgun. According 
to Nate Bellamy, the MPD tried to “stop the party from educating the people” and “jail as many 
panthers as possible.” The “Milwaukee Three,” as they became known, were “beaten badly” by 
police.74 A trial for attempted murder took placed in November 1969. An all-white jury sentenced 
two defendants to thirty years in prison; the third was sentenced to ten.75 “Police persecution was,” 
historian Andrew Witt argues, “the primary reason why the first wave of the Milwaukee Panthers 
disbanded” that winter.76 However, “internal dissension” also played a major role. Rank-and-file 
MBPP members felt betrayed when Branch Captain Dakin Gentry wrote to the BPP’s Central 
Committee asking for the dissolution of  the chapter based on a “lack of success in the community.” 
They observed that Gentry and Bellamy received plumb jobs in Milwaukee’s “Concentrated 
Employment Office.” City Hall was known to offer bureaucratic service positions to Black militants 
as a means of cooling down political radicalism or stifling dissent. Regardless, Oakland dissolved the 
MBPP before it had a chance to press for its community control agenda.77  
  Other organizations filled the void left by Milwaukee’s Black Panthers on demanding 
community control. The Wisconsin Committee to Combat Fascism petitioned City Hall in 1970 to 
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redistribute power from “the one-man dictatorship of Chief Breier” to the neighborhood level.78 
They proposed a decentralized structure similar to the MBPP model. Milwaukee’s American Civil 
Liberties Union chapter, meanwhile, also supported community control of  the police. Organizer 
Joan McManus drafted a position paper that detailed the ACLU proposal. Her intent was “changing 
the concept and role” of  law enforcement “so that status and success” in policing meant “being 
responsive to the needs of  the people in the community.”79 A drastic shift was needed, since “every 
other approach to improving police/community relations had failed.” Liberal reforms did not 
address the racial and economic implications of  police power, focused on whether “improving 
image,” “recruiting minorities,” or establishing “citizen advisory review boards.”80 Like the MBPP 
and anti-fascism committee plans, McManus underscored decentralization. She envisioned a 
reformed MPD reconstituted under a multi-district framework. The ACLU framed the MPD as “an 
occupying army” that did not “know nor care about the people or the culture of  the community 
they work in.”81 A set of  dual enforcement standards existed, set by a powerful police chief  and “the 
dominant white middle-class culture.” Pushed to the margins were Black and Brown men and 
women who resided in heavily policed, under-serviced, and segregated neighborhoods.82  
  McManus was clear in her writing that “the police problem in Milwaukee” was not “a matter 
of  a few bad cops…to be remedied by higher standards and psychological screening.” Rather, it was 
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“the police system itself—quasi-military, secret, based on maintaining the status quo”—that allowed 
for police repression.83 Eventually, she asserted, policing “corrupts all but the most exceptional 
men.” By not speaking out against police violence, the community “gives it our tacit approval.” 
Because society expects Black, Brown, poor, and “politically unpopular” citizens to be repressed, the 
MPD inflicts violence. They get away with abuses of  power because liberal opposition is 
“fragmented” and local politicians are “extremely conservative, parochial, and secretive.” She cited 
an “absence of  organization and unity,” which makes it easier for police misconduct to go ignored. 
 
1972 U.S. Civil Rights Commission Study 
 At the same time that radical Black Power organizations and the Milwaukee ACLU laid out 
their visions for community control of  the police, more moderate liberal interests concerned about 
issues of  public safety worked towards making the MPD more accessible, fair, and community-
oriented. They did so to better control crime, which felt to many people like a growing problem in 
the long 1970s, but also to reduce opportunities for civil disorder and racialized police violence. 
While community control advocates also wanted to better address crime in Black and Brown 
neighborhoods, their prevailing concern was the routine police brutality being administered by 
Breier’s MPD. Liberal organizations and accountability advocates prioritized order maintenance 
improvements and mending relationships between a recalcitrant police force and disparate 
community groups. At different times, both of  these ideological/political forces turned to the 
federal government, either for LEAA funding to help pay for programs related to crime and safety, 
or to intervene when the MPD failed to meet its compulsory civil rights requirements.  
 Federal investigations aided Milwaukee liberals in documenting the need for police reform. 
 
83 Joan McManus, “The Police Problem in Milwaukee,” 1, Box 1, Folder 15, “Greater Milwaukee Conference on 
Religion and Urban Affairs, Police Accountability, 1984-1985, 1991,” Joan McManus Papers, 1970-2003. 
 336 
Following the political upheavals of  the 1960s, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR) 
interrogated police discrimination within individual agencies in an effort to highlight structural 
biases, enforce civil rights compliance, and encourage procedural reforms that would better serve 
diverse urban populations.84 In 1972, the commission investigated the MPD. The USCCR appointed 
a Wisconsin Study Committee (WSC), which found a police department and top administrator that 
was “accountable to no one.”85 The WSC’s report on the MPD revealed for a national audience the 
extent to which Chief  Breier’s impervious authority undermined the police department’s ability to 
police fairly, address internal and external discrimination, and hold officers accountable for 
misconduct. It also documented the apparent turn towards reactionary law-and-order that Breier had 
facilitated since becoming chief  in 1964. Once perceived by federal agencies as an exemplary police 
force, the MPD now stood out more for its regressive tactics, strict regulations, and institutional 
isolation than for its admired professionalism, reform-orientation, and efficient crime control. The 
state-sanctioned independence that, for decades, was seen as a boon to the department’s outwardly 
progressive development, now prevented City Hall from making even basic alterations to 
Milwaukee’s policing system, or the MPD’s strategic approach, public outlook, and internal culture. 
 The WSC’s report, released on December 6, 1972, dealt a symbolic blow to Chief  Breier’s 
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reactionary law-and-order methods, but did not force any structural adjustments. The committee 
questioned the MPD’s insularity and the usefulness of  its freedom from external oversight. The 
WSC noted that little had changed since the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
(NACCD) identified “police brutality” as “the most pervasive” issue identified by Black citizens in 
the fall of  1967.86 Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy showed “no sensitivity” to “the magnitude of  this 
problem.” The WSC acknowledged that the MPD, once considered “a model” and “pioneer in 
progressive police measures,” had lost its “innovator” reputation under Breier.87 Instead, it found an 
administrator “whose central focus…has been to stress traditional police duties.”88 The chief  
“downgraded” areas that other police departments now stressed, such as “college education, 
specialized teams for juveniles, and minority and community relations units.” He denied public 
requests for information and refused to comply with inquiries from outside government agencies, 
including the U.S. Department of  Justice.89 In terms of  waging Milwaukee’s War on Crime, Breier 
refused to apply for federal grants earmarked for “human relations training, community relations 
work or programs designed to treat special situations” related to race.90 These tasks were left to the 
Mayor’s office and MFPC. The police chief ’s “independence on civilian control” allowed him to 
“avoid public scrutiny” for all departmental operations. 
 The WSC identified pervasive discrimination within and without the MPD. They proposed 
solutions that would rid the MPD of  racism and create a more balanced system. The liberal 
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committee concluded that the MPD’s organization and policies had severely “isolated” it from the 
communities of  color most in need of  responsive policing and protection from interpersonal crime 
and police misconduct. The WSC called on Milwaukee’s mayor to “devote his considerable influence 
to the task of  making the MPD accountable to the electorate,” to marshal support from the 
Common Council and state officials, and to use his executive authority to re-organize the police 
department. The WSC posed a series of  questions to Mayor Maier about the MPD, as well as the 
MFPC’s capacity to raise police accountability standards. His answers largely deflected responsibility. 
The mayor pointed to the police chief ’s statutory powers, arguing that his office only had the 
authority to direct the MPD during times of  emergency, like the 1967 civil disturbance. Maier 
applauded the MFPC’s minority recruitment efforts, despite the fact that it fell well short of  its goal. 
Regarding civilian oversight, the mayor cited the 1911 statute and the Wisconsin State Supreme 
Court’s decision to affirm the Milwaukee police chief ’s autonomy. Consequently, the WSC 
recommended that all Safe Streets Act funding for the city be withheld until the MPD drastically 
improved its “human relations” training practices, cooperated with outside agencies and funding 
sources, established a dedicated “community relations unit,” and recruited additional “minority” 
officers.91  
 The WSC report also documented the experiences of  Black police officers in Milwaukee. It 
exposed a problematic system of  Black police recruitment, assignment, and promotions. The 
committee recognized that “uniformed personnel jobs in local police and fire departments were the 
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most difficult for minorities to obtain.”92 Recruits entered the department as patrolmen, some 
through the Police Aide program. After five years, eligible patrolmen could apply for sergeant. After 
a period of  time as sergeant, they could apply for lieutenant and, eventually, captain. Since 1885, the 
MFPC had overseen all hiring and promotions in Milwaukee’s police and fire departments. The 
Commission designed, scheduled and administered entrance and promotional examinations and 
determined eligibility lists based on composite grades. As of  1973, the grade for new recruits 
featured three examination components: forty percent written, thirty percent physical agility, and 
thirty percent oral interview. Successful recruits exhibited “good moral character,” had zero felony 
convictions or “habitual petty law violations,” and were U.S. citizens with at least one year of  
residency in Wisconsin. They had to demonstrate English proficiency and pass reading 
comprehension, oral, and written exams. Patrolmen between the ages of  21 and 33 years also had to 
meet a 5’ 8” height requirement.  
 Until 1968, the MFPC kept no record of  how many Black officers worked for the MPD. This 
changed with the arrival of  Marquette Law School Dean Charles Mentkowski, who aimed to update 
the commission’s statistical records and meet federal diversity requirements. Still, despite dozens of  
applications, very few Black candidates succeeded in getting hired on the MPD. The Assistant to the 
Executive Secretary of  the MFPC selected written exam questions, which were supplied by the 
Public Personnel Association. The MFPC conducted oral interviews and physical agility tests. Failure 
to obtain a passing score on either resulted in disqualification. Eligible candidates were also expected 
to pass medical screenings. Breier offered no reliable data on the number of  Black police officers 
employed. Depending on who the WSC asked, estimates ranged from thirty-three to seventy-one. 
According to interviewees, Breier ordered Black officers not to respond when anyone asked about 
his department’s racial composition. 
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 The WSC’s investigation reflected Milwaukee’s economic segmentation and racial segregation. 
Chief  Breier exacerbated existing racial and class schisms, as City Hall and the MFPC looked to 
diversify the MPD. One way City Hall tried to do so was by hiring a Community Relations Specialist 
(CRS) to help improve the department’s image by mediating disputes between heavily-policed poor 
and working-class communities of  color and law enforcement. At Breier’s urging, rank-and-file 
officers voted against its creation. The chief  saw the position as unnecessary, since every patrolman, 
in his view, was already a community relations expert. The WSC noted that Breier stressed traditional 
practices, like monitoring jaywalking. He rejected partnering with Black-led organizations and 
community institutions to better control crime. The chief ’s aversion to taking Black police 
recruitment and retention deepened the gulf  between the department and the MFPC’s Community 
Relations Specialist.  
 The WSC’s recommendations charted a reformist path that was meant to better connect police 
bureaucrats to federal War on Crime programming, mitigate opportunities for civil disorder, and 
ensure that the MPD was in compliance with civil rights laws. If  the city followed these steps, justice 
would be more equitably served. Moreover, civil service employment opportunities would become 
more widely available to populations suffering from disproportionate unemployment, poverty, and 
crime. To ensure the creation of  a more diverse police force that advanced access and opportunity, 
the committee proposed eliminating the MPD’s one-year state residency requirement. That rule 
effectively barred recent Black and Brown arrivals from employment and precluded national 
recruitment efforts. It advocated for a reduction in the department’s 5’ 8” height requirement, which 
Latinx representatives argued disqualified them from entry onto the force. Regarding the testing of  
police recruits, the committee recommended that the MFPC devise an entrance exam that was free 
of  cultural bias and more specific to the functions of  the job. Although it should not serve as an 
“intelligence test,” they argued that examinations should include psychological testing for new 
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recruits. Finally, existing Black officers should be enlisted to recruit patrolmen and police aides, with 
the MPD recording its racial data and tracking progress of  advancement.  
 Ultimately, the WSC shed a brighter light on the MPD’s discriminatory practices, particularly 
the department’s internal racism and undermining of  minority recruitment, retention, and 
advancement.93 The committee’s recommendations mostly focused on improving police-community 
relations, outlining specific areas to enhance civilian input and oversight. Public testimony revealed 
that people of  color saw the MPD “as a quasi-military occupational force unresponsive to 
community concerns and needs.”94 Therefore, the WSC recommended establishing “community 
advisory boards” to aid district-level commanders in developing “mutual understanding of  
department policy and community needs.” Such advisory boards were to include women, students, 
senior citizens, “business people,” and other community representatives. The Committee also 
recognized that Chief  Breier’s lifetime tenure was a great hindrance to accountability. It 
recommended Mayor Maier and the Common Council restructure the city’s public safety institutions 
so that the police and fire chiefs served limited terms and were held responsible by elected officials. 
Finally, any public complaints received by the MPD should go before the MFPC. Grievance hearings 




93 Overt racial discrimination denied Black officers promotion for years. Chief Breier exerted special control over 
promotions to the Detective Bureau. He reserved the right to appoint all “Acting Detectives”—the initial rank required 
for an officer’s name to be advanced for promotion to full Detective. The committee recommended that only acting 
detectives who had served a year in their position should qualify for the Detectives examination administered by the 
MFPC. Moreover, all patrolmen, not just those selected by the chief, should be eligible to complete this test. 
Recognizing the lack of non-white brass, the committee called for Black and Brown officers to be promoted immediately 
to administrative positions in districts encompassing sizable nonwhite populations, like District Five, District One, and 
District Two. The committee also recommended that all administrative comments concerning police promotions be 
made in writing. No police brass should be present for the MFPC’s oral interviews, as white supervisors had historically 
exerted undue influence on the promotion process when nonwhite candidates came up for review. Police Isolation and 
Community Needs, 43-46. 
94 Police Isolation and Community Needs, 125. 
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The Police Killing of  Jacqueline Ford  
  Supporters of  community control grew increasingly vocal in the wake of  several high-profile 
police killings of  Black Milwaukee citizens in the mid-1970s. On November 14, 1972, the famed 
Black feminist and Marxist philosopher, Dr. Angela Davis, said one of  their names before a packed 
house of  about 1,000 spectators at the Black-owned Creative Center on N. Teutonia Ave.95 Less than 
six months removed from being acquitted of  aggravated kidnapping and first-degree murder charges 
in California, Davis decried Ms. Jacqueline “Jackie” Ford being “viciously shot down by a Milwaukee 
cop.96 A white Detective, Snead Carroll, was the culprit. He fatally shot the 19-year-old less than a 
week after Mother’s Day, on May 17, 1972. Carroll killed Ford outside of  the inner-rear doorway of  
a second-story flat on N. 13th St. He was one of  three detectives to enter the building’s rear entrance 
that day. The detectives ascended Ford’s staircase in search of  a man who was wanted in connection 
with an armed robbery and shootout. The officers found 23-year-old Duane Greer, Ford’s 
boyfriend, in the apartment.97 
  Soon after Carroll shot Ford, the MPD’s public relations team went about defending the 
veteran detective’s honor. Police on the scene reported Ford’s death as accidental. They said he had 
rushed up the back staircase to subdue the young woman, who, at first, officers said was brandishing 
a butcher’s knife. They retracted that claim. Carroll said he “tripped” while moving quickly up the 
 
95 The Creative Center was formerly the Egyptian Theater. At the time it was the only Black-owned theater in Wisconsin. 
“Angela Davis Visit Set Monday at the Creative Center,” The Milwaukee Star Times, November 9, 1972, 1. 
96 Davis’ speech touched on the killing of Soledad Brother George Jackson, South Africa’s oppressive apartheid regime, 
U.S. imperial aggression in Vietnam, and other racist forces of “monopoly capitalism.” “Angela Davis Visit Set Monday 
at the Creative Center.” 
97 An accomplice in the robbery, Lavern Scott, tipped MPD investigators off to Greer’s assumed location at Ford’s N. 
13th St. apartment. The previous day, a detective shot and wounded Scott as he, Greer, and, and another man, George 
M. Williams, exited a Lisbon Ave. liquor store after allegedly holding it up for $70.00. A “tavern customer” was non-
fatally shot in the leg. Detective Carroll and several other officers said they visited Ford’s apartment earlier that 
Wednesday. She denied Greer was hiding in her flat and refused to let the police inside. Scott insisted that Greer was 
hiding in Ford’s apartment. Carroll, two other detectives, and several patrolmen returned to the apartment, entering 
through its front and rear entrances with their guns drawn. “Police Shooting of Woman Probed,” The Milwaukee Journal, 
May 18, 1972, Part 2, 1, 7; “Woman Killed as Police Raid Home for Suspect,” The Milwaukee Journal, May 18, 1972, Part 
1, 7. 
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staircase, unintentionally firing his service weapon in the direction of  Ford’s lower right chest. 
District Attorney E. Michael McCann called the shooting “accidental, though tragic.” Although he 
requested an inquest hearing at the behest of  the Ford family, McCann told reporters that Carroll 
was “one of  the most capable and professional men in the Milwaukee Police Department.”98 Few 
police accountability advocates expected justice from the DA. As McCann told Joan McManus in 
1970, he would “probably never file criminal charges” against a police officer in “a citizen complaint 
case.” They would not be able to overcome the credibility afforded to police in court.99 
  Black residents, incensed over Ford’s death, mobilized a campaign for justice. Twenty-five 
community members filled a small room for the June inquest hearing, including friends and family 
of  the deceased. When the county medical examiner announced his decision to exonerate Detective 
Carroll, loved ones cried out against what they knew to be a grave injustice. Attorney Terrance Pitts 
called the medical examination a “whitewash.” “If  a cop can’t be held responsible for falling and 
killing someone,” he asked, “What are our lives worth—nothing.”100 Duane Greer, on the other 
hand, was charged with attempted murder, armed robbery, and “causing injury by conduct regardless 
of  life.” At the hearing, MPD detectives reiterated their story, insisting that one accidental shot was 
fired. However, witnesses and neighbors presented a murkier picture. Greer and Ford’s sister 
testified to hearing multiple shots fired. A Madison crime lab expert studying the case argued that 
the bullet that hit Ford exited her body and entered the apartment door from the opposite side of  
where police described. Nevertheless, the medical examiner confirmed the police version of  events. 
Carroll’s actions were ruled “excusable homicide.” After the inquest hearing, Sarah Ford addressed 
the press. She called out the whitewashed criminal-legal system’s contradictory character and self-
 
98 “Police Shooting of Woman Probed.” 
99 McManus, “The Police Problem in Milwaukee,” 2. 
100 “Police Shooting of Woman Probed”; “Woman Killed as Police Raid Home for Suspect”; “Detective Cleared in Fatal 
Shooting,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 16, 1972, Part 2, 1, 12. 
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serving narratives, commenting, “Each one is coming up with a different story…. They’re going to 
stick together on their lies…They makes the law, and they breaks the law, to their own advantage.”101 
 Black-led neighborhood organizations assembled in the days after the Ford killing, 
demanding community control of  the police as part of  a larger quest for Black political and 
economic self-determination.102 In Milwaukee, a short-lived umbrella coalition of  Black Power 
organizations formed as the Council of  Black People (CBP). The CBP’s focus was to eliminate 
police violence on the north side. For its members, that began with garnering Black police 
representation, gaining Black input on police policy, and guaranteeing Black civilian oversight of  
police actions. MBPP co-founder Walter Chesser said it was “the first time in Milwaukee [that] Black 
people came together to seriously deal with the question of  community control of  the police.”103 
The CBP’s goal was ultimately to engender more responsible police protection—not to abolish law 
enforcement, but “to develop a police department responsive to the community it serves.”104 That 
included decentralization of  the MPD, or at least uncoupling the department from the 
“impregnable” grasp of  Chief  Breier. The critical issue for Chesser and others was the lethal, 
physical police force regularly inflicted on African Americans. The CBP “was not responding to the 
loss of  one black life,” he affirmed, but “to the deaths of  all Black persons at the hands of  
Milwaukee’s Police Department.” 
 The CBP organized a demonstration at the Milwaukee Safety Building in the wake of  the 
 
101 Sarah Ford filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against Chief Breier and the City of Milwaukee seeking $1.25 million in 
damages. The case moved slowly through the system, and was not settled until 1976. Judge John Reynolds dismissed 
Ford’s claim for “want of prosecution and to clear the court’s calendar.” The Common Council’s Judiciary-Legislation 
Committee then recommended a $15,000 payout. “$1 Million Suit Dismissed in Gun Death,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, May 
4, 1976; “City Urges Settlement in Shooting,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 27, 1976, Part 2, 5; “Sarah Ford 
Addresses News Reporters,” Daily News, June 14, 1972, Milwaukee Journal Stations Records, Milwaukee Mss Collection 
203, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. 
102 As Elizabeth Hinton has written, in the context of increasing civil violence in the late 1960s, “mainstream black 
activists shifted the focus of their organizing from the pursuit of civil rights and equal access to the quest for self-
determination and community control.” Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 132. 
103 Walter Chesser, “Reader Opinion: Did Beach Disrupt COPB?” The Milwaukee Star Times, June 22, 1972, 4. 
104 “Reader Opinion.” 
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Ford killing, where they presented three demands: first, for the MPD to fire Detective Carroll. 
Second, for Breier to replace all white patrolmen serving in Black Milwaukee neighborhoods with 
Black officers. Third, for the police chief, mayor, and MFPC chairman to formally apologize to the 
Ford family for carelessly ending Jacqueline’s life. The CBP worked with Black clergy to shine a 
brighter light on issues of  police violence, circulating a petition for legal changes that permitted 
community control of  the police.105 On May 23, 1972, upwards of  300 people marched on 
Milwaukee’s Safety Building after Ford’s funeral service.106 Four of  the marchers representing the 
CBP—Walter G. Beach II and Webster Harris of  the recently formed New Image Concept, 
Commando Project I leader Jesse Wade, and Robert Bond of  Interested Veterans of  the Central 
City—demanded a meeting with Chief  Breier. “We are not satisfied,” Beach told the press after the 
meeting.107 “The three points that we presented to the chief  were presented as strongly as [they] 
could be presented. And we let the chief  know that we were not satisfied with anything other than a 
positive position on the part of  the police administration,” he added. While Beach insisted the CBP 
would “continue to pursue the issue,” he looked to set the public’s mind at ease about any threat of  
civil unrest surrounding the outcome of  the inquest hearing. “We are not here to destroy or tear 
down. We merely want to make input. And we feel that we ought to have that opportunity to talk to 
the chief  to seek the beginning of  negotiations on behalf  of  the citizenry of  the City of  Milwaukee, 
specifically of  the Black community, and with the Police Department. This is what I call working 
together,” Beach concluded. 
 
105 The Milwaukee Star Times, June 8, 1972. 
106 “250 Blacks Protest Gun Death,” The Milwaukee Journal, May 23, 1972, Part 3, 10. The Milwaukee Sentinel reported a 
lower estimate of 150 protestors. “Says Breier Vows Look at Black Demand,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, May 24, 1972, Part 
1, 5. Conversely, The Milwaukee Courier reported about 300 protesters. “Protestors demand the removal of racist white 
cops from Black Community,” The Milwaukee Courier, May 27, 1972, 1. 
107 Chief Breier initially refused to meet with the CBP. First District Commander Gregory Isermann told the envoys that 
Breier was too busy. Isermann said he would personally deliver their requests. Alderman Orville Pitts intervened, taking 
it upon himself to telephone Breier from the building’s lobby. He was able to persuade Breier to hear out the grievances 
of his constituents. Walter G. Beach II addresses news reporters, May 23, 1972, Daily News, Milwaukee Journal Stations 
Records; “250 Blacks Protest Gun Death,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 12, 2018, Part 3, 10. 
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 None of  the CBP demands were met. Chief  Breier told the council he would take “a long, 
hard look” at removing white officers from Black neighborhoods by the next year. However, he 
called the request “impractical,” citing a limited availability of  Black patrolman candidates.108 Not 
surprisingly, the chief  refused to fire Carroll, who he believed acted appropriately and was 
exonerated by the DA. In a letter to his fellow MFPC members, Louis Miller, the only Black 
commissioner, pleaded for at least a suspension pending a full investigation.109 But Miller’s colleagues 
rejected his request. Assistant City Attorney Thomas Hayes advised the MFPC that police officers 
could not be suspended unless a “formal complaint” was filed by an “elector.” The only room for 
action was on recruiting more Black police. That representation was so low, five years after the 
MFPC had begun taking minority recruitment seriously, was a problem for a commission that had 
done little beyond placing a handful of  public advertisements, outfitting a “community relations 
mobile unit,” and employing a “community relations specialist” to lecture to Black and Latinx people 
on the benefits of  police work. The MPD’s harsh tactics in minoritized spaces, meanwhile, 
undermined their recruitment efforts long-term. Countless Black and Brown youth mistrusted 
police and showed no interest in joining their oppressor. But even those who expressed interest 
faced institutional barriers. In 1972, only two Black young people qualified for the Police Aide 
program, despite an eligibility list of  sixty-two candidates. The MFPC’s executive secretary, Arlene 
Kennedy, cited “economic conditions” and “high unemployment” as factors. Yet Black officers and 
community members knew that written exam questions favored white test-takers in their cultural 
framing. This compounded existing distrust of  Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy.110 
 
108 “Not Enough Blacks to Fill Police Jobs, Breier Says,” The Milwaukee Journal, May 24, 1972, Part 2, 12. 
109 “Commission Declines to Suspend Detective,” The Milwaukee Journal, May 19, 1972, Part 1, 20. 
110 Thirty-two Black and three Latinx candidates applied for the Police Aide position. Three passed the written 
examination; one failed the medical test. Of the two candidates that passed the MFPC’s assessments, only one was 
appointed based on the MPD’s eligibility rankings. Kathleen Matichek, “Police Minority Drive Proves Disappointing,” 
The Milwaukee Journal, August 11, 1972, Part 1, 4; Ralph E. Van Atta, “A Program for Reducing Spurious Attrition of 
Blacks by Police Patrolman Qualifying Examinations,” Box 9, Folder 29, “Administrative Subject Files, Wis. Council on 
Criminal Justice - Police Dept. Test Skills Program, 1974-1976,” Milwaukee Urban League Records, 1919-1979, 
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 Because of  the CBP and Walter Beach’s commitment, Black police recruitment remained the 
only viable reform solution. The statute protecting Chief  Breier’s authority, combined with his 
political influence, neutralized any hope for elected officials expanding community input or civilian 
review structures. Whether Black officers patrolling on the north side would actually lead to a 
reduction in racialized police violence was an untested question. As one retired Black officer 
claimed, he and his peers intervened in potentially violent situations involving white police and Black 
citizens. “If  you see an officer getting heavy handed with someone else,” the officer said, “you step 
in between and you take the blow. And then when they hit you, you can hit back.”111 In 1971, only 
fifty-one Black officers served out of  2,200 sworn personnel—just two percent of  the MPD’s 
total.112 At Breier’s direction, supervising officers refrained from assigning Black officers to the same 
squad. They were not allowed to congregate together on the job. The goal for Walter G. Beach II 
and his collaborators was to create power in numbers, eventually moving Black officers up the chain 
of  command within the existing system. He started a community-based hiring drive, working 
alongside the Milwaukee Urban League, University of  Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Adult Basic Education 
Department of  the Spanish Center, and MFPC to host skills training workshops.113  
 Beach’s efforts were successful. Ford’s death motivated, for instance, future League of  
Martin president Lenard Wells to join the MPD.114 His long career began as two forces converged in 
the long 1970s: Black Power organizations seeking to implement community control of  the police 
 
Milwaukee Mss EZ, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. 
111 Lenard Wells, interview by Will Tchakirides, November 12, 2016, African Americans in the Milwaukee Police 
Department Oral History Project. 
112 Kenneth Feit, “The Milwaukee Police Department Part II,” 5. 
113 “Blacks Fear Police Plant, Oust Whites,” The Milwaukee Journal, January 4, 1973, Part 2, 2. 
114 Wells heard Beach discuss the shooting death on his WAWA radio show with O.C. White. Beach personally recruited 
him as he was leaving his manufacturing job. As Wells recalled in an oral history interview, “I’m leaving A.O. Smith one 
morning, and Walter G. Beach is standing there, and he handed me a flyer, and he looked me in the eye…and says, ‘You 
are who we need. Come to a meeting.’ And the meeting was at the Urban League…” Lenard Wells, interview by Will 
Tchakirides, November 12, 2016. Lenard Wells migrated to Milwaukee in 1968 from Whatley, Alabama, a small farming 
town of several hundred residents. Wells had a large family, with twelve siblings—eight boys and four girls. “Jackie 
Ford’s Family Sues City, Hearing Begins Half Million-dollar Suit,” The Milwaukee Star Times, November 9, 1972, 3; 
Lenard Wells, interview by Will Tchakirides, November 12, 2016. 
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and the federal government enforcing civil rights compliance within police agencies. Beach’s 
recruitment push, in January 1973, secured a record sixty-two minority applicants—mostly Black, 
but also some of  Latinx and Native American ancestry.115 In May, he founded a police training 
school that would operate through his non-profit organization, the New Image Concept (NIC), 
which sought grant funding through the LEAA. The “image” of  the MPD was the main inhibitor to 
“good potential policemen,” Beach surmised.116 Black politicians supported the one-time Milwaukee 
NAACP president’s recruitment efforts. Without recruiting more Black patrolmen, Lloyd Barbee 
wrote Beach, “the dogs who are to protect us will become madder, or wolves who will prey upon the 
Black and Latin community all the more.”117 Mayor Maier appointed the second Black Fire and 
Police Commissioner, William Gore, in May 1973. It marked a liberal transition for the MFPC, as the 
board moved further away from the secretive, conservative, all-white civic alliance’s powerful 
influence. Police brutality, Gore said, was “something that should be looked at honestly and 
corrected.”118 He expressed hope that Milwaukee would curb Black suspicions of  police. However, 
additional police killings foiled this goal. 
 
Black Lawmakers and Police Reform  
  Racialized police killings, like the Ford case, shaped Black political agendas during the long 
1970s. Milwaukee’s few Black legislators responded to constituent demands for accountability. 
 
115 “Minorities Take Up Police Officer,” The Milwaukee Journal, January 26, 1973, Part 2, 13. 
116 In July 1973, the New Image Concept held a “Police Community Solidarity Day” fundraiser for the Minority Police 
Training and Recruitment School of Milwaukee. Beach hoped to fund the training school through an LEAA grant. 
However, he missed an application deadline with the Metropolitan Milwaukee Criminal Justice Council in January 1974. 
Box 56, Folder 40, Police Training and Recruitment of Minorities, 1973, undated, Lloyd A. Barbee Papers; “Training 
School for Would-Be Officers Planned,” The Milwaukee Journal, May 18, 1973, Part 2, 4. The NIC hosted its first police 
training and recruitment course for police recruits in February 1974. The course was held at 1201 W. Vliet St. Box 140, 
Folder 3, “Police Department, October-December, 1974,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
117 Lloyd Barbee to Walter Beach, July 10, 1973, Box 56, Folder 40, “Police Training and Recruitment of Minorities, 
1973, undated,” Lloyd A. Barbee Papers, 1933-1982, Milwaukee Mss 16, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. 
118 “Commissioner Tells Job Aims,” The Milwaukee Courier, May 19, 1974, 3. 
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However, they found lax support from white colleagues. Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee, who had 
joined Alderwoman Vel Phillips in calling for more Black police officers in the early 1960s, was the 
most active.119 His participation in the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality Committee (1964-1965), when 
Chief  Breier refused to work with local organizations in alleviating police-community tensions, 
showed him that fixing Black Milwaukee’s policing crisis would require legislative solutions. In 1968, 
Barbee introduced a bill that granted anyone the right to file a complaint against the police with the 
MFPC, regardless of  taxpayer or property owner status. It passed. The next year, he proposed 
additional measures that failed.120 “We no longer have time for debate when incidents of  violence by 
police are directed against and restrict the legitimate movement of  people,” Barbee argued.121 His 
first bill mandated psychological screenings for police recruits, so as to remove potentially dangerous 
or racist patrolmen.122 Another made it illegal for police to abuse any person stopped, arrested, or 
detained by law enforcement. In “incident after incident,” the assemblyman observed, Milwaukee 
police were “catching a person unaware and physically assaulting him for no reason other than 
exercising his power.”123 A third measure would have established a civil rights division within the 
Wisconsin Department of  Justice. That agency, among other responsibilities, was to handle all police 
brutality and misconduct allegations registered in the state.124 Finally, Barbee drafted a bill that would 
install a civilian head of  the MPD—a commissioner appointed by and who served at the mayor’s 
 
119 While Barbee retained faith that policing could be made legitimate through “conscientious” administration and efforts 
to attract Black personnel who were “alert to the problems of the inner core,” he was clear-eyed about how institutional 
racism functioned on the MPD. He did not think that hiring more Black police officers alone would automatically 
resolve issues of discrimination. “Liberal advocates” were “proceeding like a herd of turtles” in the “race against racism,” 
doing “too little too late.” Lloyd A. Barbee, “State Report,” The Milwaukee Star Times, May 2, 1974, 4. 
120 “Barbee Bills Would Curb Police Violence,” The Greater Milwaukee Star, May 31, 1969, 7. 
121 “Barbee Moves to Stop Cops,” The Milwaukee Courier, May 24, 1969, 1. 
122 Barbee identified a need to “weed out all those potentially sadistic people who enjoy physically beating a victim” in 
favor of those who can “calmly react to all situations.” “Barbee Bills Would Curb Police Violence.” 
123 “Barbee Bills Would Curb Police Violence.” 
124 Finally, Barbee introduced a measure calling for the creation of a civil rights division within the Wisconsin 
Department of Justice. As the lawmaker affirmed, “With a continued rise in police violence and a significant number of 
persons being constantly oppressed, there must be a move made to protect society from its own creations, mainly the 
police.” “Barbee Bills Would Curb Police Violence.” 
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discretion.125 All of  these bills reflected mounting Black frustrations with the city’s all-white police 
bureaucracy. Unfortunately, few made it out of  committee.126 
  Assemblyman Barbee again addressed police brutality in 1971. He specifically responded to 
the violence inflicted by the MPD’s Tactical Squad. His latest measure declared that “no law 
enforcement officer shall abuse any person detained or in the custody of  a law enforcement 
agency.”127 The proposed bill helped aggrieved people file lawsuits with the U.S. Justice Department, 
along with calling for mandatory investigations. Any officers who engaged in violent acts or 
misconduct were to be disciplined. Barbee put forward more bills, including one that challenged the 
1911 statute granting Milwaukee public safety chief ’s lifetime tenure, policymaking authority, and 
regulatory independence. “If  we want to begin to get rid of  militarism from the police department, 
then we have got to start with the department’s leadership,” he stated.128 During a June 1973 
legislative hearing on setting four-year term limits for public safety chiefs, Barbee and an assembly 
colleague, Harout Sanasarian (D-Milwaukee), criticized Chief  Breier’s “arrogance,” “inaccessibility” 
to citizens, and “roadblocking” of  elected officials who tried to make the MPD “more open and 
responsive to the people.”129 In Barbee’s view, the department had become exceptional for being the 
only police department in the country to run “contrary to democratic arrangements,” with a “police 
 
125 “Civilian Police Head Favored by Barbee.” 
126 Other legislators actively worked to shore up the MPD’s counterinsurgent power in the wake of civil violence. For 
instance, the Wisconsin Senate passed a stronger “stop and frisk” law, just before Barbee demanded action on curbing 
racialized police violence in Milwaukee. It authorized police to “stop and question” persons “considered suspicious” 
prior to effecting an arrest and reflected the unease of white officials with Black Power organizations, especially the 
MBPP. The stop and risk law required that confiscated weapons be sent to the State Crime lab for processing within 
forty-eight hours of seizure. It also made weapons and other materials discovered in police searches subject to seizure 
and admissible in court as evidence. Black activists and civil rights groups assailed the measure. African Americans, 
Barbee said, felt “harassed and intimidated by police who illegally detain[ed] Blacks for questioning just for being on the 
street.” The MPD’s history of indiscriminately stopping and searching Black residents—regardless of class 
background—dated to at least the 1930s, when Vice Squad officers aggressively frisked and brutalized presumed 
“policy” gamblers. “Barbee Moves to Stop Cops.” 
127 “March 23, 1971, Introduced by Representative Barbee,” Box 57, Folder 1, Police Brutality, 1961-1974, n.d., Lloyd A. 
Barbee Papers. 
128 “Civilian Police Head Favored by Barbee,” The Greater Milwaukee Star, August 30, 1969, 2. 
129 “Hearing Critical of Breier,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 13, 1973, Part 2, 4. 
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chief  appointed for life.” 
  Other Black legislators introduced policing measures as more got elected to office in the 
long 1970s. State Senator Monroe Swan, former chair of  the Organization of  Organizations, 
introduced three bills in March 1973. They responded to the MPD’s brutal searches and 
interrogations following the shooting deaths of  two officers. The first measure required on duty 
police in “first class cities” to wear police badge identification numbers sewn on their uniforms.130 
The second called for a five-member “police and fire safety review board” to be established in each 
of  Milwaukee’s seven police districts. The boards would be able to evaluate and act on civilian police 
complaints.131 One member from each board would also serve on the MFPC, raising the 
commission’s membership from five to twelve members. Swan’s third bill, co-sponsored with five 
other senators and three representatives, called for the creation of  a “safety commissioner’s” office 
in Milwaukee. The Safety Commissioner would be responsible for appointing police and fire chiefs 
and holding them accountable. They would report to the MFPC, which would be expanded from 
five to nine members, with the Common Council appointing two members and the fire and police 
unions appointing two as well. The measure also called for public safety chiefs to serve four-year 
terms. Swan introduced another measure in April prohibiting police officers in first-class cities from 
living outside of  the precincts or districts in which they served.132  
Lloyd Barbee was also the first Black community leader in Milwaukee to float the idea of  
police abolition. He told the city’s International Society for General Semantics chapter in 1968 that 
all police forces should be abolished. “They are taught violence and actively practice it,” Barbee 
stated, referencing the police riot that had just taken place outside of  the Democratic National 
 
130 Swan introduced these bills on March 30, 1973. “1973 Senate Bill 417,” 1, Box 139, Folder 21, “Police Department, 
March, 1973,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
131 “1973 Senate Bill 418,” 1, Box 139, Folder 21, “Police Department, March, 1973,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier 
Administration. 
132 “1973 Senate Bill 448,” 1, Box 139, Folder 22, “Police Department, April-September, 1973,” Records of Mayor 
Henry W. Maier Administration. 
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Convention in Chicago.133 He framed the police as defenders of  class privilege, “put in a position of  
killing human beings for taking or damaging property.”134 “This kind of  action triggers counter-
action” from overpoliced citizens, who perceive law enforcement as “an occupying army.” Barbee 
held that it was only possible for the police to “maintain law and order” if  they respected human 
dignity rather than “violate it with acts of  brutality, harassment, and sadism.”135 To make his point, 
Barbee alluded to an era of  benevolent policing, pre-militarized and with sound community 
relations. We can no longer “rely on hardware and weapons for law and order,” Barbee commented. 
“Police now play the role of  provocateurs, doing much more harm than good,” and “white bigots 
support this kind of  force.”136  
Barbee unsuccessfully tested his abolition concept in the legislature in October 1969. He 
introduced what is essentially a proposal for community control of  law enforcement. The bill called 
for the abolition of  all police departments in Wisconsin cities and villages with populations over 
5,500 residents. The departments were to be replaced with volunteer forces led by civilian 
administrators appointed by community boards, who were also tasked with supervising the agency’s 
“day-to-day activities.”137 The bill did more than simply dismantle organized police departments. It 
called for their civilian-led replacements to be staffed by unarmed officers. In not carrying deadly 
“instruments of  force,” historically used to “escalate essentially peaceful situations into violent 
confrontations,” law enforcement would keep the peace, refrain from brutality, and “further reduce 
the authoritarian appearance of  policemen.”138 Barbee argued this engendered “community respect 
and acceptance” from residents who mistrusted the intentions of  police. Lastly, the bill also called 
for “a draft procedure” when volunteers were needed. Draftees would be guaranteed the right of  re-
 
133 “Barbee Feels Police Shouldn’t Exist at All,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 14, 1968, Part 2, 6. 
134 ‘Barbee Says Disarm Cops,” The Milwaukee Courier, September 21, 1968, 1. 
135 “‘Barbee Says Disarm Cops.” 
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137 “Bill Would Abolish Police, Draft Plainclothes Force,” The Milwaukee Courier, October 18, 1969, 1. 
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employment, assuming they held a job, after two-year terms. All officers would undergo 
psychological screenings. Community boards would be empowered to set procedures according to 
local conditions. For Barbee, police “abolition” meant dismantling and rebuilding law enforcement 
from the ground up under a program of  community control that anchored policing in service, not 
racist public order enforcement. 
 
Re-organized Milwaukee Black Panther Party and the United Black Community Council 
 Following the Council of  Black People’s apparent dissolution in 1972, Milwaukee’s Black 
Panther Party (MBPP) reorganized.139 It was formally re-chartered in 1973 and featured about fifty 
members, mostly Black women. Again, the MBPP took up the banner of  community control of  the 
police. In May 1974, the group called for the formation of  a citizen elected “City-wide Police 
Commission” (CPC). While all Black residents experienced some form of  overpolicing and 
underprotection in Milwaukee, the Panthers faced a near-constant threat of  police harassment, 
surveillance, and violence. The Party’s national reputation for armed militancy and Black Nationalist 
posturing encouraged a focused police response locally. While the CPC had little chance of  
realization in a white-controlled city dominated by competing liberal and conservative political 
interests, it outlined a unique vision for community control that served as a baseline for more radical 
police accountability advocates going forward. Ronald Starks called the plan “the first viable 
restructuring of  the present police department system designed to institutionalize actual control by 
the community.”140 
 The Black Panthers’ idea for the CPC revived the public safety board concept outlined in 
1968 by the Martin-Weber Committee (MWC). The MWC had proposed replacing the Fire and 
 
139 Based on newspaper mentions, the Council of Black People appears to have dissolved after the public 
demonstrations for justice for Jacqueline Ford ended in 1972. 
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Police Commission with a seven-member body responsible for setting all police policies.141 However, 
the MBPP wanted to add eight additional members. CPC candidates would run on public campaigns 
funded by City Hall. They had to be civilians, at least eighteen years of  age, and should not 
concurrently hold public office. The CPC would then choose local administrators to oversee seven 
police district boards. These citizen-led boards would hold the authority to hire and fire police 
personnel, promote officers, process complaints, and operate the internal affairs bureau. CPC 
records would be open and accessible to the public, and people could petition for special meetings 
as needed. Central to this self-determined vision was, again, requiring the police to live in the 
districts they served. This would ensure fair representation, raise standards of  accountability, and 
improve community relations, while at the same time lowering Black arrest rates. The MBPP set a 
goal of  collecting 30,000 signatures for a state legislative referendum to “change laws governing 
police affairs” in 1976. To build support, they proposed educational classes to familiarize people 
with the MPD’s “history, structure, and operation.”142 
 Black Power organizations flourished in Milwaukee during the mid-1970s. The revived 
MBPP and others participated in a United Black Community Conference in August 1974.143 It was 
designed to bring Black Milwaukeeans of  sundry political, religious, and philosophical perspectives 
together. The conference’s more than a dozen workshops aimed to create a unified Black position 
on local issues like police brutality, education, housing, healthcare, and the needs of  veterans. Penny 
and Michael McGee, both Black Panthers and community activists, led the conference’s steering 
committee. They focused on developing Black political unity, community control of  institutions, an 
“economic base” for community survival programs, and registering Black voters.144 The event led to 
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the formation of  the United Black Community Council (UBCC), which competed with Black-led 
liberal coalitions in debates around police violence and public safety. The group came to include 
former members of  the MBPP, after Huey Newton shut down all branches outside of  California in 
1977, members of  the Republic of  New Africa, and the Nation of  Islam.145  
 
January 1973 Police Slayings and Response 
  The issue of  police-Black citizen violence was aggravated amid a violent start to 1973. On a 
cold January night, two white patrolmen, Charles Smith and Gerald Hempe, were shot and killed on 
N. Palmer St. by a 26-year-old Black male suspect.146 It was not immediately clear why the officers 
pulled Ben Sanders and a vehicle of  three passengers over, nor why the traffic stop took a tragic 
turn. According to witnesses, police were arresting a passenger, 21-year-old Gregory Daniels, when 
Sanders exited the vehicle and began firing.147 Community members suspected the MPD’s history of  
“social harassment” played a role.148 In response to the first slaying of  a police officer since 1967, the 
MPD engaged in an aggressive “manhunt,” or, what one Black Vietnam War veteran called, “a 
search and destroy mission.”149 Three tavern owners complained to the Milwaukee NAACP that 
officers stormed into their establishments, lined patrons up at gunpoint, searched them for guns, and 
made arrests.150 Black homeowners decried a lack of  search warrants. Alderman Ben Johnson said 
the killings were “symptomatic of  the problems that are confronted daily” by Black citizens.151 More 
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than a dozen suspects were eventually apprehended, with more stopped, searched, and questioned. 
The invasive “hunt” triggered latent traumas. Officers “forcibly entered” several family residences 
and businesses in the vicinity of  the crime in search of  witnesses and suspects. One elderly man said 
he did not know who he was more scared of, “the cops or the muggers…” The police “treat us just 
like we was all criminals.”152  Some “terrorized” suspects were so badly beaten they required 
hospitalization.153 At a district station, police denied attorney visitations to interrogated suspects.154 
Jesse Wade, of  the Commandos I project, expressed remorse about the officers’ deaths.155 However, 
he also surmised that the young patrolmen would still be alive “if  cops hadn’t been messing with 
folks.” Most Black people in the city, he said, “don’t go looking for cops…they go the other way.”156  
  The MPD’s actions evoked the 1956 and 1957 police searches for Black rape suspects 
following the alleged sexual assaults of  white women. Only this time, the Black community had 
more political capital. Black elected officials connected the tragedy of  the police murders to 
discriminatory law enforcement tactics and a lack of  protection for Black residents living on 
Milwaukee’s north side. Alderman Orville Pitts observed that an “illegal curfew” existed after 9:00 
p.m. in the Black community. Residents found in violation were “stopped and frisked while they 
walked or drove their cars.”157 The MPD criminalized African Americans, while ignoring “the 
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muggers, burglars, and other people who commit crimes” in their neighborhoods. Johnson called for 
“psychological screenings” of  police officers so as to remove those “who had overt racism and 
hostility.”158 This was not about “going soft” on crime, he said, but instilling “mutual trust and 
respect.” Having learned from past police-citizen conflicts, Black political leaders agreed that 
reaching out to the MPD to improve police-community relations was “futile,” “worthless,” 
“superfluous.”159 The same went for the “useless” MFPC, as County Supervisor Terrence Pitts 
described the commission. According to the supervisor, “the only way to stop harassment and police 
brutality” was “to win cases in a civil court system.”160 His brother (Orville Pitts) called for an FBI 
probe, noting that justice “can only be achieved through the federal process.” Pitts’ investigation 
request characterized the MPD as “engaged in a conspiracy to deny civil rights to citizens.”161 
Speaking in front of  about one hundred frustrated Black constituents at the Northtown Planning 
and Development Center, the Black alderman called on thousands of  residents to inundate City Hall 
with their grievances against the MPD and peacefully “paralyze” municipal government.162  
  Black politicians were not alone in voicing their concerns about racist policing. A white 
alderman, Martin Schreiber, said public complaints made against the police for acts of  violence 
should be City Hall’s “top priority.” By February 10, 1973, at least four civilian complaints of  police 
brutality had been turned over to the U.S. Department of  Justice’s Civil Rights Division.163 Still, 
rather than listen to and act on Black grievances against the police, Mayor Maier focused on other 
issues, like uniting residents living in Milwaukee’s “Model Cities” district to fight against federal 
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budget cuts.164 Rather than tell police to stop harassing Black people, Alderman Pitts said, Maier told 
“members of  the (black) community not to walk the streets at night, to refrain from provoking the 
police.”165 He warned against local demagogues manipulating “false charges, innuendos, and 
tensions” around policing. The Milwaukee ACLU, alternatively, framed the north side as a 
“tinderbox” ready to explode following the next instance of  police intimidation or brutality. The 
organization demanded better police leadership. Black residents suggested the community engage in 
“economic boycotts” to pressure Chief  Breier into disciplining violent officers.166 Although the 
Milwaukee County District Attorney conducted a brief  “John Doe” probe into civilian claims of  
“police brutality, abuse, and harassment,” the investigation turned up no police reprimands or 
convictions.167 Meanwhile, white citizens defended Chief  Breier, who according to The Milwaukee 
Journal, was “seen by large numbers of  Milwaukeeans as the city’s foremost protector against the 
forces of  crime and disorder.”168 
  In response to the 1973 police killings and the MPD’s aggressive response, representatives 
from over sixty Black professional and service organizations chose twelve community leaders to 
form a Show of  Solidarity Committee (SSC). The liberal coalition administered a familiar set of  
demands. Upwards of  three hundred people attended the SSC’s first meeting at Calvary Baptist 
Church that February. The open assembly included all Black city, county, and state elected officials. 
The committee challenged the MPD searches in the wake of  the police killings. Without blaming the 
entire department, it castigated “a bigoted minority of  officers bent on destroying the goodwill that 
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does exist” in the Black community.169 The SSC demanded improved police-Black community 
relations—“an immediate end to all acts of  hostility, brutality, and misuse of  police authority”—in 
addition to Chief  Breier’s resignation and a change to the state law granting police chiefs lifetime 
tenure and rule-making authority.170 The committee planned a protest march from Garfield Park to 
City Hall for the following week to pressure Mayor Maier and the Common Council to finally act on 
making police-community relations improvements. Reverend Roy Nabors, Pastor at Calvary Baptist 
Church, warned the mayor that if  he ignored the coalition’s demands, up to 3,000 residents would 
march. The SSC met with Maier and, perhaps not unsurprisingly, changed their proposed 
demonstration to a rally.171 In cancelling the march, Nabors cited a reduced volume of  civilian 
complaints, mounting clergy support for Black concerns, and more open communication from the 
mayor’s office.172  
  The rally at Calvary Baptist Church generated five demands. They included a restructured 
police department, with term limits on the chief  of  police, a citizen review board, an expanded 
MFPC to include Black and Latinx members, the appointment of  Black commanders and 
assignment of  more Black officers in majority African American districts, and the enforcement of  a 
recently passed ordinance requiring police officers to wear patches showing their badge numbers.173 
Louis Miller, who had resigned from the MFPC in January, told attendees that the MFPC was an 
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anti-Black institution. He left his post, in part, because bringing “significant change” to the 
previously all-white body felt like such a monumental struggle. Miller urged residents to “push for a 
stronger voice.”174 At the rally, the SSC established a police brutality fund to be administered by the 
Milwaukee NAACP. It called on citizens to file federal lawsuits in response to police brutality cases. 
Alderman Pitts said police violence resulted from the power wielded by manufacturers, industrialists, 
and bankers. The MPD served at their behest. Therefore, political pressure should be applied to 
local capitalists. 
 More incidents of  racialized police violence transpired that summer, often under murky 
circumstances. In late June, police shot and killed a disabled 24-year-old Black man after he 
commandeered a police service weapon in Police District Five’s parking garage and wounded four 
officers.175 Warren Pettis was arrested on charges of  public drunkenness and disorderly conduct. He 
reportedly shouted to officers that he was not going to die like Chicago Black Panther Party leader 
Fred Hampton, who was notably murdered by federal police in December 1969. Pettis was a war 
veteran, who three months earlier had commented on the employment problems of  returning Black 
servicemen.176 He said he had been brutalized by police. Counselors at Project WHERE, a veteran’s 
support organization, suspected he was provoked into a shooting match by police. The organization 
described him in glowing terms as someone who “wanted to become a more productive citizen 
within the Black community.”177 In August 1973, two officers shot and killed 22-year-old Andrew 
Friend—a young Black man who, according to MPD reporting, was acting erratically and 
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endangering the lives of  children while in an alcohol or drug-induced state.178 Friend’s family called 
the shooting “mass murder” and challenged the police version of  events.179 The case perplexed and 
saddened many residents, amplifying Black mistrust of  the police. As the public intellectual James 
Cameron editorialized, “the police, evidently, knowing nothing about imagination, or even the basics 
of  human psychology, reverted, apparently, to their natural behavioral pattern in dealing with black 
people.”180 Milwaukee County Medical Examiners ruled the shooting “justifiable” after a tense 
inquest hearing. Andrew Friend’s family charged the MPD with manipulating witness testimony and 
the county with ignoring requested subpoenas.181 
 
Civil Rights Compliance and Revenue Sharing  
 The public outcry among African American residents that greeted the police killing of  
Jacqueline Ford in May 1972, the release of  the USCCR’s report on the MPD that December, and 
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the police violence that followed the murder of  two white patrolmen in January 1973 converged 
with local, state, and federal efforts to bring Milwaukee’s police hiring practices into compliance with 
Title VI of  the Civil Rights Act of  1964. Guaranteeing diverse hiring, free from racial bias, remained 
the most palatable reform proposal supported by both liberal police accountability advocates and 
poor and working-class Black people concerned about public safety. Both sides worked to alleviate 
police-community tensions without diminishing law enforcement’s capacity for effective crime 
control and order maintenance in a city grappling with compounding issues, like white flight, federal 
disinvestment, deindustrialization, and increasing street crime.182 For City Hall officials, the stakes 
were not simply about mitigating opportunities for civil violence among Black residents frustrated 
by inequality or, for some, protecting vulnerable populations of  color from police misconduct—they 
were also about the possibility of  losing federal grant dollars under the Nixon administration’s 
revenue sharing program. 
 On October 20, 1972, a Wisconsin Council on Criminal Justice (WCCJ) civil rights 
compliance officer asked Chief  Breier to account for the MPD’s racial demographics and submit 
data on all white, Black, Mexican, and Native American personnel hired onto the department since 
January 1, 1971. The compliance officer, Rina Rosenberg, wanted the names, racial backgrounds, and 
assignments of  all rank-and-file officers and an explanation for how their recruitment occurred, 
including any gender restrictions and an outline of  all screening processes.183 Breier responded, 
petulantly, and declined to provide any demographic information. He argued the MPD had only 
applied for “radio equipment” upgrades from the WCCJ and was thus exempt from state monitoring 
because his grant request did not have “employment” or “training” as a “primary objective.” 
Rosenberg informed Breier that federal law mandated compliance from all agencies receiving any 
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LEAA funding.184 She gave him a deadline of  November 27, 1972, less than a month before the 
Wisconsin State Committee published its report on the MPD’s institutional isolation and 
discriminatory internal and external practices. Still, the police chief  abstained. The WCCJ proposed 
holding a hearing on the MPD’s unwillingness to comply with federal civil rights law and, in March 
1973, recommended that the U.S. Justice Department deny Milwaukee $400,000 in Safe Streets Act 
funds. Mayor Maier assured the council that Breier had complied with its request and the WCCJ 
canceled the hearing.185 But the chief, nonetheless, bypassed the council and sent the MPD’s 
demographic data straight to the LEAA in Washington, D.C.186 He reported that fifty-eight Black 
men, one Black woman, six Native Americans, and ten Latino men served on a staff  of  1,900 sworn 
personnel—roughly four percent of  his department.187 
 The LEAA forwarded the MPD’s demographic information to the DOJ’s Civil Rights 
Division, which met with the Maier administration, the MFPC, and Chief  Breier on August 30, 
1973.188 After the meeting, the DOJ announced an investigation into Milwaukee’s police recruitment 
practices.189 If  the city’s police bureaucracy was found to be in violation of  U.S. civil rights law, then 
it would not only lose criminal justice funding, but all revenue sharing monies for 1974—a total of  
$16,374,629.190 While the DOJ did not name specific anti-discrimination claims it was investigating 
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or who called for the probe, it said federal officials were looking into the “systematic exclusion” of  
“minorities” from the “testing procedures and physical requirements for policemen.”191 As police-
Black community tensions increased in the mid-1970s, Black MPD officers brought complaints of  
internal racism to federal authorities. They supported the USCCR’s 1972 probe. Some even met 
anonymously with local reporters before the Wisconsin State Committee released its findings. Black 
officers were hesitant to talk with the press on the record, fearing retaliation from supervisors and 
Breier. They expressed hope that the investigation would compel the DOJ to file litigation alleging 
discrimination in police hiring and promotions, as it recently had in Chicago and Buffalo.192 A 
memorandum circulating throughout the MPD suggested “some men coming into the department” 
would not have met previous hiring standards. New recruits, accordingly were “to be watched closely 
for rule infractions” during their one-year probationary period, during which time they could not 
appeal disciplinary measures.193 Although Breier insisted on his support for inter-governmental 
cooperation, he stated that any MPD personnel who spoke with DOJ investigators would be subject 
to internal rules barring discussions of  “official business” with “outsiders.”194 He demanded federal 
subpoenas for police testimony. Of  the twenty-nine officers contacted to testify, only three 
responded.195 When an investigator incredulously asked the chief  who he was “responsible to,” what 
“supervisor,” he said he was only “responsible for the efficiency and good conduct of  the 
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department.”196  
  The threat of  losing millions of  dollars in federal funding “roused” Milwaukee’s police 
bureaucracy into finally taking action on revising its recruitment and testing practices. It is important 
to recognize the federal government’s role in pushing local reform. However, this was a liberal 
intervention that did nothing to alter existing police structures and had no immediate impact on 
long-standing Black complaints of  police violence. DOJ investigators wrote to the MFPC in August 
1973. It demanded that the commission rewrite its civil service hiring documents, so as to ensure 
minority recruitment and testing procedures free of  cultural bias. The goal, they said, was “hiring 
40% of  black patrolmen,” as previously set by the commission.197 The MFPC had only begun 
tracking the racial composition of  Milwaukee’s police and fire departments in 1973.198 Following the 
release of  the USCCR’s December 1972 report, it instituted dual eligibility lists that tracked white 
and non-white candidates. The commission resolved to hire two minority officers for every three 
white applicants.199 Only one Black candidate qualified in 1971.200 
  At the same time that the DOJ conducted its investigation, Black police officers filed Equal 
Employment Opportunity complaints. These ushered in federal court monitoring of  Milwaukee’s 
public safety hiring and assignment procedures. U.S. District Court Judge John Reynolds filed a 
consent decree in 1974 mandating the hire of  three “minority” officers for every five open positions 
on the MPD. On June 28, Reynolds filed a temporary restraining order that prevented the MFPC 
and Milwaukee Fire Department from hiring twenty-two white applicants.201 The order prevented 
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the commission from hiring patrolmen examined in Summer 1974, and “temporarily restrained” the 
MFPC from “engaging in any unlawful discriminatory employment practice or any practice which 
serves to continue past discriminatory employment practices against women.” It also barred the 
commission from “using unfair and non-job related physical ability tests for positions of  police 
patrolman until a final determination on the merits of  this case.” Reynolds set a hearing for October 
2, 1974.202     
  Reynolds certified the MFPC’s affirmative action program in the case Ward and U.S. v. 
Milwaukee (1974). It centered Black women’s experiences with the MPD and instigated lasting hiring 
changes based on both race and gender. In the case, Christine Ward, a 28-year-old Black applicant, 
filed a class action lawsuit against the city and MFPC. She filed on behalf  of  thirty-seven women 
who had passed the written examination for patrolman, but then failed the “physical ability” test. 
Lloyd Barbee represented Ward. He denounced the MFPC’s physical ability test as “inaccurate” and 
“discriminatory…not a true test of  a person’s strength.”203 Ward’s suit alleged that when 
“patrolmen” were hired, they did not need to continue taking the physical examination in order to 
stay employed. This made the process arbitrary and unfair. As Barbee observed after Judge Reynolds 
entered a final court order in 1979, this legal battle was only the beginning of  a broader process of  
integrating the MPD and, in turn, making it more accessible and accountable to the communities it 
served. “We won the legal constitutional battle for employment opportunities,” he said. “It will be a 
hollow victory unless more Blacks, minorities, and women apply, qualify, multiply, and stay in this 
field. Only by working more in these types of  jobs can change from within be accomplished.”204  
 In the end, the DOJ filed two lawsuits alleging racial and gender discrimination in 
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Milwaukee’s public safety hiring practices. One was filed against the city and MFPC on October 17, 
1974. Federal attorneys alleged that a “pattern or practice of  discrimination based on race and sex 
with respect to employment” existed in the police and fire departments. Federal prosecutors argued 
the city was operating in violation of  title VII of  the Civil Rights Act of  1964, as amended by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of  1972, the provisions of  the State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act of  1972, the provisions of  the Safe Streets Act, and rights guaranteed under the 14th 
Amendment.205 Title VII exempted state and local governments from being required to protect 
employees from discrimination. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of  1972 expanded the 
provision to cover public and private employers, educational institutions, and labor organizations 
with fifteen employees or more.206 The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, signed into law in 
October 1972, allocated $30.2 billion to U.S. states over a five-year period. A provision of  the law 
prohibited “discrimination by race, religion, national origin or sex” in the distribution of  federal 
funds. Chicago’s Afro-American Patrolmen’s League (AAPL) was the first police organization to file 
an anti-discrimination complaint with the U.S. Treasury Department.207 The group alleged 
institutional discrimination against Black, Mexican-American, and Puerto Rican officers in Chicago. 
The MPD had even greater racial disparities than Chicago. Black officers comprised fifteen percent 
of  Milwaukee’s total population, but only three percent of  sworn police personnel. Black officers 
comprised sixteen percent of  Chicago’s force and thirty-three percent of  the city’s population.208  
 MFPC Executive Secretary Kennedy and Chief  Breier filed written depositions with the U.S. 
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Attorney’s office in December 1974. On February 11, 1975, Judge Reynolds ordered the MPD to fill 
fourteen of  twenty-four patrolman vacancies “from among those who are currently being 
considered for an eligibility list” and “who were previously examined in June or July 1974 on the 
basis of  the defendants’ policy of  hiring two qualified minority applicants for every three majority 
applicants.”209 Reynolds ruled the MFPC had followed “unconstitutional procedures” in its written 
and physical agility testing. In response to the federal government’s earlier pattern-and-practice 
investigation, he issued a summons through the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division. It ordered the MFPC 
to immediately stop engaging in practices that had “the purpose or effect of  unlawfully 
discriminating against any future employee or any applicant or potential applicant for employment as 
a fire-fighter with the Milwaukee Fire Department because of  such individual’s race, sex, or national 
origin, etc.” The city responded with an appeal. James Brennan, Milwaukee’s City Attorney, counter-
sued, charging the federal government with discrimination by engaging in a selective enforcement of  
civil rights law. Brennan claimed the U.S. had exempted suburban fire and police departments from 
setting minority hiring quotas. This response disappointed Black leaders. MNAACP President 
Thomas Malone summed up the community’s frustration with City Hall’s equivocation on 
affirmative action hiring: “Milwaukee has to get its own house in order. Here is where the 
professional job market can have the greatest impact on minorities. Here is where there are many 
minorities who want jobs as firemen and policemen. Milwaukee has a greater opportunity to hire 
minorities than the suburbs do, and a greater responsibility.”210 
 While ideological divisions were present among liberal reformers and more radical activists 
demanding community control, these federal interventions suggested that there was broad 
agreement around the need to democratize the MPD once and for all. The former looked to alter 
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Milwaukee’s policing system so that it better reflected the communities it served, generally to 
preserve public order, create access, and limit violence. The latter envisioned a transformed police 
bureaucracy that directly empowered overpoliced and underprotected citizens of  color with input, 
oversight, and representational authority. The combination of  police violence, growing anxieties 
over street crime, and mounting desires among everyday people to organize and become more 
involved in preserving neighborhood safety signaled that the status quo was in trouble. Chief  
Breier’s isolated and reactionary law-and-order approach was increasingly less popular with citizens, 
as Milwaukee diversified in the late 20th century. The city’s Black-led struggle for police 
accountability, with the support of  federal agencies, was gradually turning towards revising the 1911 
statute that historically empowered Milwaukee’s police chief—a power that was “unique in the 
United States, with nothing like it short of  military occupation.”211 
 
Citywide Coalition for Community Control of  the Police 
 Around the time that Milwaukee’s second Black Panther Party chapter outlined its vision for 
community control of  the police and the weakening of  Chief  Breier’s power, liberal reformers also 
worked to attenuate the MPD’s authority under a related, if  less self-determined model. The 
Milwaukee ACLU, having drifted from its most radical 1970 writings on community control, 
organized with Black legislators and civil rights activists in July 1974 under the banner of  the 
Citywide Coalition for Community Control of  the Police (CCCCP). The multi-organizational unit 
formed as police brutality claims rose following the 1973 police slayings. The coalition called for the 
police chief  to be held liable to the mayor and Common Council and for the elimination of  their 
lifetime tenure.212 The CCCCP saw political negotiation as the best recourse in effecting change, 
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given Breier’s statutory authority. They came to see proposals for community control that 
empowered minoritized groups with input on police policy directly as unfeasible. Nevertheless, the 
coalition aimed, according to Lloyd Barbee, to “work together on legislation” that rendered the 
MPD more “open and accountable to the public” and to “push passage of  the recommendation 
proposed by the Martin-Weber Committee.”213 The CCCCP specifically addressed “the secret and 
autonomous practices” of  the MPD and Chief  Breier’s “public-be-damned belief  that he is 
accountable to no one.”214 
 In September 1974, the CCCCP and nearly one hundred residents pressured the Milwaukee 
Common Council’s public safety committee to draft an ordinance creating an independent public 
safety review board that functioned outside of  Breier’s purview.215 Spokeswoman Karen Golsil 
attacked his lifetime appointment and “sole control over department operations.” ACLU attorney 
Curry First argued that police misconduct and inadequate protection were unsustainable and 
dangerous; law enforcement discouraged citizen complaints and offered no public relief. The 
CCCCP-backed proposal was drafted by Alderman Ben Johnson, one of  two Black city 
councilmen.216 The measure authorized a mayor-appointed public safety board to set policies related 
to police budgeting, community relations, compensation, facilities, and more. The six-member body, 
serving six-year terms, would appoint new police chiefs on a limited term basis. For the CCCCP, the 
proposal was a compromise, as the coalition wanted safety board members to serve three year terms 
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and be represented by two union members, two “minority group” members, two members of  the 
general public, and one youth (aged 18-24). The CCCCP asked for safety board candidates to be 
nominated by citizen petitions with 5,000 signatures and for the board to select its own chairman, 
not the mayor. They also made clear that those most affected by police violence—racial minorities, 
youth, and the poor—must receive sufficient representation.  
As the CCCCP observed, city officials undermined community-led efforts to make the MPD 
more accountable by telling grassroots activists that police rule-making authority and oversight were 
subject to state law. Then, when those same groups traveled to Madison to support the revision of  
state law, city officials claimed policing issues were matters of  “local concern” and “none of  the 
legislature’s business.”217 The Milwaukee Common Council never passed the review board ordinance. 
Breier remained “immensely powerful and popular,” capable of  ending an alderman’s career by 
leaning on a network of  white civic organizations, business communities, and citizen’s councils.218 
They lacked the political will to put their voices on record. However, some Common Council 
members did argue for revising the 1911 statute that determined police rule-making authority and 
outlined the police chief ’s terms of  service. They came to see this as a more effective way to 
generate accountability, from a legal standpoint, without ceding police power to everyday citizens. A 
multi-racial coalition of  state representatives, led by Milwaukee Democrat Dennis Conta, worked in 
Madison to reform law enforcement in “cities of  the first class,” i.e. Milwaukee. For state lawmakers, 
the challenge was striking a “delicate balance” between limiting the potential for partisan 
manipulation of  the MPD—the quality that had built the exceptionalism myth—and preventing an 
“uncontrollable, authoritarian police department.”219 However, only a handful of  Black lawmakers 
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supported civilian, as opposed to political, review of  the police. 
 
A Deadly Winter in the Policing of  Black Milwaukee 
 Two more lethal police brutality incidents occurred in December 1974. Both were ruled 
justifiable by the District Attorney, aggravating a tempestuous few years of  police-Black citizen 
conflict and renewing further calls for community control. In the first incident, police shot and 
killed Black Panther Johnnie Starks in his own apartment. Mary Pendleton, a 42-year-old Black 
woman accompanying the 54-year-old Starks, died from smoke inhalation after Tactical Squad 
officers hurled tear gas into the flat. The chemicals ignited a building fire that injured six additional 
people. Two Black plainclothes detectives actually arrived at the scene first, in search of  a homicide 
suspect. A shootout ensued. Later, a white TEU officer, Gerald Albertson, fired the fatal shotgun 
blast that killed Starks. Albertson had a history of  violence. The MFPC failed to discipline the 
officer after a Black woman alleged that he beat her 15-year-old son with a wrench “for no justifiable 
reason.”220 The MPD claimed that officers raided Starks’ building in search of  a murder suspect. Yet, 
none was found. As Community Review Board member Jeanetta Robinson later stated during a 
UBCC “peoples trial,” Starks was armed with a revolver because he was involved in citizens’ crime 
watch. He had attempted to keep “dope smokers and others doing illegal things out of  the 
building.”221 He likely suspected that the plainclothes officers were malicious intruders.  
 Black residents were outraged at the killings, and showed it in the streets. The UBCC 
demonstrated outside of  the Milwaukee Safety Building. Protestors demanded an independent 
investigation of  Starks and Pendleton’s deaths.222 Police and sheriff ’s deputies retaliated by arresting 
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ten members of  UBCC’s Committee to Fight Police Repression. Having been spurned in the past, 
Black activists refused to wait for city officials to conduct an inquest hearing. Two days after the 
UBCC arrests, the council formed a “Community Review Board” (CRB) to investigate the killings.223 
In true Milwaukee fashion, they met at the Paradise Lanes bowling alley. The CRB’s main objective 
was “to organize the community politically” and render the MPD “more responsive and sensitive to 
the needs of  the community.”224 Knowing that white police bureaucrats would not review and act on 
these police brutality cases in a thorough and timely fashion, Black community control activists took 
it upon themselves to review cases and issue verdicts. They proposed “people’s trials,” after which 
they would submit their findings to the District Attorney, Mayor Maier, Chief  Breier, the MFPC, the 
state legislature, and the DOJ.225 The process served both a substantive and symbolic, almost 
therapeutic function for a community traumatized by unchecked police violence. Whether 
Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy acted or not, the CRB would perform its due diligence on behalf  of  
poor and working-class Black people vulnerable to police violence. As UBCC chair Hubert Canfield 
wrote, it was difficult to get Black community members to come forward with their stories of  police 
brutality out of  fear of  retaliation.226 
 Only two days after the Community Review Board formed, a white patrolman shot and 
killed a Black 16-year-old. Jerry Brookshire was unarmed. Officer Ray Marlow said he fired his gun 
“accidentally”—a grim reminder of  Snead Carroll’s shooting of  Jacqueline Ford. Marlow asserted 
that he was chasing Brookshire, a suspected “car thief ” and “purse snatcher,” after the teenager ran 
from a reportedly stolen vehicle. His account stated that Brookshire resisted arrest as Marlow was 
engaging in a pat down.227 The patrolman’s gun evidently fired as he fell while frisking Brookshire, 
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who laid spread eagle on the ground.228 However, an eyewitness contradicted the officer’s report. 
Risking police intimidation and potential violence, a woman bravely came forward and told 
authorities that the young man was gunned down while climbing a fence.229 The police killing 
enraged an already emotional and increasingly divided Black community. Residents were still trying 
to make sense of  the Starks and Pendleton killings less than two weeks prior. Lillie Mae Brookshire, 
Jerry’s mother, filed a civil rights lawsuit. In 1979, she received a $12,000 “wrongful death” 
settlement for the loss of  her son.230 
 Black politicians registered their alarm in the wake of  the latest police killings. Alderman 
Orville Pitts wired Chief  Breier a message, on Christmas day, of  “shock and dismay.” Milwaukee’s 
second-ever elected Black alderman called for Officer Marlow to be “discharged or suspended for 
unprofessional conduct.” The “rash of  ‘accidental deaths,’” he noted, severely weakened trust in the 
police— “law abiding citizens” believed the MPD “unfairly administered” justice.231 “Justifiable 
outrage, fear, and anger swept through the Black community in the form of  meetings, excited rallies, 
minor conflicts…and ‘grand-stand plays’” following the deaths of  Starks, Pendleton, and 
Brookshire.232 Upwards of  five hundred people crammed into St. Mark A.M.E. Church on 
December 27, 1974. Mayor Maier arrived halfway through the emotionally charged event, greeted by 
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a din of  “jeers.”233 He used his time to defend the city’s record on “Inner Core” issues, blaming 
“social conditions” and the Nixon administration’s budget cuts to programs that addressed 
“unemployment,” “bad housing,” and “family problems.” Black elected officials called for a “united 
Black front” against the city’s “racist police system” and proposed ending the lifetime appointment 
of  Milwaukee police chiefs.234 County Supervisor Terrance Pitts implored City Hall to “stop giving 
the police money to kill black people” and to appoint Black Police Captains in MPD Districts Five 
and Seven. Some community members called for an “armed black defense group.” Meanwhile, the 
Brookshire family demanded an independent doctor’s examination, Black solidarity, and justice for a 
senseless police “murder.” Hundreds more attended community meetings later that week, including 
one specifically for women.235 
 “Conflict and dissent” within the community shrouded the formation of  a twenty-one 
member grassroots study group charged with investigating the Brookshire killing and answering the 
recent rash of  police repression.236 A group of  up-and-coming Black activists, including 25-year-old 
Black Panther Michael McGee denounced the city’s Black political class for intentionally “freezing 
out” and drawing support from the UBCC’s Community Review Board. In response, the CRB said it 
would take it upon itself  “to expose the brutality and injustice Black people are being subjected to 
by the police department.”237 In their view, Black citizens could ill afford another official 
determination of  excusable homicide, nor could they give in to a white-controlled political process 
that consistently abdicated justice for Black victims of  police violence. Black elected officials had, 
journalist Deborah Crosby wrote in a Star Times editorial, the “resources and knowledge,” useful 
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information and expertise, to help citizens win this “righteous struggle.” But there was “a distinct 
point where their hands were tied by careers, reputations, and friends” they were not willing to risk. 
The “nature of  politics in this country leaves no room for endless sanction of  would-be Black 
messiahs.”238 Supervisor Pitts countered that the UBCC were “Johnny-come-latelies” who came “to 
disrupt” and “engineer leadership through disunity.”239 
 The group that McGee and the UBCC dissented from—the “Committee of  21” (C21)—was 
represented by a mix of  Black politicians, civil rights veterans, Latinx community leaders, and liberal 
organizational stalwarts.240 Some members, like Rev. R.L. Lathan, had struggled against police 
brutality in Milwaukee ever since the police murdered Daniel Bell in 1958. Citizens Anti-Police 
Brutality Committee leaders Rev. B.S. Greggs and Assemblyman Barbee also participated. The C21 
demanded that Officer Marlowe be suspended without pay as a “pending an honest and full 
investigation of  this latest homicide.”241 It turned to federal tools for protecting the civil rights of  
individuals through litigation, while also pressuring Mayor Maier to compel Chief  Breier “to enforce 
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the laws equally or resign.”242 The committee observed the need to change state law, which 
undergirded the MPD’s institutional independence and freedom from oversight. At a meeting, 
Barbee noted his introduction of  several bills in the legislature between 1969 and 1974, which 
addressed police chief  term limits. Replacing Breier was not enough, he said, “we have to alter the 
system.”243 The C21 petitioned the U.S. Attorney General to investigate the MPD “for conspiracy to 
commit genocide against Blacks in violation of  law and humanity.” They also stated that Milwaukee’s 
inquest system and the District Attorney's office should be scrutinized as well. Police killings of  
Black men and women are consistently ruled “accidental and justifiable homicide.” The group called 
for “a complete investigation of  the recent homicide[s] by the police during December 1974. The 
harm which flows from these killings of  Blacks by so called law enforcers murders justice, the 
essence of  good government…investigate, prosecute and convict the killers in blue of  Blacks and 
minorities.”244  
 Concurrently, the UBCC’s Community Review Board invited Black politicians and business 
leaders to its first hearing on January 5, 1975. Chairman Kenneth Williamson, representing a diverse 
cohort of  students, youth, community organizers, veterans, attorneys, and elected officials, chalked 
up their “conspicuous absence” to “bad timing” and “conflicting schedules.” Williamson stressed 
“the need for unity”— “divisions [in the black community] are in fact only metaphysical.”245 The 
UBCC’s urgency was plain: “Each and every day that we waste seems to be fatal…it is of  paramount 
that we begin to get on our job.” Part of  the review board’s charge was creating a task force to “pre-
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244 Committee of 21 to U.S. Attorney General, December 31 1974, Box 140, Folder 3, “Police Department, October-
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investigate” police-involved shootings of  black residents, “past, present, and future.”246 That they 
were “pre”-investigating police killings indicated the UBCC’s distrust of  Milwaukee police 
bureaucrats. Too many times, Black deaths at the hands of  the police went unpunished, police 
policies unaddressed. “The Committee sees that the police murders last month are not ‘accidents’ 
but part of  a systematic pattern of  police repression against Black people and all working people.” 
The group connected Milwaukee’s struggle to a national Black movement against police violence. 
“We have seen brothers and sisters murdered and harassed not just in Milwaukee but all across the 
country.”247 The Board vowed to report its findings directly to “the community” with an “analysis of  
why [the death] happened.” In these “People’s Trials,” they looked “to offer possible changes” to 
police practices “to end such conduct.” These changes would then be submitted to “the proper 
authorities.”248 
  A “People’s Trial” was held the following week by the Committee to Fight Police Repression 
at Canaan Baptist Church.249 The UBCC called for the punishment of  any officers involved in the 
shootout that claimed Johnnie Starks and Mary Pendleton’s lives. The committee demanded 
“organized resistance” in poor and working-class communities against police repression.250 A march 
of  around one hundred persons to the MPD’s District Five station followed.  
  More police shooting deaths of  Black citizens followed in 1975. The police killed a 20-year-
old Black male in August.251 Charles Dailey was mistaken as a burglary suspect. Police alleged that he 
pointed a gun at officers. The District Attorney’s office, again, ruled the police actions “justifiable 
homicide.” Michael McGee and the UBCC called for Black self-defense— “Do for yourself. Defend 
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yourself…the only gun slingers left in town are the police.”252 A week earlier, Steven H. Gaston was 
shot and killed by police.253 The twenty-one-year-old had tried to evade a roadblock in an allegedly 
stolen car. New conversations around police-Black community relations took place in halls of  
government, but no substantive actions that shifted police policies, administrative structures, or 
oversight capacities resulted.254 Speaking before the United Black Community Conference, McGee 
not only called out the DA, Chief  Breier, and Mayor Maier, but also liberal Black elected officials 
and the Committee of  21. He implored, “Does anyone know who else we can turn to, except 
ourselves?”255  
 In June 1976, the UBCC reiterated the Milwaukee Black Panther Party’s demands for 
community control of  the police. That meant electable, district-level citizen review boards that were 
empowered to oversee all police actions; civilian input and open communications on police policies; 
and the hiring of  more Black and Brown police officers.256 The UBCC counted almost twenty police 
killings since 1972. It was times for “each district police station to be controlled by the people that 
live within that particular district’s boundaries.” Government study committees, formal inquests, 
investigations, political deliberations—none of  it had led to revised law enforcement procedures or 
more humane and accountable police behavior on Milwaukee’s north side. Mayor Maier had the 
power under Milwaukee’s City Charter, to “take care that the laws of  the state and the ordinances of  
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the city are duly observed and enforced; and that all officers of  the city discharge their respective 
duties.” And yet, when Black police accountability advocates demanded redress for disparate and 
deadly MPD practices, he claimed to have no control over the MPD.257 It was the same story in 1976 
as it was in 1966, as it was when Black community leaders first tried to shift the terms of  police 
power in Milwaukee during the post-World War II era. 
 
Community Control and the Neighborhood Movement in Milwaukee 
 Black demands for community control in the 1970s converged with the development of  a 
wider “neighborhood movement” that, as historian Joseph Rodriguez notes, “included residents of  
all races and ethnicities actively seeking to address community problems via direct action.”258 This 
multi-racial drive for localized power at the grassroots built on Black-led organizing models to 
address social, economic, and political concerns that community leaders thought white city officials 
had neglected, including administering responsive crime control and curbing police brutality.259 
Protests of  racist urban renewal policies and freeway construction projects, as well as efforts to 
garner more direct public control over the disbursement of  federal Community Action and Model 
Cities funding in the 1960s, helped establish a baseline of  activity for Milwaukee’s burgeoning 
neighborhood movement. Calls for infrastructure and municipal service improvements, which 
diverse community organizations amplified through demonstrations, compelled city officials to take 
these local demands seriously and view neighborhood associations as interest groups whose voices 
mattered in the enactment of  civic policy. 
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 While these primarily middle-class, predominantly white community associations confronted a 
host of  issues—from curbing freeway expansion, to battling real estate “block-busters,” to fighting 
for school desegregation—crime and safety became a top priority, particularly as middle and 
working-class Black families began moving into previously all-white areas on the city’s northwest and 
west sides following the passage of  new fair housing laws in the late 1960s. Crime control was a 
concern for neighborhood “self-help” organizations like the Cooperation West Side Association, 
Mid-Town Neighborhood Association, and Sherman Park Community Association, who respectively 
organized to stabilize and economically develop their individual communities. The crime issue was 
magnified as both a material reality and a phenomenon historically racialized by white politicians, 
media outlets, and residents. Milwaukee neighborhood associations joined a national drive that 
reflected deepening public anxieties around street crime, police protection, and the local impact of  
constrained municipal budgets.260 Neighborhood groups reimagined crime control on their own 
terms, though they were eager to do so in consort with the police department, from whom they 
desired greater cooperation, respect, and service. Select law enforcement agencies throughout the 
country were just beginning to embrace principles of  “community policing,” which was coalescing 
as a strategy for re-integrating beat patrol officers in neighborhoods to proactively prevent crime, 
resolve disputes, and facilitate trust between police and citizens.261 
 
260 As Rodriguez notes, “policing was a limited resource that neighborhoods had to compete for” and rising crime did 
not translate into an expanded police budget during the 1970s and 1980s. Rodriguez, Bootstrap New Urbanism, 79. 
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color. The strategy assumed that everyday people added value to the policing mission and, therefore, called for their 
input and collaboration in identifying policing priorities and allocating resources. Community-oriented policing made 
sense for residents, who were collectively experiencing the threat of crime. Through its deployment, citizens could 
theoretically exert a measure of control over the police, mitigating the proliferation of crime and disorder, as well as 
opportunities for police malfeasance. Community-oriented policing was meant to reorient rank-and-file officers away 
from random patrols and centralized command posts, which, by the 1970s, criminal justice experts, social critics, and 
everyday residents came to view as disengaging, ineffective, and volatile. Encouraging police to familiarize themselves 
with people living in the districts they patrolled would hypothetically reduce police-community tensions, minimize the 
use of excessive police force, and better control disorderly behavior. The problem with community-oriented policing, 
among others, was that municipal police forces were not looking to surrender autonomy or their expert status as crime- 
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 The neighborhood movement sought to align itself  with preventive policing strategies. Citizen 
“block watch” systems emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, whereby residents organized community 
patrols and hired private security firms to monitor the spread of  crime in their neighborhoods. 
These practices, according to one scholar, “shattered what had been a state monopoly on the official 
surveillance of  public spaces.”262 Neighborhood “watch” programs normalized civilian engagement 
in proactive street patrol, sometimes functioning alongside police officers and police surveillance 
practices. However, in Milwaukee, MPD assistance to block-level community watch efforts remained 
contested given Chief  Breier’s hesitancy to embrace community involvement in policing. He saw an 
expanded community role as ineffective in resolving crime and thought it would diminish police 
authority. Chief  Breier and Mayor Maier also argued that beat patrols were too costly and 
necessitated greater taxpayer support.263 Despite the fact that some community associations 
deliberately embraced racial diversity, Milwaukee’s neighborhood movement was not free of  bias. 
Poor and working-class Black and Latinx citizens, particularly youth, received the bulk of  
community and police attention based on historically perceived, thoroughly racialized white 
conceptions of  disorder and criminality. 
 The neighborhood movement prompted a range of  responses in individual communities. 
Some, like the Sherman Park Community Association (SPCA), explicitly opted to make integration a 
priority in their racially changing northwest side district. At the same time, SPCA members urged 
Black newcomers to comply with white middle class notions of  proprietorship and communal 
 
control agents. The approach also privileged the voices of homeowners, organizational elites, businesses, and other 
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respectability. This stemmed from a shared belief  held by its members that achieving a desirable 
“quality of  life” in their neighborhood meant stabilizing property values, which in turn would help 
homeowners preserve local perceptions of  community safety and security. The SPCA attracted 
“responsible” homeowners and developers who bought into the idea of  proactive crime reduction. 
Poor and working-class Black migration to the northwest side neighborhood threatened to disrupt 
this model, since race-based state and private sector housing policies historically linked Black 
habitation to poverty, vice, and crime. Liberal community groups like the SPCA challenged racist 
housing policies through mobilizations and legal actions inspired by civil rights activists, while also 
working to remake understandings of  Black racial inferiority that might derail their community’s 
progress. Against a backdrop of  social demographic change, collective struggle, and metropolitan 
transformation in the 1970s, community-oriented policing in Milwaukee took shape.264 
 
Milwaukee Professional Policemen’s Protective Association   
  The long 1970s was also an era of  expanded police union power in Milwaukee. Opposition 
to Breier’s strictures influenced the Milwaukee Police Patrolman’s Protective Association’s (MPPPA) 
development. A level of  institutional mistrust flowed from within the department as much as it did 
without. Police unions accumulated power and used it to advance specific goals, such as garnering 
wage increases, securing benefits, upgrading equipment, and meeting staffing needs.265 Today, they 
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tend to endorse political candidates who reflect their conservative values and support objectives that 
protect their rights as officers. Police unionism has translated into modern police departments 
becoming independent political units that mobilize for their own benefit, “regardless of  what that 
means for the public.”266 Law enforcement has immense power over the lives of  citizens, including 
the power to kill. Therefore, it is critical that enforceable measures of  police accountability exist. 
Contemporary police unions undermine accountability more than any other force in the criminal 
justice system. As legal scholar Matthew Flynn warned as early as 1974, “The rise of  the power of  
police unions in the past decade is a development…which will also have to be dealt with if  the 
police are to be accountable to the public.”267 
  Chief  Breier’s antagonistic relationship to the MPPPA influenced Milwaukee’s struggle for 
police accountability. Mutual respect existed among police administrators and the police association. 
However, it wavered under Breier’s draconian leadership. He set inordinately strict rules and 
expected his officers to follow them accordingly. Breier imposed his authority over the professional 
and personal lives of  rank-and-file police, even dictating who they could or could not live with. He 
dismissed the idea of  salary increases for officers who earned advanced degrees or obtained college 
credits, calling higher education “bad for department morale.” The chief  refused to meet with 
MPPPA officials to discuss possible treatment options for personnel dealing with alcoholism, drug 
addiction, or emotional distress.268 For decades, the MPPPA operated as a fraternal and protective 
association whose views aligned with police administrators and the movement for 
professionalization. This emphasis started to shift in the 1960s and 1970s, as the police union 
movement progressed. As labor historian Dennis Deslippe has written, “demands for racial justice 
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and individual rights led to great scrutiny of  [police] behavior.” More attention paid by society to the 
rights of  suspects and intensifying public criticism of  police practices encouraged rank-and-file 
officers to feel more and more isolated and unappreciated.269 Police unions organized to address 
what they saw as unfair, racially biased affirmative action policies advanced by the civil rights 
movement. 
  Since 1885, a local ordinance prevented police personnel in Milwaukee from engaging in off-
duty political activities, such as turning out the vote for political candidates or making contributions 
to campaigns. MPPPA members could not collectively bargain and police rules forbade officers 
from discussing police business with “outsiders,” including arbitrators. Breier made the rules and no 
one could publicly discuss the MPD handbook without facing reprisal from the chief. In October 
1970, the MPPPA asked the Common Council to revise Milwaukee’s 1885 ban on off-duty political 
activity. Breier quashed the attempt using his vast political influence to pressure aldermen on the 
council’s finance committee. Then, in January 1971, the MPPPA’s executive board asked city labor 
negotiators and Mayor Maier for the right to bargain on rules, police grievance procedures, and 
salaries. Breier responded by reprimanding eight of  the nine officers on the board.270 Rank-and-file 
officers responded by waging a “blue flu”; ninety-five percent of  the city’s police officers called in 
sick on January 23, 1971. As historian Ronald Snyder noted, it was “the first time in city history that 
public employees had engaged in such activity.”271 Wisconsin Employment Relations Commissioners 
travelled to Milwaukee from Madison to help city officials negotiate with uniformed officers and 
ensure public safety. Breier was ostensibly detached from the negotiations, but also working out of  
view to prevent his prized Detective Bureau from joining the action. During the four-day walkout, 
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the MFPC authorized the use of  special police. Supervisors and Milwaukee County Deputy Sheriffs 
kept the peace. A Milwaukee police wives organization and surrounding police unions supported the 
MPPA’s actions, as did the Left-progressive Kaleidoscope newspaper, which drew a distinction between 
the rank-and-file and Chief  Breier’s “boys— (non-striking members) the vice squad, the detective 
bureau, and the subversive squad.”272 While the union assumed all hell would break loose if  they 
struck, crime and traffic accidents maintained the same rates. The MPPA failed to win the 
endorsement of  the AFL-CIO, which argued that their salary demands were too high and their 
social positions too conservative and alienating from the labor movement. Eventually, a court 
injunction ended the strike.  
  Milwaukee diverged from other big cities confronting the urban crisis in that its police 
bureaucracy never presented as fearful of  additional rioting or intensifying Black demands for 
civilian review. While some liberal mayors, as historian Alex Elkins has observed, “appointed police 
commissioners with a mandate to maximize efficiency in the war on crime and to discipline officers 
who were rude, offensive, or unduly brutal to members of  the public—especially black residents,” 
Chief  Breier doubled-down on his reactionary law-and-order approach.273 Under Breier, the MPD 
eschewed the elite, technocratic professionalism advocated for by the International Association of  
Chiefs of  Police. Alternatively, Milwaukee’s police chief  enjoyed state-sanctioned lifetime tenure, 
allowing him to resist War on Crime interventions that he saw as meddlesome and overreaching. 
Furthermore, he did not view police brutality as real, let alone a practice unevenly meted out against 
African Americans. Indeed, Breier saw the MPD as exceptional because of  its institutional 
independence, an efficient, value-neutral crime control machine that existed above the fray of  urban 
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politics. He essentially authorized police brutality through his permissive accountability structures, 
enabling aggressive discretionary policing in Black spaces and against civil rights demonstrators. 
  Consequently, the city did not feature the same contentious relationships shared by rank-
and-file officers and “professionalism experts” leading other urban police forces. Chief  Breier never 
implemented “economy measures like one-man patrol cars” and “departmental trial boards” used 
“to scapegoat officers before a bloodthirsty public.”274 In fact, the opposite was true in Milwaukee, 
where MPPPA leaders called the chief  out for not taking police-community relations seriously 
enough. The police union argued that Breier’s inattention to community relations matters and his 
willingness to allow Black mistrust of  the police to deepen put the lives of  MPPPA members at risk. 
This is not to say that line officers in Milwaukee were not frustrated by the liberal Supreme Court’s 
police rulings in the 1960s, which ostensibly prioritized the needs of  criminals over law 
enforcement, nor that they supported civilian review boards as means of  tempering racial unrest. 
Moreover, they did not have to worry about an “elite management class” replacing Breier’s 
reactionary law-and-order approach, given the state-authorized structure of  police power. The union 
generally aligned with Breier. Still, the MPPPA was becoming frustrated with a top-down system that 
privileged the Detective Bureau at the expense of  patrol.275 In 1973, the police association won the 
right to appeal departmental rules to an outside arbitrator.276 
  The MPPPA, alongside other police unions nationally, “combined the traditional progressive 
goals of  organized labor to win greater power, rights, and dignity for workers with a more 
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conservative, indeed even counter-revolutionary, agenda.”277 However, the MPD’s rank-and-file did 
not need to “defeat” a “liberal and radical program to regulate front-line officers,” or proposals like 
“civilian review,” “tougher departmental trial boards,” or “stricter gun-use guidelines” until the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The structure of  police power, and the authority that state legislation vested 
in Milwaukee’s police chief, delayed urgency in this area for MPPPA members.278 In the interim, 
police union leaders framed their grievances as civil rights demands. The MPPPA championed 
collective bargaining—Wisconsin passed one of  the nation’s first such laws for public employees in 
1959—and more transparent grievance procedures within Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy.279 They 
focused their activism on union recognition and developing a workable police-community relations 
plan. According to MPPPA officials, efforts to improve police-community relations had “resulted in 
frustration for many sensitive police officers who want to bridge the credibility gap with minority 
groups.” They claimed that aggressive, racist officers perpetuated “the negative ‘pig’ stereotype” 
ascribed by many residents of  color and argued that “the cloud of  poor police community relations 
has contributed to a breakdown in police protection.” Some officers did crackdown on Black and 
Brown folk, while others were “reluctant to intervene in racial situations for fear of  a brutality 
charge.” The point being that, somewhat ironically given their political position today, police union 
members in Milwaukee believed they had “a vital interest in maintaining good community 
relations.”280 
  Alternatively, Chief  Breier saw little need or rationale for the community to play an active 
role in everyday police work.281 Early in 1970, the chief  reaffirmed this perspective before the 
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Milwaukee Common Council’s judiciary committee.282 That January, the MPPPA announced it would 
apply for $40,000 in Safe Streets Act funds to establish a “program involving police and community 
in closer cooperation.” “Project Communication,” was “a program designed to improve the quality 
of  the relationship between citizens and the police.” Under the plan, two MPPPA members— 
“professional police personnel”—would meet with community groups “to exchange ideas and 
hopefully increase understanding of  police and community perspectives.”283 Breier refused to 
comment publicly, while expressing his displeasure internally. Behind the scenes, he forced 
subordinates, many of  who had respected him as a leader who always stood up for police officers’ 
interests in moments of  public outcry against the profession.284 The Detective Bureau’s supervisors 
and the John Birch Society joined Breier in opposing the measure. The latter mailed oppositional 
literature out to local police officers.285 Consequently, the union withdrew its application for LEAA 
funding in March.286 
  In August 1973, an arbitrator determined that MPPPA members could appeal MPD rules 
beyond Chief  Breier. It was “the first blow to Breier’s absolute control over the police 
department.”287 Milwaukee’s police union, not elected officials fearful of  Breier, initiated, what 
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 Civil rights gains, continued attention to law enforcement, and the federal government’s 
efforts to stabilize cities in the wake of 1960s civil unrest led to a more intensive cataloging of 
racialized police violence. As Milwaukee citizens filed complaints against abusive police officers in 
the federal court system and with the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission (MFPC), police 
mistreatment was better documented.289 From 1964 to 1974, residents filed no less than forty-five 
claims of police brutality against the city.290 Still, judges determined all of these complaints were 
“invalid.”291 In that same span, at least 128 citizens filed grievances with the MFPC. Yet the 
commission dismissed seventy percent of these cases; no officers lost their jobs. Only eight police 
personnel received suspensions, most for “a week or less.” As of 1975, the MFPC had yet to fire a 
single police officer based on a police brutality complaint. Fears of police retaliation and frustration 
with the commission’s slow review process dissuaded citizens from filing grievances.292 Meanwhile, 
Milwaukee police killed at least six residents from 1972 to 1974 alone. Each death was ruled 
justifiable, almost all victims were Black. 
  The question for most poor and working-class Black folk in Milwaukee was not whether the 
exercise of political control over the MPD was necessary, but how to re-cast who exercised that 
authority. Community control mandated civilian oversight of police strategies, “enforcement 
decisions,” and conduct.293 Citizen review—anchored in policed communities and operated by 
 
289 The MPD’s training manual defined police brutality as “conduct unbecoming of a member and detrimental to the 
service.” Barbara Dembski and Monroe Walker, “A Look Beyond the Badge,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 23, 1975, 
Part 1, 1. 
290 Between 1968 and 1974, the MPD fired three officers for “misconduct connected to citizen abuse.” The dismissals 
resulted from internal investigations “prompted by publicity” surrounding the cases. But this was rare. It is not clear if 
the abused citizens were Black or representative of another minoritized group. Barbara Dembski and Monroe Walker, 
“Some Find Police System Frustrating,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 23, 1975, Part 1, 20. 
291 From 1970 to 1974, thirteen citizens alleged civil rights violations in federal court filings. Three were settled out of 
court. “Some Find Police System Frustrating.” 
292 Attorneys also expressed fear of police reprisal. White residents filed charges against the MPD too. However, Black 
and Latinx citizens filed the most complaints. “Some Find Police System Frustrating.” 
293 Under community control, the policing of minor crimes like “disorderly conduct, drunkenness, and vagrancy” would 
“vary according to what the particular community finds offensive.” David Riley, “Community Control of Police,” Civil 
Rights Digest 2 (4) (Fall 1969), 34-35. 
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policed citizens—was fundamental to this concept. Without it, unchecked abuses of police power 
would “only widen the gap” and “increase the warfare” between law enforcement and minoritized 
citizens.294   
 Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability turned to community control in the 
long 1970s. While it never achieved the level of local authority that adherents imagined, particularly 
from the standpoint of garnering rule-making input and civilian complaint oversight. Still, as this 
chapter argues, Black and allied police accountability advocates moved a white-controlled police 
bureaucracy towards a more democratic framework. During the long 1970s, reform activity buzzed 
around issues of police violence, administrative control, and law enforcement strategy. For better or 
worse, that action was united by the widespread conviction that policing was the most legitimate 
means of preserving order in a socially and economically changing city. 
 Against the backdrop of intensifying police-Black civilian violence, rising public fears about 
crime, a deepening budget crisis, and internal police dissension, a political consensus emerged 
around revising the institutional independence that had long defined Milwaukee’s narrative of 
policing exceptionalism. By 1975, Black and white allied state legislators worked to revise the 
policing structure in “first class cities.” Despite his widespread popularity among white constituents, 
Chief Breier’s leadership had grown costly, both from a police budget standpoint and the rising 
number of payouts the city was making to settle police brutality claims. The federal government, via 
the USCCR’s 1972 report, outlined why the MPD’s community isolation was detrimental to the 
maintenance of law-and-order and effecting public safety. The shooting death of Jacqueline Ford by 
a Milwaukee detective, the 1973 slayings of two MPD officers and the racialized police violence that 
followed, and the police killings of Jerry Brookshire and other Black citizens illustrated the system’s 
 
294 Black politicians embraced community control. Cleveland’s first Black mayor, Carl Stokes, cited the “nationwide 
struggle going on for civilian control of the districts. Riley, “Community Control of Police,” 29-30. 
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dysfunction. The MFPC was unable to meet the needs of aggrieved citizens. Federal lawsuits and 
legislative changes are the only way to secure accountability and transform Milwaukee’s police 
oversight structures. 
  In Milwaukee, the long 1970s was an era of prolonged social tensions, political activism, and 
intra-racial discord. It was an unsettled moment of Black movement building that largely centered 
on curbing police violence and ending institutional discrimination on the MPD. It was a period 
when poor and working-class people of color, Black and Latinx, expressed vocal disenchantment 
with Chief Breier’s reactionary leadership. Spurned by urban liberalism and mistrustful of governing 
institutions, Black and Brown freedom fighters turned inward, to their own communities, and 
imagined what it would mean to build power from the grassroots.  
  However, local efforts to instill community control of the police and respond to ongoing 
episodes of racialized police violence failed to restructure police power on acceptable terms. This 
had as much to do with the persistence of liberal policy prescriptions that framed police reform 
exclusively as a matter of weeding out individual bad actors and advancing institutional diversity, as 
it did with conservative backlashes against Black political dissent, costly social welfare programs, and 
rising street crime. Liberals and conservatives joined forces to expand the machinery of the carceral 
state in the long 1970s. The bipartisan tough on crime consensus legitimized police power as a 
solution to the 1960s urban crisis without fully appreciating the role law enforcement had always 
played in aggravating urban inequality and reproducing biased criminal-legal outcomes that 
disproportionately harmed African Americans. Reactionary and liberal law-and-order politics, 
therefore, continued to shape Milwaukee’s racial politics, which still broadly favored a white 
working, professional, and business class majority. As such, Black men and women consistently 
found themselves on the wrong end of perpetually a racist, sexist, and classist policing system. 
  The Black-led movement for police accountability challenged the core assumptions that 
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powered Milwaukee’s durable narrative of policing exceptionalism. For decades, City Hall prided 
itself on the MPD’s assumed professionalism and crime control efficiency—a status that most 
elected officials believed sprang from the department’s state-sanctioned independence from political 
oversight and the freedom it was afforded to innovate. Concerns around the persistence of racialized 
police violence under Chief Breier, as well as rising street crime on Milwaukee’s north side, 
engendered grassroots and federal pressures for City Hall to confront its established approach to law 
enforcement. While the civil violence of 1967 ushered in new prospects of reform, encouraging 
police bureaucrats to make changes to police recruitment and community relations procedures, 
resistance from the MPD undermined success.
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy and the Limits of Reform 
  “This Lacy-type incident, so common in American life, is a condition we live with and 
expect to happen to any one of us, every time we step out into the city streets!”1 So wrote Black 
community historian, and America’s only known racial terror lynching survivor, James Cameron as a 
1983 civil suit filed by the mother of a slain police brutality victim worked its way through the 
federal courts. The deadly circumstances that eventually resulted in a $600,000 settlement, two 
statutory reforms, and the firing of a white MPD officer began late on the night of July 9, 1981 
when a brutal police encounter led to the death of yet another Black young person in Milwaukee. 
Ernest Lacy had taken a break from helping his cousin paint an apartment when he walked to the 
Open Pantry Food Mart at Wisconsin Ave. and N. 23rd St. to retrieve a snack. On the way, three 
members of the Milwaukee Police Department’s (MPD) all-white Tactical Enforcement Unit—each 
with a history of using excessive force—stopped and questioned him about an alleged rape that 
occurred near W. Michigan and N. 20th St.2 The female victim was white and the officers were 
looking for a Black male suspect.3 Lacy fit the assailant’s description.4 Likely “petrified” when the 
 
1 James Cameron, “An Open Letter to the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Regarding the Ernest Lacy 
Complaint,” March 31, 1983, 12, Dr. James Cameron Pamphlet Collection, Milwaukee Public Library, accessed October 
31, 2020, https://content.mpl.org/digital/collection/jcameron/id/529/rec/5. 
2 “Officer Says Lacy Not Told He Was Arrested,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, April 15, 1983, Part 1, 5; “Officers, Lacy Family 
Plead Cases,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 14, 1983, Part 2, 17. Officer Dekker reportedly “choked” a Black woman in 
front of the Milwaukee Arena because, according to the victim, she “touched” him “in a friendly gesture” after asking 
about a group of people being locked-up in a police paddy wagon. A second confrontation in 1978 saw Dekker beat two 
men and two women in a tavern. In November 1980, Dekker, Eliopul, and Kalt, together, were accused of beating an 
unarmed man unconscious. Their actions underscored a culture of violence that fostered mistrust and resentment among 
Black citizens. “Dekker Tied to Four Other Brutality Cases,” The Milwaukee Courier, July 18, 1981, 1, 3. 
3 The specific circumstances of the crime—a racialized sexual assault—conjured historical images of white rage and fed 
racist narratives of Black male criminality and lustfulness after white women. See Chapter Two. Black female 
complainants of sexual assault, meanwhile, said they experienced a double-standard when it came to police responses in 
Milwaukee. About three months before Lacy was stopped by police, Black community members and Black police 
officers faulted the MPD for not taking seriously “a string of attacks” against Black women on the city’s north side. Four 
of eighteen victims were raped. Gregory D. Stanford, “Blacks Want More Done to Nab Rapist,” The Milwaukee Journal, 
April 16, 1981, Part 1, 1. 
4 Officers testified later at an inquest hearing that the alleged suspect was a 5’ 10” Black man with “long bushy 
sideburns” and wearing a blue shirt. Gregory D. Stanford, “Witness Tells How Officers Arrested Lacy,” The Milwaukee 
Journal, September 18, 1981, Part 1, 10. 
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officers approached, he hesitated to comply with their aggressive commands.5 The 22-year-old 
suffered from a psychological condition that manifested in acute “periods of emotional stress.”6 
 What happened next underscores the tragic legitimacy of Ernest Lacy’s fears of Milwaukee 
police. The three cops arrested him, failing to read him his rights in the process. According to the 
police report, a resistant Lacy tried to run before being placed in the back of a squad car. One of the 
officers grabbed his arm; a struggle ensued. Eventually all four men were on the ground, jostling 
over competing goals of freedom and suppression. To subdue Lacy, Officer Thomas Eliopul 
pressed his knee against the young man’s upper back and neck, between his shoulder blades, with 
Lacy’s left cheek pressed to the sidewalk. Eliopul then raised Lacy’s arms, almost perpendicularly, 
behind his torso for handcuffing—a move that an independent medical examiner said helped cut-off 
the flow of oxygen to the lungs.7 The other two officers, James Dekker and George Kalt, held their 
suspect’s legs down. Witnesses saw the officers wrestle Lacy to the floor, inducing a “violent, 
convulsive seizure” before he was “absolutely still.”8 Medical opinions varied about what stopped 
Lacy from breathing, though all agreed Eliopul’s force played the decisive role.9 Once he was 
 
5 Lacy’s parents described their son as “petrified of the police,” as well as “gentle,” “docile,” and “not violent.” Joe 
Manning and John Fauber, “Family Says Lacy Thought He Was Inferior to Others,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 11, 1981, 
Part 1, 5. 
6 Lacy’s condition had required medical attention at Milwaukee County General Hospital as recently as the previous 
month. As his mother noted, Ernest’s apprehension was magnified by existing fears of local police. “Nurse Says Lacy 
Was Frightened, Withdrawn,” The Milwaukee Journal, April 24, 1983. 
7 Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., “Death of Black Man in Police Custody Leads to Bitter Protests,” The New York Times, August 
16, 1981. 
8 As the officers carried Lacy to the police van, one witness said his “eyes were open, his tongue was partially out, he was 
not breathing and he was not moving.” The witness, an electrician named Fred Kolde, was on his way home from work. 
Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., “Death of Black Man in Police Custody Leads to Bitter Protests,” The New York Times, August 
16, 1981. Another witness said he saw Lacy thrown on the hood of a police squad car twice, then kneed in the groin by 
police. Family members viewing Lacy’s body post-mortem said they saw blood on his genitals. Kevin Merida, “2nd 
Autopsy Clouds Case,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 12, 1981, Part 1, 1, 4. 
9 Alan Eisenberg, the Lacy family’s attorney, hired an independent “legal and forensic medicine specialist” to review the 
deceased’s body. Ophthalmologist G. W. Lazachek determined that Lacy died of “compression strangulation.” The force 
of Eliopul’s knee to Lacy’s neck cut off his air supply. Kevin Merida, “2nd Autopsy Clouds Case,” The Milwaukee Journal, 
July 12, 1981, Part 1, 1; “Defense Doctor and Eye Specialist,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 13, 1981, Part 1, 10. Other 
medical experts, including Milwaukee County Medical Examiner Chesley Erwin, disagreed with Lazachek. Remarkably, 
Erwin suggested there was a strong possibility that Lacy was “frightened to death.” After two county autopsies, medical 
examiners reasoned Lacy probably died from a lack of oxygen but officially left the cause of death “undetermined.” 
Sheppard Jr., “Death of Black Man in Police Custody Leads to Bitter Protests”; Marilyn Kucer, “New Autopsy Fails to 
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forcibly restrained, the Tactical Squad members called for a police van. It arrived minutes later and 
they carried Lacy into the vehicle’s holding chamber and shut the door.10 The police then drove to 
the sexual assault survivor’s home to identify Lacy. In this moment, they said they recognized he was 
unconscious. Police attempted to revive him using an ammonia capsule.11 The unconscious Lacy was 
rushed to Good Samaritan Medical Center and pronounced dead at 12:46 a.m. on July 10, 1981.12 
Earlier that night, around the same time that Lacy was stopped, patrolman David A. Clarke Jr. 
arrested a man who later admitted to committing the sexual assault.13 
 News of Lacy’s death spread the next morning.14 It reached a number of Black community 
groups who, over the course of “the long 1970s,” had committed to addressing the net effects of 
structural racism and racialized police violence against Black Milwaukeeans. Some, like the United 
Black Community Council (UBCC), prioritized issues of police brutality and neglect.15 Indeed, this 
latest in-custody death invigorated police accountability activists who were already struggling for a 
more just, responsive, and community controlled law enforcement system. Black residents living on 
 
Reveal Cause of Lacy's Death,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 13, 1981, Part 1, 1, 13. 
10 It was against police rules to place an unconscious person into police van. The two police van attendants testified to 
the MFPC in 1983 that they believed Lacy was conscious when he entered the van, and that he was “passively resisting” 
the officers. “2 Say They Believed Lacy Was Conscious,” The Milwaukee Journal, April 13, 1983, Part 1, 5. A block or two 
away, they stopped and searched two more Black males, arresting one on a minor Sheriff’s warrant. The arrested man 
saw Lacy’s body spread across the floor upon entering the back of the van. He warned an officer, but they ignored his 
appeal. This witness, Tyrone Brown, said he told one of the police officers that Lacy looked “beat up pretty bad,” to 
which the officer replied, “How do you know he wasn’t hit by a car?” Sheppard Jr., “Death of Black Man in Police 
Custody Leads to Bitter Protests.” 
11 The failure of Eliopul, Dekker, Kalt, and the two officers driving the van to provide medical attention would later 
serve as a focal point for both accountability advocates and state legislators. 
12 His body, according to an independent pathologist, showed abrasions and bruises. Woliver, From Outrage to Action, 62-
63; “No Blows,” The Milwaukee Courier, July 18, 1981, 8. 
13 Clarke would go on to serve as Milwaukee County Sheriff from 2002 to 2017. “Officers Were Taught First Aid, 
Instructor Testifies at Inquest,” The Milwaukee Journal, October 10, 1981, Part 2, 4. As community activist Howard Fuller 
recounted: “…what happened was, allegedly, there was a rape, and the only description was, it was a young Black man. 
Ernest Lacy just happened to be going to the store. And…what they did to him was, they [the police] threw him down 
and they, you know, went into that choke hold, or put their knee on his neck. And, he, he ultimately died in police 
custody, in the van. And…there were witnesses who saw this and came forward. And so, our whole thing was that these 
police needed to pay for his death.” Howard Fuller (Distinguished Professor of Education, Marquette University), in 
discussion with the author, March 2013. 
14 Police told Lacy’s family he “just died.” Woliver, A Measure of Justice, 62. 
15 Evidently, a Lacy family member called the UBCC’s Michael McGee the same night Ernest died. Woliver, A Measure of 
Justice, 63. 
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Milwaukee’s segregated north side had weathered an onslaught of police abuse in recent years. At 
least ten Black men and women lost their lives in police-Black citizen encounters between 1967 and 
1981.16 Non-lethal police brutality incidents continued unabated since the issue first gripped Black 
community leaders in the postwar era. Between 1972 and July 1981, citizens filed over 267 police 
misconduct complaints with the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission (MFPC).17 At least fifty 
cases sat pending in state and federal courts at the time of Lacy’s death.18 Black allegations of police 
brutality often went unreported. Fears of police retaliation and a sense that the system did not work 
in their favor prevented more from coming forward. Many citizens, according to journalist Gregory 
Stanford, had “come to accept it as a fact of life and had little hope that officials would act on their 
complaints.”19 In the wake of Lacy’s death, the threat of civil violence was real. Black rebellion was 
in the air nationally. Miami’s Liberty City and Overtown neighborhoods had just experienced civil 
unrest after an all-white jury exonerated four white police accused of beating a Black insurance agent 
to death.20 “Our city of Milwaukee is in a crisis,” James Cameron warned. “Whether it will terminate 
peaceably or in more bloody steps being taken remains to be seen.”21  
 This chapter places the police killing of Ernest Lacy in context. To do so, it pays attention to 
historical contingency and agency.22 Any victories that the Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy 
 
16 See: Appendix A. 
17 The MFPC dismissed 154 of these complaints. Sheppard Jr., “Death of Black Man in Police Custody Leads to Bitter 
Protests.” 
18 The cases were pending in both federal and county circuit courts. Chief Breier said that the MPD had fewer 
misconduct complaints against its officers than in other cities and commended his department’s training program. 
Gregory D. Stanford, Barbara Dembski, and James Romenesko, “Lacy Death Puts Spotlight on Police Conduct,” The 
Milwaukee Journal, July 26, 1981, Part 1, 1. 
19 For many, the MPD inhabited “the role of an occupying army in which brutality is routine.” Gregory D. Stanford, 
Barbara Dembski, and James Romenesko, “Old Questions Surface in Wake of Lacy Death,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 
26, 1981, Part 1, 10; Gregory D. Stanford, Barbara Dembski, and James Romenesko, “Minorities See Police as Brutal,” 
The Milwaukee Journal, July 30, 1981, Part 1, 1. 
20 The man’s name was Arthur McDuffie. Miami’s Black uprising occurred in 1980. “The Day Miami was Rocked by 
Riot After Cops Cleared in McDuffie Beating,” Miami Herald, May 15, 2016, accessed April 26, 2020, 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article77769522.html. 
21 At the same time, he noted that some Black residents had “the utmost confidence” in the MPD, despite “quite a few” 
having “ceased to respect its insensitivity to respect of the human personality.” Cameron, “An Open Letter to the 
Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Regarding the Ernest Lacy Complaint,” 7. 
22 Historian Andrew Baer’s book on Chicago’s police accountability movement shaped my thinking on “contingency” 
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(CJEL) achieved in the early 1980s were tied to contextual factors that transcended the case itself. 
More specifically, police bureaucrats operated under a brightening federal spotlight at the time of 
Lacy’s 1981 death. Two preceding developments, both surfacing in 1978, raised federal scrutiny. 
First, a former MPD officer divulged the truth about the 1958 police killing of Black migrant Daniel 
Bell. The officer said the patrolman who shot Bell not only planted a knife on his lifeless body, 
justifying self-defense claims, but that supervisors knew about the murder and helped cover it up. 
The Bell case revelations sparked demands for justice, a federal lawsuit, and accelerated grassroots 
activism around passing a statute that would reduce the police chief’s policymaking authority. The 
shocking disclosure also encouraged a federal investigation of the MPD’s history of using deadly 
force. Second, a group called Residents Integrating Law Enforcement (RILE) requested a federal 
probe into racial and gender discrimination on the police force. A U.S. Attorney’s investigation led 
to mandates on diversity hiring that, if unmet, could strip Milwaukee of valuable revenue sharing 
funds. In 1981, the city’s Black police association, the League of Martin (LM), went even further. 
The LM filed a Title VII lawsuit against Chief Breier, the MPD, MFPC, and City for violating Black 
officers’ civil rights. The League’s complaint alleged racist hiring, promotion, and assignment 
practices. These two developments added to a mix of existing forces that threatened to disrupt 
Milwaukee’s policing status quo. 
 Next, this chapter details the steps that activists took to secure “a measure of justice” for 
Ernest Lacy’s family from 1981 to 1983. Far from fomenting civil unrest, the CJEL channeled an 
emotional public response into the largest peaceful campaign for racial justice the city had seen since 
 
and “agency.” As Baer writes, “the interplay between agency and contingency in the [John] Burge scandal” mattered in 
terms of what police accountability advocates were able to achieve over the course of decades. It was “the convergence 
of perseverance and opportunity” that enabled social movement activists and advocates for institutional accountability to 
eventually succeed in bringing the abusive commander to justice. Likewise, factors of contingency— “both concrete and 
abstract developments”—informed how the Chicago Police Department’s torture scandal and the movements it inspired 
played out over time. It framed “opportunities and constraints.” Andrew S. Baer, Beyond the Usual Beating: The John Burge 
Torture Scandal and Social Movements for Police Accountability in Chicago (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2020), 10-
11. 
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1968. In the months following the Lacy killing, thousands of residents demonstrated in support of 
the Lacy family and for the prosecution of the officers responsible for cutting his life short. 
Marches, rallies, sit-ins, boycotts, and lawsuits endured well into the mid-1980s. The CJEL’s 
movement was powered by a diverse coalition of Black and allied community groups—many of who 
were tired of seeing the MPD kill young Black men and women with impunity. Public anxieties and 
distrust of the police undermined communal safeguarding at a moment of worsening economic and 
political distress for African Americans. Considering Lacy’s innocence and the arresting officers’ 
checkered pasts, accountability groups sensed an opening to confront police bureaucrats on their 
historical failure to deliver justice to Black police brutality victims. Building on the movement tactics 
of preceding campaigns, the CJEL garnered results in areas where prior mobilizations had failed. For 
instance, the MFPC eventually fired the officer directly responsible for Lacy’s death. The city also 
paid a substantial sum to the victim’s family.  
  Official responses to Lacy’s death and mounting Black frustrations around police-
community relations and police violence were also contingent on recent political, social, and 
economic changes. Milwaukee’s Black population increased by almost 42,000 between 1970 and 
1980.23 Meanwhile, its white population decreased by about 139,000. This demographic shift held 
political ramifications for longtime Mayor Henry Maier and other elected officials trying to retain 
power. While the city remained seventy-three percent white in 1980, African Americans were 
emerging as a more influential voting bloc, along with Latinx residents. Constituents of color cared 
deeply about issues of crime and policing. A 1980 Milwaukee Journal poll, for instance, showed that 
69 percent of Black voters were dissatisfied with Chief Breier’s leadership.24 Yet, despite the salience 
 
23 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by 
Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States,” U.S. Census Bureau, 
Population Division, Working Paper no. 76 (February 2005), Table 50. 
24 Gregory D. Stanford, “Maier Seen as Having Kept City from Typical Urban Woes,” The Milwaukee Journal, February 
14, 1980, Part 2, 6. 
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of police-community relations as an issue, the mayor received ample Black support in his 1980 
reelection bid. According to some reporters, the mayor “divorced himself from the Police 
Department in the public’s mind.” Although Maier’s challenger, Assemblyman Dennis Conta, 
authored a 1976 bill that put term limits on public safety chiefs and limited their rule-making 
authority, most Black voters saw him as “soft” on policing overall. Maier’s willingness to establish a 
committee to track developments in the Lacy case—a step never taken by a Milwaukee mayor in 
response to a racialized police killing—reflected a desire to show Black constituents that he was 
taking their concerns seriously.25 With the revelations of the 1958 murder cover-up, Maier also had 
little choice politically but to provide full transparency. 
  The Lacy case was indirectly connected to glaring economic indicators. Throughout the 
“long 1970s,” a “spatial fix” had occurred in Milwaukee’s economy that disproportionately affected 
Black workers and their families.26 The city’s rapid industrial decline at the end of the 1970s and 
 
25 Maier also needed greater minority support as he eyed an unprecedented seventh term in 1984. 
26 Marc Levine, “The Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: Trends, Explanations, and Policy Options,” 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Center for Economic Development, Working Paper (March 2007), 9. On the 
“spatial fix” metaphor, see David Harvey, The Limits of Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). On the 
“long 1970s,” or the period between 1969 and 1984, see: Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American 
Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).  
Midwestern manufacturing firms facing rising oil prices and diminishing profits sought fresh opportunities abroad to 
outsource production lines and utilize cheaper labor in deregulated markets. New technologies and strategies facilitated a 
shift towards “integrating and managing spatially dispersed global enterprises. Revised global trade rules and financial 
practices, in addition to new protections for Western intellectual property, led to the abandonment of U.S. production 
facilities for “more lucrative arrangements” overseas and in the nation’s Sunbelt South. Milwaukee industrial firms 
struggled to pay off debts, so they laid off workers and started closing factories. The expectation of obtaining a union 
job with good wages disappeared for most high school graduates. Jobs in the information and healthcare sectors paid 
similar wages, but required specialized training and advanced degrees. Jane L. Collins and Victoria Mayer, Both Hands 
Tied: Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom of the Low-Wage Labor Market (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2010), 35-36. Project out and it was clear that national policymakers, firms, financial institutions, and state governments 
were engaging in a larger process of social reorganization around “perceived market imperatives” that concentrated 
corporate and proprietary control over goods and resources. These ranged from “intellectual property rights, to laws 
governing the movement of goods and capital across borders and the basic rules undergirding employment.” Brishen 
Rogers, “Work after Quarantine,” Boston Review, April 7, 2020, accessed April 8, 2020, https://bostonreview.net/class-
inequality/brishen-rogers-work-after-quarantine. Such initiatives undermined worker’s rights and labor contracts 
negotiated over decades of political struggle. The “social wage,” which was informed by citizenship, community 
standards, and economic conditions, gave way to “a naked competitive logic.” The antecedents of this market-oriented 
structure existed in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. However, it was accelerated by U.S. elected officials in the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s. State actors failed to ensure that the global economy met the daily needs of poor and working-class people, 
especially Black citizens. 
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early 1980s and its transition from a high-wage manufacturing economy to a comparatively low-
wage service economy in the late-20th century impacted Black workers and families differently than 
white. Black workers had yet to attain high levels of labor seniority.27 Laid off white workers, most 
of who lived in comparatively prosperous neighborhoods and suburbs, fared much better in terms 
of finding new, good-paying jobs.28 In 1970, Milwaukee’s Black poverty rate was twenty-two percent 
below the national average. By 2000, it was thirty-four percent higher than the national mark. Low-
wage service jobs, which surpassed available manufacturing opportunities by 1981, were among the 
only jobs available to under-educated Black workers.29 The “mark” of a criminal record, or the 
lingering professional stain assigned by the state to the growing number of Black citizens swept up 
in U.S. “wars” on crime and drugs, compounded harsh economic realities.30 When the CJEL 
formed, Americans were experiencing the second “dip” of a global economic recession that 
devastated Black and Latinx families. The recession began shortly before President Ronald Reagan 
signed the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which cut taxes for corporations and wealthy 
Americans, slashed domestic spending for the poor, and drastically reduced federal low-income 
housing subsidies.31 Against this backdrop, the CJEL put aside lingering ideological differences 
within Milwaukee’s Black-led movement for accountability and focused on securing justice for the 
Lacy family and re-constituting police power. 
 
27 This was the case for Black men in particular. Decades of union and employer discrimination in the early-to-mid 20th 
century undermined Black workers’ ascent within organized labor; they were only just beginning to garner high-level 
union jobs. See: Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2006). 
28 Their whiteness and affluence “insured that new businesses would spring up” in white urban enclaves and suburban 
municipalities. Isabel Wilkerson, “How Milwaukee Has Thrived While Leaving Blacks Behind,” The New York Times, 
March 19, 1991, A1. 
29 Many retail and service sector jobs were part-time, making it harder for Black families to save money and meet basic 
needs. Between 1973 and 1996, women’s work outside of the home rose by forty percent. Collins and Mayer, Both Hands 
Tied, 37. 
30 Devah Pager, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007). 
31 Between 1981 and 1989, the Reagan administration reduced Housing and Urban Development’s budget by nearly four 
times, “from $74 billion to $19 billion in constant dollars.” “Ronald Reagan: A Better Friend of Blacks than Obama?” 
The Milwaukee Courier, February 12, 2011. 
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The Police Killing of Daniel Bell Revisited 
  Although justice at the time went for naught, the 1958 police killing of Daniel Bell sparked 
Milwaukee’s Black-led movement for police accountability.32 The 22-year-old’s tragic shooting death 
roused Black community activists and professional leaders, who were growing more and more 
concerned about both the individual prejudices of white patrolling officers and the rampant neglect 
shown by law enforcement towards Black crime victims on the city’s north side. And yet, the full 
story of Bell’s demise remained unknown to the public for twenty years. Bell’s family always 
suspected foul play.33 They worked assiduously to clear his name and tell the truth of his false 
criminalization. However, no verifiable evidence or witness testimony existed that would hold up in 
Milwaukee’s white-controlled criminal-legal system. This changed in 1978, after former patrolman 
Louis Krause confessed to a reporter and District Attorney E. Michael McCann that Bell was not 
shot in self-defense, but murdered in cold blood by Officer Thomas Grady.34 Seeking to ease a 
“troubled conscience,” Krause set the record straight about a lethal police encounter that, as 
historians argue, galvanized Black Milwaukee’s postwar freedom struggle.35 Krause also spoke 
candidly about the wider culture of racialized violence on the MPD. For example, he described how 
 
32 See: Chapter Two. 
33 Daniel Bell’s siblings suspected foul play from the moment police said their brother had flashed a knife with his right 
hand. He was left handed. So too did the Black community members who mobilized a protest march in the weeks that 
followed. As the Bell family grieved a fallen son, a “conscious and detailed” masking of the truth ensued. The 
conventional media portrayed their loved one as “a knife-wielding aggressor” and little more. The Bell family “endured 
the false stigma of persistent governmental perjury and racial insults to their brother’s memory.” Dock Bell, the family 
patriarch, died in the arms of one of his sons before a final verdict was ever read in the family’s civil case. Kelly, “What 
Price Justice,” 2. 
34 “Partial Truth on an Ugly Incident,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 31, 1979, Part 1, 10. Grady had resigned from the 
MPD in 1958 before having to face disciplinary charges for “conduct unbecoming of an officer.” Jerry Resler, “Coverup 
in ’58 Homicide,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, September 1, 1979, 10. Krause was dismissed by the MPD in April 1958 for his 
role in tavern fight that occurred with five other officers. He struggled with alcoholism after leaving the force, 
descending into years of heavy drinking before sobering up three years before making his confession about Daniel Bell. 
Jerry Resler, “Coverup in ’58 Homicide,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, September 1, 1979, 10. 
35 In addition to tackling police violence, Milwaukee’s civil rights movement addressed racism in employment, public 
accommodations, education, and housing. See: Patrick D. Jones, The Selma of the North: Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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officers would place Black suspects “on the elevator in the old Safety Building” and give them “an 
elevator ride going to the top floor, back down to the garage and literally beating the shit out of 
them” the entire time.36 Black residents told similar stories to the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders research team in 1967, as did Black police officers.37 DA McCann opened a John 
Doe investigation into a police cover-up in late November 1978.38 Chief Breier, a detective in 1958, 
called Krause’s story “bull roar” and defended the MPD’s historical practices. 
  In Krause’s revised telling of Bell’s 1958 murder, the young man was pulled over on account 
of his race. Whether he had a broken tail light or not mattered less than Officer Grady’s eagerness 
to, as Krause stated, “arrest some niggers.”39 Likely frightened of the consequences of being 
apprehended again for not possessing a driver’s license, the Louisiana native fled. After catching up 
with Bell, Grady fired from behind him at point blank range.40 Bell was unarmed, so Grady planted a 
“throwaway knife” in his right hand to make it appear as if he had fired in self-defense.41 The two 
 
36 Police abuse of Black arrestees in MPD elevators was a notorious tactic used by Milwaukee police to administer 
private beatings. The testimony of a Black clergyman who spoke during a town hall on police-community relations in 
October 1978 illustrates this fact, as well as the connections between racialized police violence and the maintenance of 
white supremacy and housing segregation in the city. The Black pastor, Rev. George Johnson, said he called the police 
on a white neighbor after the neighbor physically struck him and his daughter. Two white officers responded. Instead of 
recording Johnson’s account of what happened, the officers first conferred with the abusive neighbor. After recording 
his story, they walked over to Rev. Johnson and “advised” him to leave the neighborhood. According to Johnson, the 
patrolmen insisted he had “no right living in that area.” When he asked the police for their names and badge numbers, 
they refused. They then arrested Rev. Johnson on a disorderly conduct charge. Johnson filed a complaint with the 
District Seven commander. Then, while riding in an elevator with the officers, they stopped the machine and 
administered a severe beating. The police threatened the clergyman, saying, “you don’t know what you have done” and 
what you are “getting yourself into.” In his testimony, Rev. Johnson likened the “people wearing blue suits” to the “men 
who beat us in white sheets.” Kleinert and Kleinert, “Police Misconduct: Fear, Apathy, and Coverups,” The Milwaukee 
Courier, August 15, 1981, 1, 12. 
37 George L. Roberts to Sam Dennis, September 15, 1967, “Materials Resulting from Field Team Trip Sept. 27, 1967-
Oct. 3, 1967,” Folder, 001346-025-0001, Civil Rights during the Johnson Administration, 1963-1969, Part V, Lyndon 
Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas; Lenard Wells (Lecturer, University of Memphis), in discussion with 
the author, November 2016. 
38 Helane Morrison, “After 20 Years, the Echoes of a Police Gunshot Return,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 10, 
1979, Part 1, 16; Jeff Kannel, “Was There a Cover-up? Shooting Case Unresolved after 21 Years,” The Milwaukee Courier, 
January 15, 1979, 1. 
39 Sylvia Bell White and Jody LePage, Sister: An African American Life in Search of Justice (Madison: Wisconsin University 
Press, 2013), 176. The officers reported that Bell fit the description of a Black male robbery suspect. 
40 The muzzle of his gun literally touched Bell’s jacket. Grady pointed the weapon upward, so as to inflict a mortal head 
wound. 
41 The Milwaukee Journal defined “throwaways” as “knives or spare guns that could be planted on bodies after police 
shootings to make it appear that officers shot in self-defense.” “Bell Case ‘Shocks’ Ex-Police Chief,” The Milwaukee 
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patrolmen—who were not partners, but whose paths met on shift that night—reported an 
improbable story in which Bell shouted while running away, “You sons of bitches will never catch 
me, I’m a hold-up man.” Relying on false information, an all-white inquest jury handpicked by the 
Milwaukee County Sheriff exonerated Krause and Grady. As Bell family attorney Walter Kelly wrote 
during legal proceedings over twenty years later, Thomas Grady had “a known propensity for racial 
prejudice against blacks.”42 The disgraced former officer admitted to framing Bell in August 1978. 
He pled guilty to reckless homicide and perjury charges the following year, was convicted, and began 
serving a seven-year prison term in January 1980.43  
  Louis Krause’s confession to a police cover-up in the aftermath of the Bell killing delivered 
what appeared to be a fatal blow, at least conceptually, to the MPD’s narrative of policing 
exceptionalism. His admission disrupted the notion that, when left to its own devices free of 
oversight, the MPD was well-equipped to deliver efficient and honest crime control. Krause told 
John Doe investigators that the “coverup and conspiracy” engaged in by police supervisors “reached 
to the top of the department.”44 It began at the crime scene and was actively supported by two 
commanding officers: Detective Inspector Rudolph Glaser and Detective Captain Leo Woelfel.45 In 
 
Sentinel, September 3, 1979, Part 1, 5; District Attorney E. Michael McCann to Milwaukee Journal Editorial Board, 
September 5, 1979, Box 140, Folder 9, “Police Department, January-August 1979,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier 
Administration, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Milwaukee Series 44, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. State law 
permitted police to shoot at “fleeing felons.” White and LePage, Sister, 176. 
42 Grady evidently remarked to Louis Krause after ending Bell’s life, “it’s just a goddamn nigger kid anyhow.” Walter F. 
Kelly, “What Price Justice: The Daniel Bell Case,” Box 19, Folder 1, “Bell, Daniel 1982-83,” National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, Milwaukee Branch, Records. Milwaukee Mss EP, University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee Archives. According to Krause, Grady spent his shift hunting for Black north side residents to detain; Grady 
“needed some more arrests that night…he was going to check some vacant homes around 7th or 8th St. or Vine St. and 
arrest some niggers.” Diane Schwerm, “Justice Done in 21-Year-Old Shooting Case, McCann Says,” The Milwaukee 
Journal, August 30, 1979, Part 1, 16. 
43 “Extensive Bell Coverup Denied,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 19, 1980, Part 1, 8. 
44 A Detective Sergeant allegedly told Krause to “stick to your guns,” when he tried to explain to supervisors what 
happened on the night of February 2, 1958. Curry First to Thomas Atkins, NAACP New York Headquarters, January 
19, 1983, Box 19, Folder 1, “Bell, Daniel 1982-83,” National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
Milwaukee Branch, Records. Milwaukee Mss EP. Then Police Chief Howard Johnson denied any knowledge of a cover-
up. 
45 Both Glaser and Woelfel had died by the time Krause told his revised account. The first story about the police cover-
up of the Bell killing was buried on page sixteen of the Milwaukee Journal. A year later, it was headline news. Helane 
Morrison, “After 20 Years, the Echoes of a Police Gunshot Return,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 10, 1978, Part 1, 
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order to cast the innocent Bell more credibly as a knife-wielding criminal, Captain Woelfel ordered 
Detective Russell Vorpagel to pick up a “known alcoholic” and buy her drinks before bringing her 
to the morgue to identify Bell as a criminal.46 When Krause told his superiors the truth about what 
happened to Bell, he said “they convinced him to match his story with what Grady had told him”—
that the officer shot in self-defense at a lunging Black man slashing a knife. Nobody in power would 
question their fabrication. Krause’s testimony revealed that the MPD’s reputation for honest police 
administration in the liberal law-and-order era was “a veil of lies.”47 The cover-up masked racist, life-
threatening, and illegal acts of police discretion. MPD supervisors were willing and able to protect 
their own officers at the expense of the truth, systematically devalue Black life, and further justify the 
department’s undue, extractive presence in Black urban spaces. These choices aligned with police 
policies that determined how Black neighborhoods experienced law enforcement—harmful double 
standards that helped preserve narratives of racial difference, promoted common white perceptions 
of Black criminality, and supported racial segregation. 
  The Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy would not have gained the organizational following 
or community support it did in 1981 had a grassroots campaign for justice not emerged in 1979 
around the revisited Bell case. In addition to the Bell family filing a federal lawsuit against Thomas 
Grady, former Police Chief Howard Johnson, and the City of Milwaukee for violating Bell and his 
family’s civil rights, frustrated police accountability advocates made their voices heard on the 
streets.48 For decades, Black and Latinx citizens had critiqued Milwaukee’s racist policing system and 
 
16. 
46 Detective Vorpagel refused to go along with the Captain’s plan and eventually quit the MPD over the Bell case. The 
only individual who claimed to have “identified” Bell as their assailant was actually robbed while Bell sat in jail for 
driving without a license. Captain Woelful and Inspector Glaser also had the officers falsify police reports to make the 
murder appear more legitimate. White and LePage, Sister, 177. 
47 Quote by Milwaukee Journal reporter Alex P. Dobish. Alex P. Dobish, “Former Officers Named in Bell Killing 
Coverup,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 6, 1979, Part 1, 1. 
48 The Bell family hired civil rights attorney, and former partner of Lloyd Barbee, Tom Jacobson to pursue the case. He 
brought in outside attorneys Curry First and Walter Kelly, who handled much of the work. The plaintiffs sued the 
defendants on the grounds that the traffic stop, killing, and cover-up violated Daniel Bell’s and the Bell family’s civil 
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its brutal behavior. At issue now was determining the extent to which the MPD’s 1958 cover-up 
extended to the dozens of other police killings that occurred since. Despite pursuing the John Doe 
case, DA McCann refused to prosecute or even name those who participated in the MPD cover-up, 
citing a statute of limitations that protected offenders who lived in the state at least six years after 
their offense.49 To pressure McCann and local officials, more than two hundred fifty demonstrators 
joined a “March for Justice” in September 1979.50 The march wound its way through Milwaukee’s 
north side, from New Hope Baptist Church to N. 6th St., where Bell was murdered. Rev. R. L. 
Lathan, who organized the city’s first Black-led civil rights march after Daniel Bell’s death in 1958, 
symbolically rode at the front of the procession in a hearse and casket.51 Protesters aimed to indict 
and convict Grady, expose others involved in the alleged cover-up, compensate the Bell family, and 
secure an investigation into all racialized police killings in Milwaukee. As radio host O. C. White 
commented, the Bell case raised “a question about some of the other ‘mistakes’ and ‘accidents’ that 
have happened in the community.”52  
  Because of the Bell case revelations, momentum built for a federal investigation into 
racialized police violence in the city. On September 28, 1978, a hearing on police-community 
relations was held at North Division High School.53 Organizers invited Black Alderman Roy Nabors, 
who supported a federal investigation into Milwaukee police shooting deaths. Black fire and police 
commissioner William Gore attempted to force the Milwaukee County DA to reveal more about the 
 
rights. Liberal District Court Judge John W. Reynolds presided over the case. A federal jury found the defendants guilty 
and awarded the family $1,795,000 on December 16, 1981. However, Mayor Maier and the city appealed, dragging the 
case on for another couple years before a smaller settlement was reached. Thomas J. Hagerty, “Award Doesn’t End Bell 
Family’s Battle,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 17, 1981, Part 1, 1; White and LePage, Sister, 229-231. 
49 White and LePage, Sister, 227. 
50 D. Michael Cheers, "Twenty-one Years Later, White Cop Admits Killing Black Milwaukee Man," Jet Magazine, 
September 27, 1979. 
51 Cheers, "Twenty-one Years Later, White Cop Admits Killing Black Milwaukee Man”; White and LePage, Sister, 229. 
52 Gregory Stanford, “Doubts Raised by Slaying Case,” The Milwaukee Journal, August 30, 1979, Part 1, 16. 
53 North Division High School was the heart of Black Milwaukee’s community control movement around public 
education. Howard Fuller, an alum, led the Coalition to Save North Division. The group ensured that it would continue 
as a neighborhood school, serving primarily Black students. Box 140, Folder 8, “Police Department, January-August 
1978,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
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officials’ actions in the cover-up using a special procedure.54 White officials went on the defensive, as 
Black political leaders used their limited, if growing power to secure justice. City Attorney James 
Brennan informed the MFPC that it had no legal right to conduct an investigation into Bell’s 
shooting death or potential police cover ups.55 Nevertheless, on October 2, 1979 the Milwaukee 
Common Council, led by Alderman Nabors, passed a resolution (9-7) to ask the U.S. Department of 
Justice to investigate all police shooting deaths occurring in the city since 1965.56 Mayor Maier was 
reluctant to sign the resolution, given the upcoming primary election and a desire to appease white 
south and northwest side voters who actively supported Chief Breier and the MPD.57 Breier offered 
Maier a safety valve, confidently writing him that he had “no fear” and “strongly urged” the mayor 
to sign the resolution, which he did shortly thereafter.58  
  Fortunately for both Maier and Breier, a federal statute of limitations narrowed U.S. 
Attorney Joan Kessler’s 1980 investigation into the MPD’s “use of deadly force and other violent 
conduct” to between 1975 and 1979.59 This negated at least eight Black in-custody deaths, some of 
which were controversial, high-profile cases that drew community protests. Kessler’s investigation 
identified zero deaths that “appeared likely to be developable into prosecutable cases.”60 Only the 
1976 police shooting death of white “Outlaw” motorcycle club member Roger Lyons evidently 
neared “criminal misconduct.”61 Of twenty-two lives lost between 1975 and 1979, eight were African 
 
54 White and LePage, Sister, 228. 
55 James F. Brennan to Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, September 27, 1979, Box 140, Folder 9, “Police 
Department, January-August 1979,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
56 Joan F. Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” March 27, 1980, 
Box 140, Folder 12, “Police Department, January-May, 1980,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
57 Ronald H. Snyder, “Chief for Life: Harold Breier and His Era” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 
2002), 80. 
58 The vote was 9-7. Chief Breier to Mayor Maier, October 3, 1979, Box 140, Folder 9, “Police Department, January-
August 1979,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
59 Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 3. 
60 Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 16. 
61 The U.S. Attorney’s office conducted a nine-month grand jury investigation that was “unable to develop sufficient 
admissible evidence of federal criminal misconduct to justify requesting an indictment.” Kessler, “Milwaukee Common 
Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 16. 
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Americans.62 The rate of Black citizens who died in police custody, as compared to white, almost 
matched the rate of Black arrestees.63 Kessler counted 45 of 137 total complaints had made to the 
MFPC as “excessive force.”64 However, these complaints did not include racial identification, 
making it difficult to find “a pattern of racism.”65 Incomplete data collection limited the study, as did 
Chief Breier’s refusal to cooperate without being subpoenaed.66 In the end, the federal government 
found “no factually sufficient basis” to investigate police misconduct in Milwaukee on a wider 
scale.67 Unless other officers came forward and said they lied, Kessler saw no need to open inquiries 
into previous shooting deaths. On the issue of accountability, however, she wrote that the MPD “is 
effectively free to ignore articulated public policy,” which “contribute substantially to the feeling of a 
significant portion of our population that they are in fact treated differently because of race.” While 
the MFPC had power to, as of 1977, “review department policy annually,” it lacked the authority “to 
impose policy, or enforce policy already adopted.” The police accountability issue was a “political 
problem” to be solved by elected officials, not “criminal civil rights prosecution.”68 
 
 
62 Fourteen in-custody deaths between 1975 and 1979 were white citizens. Six of the total deaths were suicides in 
Milwaukee County Jail. Only one “Hispanic” died in police custody during this span (1979). Kessler, “Milwaukee 
Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 8. 
63 Despite comprising “only about 20% of the population,” Black citizens accounted for “more than 40% of all arrests” 
in Milwaukee from 1975 to 1979. Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and 
Recommendations,” 7. 
64 Seventy of these incidents involved injuries, resulting in 37 lawsuits. U.S. Attorney Joan Kessler to Henry Maier and 
Robert Anderson, Box 140, Folder 12, “Police Department, January-May, 1980,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier 
Administration. 
65 Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 1, 11. 
66 The MFPC and City Attorney cooperated fully. Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and 
Recommendations,” 4. 
67 A leak of Kessler’s report to the U.S. Justice Department to the press in Milwaukee angered the Maier administration 
and Milwaukee City Attorney’s office. The latter asked the DOJ for an investigation into Kessler’s conduct, citing “an 
unprofessional attempt…to influence the outcome of our local political elections.” Maier was up for reelection and 
Kessler’s report allegedly went beyond the scope of investigating police shooting deaths exclusively and suggested 
internal discrimination on the police force that City Hall was, by her account, doing little to resolve. The City Attorney 
referred to her as “a political activist.” City Attorney James B. Brennan to Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, April 17, 1980, Box 140, Folder 13, “Police Department, June-September, 
1980,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
68 Kessler, “Milwaukee Common Council Resolution, Observations and Recommendations,” 15-17. 
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Residents Integrating Law Enforcement and the League of Martin Lawsuit 
 A second federal report written by U.S. Attorney Kessler in 1980 did necessitate action from 
the city. This one involved the employment of “minorities”—African American, women, and Latinx 
officers—on the MPD. Stepping backward, on May 31, 1978, a newly formed organization called 
Residents Integrating Law Enforcement filed a complaint with the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. 
Treasury Department’s Office of Revenue Sharing (ORS). George Sanders, a Black Milwaukee 
journalist, drafted the letter.69 RILE comprised an anonymous roster of active and former MPD 
personnel. Most were members of the city’s Black police association, the League of Martin. RILE’s 
mission was “the integration of Hispanics, Blacks, and women into the MPD.” The group acted 
anonymously out of fear of harassment or retaliation from police administrators and rank-and-file 
officers.70 Their whistleblower complaint alleged “discriminatory practices” in violation of the U.S. 
Eastern District Court of Wisconsin’s 1975 consent decree mandating the hiring of two “minority” 
officers for every three white officers on the MPD.71 RILE called for a federal investigation into 
how Milwaukee officials used federal revenue sharing funds and for “a determination” as to whether 
federal aid should be withheld, suspended, or withdrawn as a result of internal police 
discrimination.72 The group cited five specific areas of concern. First, “no Blacks, Latinos, or 
Females” had been assigned to work at the MPD’s training academy. Second, Chief Breier had 
 
69 Sanders also mailed a copy of the letter to President Jimmy Carter’s offices, as well as those of U.S. Attorney Griffin 
Bell, Housing and Urban Development Secretary Patricia Hayes, and Wisconsin Fifth District Congressperson Henry 
Reuss. Sanders did not sign his name on the document. He served as RILE’s spokesperson, and believed integration 
made for “a more humane police and a lower unemployment rate among minorities.” As Sanders commented, “It’s time 
for accountability, and the police should be held accountable by the people they are supposed to be protecting. “Police 
Misconduct,” The Milwaukee Courier, October 7, 1978, 12; George Sanders (Freelance journalist), in discussion with the 
author, April 2018. 
70 Charles J. Sykes, “City, US Make a Deal; Funds to Keep Coming,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 26, 1979, 1; 
Gregory Stanford, “US-City Deal Called a Sham,” September 26, 1979, 1; Box 19, Folder 3, “Milwaukee Police 
Department, 1978-1981,” National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Milwaukee Branch, Records, 
Milwaukee Mss EP, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. 
71 Women were included among Black, Latinx, Native American, and Asian American officers. 
72 RILE specifically charged the MFPC, MPD, “and any other section, group or agency of the City of Milwaukee” with 
“engaging in discriminatory practices” while utilizing federal economic assistance. 
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assigned no minority officers to specialized police units, “particularly the so-called Tactical Squad.” 
Third, as of 1978 “no Latino or Female Lieutenants, Captains or Sergeants,” and zero “Black 
Lieutenants” served in the department.73 Fourth, Black officers comprised less than four percent of 
the MPD’s nearly 2,200 sworn personnel. Finally, RILE noted the high Black attrition rate. 
Numerous African American officers had “resigned or quit the force with unusual frequency 
because of racism, intimidation, and other unfair conditions.”74 RILE signed its complaint “on 
behalf of the citizens and residents of Milwaukee,” suggesting the city as a whole suffered from the 
“discriminatory conditions” advanced by police bureaucrats. 
 About two weeks later, the Civil Rights Division of ORS notified the mayor’s office that it 
would investigate RILE’s complaint.75 The federal government revealed its findings to the city on 
August 21, 1979, reporting that Chief Breier had failed to comply with Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination by parties receiving federal revenue. According to 
investigators, the MPD “used promotion selection procedures” and “engaged in assignment 
practices that adversely affected the employment opportunities of black police officers.” The report 
cited evidence that Black patrolmen were concentrated in predominantly Black districts and 
“excluded” from mostly white areas. At the time of the investigation, the MPD was assigning no 
Black officers to Districts Two and Six on the city’s white south side.76 Consequently, the ORS 
threatened to withdraw the city’s federal aid after finding “probable cause” for racial discrimination 
in the MPD. By late September, the matter was apparently resolved through “conciliation,” or 
 
73 The department employed only one Black captain at the time, Dewey Russ. 
74 George Sanders to Robert Clark, May 31, 1978, Box 19, Folder 3, “Milwaukee Police Department, 1978-1981,” 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Milwaukee Branch, Records, Milwaukee Mss EP, 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. 
75 ORS notified the city on June 16, 1978. Box 140, Folder 9, “Police Department, January-August 1979,” Records of 
Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
76 Respondents for the city designated these police precincts as white residential areas. As of June 1980, the city 
submitted three police assignment rosters. The rosters showed a complete absence of Black officers assigned to District 
Two and Six. 
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settlement through a neutral third party.77 However, Black officers filed additional complaints with 
the U.S. Attorney.78 The city’s 1982 report to ORS showed improvement in the distribution of Black 
police officers to the other five districts. Still, half of all Black officers were assigned to District Five 
and District Seven.79 Chief Breier continued to exclude Black police from the Tactical Squad until 
1982.80 The city only appointed two African Americans to the squad in July 1982 in response to 
community pressure as a result of the Lacy case and a U.S. Justice Department communication.81 
 The groundwork laid by RILE set the stage for the federal litigation filed by Black police 
officers in 1981. It showed that a viable outlet existed for Black police to challenge racism that 
circumvented Chief Breier’s state-sanctioned power. Needing evidence to challenge internal 
discrimination in the U.S. District Court, League of Martin members documented work practices 
that they believed violated their civil rights. They maintained separate memo books, one for daily 
work and another for documenting racism. When Black officers began filing complaints in the mid-
1970s, their supervisors “started watching…to see who was keeping two sets of memo books.”82 
 
77 The ORS wrote City Attorney Brennan on September 24, 1979 that its investigation into police hiring and promotion 
practices was resolved. Brennan to Shaheen, Jr., April 17, 1980. 
78 On June 6, 1980, DOJ’s Civil Rights Division wrote City Attorney Brennan stating that the U.S. Attorney had received 
additional complaints “relative to assignment, promotion, and termination practices” on the MPD. James B. Brennan to 
Joan F. Kessler, February 2, 1981, “Police Department, January-February, 1981,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier 
Administration. 
79 “Additionally, the 1979 notice of non-compliance cited the City for the circumstance wherein only one black officer 
held a special assignment on the district level, while no black detectives were assigned to the Special Assignment Squad. 
The City’s June 1982 annual report showed three black officers holding special assignments on the district level. The 
ORS has subsequently learned that at least two of these officers no longer hold such assignments and that black officers 
continue to allege discrimination in this area.” The MPD’s 1982 Annual Report continued to show that zero Black 
detectives worked the Special Assignments Squad. 
80 Black officers Earl Ridgway and Leslie Barber became the first Black officers assigned to the Tactical Squad in June 
1982, after the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Wisconsin forced Breier to integrate the unit. Cheikh T. 
Sylla, “US After Breier, Wants More Blacks on Tactical Squad,” The Milwaukee Courier, September 11, 1982, 1; “Tactical 
Squad Officer Shifted,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, October 1, 1983. 
81 Treadwell O. Phillips to Mayor Maier, August 21, 1979, Box 19, Folder 3, “Milwaukee Police Department, 1978-
1981,” National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Milwaukee Branch, Records. Milwaukee Mss EP, 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. 
82 Quote in: Lenard Wells (Lecturer, University of Memphis), in discussion with the author, November 2016. The 
League of Martin’s first president and future MPD Chief (1996-2003) Arthur Jones filed the first discrimination 
complaint by a police officer with the State Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations on March 16, 1976. 
The complaint alleged that MPD District Five Lieutenant James Marx, Jones’ “early shift” commander, engaged in racial 
discrimination when he denied Jones’ request for a plainclothes assignment. Notwithstanding recommendations from 
multiple sergeants, District Captain Duane Casey selected five white officers for promotion ahead of Jones, two of 
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According to former LM president Lenard Wells, “That hit the police department like a barn fire.”83 
Largely at issue for the League was Breier’s control over internal assignments and promotions. 
Although the MFPC approved who got hired and promoted, the chief determined who filled 
“exempt positions.”84 For instance, he controlled who made “Acting Detective,” an informal 
prerequisite Breier bestowed before any officer could advance through MFPC channels to 
“Detective.” Breier empowered loyal district-level subordinates to nominate officers for these 
roles.85 Supervisors denied exempt assignments to Black officers, some of who worked at the same 
precinct for over ten years.86 In November 1981, the chief directed the involuntary transfer of seven 
“outspoken” Black patrolmen from the MPD’s District Five station.87 With the support of the 
 
whom had less seniority. Jones was passed over for a plainclothes assignment in 1973, despite having more seniority and 
experience than selected white officers. After receiving Jones’ 1976 complaint, the state mailed Chief Breier a letter 
asking him to attend a conciliation meeting to discuss the issue further. Later that year, Jones filed a second complaint 
alleging retaliation by MPD officials for complaining about racial discrimination. In 1979, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission found “probable cause” to believe that the department, indeed, had retaliated against Arthur 
Jones based on his race and for filing his initial complaint. By this point, Jones had made Detective. However, as he 
argued in the League of Martin’s 1981 lawsuit, the MFPC should have promoted him to Detective in 1976. As a result, 
he missed out on two years of eligibility towards becoming Lieutenant of Detectives, which required three years of 
service in the Detective Bureau. Scott Anderson, “Black Officers File Federal Suit; Seek Promotions, End to 
Retaliation,” The Milwaukee Courier, November 28, 1981, 1, 10; “Black Officer Files Bias Complaint,” The Milwaukee 
Journal, March 17, 1976, Part 2, 9. 
83 Lenard Wells (Lecturer, University of Memphis), in discussion with the author, November 2016. 
84 These included the Tactical Enforcement Unit, Special Assignments Squad, and Acting Detectives (AD). According to 
MPD rules, being an acting detective for a year was required to make full detective. The Chief of Police had the 
authority to downgrade AD’s before they reached their year requirement. Arthur Jones’ experience working in District 
Five reveals the extent to which Black police officers were excluded from special assignment promotions, which 
prevented them from earning the “Acting Detective” designation: “Every Special [Assignments Squad member] that 
worked at District Five became an acting detective, and the only way you could become a detective is if you were an 
acting detective for at least one year. Then you could take the exam for detective…So the only way you could become a 
detective on the Milwaukee Police Department was to become an acting detective...The only way you became a detective 
at District 5 and a lot of other districts was if you worked special. See, you went from beat to squad, to plainclothes, to 
detective.” Arthur Jones, “Duncan Group, Inc.: Through One City's Eyes Video Recording and Interview Transcripts, 
1998-1999,” Milwaukee Mss 202, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. 
85 Other exempt positions included Administrative Sergeants, the Auto Squad (auto thefts), the Tavern Car (tavern 
violations), and the Special Car (general felonies and misdemeanors). 
86 According to Arthur Jones, “The department did assign Black officers to weekend squad patrols, when taverns stayed 
open late, on a temporary or ‘loan’ basis…I thought that was terrible…There were young white officers who damn near 
came out as contemporary with me, coming out of the academy, who were assigned to squads.” These assignments were 
important, as they signaled a path to professional achievement. Breier himself became Chief of Police after serving as a 
full detective, then rising to the rank of Detective Inspector—the head of all detectives. As Jones reiterated, “everything 
centered around the Detective Bureau in the Milwaukee Police Department. Everything. That’s where the power was.” 
Arthur Jones, “Duncan Group, Inc.” 
87 Thirty-four Black officers worked at the station; only six percent of the MPD was Black. Gregory D. Stanford, 
“Reassignments Anger Black Officers,” The Milwaukee Journal, November 8, 1981. 
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Milwaukee Urban League and NAACP, LM President Arthur Jones announced the filing of a class-
action lawsuit against Breier, District Five supervisors, the MPD, the MFPC, and the City on 
November 18, 1981.88 Among their allegations, the officers said a white sergeant told them to issue 
more jaywalking and traffic tickets in the mostly Black district as retaliation for the Coalition for 
Justice for Ernest Lacy’s protests that summer.89 Here, the internal ramifications of the Lacy killing 
within the MPD intersected with the external implications for policed Black residents. Both Black 
police and civilians were ensnared by racist double-standards. 
 
Forging a Grassroots Movement  
 Against this backdrop of renewed protests and pending lawsuits, Milwaukee’s Black-led 
movement for police accountability coalesced around the July 1981 police killing of 22-year-old 
Ernest Lacy. With his family’s support, the Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy (CJEL) formed on 
July 13, 1981 at the N. 3rd St. offices of the United Black Community Council (UBCC).90 About forty 
people attended the initial meeting, representing dozens of community and civil rights organizations. 
Most attendees were Black; however, white and Latinx voices were also present. A sense of urgency 
pervaded the gathering. “These people (the officers who killed Lacy) are still on the street, and they 
could do the same thing tomorrow night,” activist Michael Rosen exclaimed.91 The UBCC’s Michael 
McGee was nominated to lead the umbrella coalition. All present agreed that the first step would be 
to pressure the MFPC to suspend Officers Eliopul, Dekker, and Kalt until an investigation was 
completed; then seek prosecution.92 Each of the officers had pending brutality claims filed against 
 
88 Karen Rothe, “Minority Officers Plan Discrimination Lawsuit,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, November 19, 1981; Gregory 
D. Stanford, “Harassment Alleged in Black Officers’ Suit,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 17, 1981, Accent, 1. 
89 Sergeant Phil Eccher denied the allegations, as did his union representatives. Black officers also alleged receiving 
“bottom-rung chores, suspensions, threats of discipline and orders to get haircuts,” as written in federal affidavits. 
“Transfer of Officers Defended,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 11, 1981, Part 2, 1. 
90 Gregory D. Stanford, “Coalition Urges Suspensions,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 14, 1981, Part 2, 1. 
91 Gregory D. Stanford, “Coalition Will Seek Officers’ Suspensions,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 14, 1981, Part 2, 4. 
92 The commission did so, with pay. 
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them by Milwaukee citizens. The MFPC had scheduled a hearing for all three officers just hours 
before they encountered Ernest Lacy on Wisconsin Ave. However, it was postponed for health 
reasons.93 
 The CJEL immediately channeled existing frustrations over decades of racialized police 
violence into concerted action.94 To do so, it drew on grassroots momentum harnessed during 
recent mobilizations for racial justice, more specifically the effort to save a predominantly Black 
neighborhood high school from being closed down and reopened as an integrated magnet school, 
the Bell movement for accountability, and the “Coalition to Oust Breier” as Milwaukee police chief. 
Marquette University Equal Opportunities Program director Howard Fuller co-chaired the CJEL 
alongside McGee. Both men were respected community activists with experience leading grassroots 
campaigns and directing non-profit organizations. Fuller was a civil rights turned Black Power 
activist with an international profile. He led the “Coalition to Save North Division High School.”95 
 
93 Dekker, along with two other police officers, was accused of police brutality by four complainants in February 1978. 
The city was forced to pay each individual $750. In the postponed case, 45-year-old Rexnord Corporation machinist 
Hercules Brown filed a complaint against Dekker, Kalt, and Eliopul after he was arrested and allegedly brutalized on 
June 21, 1980. According to the officers’ attorney, the hearing was postponed because one of the officers was recovering 
from surgery. “3 Officers in Lacy Case Face Brutality Charge in ’80 Arrest,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 14, 1981, Part 1, 
1. The MFPC dismissed the Brown case in October 1982. Patricia Wirth, “Brutality Case Dismissed,” The Milwaukee 
Sentinel, October 26, 1982, Part 1, 1. 
94 For a list of Black Milwaukee police brutality victims, see Appendix A. 
95 Howard Fuller was born on January 14, 1941 in Shreveport, Louisiana. He moved with his mother to Milwaukee’s 
Hillside Terrace housing project in 1947. Fuller attended North Division high school, where he excelled both 
academically and on the basketball court. In high school, Fuller says he learned the fundamentals of community activism: 
teamwork, organization, and effort. After earning a bachelor’s degree in Sociology from Carroll College in Waukesha, 
Wisconsin, he moved to Cleveland, Ohio. There, Fuller got married, obtained a Master’s degree in Social Work from 
Western Reserve University, and found employment as a job placement coordinator at Chicago’s Urban League branch.  
After a protest in Cleveland for school integration as a member of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), 
Fuller discovered a newfound sense of purpose as a grass-roots organizer. He spent the next decade serving in North 
Carolina at the Operation Breakthrough community action agency. Fuller democratized higher education by founding an 
all-Black college, Malcolm X Liberation University. He crisscrossed the globe as a sought after leader, speaker, and 
organizer in the national Black Power movement. Known to his peers on the African Liberation Support Committee by 
his Swahili name, Owusu Sadauki, Fuller’s embrace of revolutionary Pan-Africanism brought him to the coast of East 
Africa, where he marched with anti-colonial Mozambican freedom fighters in a war to oust the Portuguese.  
After working as a business agent for the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees’ 
Union Local-77, Fuller moved back to Milwaukee in 1976. There, he successfully organized against the busing of African 
American students living in the neighborhoods surrounding North Division High School (1979), mobilized against 
police brutality following the death of Ernest Lacy (1981), and led the college division of the Educational Opportunity 
Program at Marquette University (1979-1983). Howard Fuller (Distinguished Professor of Education, Marquette 
University), in discussion with the author, March 2013. 
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McGee was a former Black Panther and co-founder of the UBCC, which spearheaded the city’s 
movement for community control of the police and Black self-help in the 1970s. He also founded 
Project Respect—an anti-crime project focused on youth diversion and neighborhood crime control 
that partially relied on block grant funding.96 Project Respect defied the notion that Black 
community activists were solely concerned about police violence and not intra-communal violence 
as well, which, for McGee, fit hand-in-hand. Despite seemingly opposing leadership styles—one was 
discreet and philosophical, the other spirited and tenacious—Fuller and McGee made a strong team. 
“People thought we weren’t going to be able to work together,” Fuller recalled in 2013. “I had a 
Master’s degree, [and was] college educated. Mike was…a Panther…a lot more militant acting…he 
functioned in a certain way, I functioned in a certain way.”97 The two eventually had a notable falling 
out over the proper course of Black political action. However, from the late 1970s through mid-
1980s, Fuller and McGee combined to form the vanguard of Milwaukee’s Black protest politics.98 
 While Fuller and McGee played prominent roles as co-chairs of the CJEL, helping to set the 
movement’s tone and direction, it was Ernest Lacy’s mother, Myrtle, who was the real face of the 
struggle. She served as a powerful symbol of Black women’s resistance to racialized police violence, 
particularly during protest marches and pickets, at the MFPC’s disciplinary hearings and in federal 
 
96 Gregory D. Stanford, “A Question of Power," The Milwaukee Journal, October 16, 1983, 4. A portion of Project 
Respect’s grant funding came from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and Wisconsin’s state criminal 
justice council. 
97 Howard Fuller (Distinguished Professor of Education, Marquette University), in discussion with the author, March 
2013. 
98 The onetime revolutionary Black nationalist, Fuller, opted to “work within the mainstream” of state and local politics. 
McGee called Fuller a “lackey” and “hypocrite” after he moved into conventional politics. However, McGee also 
entered the political arena when he won an aldermanic district seat in 1984, following two failed tries in 1976 and 1980. 
Jonathan Coleman, Long Way to Go: Black and White in America (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1997), 37-38. Leaving 
his days of radical adventurism behind, but remaining focused on uplifting poor and working-class people of color, 
Fuller entered the public sector. After serving as Secretary of Employee Relations (1983-1986), Dean of General 
Education at the Milwaukee Area Technical College (1986-1988), Director of Milwaukee County’s Department of 
Health and Human Services (1988-1991), and Superintendent of Milwaukee Public Schools (1991-1995), Fuller became a 
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Howard Fuller (Distinguished Professor of Education, Marquette University), in discussion with the author, March 2013. 
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court amid the legal battle for civil justice.99 Her agency as an “emerging leader” in Milwaukee’s 
police accountability movement was, to some extent, contingent on the success of the 1970s 
Women’s movement and an implicit desire to complete the work of previous Black mothers forced 
into the spotlight after police killed their children.100 Myrtle Lacy’s constant presence in all aspects of 
her son’s death provided an emotional reminder of police brutality’s less visible collateral 
consequences, especially for poor and working-class Black families whose mutual survival relied on, 
in part, emotional and monetary support provided by children and extended kinfolk.101 The needless 
loss of Ernest’s life instilled a righteous anger and deep sadness in Myrtle Lacy. “It is as if I have 
lived another whole lifetime in these months since Ernest died…And I feel that life will never be the 
same…He was innocent…and nothing has been done about it,” she told reporters.102 Still, she never 
lost faith in her community. “Every time we would go before the people, we would always get 
justice. When we went to the judiciary system, that’s when everything broke down.”103 In addition to 
calling for the “just punishment” of the officers who killed her son, Lacy sought “redemptive” 
justice for Black families. Police were “not above the law.” It was incumbent upon her and the CJEL 
to communicate this message through direct action. The stakes were high for all Milwaukee 
residents, not just African Americans. As she remarked, “It is my duty and my strong conviction that 
if nothing happens out of this Lacy case, it will be a sad day for the white community and the black 
community. People could be hurt.”104 While Lacy retained faith in the criminal-legal system, she was 
 
99 Dorothy Austin, “Myrtle Lacy Emerges as Leader,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, February 8, 1982, Part 1, 8. 
100 Sarah Ford, mother of Jaqueline Ford, is a good example of a Black mother compelled to publicly seek justice. 
Jacqueline Ford, was killed by Milwaukee police detective Snead Carroll in 1972 when he purportedly tripped climbing a 
set of stares and accidentally fired his gun. See: Chapter Five. 
101 The family struggled financially and Myrtle Lacy received county welfare benefits and medical assistance, which she 
actually chose to pay back after her civil case concluded in 1985. “I feel that, as far as I’m concerned, this is the right 
thing to do…when people have the money, they should pay,” Lacy told reporters after receiving a $600,000 settlement. 
Larry Sandler, “Lacy's Mother to Repay County for Welfare,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, October 24, 1985, Part 1, 1. 
102 Dorothy Austin, “Myrtle Lacy Emerges as Leader.” 
103 Laura R. Woliver, From Outrage to Action: The Politics of Grass-roots Dissent (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 
1993), 86. 
104 Woliver, From Outrage to Action, 86. 
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dismayed when it operated by a dual standard: “I just want people punished like I would have been 
punished if I had killed somebody on Wisconsin Ave.”105 
 A broad assemblage of civil rights organizations, social justice non-profits, labor unions, 
houses of worship, neighborhood associations, professional groups, university programs, political 
parties, and student alliances comprised the CJEL. At its height, the coalition totaled over one 
hundred twenty-five groups. An umbrella coalition, according to political scientist Laura Woliver, 
allowed for “supportive and parallel” units to commit “time and energy to larger issues and different 
tactics.”106 The CJEL was diverse, representing a range of political, cultural, and identity-based 
interests, yet complimentary in approach. From the AFL-CIO to the Workers World Party, Women 
Against Rape to the Latin American Union for Civil Rights, the National Association of Black 
Veterans to the People’s Anti-War Mobilization—it wagered that Milwaukee police bureaucrats 
could ill afford to ignore such a unified swath of stakeholders. As leaders, Fuller and McGee 
maintained a clear, “modest agenda.”107 The coalition overcame competing interests and 
subordinated participants’ ideological differences by establishing “principles of unity” and focusing 
on the common goal of prosecuting the officers responsible for Lacy’s death.108 They also hoped to 
establish new statutory first aid protocols for police and more reliable accountability structures. 
Open lines of communication facilitated the mobilization of thousands of citizens for 
demonstrations at a moment’s notice. The CJEL demanded transparency—not only in terms of 
clarifying the process of events leading up to Lacy’s death, but also in terms of how the city 
responded to yet another tragic police killing. The twenty-year cover-up of Daniel Bell’s murder was 
on their minds when Lacy perished. But so too were the police killings of Clifford McKissick (1967), 
 
105 Dorothy Austin, “Myrtle Lacy Emerges as Leader.” 
106 Woliver, From Outrage to Action, 80. 
107 Woliver, From Outrage to Action, 68. 
108 Karen Rothe and Marilyn Kucer, “Better Milwaukee for Blacks Is Aim of Activists,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, August 
17, 1981, Part 1, 12. 
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Lee Wilson (1967), Jacqueline Ford (1972), Andrew Friend (1973), Johnny Starks (1974), Mary 
Pendleton (1974), Jerry Brookshire (1974), Charles Dailey (1975), and Steven Gaston (1975). The 
coalition attracted “significant support” from the community, in part because Lacy was such a 
“sympathetic victim.” He was innocent of the violent crime he was stopped for and witnesses saw 
the police abuse him. This communal empathy was manifest when more than 2,500 people paid 
their respects at Lacy’s wake and hundreds attended his funeral on July 18, 1981. 
 The CJEL’s actions shaped and reflected the twists and turns of official responses to Ernest 
Lacy’s death from the MPD, District Attorney, Milwaukee County Medical Examiner’s office, 
Milwaukee Police Association, and City Hall. The coalition pursued non-violent direct action protest 
and civil litigation to secure justice for the Lacy family. As a secondary aim, it hoped to leverage 
public pressure and effect procedural changes in Milwaukee’s police accountability system. All told, 
the coalition led three marches and rallies in July and August 1981—the city’s largest protest 
mobilizations since 1967-1968—and a final march and rally on the one-year anniversary of Lacy’s 
death in 1982. The demonstrations spotlit Milwaukee’s ongoing policing crisis and the dual 
accountability system Black residents were forced to navigate. The CJEL also held smaller 
demonstrations at City Hall and outside the MFPC offices.109 It engaged in a one-day boycott of 
downtown commerce in 1981, a sit-in at District Attorney McCann’s office, and, in 1982, a month-
long boycott of the downtown Gimbels and Boston Store, as well as the Capital Court shopping 
mall on the northwest side. 
 In negotiating established police accountability structures, the CJEL experienced several 
delays and set-backs, as well as some victories that helped coalition members persevere. The 
movement began when the Lacy family, represented by Milwaukee civil rights attorney Alan 
Eisenberg, sought relief through formal municipal channels. First, Myrtle Lacy submitted a citizen’s 
 
109 Woliver, From Outrage to Action, 64. 
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complaint with the MFPC on July 15, 1981. It alleged “agonizing, horrible police brutality” 
committed against her son and called for the immediate suspension and timely disciplining of the 
officers involved.110 In it, she identified the three Tactical Squad officers who subdued her son as “a 
potential threat and danger to the safety of other citizens.” Police officers Kenneth Kmichik (van 
driver) and Robert Enters (van attendant) were added to the complaint in October 1982.111 Having 
received letters from CJEL organizations, the Greater Milwaukee Conference on Religion and 
Urban Affairs, and another group, Citizens for a Democratic Police, William Gore—the MFPC’s 
first African American chairperson—and colleagues voted to suspend the three officers pending 
investigation.112 Breier and MPA President Robert Kliesmet “strongly opposed” the suspensions, 
arguing they violated the officers’ constitutional rights.113 The police complaint review process 
moved slowly, with the Lacy’s allegations first reviewed by an MFPC “Rules Committee,” then 
investigated by staff before going on to the commission for a hearing. Years of appeals by the 
officers and their union representatives caused delay. The MFPCs final decision on the Lacy case did 
not come until June 1983, illustrating why so many in Milwaukee’s activist community considered 
the board’s quasi-judicial function to be inefficient. 
 
The Special Advisory Monitoring Committee 
 The MFPC temporarily suspended Officers Eliopul, Dekker, and Kalt with pay on July 25, 
1981 pending investigation. Two days later, the MPA filed a complaint on the officers’ behalf with 
 
110 Myrtle Lacy’s complaint read: “They subdued [Ernest]…Officer Eliopul pinning my son’s neck, back, and particularly 
trachea to the pavement out in the middle of Wisconsin Avenue…Officers [James] Dekker and [George] Kalt pinning 
his legs down.” “Terminate Eliopul,” The Milwaukee Courier, July 18, 1981; “Lacy's Kin Calls for Police Firing,” The 
Milwaukee Journal, July 16, 1981, Part 2, 2. 
111 “Lacy Lawyers Want to Add 2 Officers to Complaint,” The Milwaukee Journal, October 17, 1982, Part 2, 8. 
112 The decisions to suspend the officers came two weeks after Myrtle Lacy filed the complaint. “Suspensions Studied in 
Lacy Death,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 17, 1981, Part 1, 1; “Religious Leaders Ask Suspension of Officers,” The 
Milwaukee Journal, July 24, 1981, Part 2, 5. 
113 “Suspensions Legal, Breier Told,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 25, 1981, Part 1, 1. 
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the U.S. Attorney’s office alleging the violation of their civil rights.114 The CJEL picketed outside 
Milwaukee’s federal building as the union filed its grievance, carrying signs that demanded the 
officers’ prosecution. The mayor carefully observed the brewing controversy. Given the Bell case 
revelations, risking a cover-up in the Lacy matter, or simply appearing apathetic, was not an option. 
Responding to the entreaties of venerable civil rights organizations, like the Milwaukee NAACP, 
Maier agreed to form a “blue ribbon panel” to monitor developments in the Lacy case.115 The CJEL 
was skeptical. The mayor had a history of forming study committees following politically volatile or 
racially charged events. Rather than act on their most urgent recommendations, he often claimed a 
lack of authority.116 This time around, Maier called for a special citizens committee to analyze 
institutional responses to civilian deaths in police custody. He urged Chief Breier, MFPC Chair 
Arlene Kennedy, and DA McCann to meet with the Milwaukee NAACP to discuss police-
community relations and issues surrounding Lacy’s death.117 
 
114 “Maier Completes 11-Member Panel to Probe Lacy Case,” The Milwaukee Journal, July 27, 1981. 
115 The Milwaukee NAACP reached out to Maier shortly after Lacy’s death and the formation of the more radical CJEL. 
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municipalities and the authority of state laws. When municipal reform committees recommended redistributing the chief 
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Box 19, Folder 2, “Lacy, Ernest, 1981,” National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Milwaukee 
Branch, Records. Milwaukee Mss EP, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives. 
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 On the same day that the MPA filed their federal complaint, the mayor announced 
appointments for his “Special Advisory Monitoring Committee” (SAMC). The group’s charge: to 
examine “the various processes involved in investigations into” Lacy’s death.118 Former Maier aide 
Alex LeGrand and Mt. Zion Baptist Church Pastor W. J. Calvin chaired the eleven-member body. It 
was racially diverse, if politically loyal to the mayor.119 No CJEL members were asked to serve. In a 
press conference, Maier expressed reservations about the “recycling of recent history” and 
perceptions among residents that he was not taking civilian demands for police accountability 
seriously.120 The CJEL’s rhetoric and legal filings had named previous MPD killings and alluded to 
potential cover-ups that went beyond the Bell case. They also publicly charged Breier with hiding the 
facts of Ernest Lacy’s death after the chief exonerated the three arresting officers in an internal 
investigation.121 Black SAMC members were themselves wary of being seen as yet another municipal 
committee that takes no action.122 “I must go back to the black community…and keep the venom 
from flowing,” one member commented.123  
 In Maier’s view, the special committee functioned as “a mechanism to observe the workings 
 
118 Mayor Maier instructed the SAMC to interrogate four questions: “1. Do the existing processes and procedures 
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of the legal processes in the Lacy case” and to “recommend ways to improve the system.”124 The 
group clarified in the press that they were “not here to investigate the Lacy case,” as they lacked “the 
authority.” The SAMC met as a full body twenty-five times, holding sub-committee meetings as 
well. At Maier’s instruction, they reached out to the mayor’s offices and police departments of the 
thirty largest U.S. cities in an effort to learn more about the procedures they followed when citizens 
died in police custody. The SAMC heard testimony from twenty-seven local people, including Chief 
Breier, DA McCann, City Attorney James Brennan.125 The committee spoke with CJEL members 
Howard Fuller, Lacy family attorney Alan Eisenberg, the Wisconsin Civil Liberties Union’s Eunice 
Edgar, and Russell Stamper of Wisconsin Black Lawyers Association. Breier testified before the 
SAMC on August 17, 1981. He strongly defended his officers, claiming they “were not involved in 
any way.” Breier refused to address Lacy’s death or police “techniques” or “procedures,” arguing 
they are “not to be discussed with the general public.”126 He maintained that investigating in-custody 
deaths was the MPD’s role. “We won’t share that function with anyone,” he insisted. Based on the 
chief’s track record of defending illegal police stops and searches, violent beatings, and slayings, the 
CJEL anticipated his response. Police accountability advocates, having experienced two decades of 
reaction and resistance from Breier, believed that repairing police-community relations was 
impossible with him in charge of the MPD. Breier favored a “siege mentality” that divided his 
officers from the people and “further exacerbated police community tensions.”127 As Howard Fuller 
put it, Breier “had everybody under his fist…he was like a local Hoover.”128 
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  Mayor Maier approved the SAMC’s twenty-six recommendations in “concept,” if not 
entirely in “substance.”129 The committee focused on procedural reforms that could get passed at the 
state and municipal levels of government. Most of their recommendations targeted Breier’s insular 
and reactionary leadership, his response to the use of excessive police force, his unwillingness to 
cooperate fully with outside investigators, his lack of support for the mental health and well-being of 
rank-and-file officers, and his unwillingness to promote personnel of color. Former police union 
president Jerome Dudzik had a clear hand in devising recommendations favoring rank-and-file 
officers, their health and well-being. While the SAMC recognized “police have a tough, often 
dangerous and unpleasant job”—one that that should transcend “petty criticisms”—they also 
observed that police work sometimes “harmed” individuals, who “deserve justice and means of 
recourse.”130 The committee surmised that “procedures must be in place” whereby “the rights of all 
are protected.” Moreover, they had to “safeguard against even the remote possibility of a cover-
up.”131 At the top of the committee’s recommendations list was passage of a state law that advanced 
“safeguards into the cause of death or great bodily harm to persons in police custody or involved in 
police action.”—A reform that the legislature ultimately accomplished in 1983.132 The SAMC called 
for disciplinary action when the police chief refused to work with state and county investigators. 
Most other recommendations regurgitated the liberal police reforms of the era, largely emphasizing 
 
129 Mayor Maier to MFPC Chairperson Arlene Kennedy, June 14, 1982, 1, Box 140, Folder 17, “Police Department, 
March-June, 1982,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
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Milwaukee Police Association president Jerome Dudzik, and his irritation for Chief Breier’s strict internal rules and 
insensitivity to rank-and-file health and wellness, was strongly felt. The SAMC recommended “mandatory psychological 
counseling” of officers involved in deadly interactions with citizens; mandatory “psychological screening” of all MPD 
applicants; psychological or alcoholic counseling for police officers “without fear of department reprisals”; and 
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132 “Report of the Special Advisory/Monitoring Committee,” 20. 
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training improvements and police working with community groups to resolve crime.133 No SAMC 
proposals addressed the CJEL’s explicit demand for the firing and prosecution of the officers who 
killed Ernest Lacy, largely because the criminal-legal system made it so. 
 
Marching Towards an Inquest Hearing 
  The Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy’s first step in achieving the officers’ prosecution, 
systematically speaking, was the inquest called by District Attorney McCann. The MFPC was not 
authorized to file criminal charges in the Lacy case. “The only way to achieve justice,” CJEL leaders 
insisted, was “to let the evidence come out in a court of law.”134 That meant District Attorney 
Michael McCann prosecuting the men who killed Ernest Lacy, “using the abundant evidence already 
before him.” In order to determine the legitimacy of pursuing criminal indictments, McCann 
ordered Milwaukee County Medical Examiner Chesley Erwin to conduct an inquest.135 Such 
hearings were not civil or criminal trials, but rather juridical investigative proceedings used to 
determine whether filing criminal charges was necessary or not.136 The CJEL opposed McCann’s call 
for an inquest, citing eyewitness testimony as more than sufficient to file criminal charges. As of July 
17, 1981, Examiner Erwin was still determining a cause of death. The DA authorized an inquest 
start date in mid-August, anticipating “in excess of thirty witnesses” to testify before a six-person 
jury selected by Milwaukee County Sheriff William Klamm. That same week, Milwaukee state 
 
133 The committee called for fairer, more comprehensive complaint review procedures; implementation of community-
oriented policing and citizen involvement in crime prevention; achieving a more diverse rank-and-file; establishing a 
public relations unit to communicate with community groups; raising the educational standards of new police recruits; 
engaging in psychological screenings, evaluations, and counseling for all officers; and expanding human relations training 
in the academy. The SAMC called for the integration of the Tactical Enforcement Unit and for the promotion of “five 
or more minority officers with five or more years of experience” to “command positions.” The SAMC’s final 
recommendation called for an amendment to state law that would create “a Milwaukee-only office of public safety 
director.” Mayor Maier to MFPC Chairperson Arlene Kennedy, June 14, 1982, 6-8. 
134 Scott Anderson, “Inquest Process ‘Hopelessly Flawed,’ Justice Means Prosecution: Coalition,” The Milwaukee Courier, 
August 22, 1981, 1. 
135 McCann ordered the inquest on July 17, 1981.  “McCann Orders Inquest into Cause of Lacy's Death,” The Milwaukee 
Sentinel, July 18, 1981, Part 1, 1. 
136 Gregory D. Stanford, “Court Drama Seeks Truth in Lacy Case,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 20, 1981, part 2, 1. 
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legislators called for a “full investigation” into Lacy’s death.  
  The Lacy Coalition, unwilling to sit idle while the Erwin and McCann deliberated, hit the 
streets demanding that officials move faster. They organized three demonstrations in the period 
leading up to the inquest. The first march and rally took place on July 20, 1981. One news report 
characterized the crowd as “bitter, but orderly.” Demonstrators focused on the filing of criminal 
charges against Officers Eliopul, Dekker, and Kalt and for the MFPC to swiftly administer lasting 
discipline. About four thousand protesters moved at mid-day from the scene of Lacy’s murder on 
N. 23rd St. and Wisconsin Ave. to Milwaukee’s Civic Center Plaza.137 Myrtle Lacy, conversely, 
counted upwards of five thousand people “walking with power and strength.”138 “We are the 
aggrieved family, but we’re looking for justice—and we will get justice,” she told the crowd. As 
people marched, they chanted the names Daniel Bell and Clifford McKissick—two young Black 
men shot and killed by Milwaukee police.139 Roll calling the names of the deceased in this way 
represented a potent political act, as it re-inscribed their humanity into a contested public space 
devoid of any memorialization to police brutality victims. At the downtown plaza, Rev. R. L. Lathan, 
Alderman Roy Nabors, State Representative Annette Polly Williams, and Howard Fuller also 
addressed rally goers.140 The MPD was prepared for civil unrest. More than one hundred officers, 
most adorned in riot gear and wielding batons, enveloped the non-violent demonstrators. Chief 
Breier made himself visible throughout the protest. Organizers viewed his presence as “an act of 
provocation to incite trouble.”141 Demonstrators chanted in the chief’s direction, “Fire Breier, he’s a 
 
137 Civic Center Plaza was located in front of the Milwaukee Public Safety Building, also the MPD’s District One 
headquarters. Chester Sheard, “Bitter, Orderly Marchers Denounce Police,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 21, 1981, Part 1, 
1. 
138 Chester Sheard, “Bitter, Orderly Marchers Denounce Police,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 21, 1981, Part 1, 1. 
139 Bell, as described above, was murdered by police in 1958. College student Clifford McKissick was killed on August 2, 
1967 amid Milwaukee’s civil disturbance. Karen Rothe, “Chanting Crowd Recalls 3 Deaths,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 
21, 1981, Part 1, 5. 
140 “Rally,” The Milwaukee Courier, July 18, 1981, 8. 
141 Anderson, “Community,” 1. 
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liar” and “Hell no. We ain’t taking it no more.” When Fuller spoke, he called on the federal Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to withhold funds from the city, which were to be 
allocated for a “police-community relations program” that would have police lecturing citizens at 
shopping centers and community association meetings. This was “hypocritical,” he said, “when the 
police are out killing our people.”142 After the rally ended, the coalition registered its own complaint 
with the Fire and Police Commission, alleging that Breier “deliberately tried to provoke an incident” 
when he marched into a peaceful crowd of demonstrators.143 McGee and Fuller filed it as a First 
Amendment violation and act of discrimination “against members of the Black community,” 
demanding an investigation and the chief’s suspension or resignation.  
 With little movement on the case, the CJEL held a second protest march and rally, this time 
in the evening. The demonstration attracted an estimated 5,000 participants, the largest of the 
group’s protests.144 Demonstrators again rallied in Civic Center Plaza, in front of the Milwaukee 
Safety Building. Most participants were young Black contemporaries of Lacy, with white and Black 
middle-aged faces also dotting the crowd.145 Protesters jeered at Breier, who strode alongside the 
marchers with a “stoney expression,” guarded by plainclothes officers.146 Twice the number of police 
were on hand, with a “phalanx” of at least one hundred officers wearing helmets and carrying 
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146 Bruce Gill, “Silent Breier Watches Lacy Demonstrators,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, July 31, 1981, Part 1, 5. 
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batons. Some rode on motorcycles, others in squad cars and vans.147 The CJEL’s own cadre of field 
marshals—members of ABATE, a motorcycle rights organization—helped ensure an orderly 
demonstration.148 Rally-goers carried signs that read, “Lacy: Innocent & Dead”; “Justice for Ernest 
Lacy”; and “Prosecute the Officers.” Chants of “Fire Breier. He’s a liar” and “No more killing” 
could be heard.149 Eleven people spoke at the rally this time. Most of them called for the prosecution 
of Eliopul, Dekker, and Kalt.150 Some condemned the media and MPD for false portrayals of Lacy 
as a mentally ill drug addict. As Ernest’s father, Leonardo Lacy, told reporters, the police were “only 
trying to cover up [Ernest’s] death. My son had no record. He was not a drug addict…He was a 
straight young man. The police killed him because a white woman said she was raped.”151 
  While the CJEL’s marches and rallies reflected the community’s clear outrage and desire for 
justice, it knew that additional protest actions would be necessary if city leaders were to take their 
voices seriously. Official responses, thus far, had failed to bring lasting disciplinary action or criminal 
charges against Lacy’s killers. Therefore, the coalition broadened its target audience beyond police 
bureaucrats, elected officials, and the courts and focused on the city’s business interests. To do so, it 
turned to another “traditional tactic of the Civil Rights Movement”: organizing “an active economic 
boycott of downtown merchants.”152 Boycotts represented a confrontational civil rights strategy that 
relied on aggrieved citizens pressuring reluctant civic leaders to take action based on a shared value 
as consumers.153 Black residents comprised a major portion of Milwaukee’s retail customer base. 
 
147 At least sixty cops were also ready when the march convened at Civic Center Plaza. “Thousands March, Rally for 
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152 “For Immediate Release,” Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy, August 4, 1981, Box 19, Folder 2, “Lacy, Ernest 
1981,” National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Milwaukee Branch. 
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Downtown outlets were the “symbol of a revitalized Milwaukee.” Ending “business as usual,” by 
attracting patrons to the coalition’s “picket lines,” would theoretically lessen retail profits and 
threaten the economic security of the city’s latest development: The Grand Avenue Mall.154 Gimbels 
and the surrounding shops on Wisconsin Ave., such as Boston Store, were integral to Mayor Maier 
and the business community’s “redeveloping downtown” project.155 What is more, national 
corporations, with markets in New York, Philadelphia, and other northeastern cities, owned both 
Gimbels and Boston Store. This carried the potential of a broader ripple effect and added 
publicity.156  
  The CJEL held its first economic boycott on August 8, 1981.157 A picket ran along 
Wisconsin Ave., from the Milwaukee River west to N. 5th St. Protesters carried signs, wore 
provocative t-shirts, and passed out leaflets. One of  their goals was to compel business elites to 
publicly support an outside investigation of  the Lacy incident.158 As Michael McGee put it, 
Milwaukee’s commercial interests were “the real power brokers in this town.”159 Unfortunately for 
the coalition, the action received a cool reception from shoppers and business leaders. Grand 
Avenue Mall developer Mathias DeVito saw “no connection” between his glossy new shopping 
center—what he called an “economic boon” to “groups plagued with high rates of  joblessness”—
and “the regrettable Lacy case.”160 Consequently, the coalition lost some editorial support in 
Milwaukee’s mainstream dailies, who condemned the boycott as harmful to innocent bystanders. The 
CJEL had “somehow perceived” the downtown business community as an extension of  “a largely 
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white police department,” according to The Milwaukee Sentinel editorial board.161 The coalition, by this 
logic, lost focus of  remediating a tragic instance of  police misconduct. Instead, it was framing police 
violence as entwined with issues of  race and class, violating implicit principles of  Milwaukee’s liberal 
capitalist order. CJEL boycotts presumably turned off  white residents, who had grown tired of  
Sixties-style protests and Black accusations of  racial prejudice. 
  On August 15, 1981, the CJEL’s third march and rally cut through Milwaukee’s north and 
near west side. It followed a new route: N. 4th and Chambers St. to N. 15th and Vliet St. Around eight 
hundred marched, with another couple hundred people waiting at Martin Luther King, Jr. Park to 
rally.162 Chief  Breier and his police officers, again, made their presence felt. At one point the chief  
stepped out of  his unmarked vehicle and walked directly into a crowd of  protestors, surrounded by 
six uniformed officers. Demonstrators “swirled” around him, chanting, “Fire Breier, he’s a liar!”163 
Michael McGee reasoned the chief  was trying to intimidate and provoke a violent response from the 
crowd. “Breier is not crazy…He knows exactly what he’s doing. He is an old, senile, dangerous man, 
and we have to understand that,” Howard Fuller said. Latinx activist Tony Baez called police 
brutality “a national menace.”164 James Groppi also spoke at the rally. The widely known activist 
once again decried police brutality, only now as it related to Ernest Lacy’s violated civil rights.165 
 Meanwhile, the Medical Examiner’s inquest hearing—initially scheduled for August 18, 
1981—was derailed another month. Warren Hill, a deputy examiner, had publicly commented that 
there was not enough evidence to justify criminal charges against the officers. Hill’s apparent 
prejudging of  the case angered CJEL leaders and the Lacy family, who lobbed charges of  a 
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“whitewashing” at county officials.166 They called for further protests and for Hill’s dismissal. 
Chesley Erwin asked retired liberal Appeals Court Judge Robert C. Cannon to preside over the 
inquest as a special medical examiner.167 The CJEL demanded Black representation on the jury, 
which they received in equal number after Cannon verified that Black inquest jurors could be 
deliberately placed without violating state law.168 The hearing began on September 14, 1981, lasted 
about a month, and was broadcast live on local television.169 Leading off  the inquest, Medical 
Examiner Erwin reiterated his belief  that Lacy died from a lack of  oxygen. Yet he found no signs of  
“excessive force.” It was unclear, he said, what precisely “keyed off ” his death.170 Witness Fred 
Kolde had an answer. He testified to standing ten feet from Lacy and the officers, where he saw the 
22-year-old forcibly tackled by police to the ground. While pinned down, his body convulsed until 
he stopped moving. The arresting officers swore Lacy was alive, if  unconscious when placed in the 
police van and that he did not require medical attention.171 In testimony, they framed their arrestee as 
a drug-crazed criminal with superhuman force.172 One officer, for example, testified that their 
combined weight of  over 600 pounds was not enough to subdue the 145-pound Lacy.173 According 
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to Officer George Kalt, people who “are either high on drugs or mentally disturbed…sometimes 
possess an inordinate amount of  strength.”174 Regardless of  the officers trafficking in racist, 
dehumanizing tropes, Lacy was not on drugs and had received no psychiatric treatment. 
  After listening to more than one hundred people testify for over three weeks, the medical 
examiner’s inquest jury stunned the city when, on October 17, 1981, it recommended “homicide by 
reckless conduct” charges be filed against Officers Eliopul, Dekker, and Kalt for using “unlawful 
means” to subdue Lacy.175 It was the first time in Milwaukee’s history an inquest jury had ever 
recommended prosecuting city police.176 Since 1967, six inquests involving the deaths of  Black men 
or women at the hands of  Milwaukee police had failed to result in criminal charges.177 The jury also 
recommended lesser misconduct charges be filed against the two officers who drove the police van 
for “failure to render first aid” and “inform medical persons of  Lacy’s condition upon request.”178 
Perhaps the most damning testimony came from pathologists, like Robert W. Huntington III, who 
argued Lacy died because of  “the physical application of  force” combined with a nerve reflex in his 
neck.179 The inquest affirmed that Lacy had died three to five minutes after Eliopul applied pressure 
to his upper back, interrupting the flow of  oxygen to his brain.180 Referring to the inquest jury’s 
decision to recommend charges, Myrtle Lacy told reporters, “I feel like screaming. Every day…I 
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prayed it would happen.”181 Chief  Breier, on the other hand, called the inquest jury’s decision “a 
terrible miscarriage of  justice” that would “handcuff  the police even more” and hurt morale. MPA 
President Robert Kliesmet called it “a perversion of  the system,” the officers were “grossly 
mischarged.”182 He later appealed the ruling on behalf  of  the five officers. Both Kliesmet and Breier 
accused DA McCann of  “going out of  his way to attack police.183 Local conservatives in a John 
Birch Society-sponsored group, Support Your Local Police, claimed a trial against the officers would 
only result in Black people rioting “for the fun of  it.”184 On October 16, 1981, Judge Cannon signed 
the arrest warrants.185 
  And yet, any elation the CJEL, Lacy family, and sympathetic residents felt dissipated when, 
during the 1981 holiday season, DA McCann requested that the Circuit Court dismiss the homicide 
and misconduct charges. Right when progress on the officers’ prosecution felt within reach, Judge 
Joseph Callen voided the inquest jury’s historic decision, withdrawing the arrest warrants. The 
District Attorney essentially used the logic of  “reverse racism” to argue that Special Examiner 
Cannon had chosen an inquest jury “partially by race.” Doing so, McCann said, violated the 
constitutional rights of  the officers.186 The DA’s late-breaking decision to ask the court for a 
dismissal was, in part, based on his mistaken belief  that the inquest jury’s recommendations would 
be “advisory” and not “mandatory.”187 DA McCann then promised a devastated, if  still determined 
Lacy family that he would file new criminal charges against Officers Eliopul and Kalt, which he did 
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on January 12, 1982.188 Myrtle Lacy signed a fresh complaint and the police arrested both officers 
the next day.189 A special prosecutor separately charged and arrested Dekker on a “misconduct in 
public office” charge, but not “reckless homicide” as recommended by the inquest jury. The 
misconduct charges stemmed from the officers not providing lifesaving aid to Lacy. This victory, 
too, was short-lived. Judge Callen again dismissed the pending charges against Officers Kalt and 
Eliopul on January 30, 1982.190 This time, the Circuit Court cited a lack of  probable cause. The 
criminal-legal system sent the Lacy’s hopes for prosecution into a second free fall. Irate but not 
discouraged, the CJEL held an “around the clock” sit-in in McCann’s Milwaukee Safety Building 
office.191 They demanded he again file criminal charges against Officer Eliopul, whose case, the DA 
said, would require federal prosecution.192 Despite McCann’s promise to the Lacy family, the officer 
most directly responsible for Ernest Lacy’s death would not be charged again for “homicide by 
reckless conduct.”193 The District Attorney did issue a second “misconduct in public office” charge 
against Kalt.194 It too was dismissed.195 Myrtle Lacy persisted nonetheless: “In my mind, what 
happened is negligent homicide…some charges have to be filed.”196 
 
Police Deaths and the “Blue Flu” 
  With the inquest hearing in the rear view, and the officers who killed Ernest Lacy escaping 
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prosecution, the widespread support enjoyed by Black-led police accountability advocates appeared 
to decline in winter 1981-1982. In December, a 19-year-old Black male, Robert Lee Collins, tragically 
gunned down two young police officers, Charles Mehlberg (25) and John Machajewski (24).197 
Invoking the racialized circumstances of  Lacy’s death, Aldermen Roy Nabors suggested that Collins 
likely feared for his life when confronted by the police and shot in self-defense. The alderman—long 
an ally in the policing struggle—was already in the MPD’s cross-hairs for recently proposing a city 
ordinance that would have placed the police chief  under the mayor and city council’s control. 
“Milwaukee can ill afford to hide behind the laws of  1911 and dodge moral and political 
responsibility for its police department,” he stated at a Common Council meeting.198 “Irresponsible 
actions” and “procedures,” including “Red Squad” spying and unwarranted surveillance needed 
reining in. Breier responded to the alderman’s comments, saying it was “unthinkable that an 
alderman would defend a criminal who has just killed two police officers…that shouldn’t happen in 
this law-and-order city.”199 
  Nabors’ comments about the late officers incensed the Milwaukee Police Association. The 
rank-and-file responded by walking off  the job for a sixteen hour “blue flu” strike that ended on 
Christmas Eve.200 Many Black officers chose not to participate.201 Invoking the Lacy killing, 
MNAACP President Christine Belnavis called the strike politically motivated— “a political act 
 
197 Collins was reportedly a robbery suspect. He said he shot the first officer accidentally during a struggle, then the 
second when it appeared he was about to fire his service weapon at him. Catherine Meister, “Shot Accidental, Suspect 
Says,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, December 24, 1981, Part 1, 1. 
198 The proposed ordinance would have repealed the city charter’s language relating to the chief’s control over the 
department and adopted a section of state law that said Milwaukee police chiefs are to command the police force “under 
the direction of the mayor.” “Nabors Proposal Would Tighten Aldermanic Grip on Police,” The Milwaukee Courier, 
December 12, 1981, 3. 
199 “Breier Criticizes Nabors’ Remarks,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 24, 1981, Part 1, 4. 
200 Strikes by public employees in Wisconsin were illegal at the time. City hall filed a temporary restraining order to get a 
court hearing, where the strike would be declared illegal and the officers forced to return to work. Police supervisors and 
about 100 Milwaukee County Sheriff deputies stepped in to patrol the city. Chief Breier said he was “prepared to man 
the streets” himself if he had to. “Police Agree to End Walkout,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 24, 1981, Part 1, 1; 
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designed to win immunity from punishment for police officers who break the law.”202 Belnavis and 
Howard Fuller said the “fear” Nabors’ comments referenced was real in the Black community. 
Regardless, the MPA flexed its mounting political power, proffering twelve demands. They included 
a “comprehensive police-community relations program” and “a public relations program to improve 
the image of  the police.”203 The MPA’s two most immediate calls, necessary for ending the illegal 
strike, were for a ban on issuing reprisals against striking officers and that City Hall disavow Nabors’ 
statement. The alderman apologized, saying he was taken out of  context. But making the statement 
was his constitutional right. Chief  Breier was critical of  the MPA’s “blue flu,” arguing that the 
officers’ “credibility with the citizens will certainly diminish. The good citizens are suffering.” MPA 
leaders were critical of  both Nabors and Breier.204 The MPA always had a tempestuous relationship 
with the chief. Upon his retirement, union president Robert Kliesmet called Breier “a racist” who 
“emulates the community he serves.”205 The union also criticized DA McCann, who Kliesmet said 
was “piling straw on the camel’s back for the last six months.”206 He was referencing the “overly 
aggressive” criminal charges pending against the officers who arrested Ernest Lacy. 
 
1982 Boycotts and the Class Question in Milwaukee’s Police Accountability Movement 
 The CJEL renewed its direct action protests as the drama surrounding District Attorney 
McCann and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court unfolded. Judge Janine Geske delayed the legal 
process once again, citing uncertainty around whether Officers Kalt and Dekker’s “misconduct in 
public office charges” were constitutional according to state law.207 The CJEL planned a retail 
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boycott in response to the delay. Throughout the spring of  1982, the coalition protested outside of  
Milwaukee’s downtown Gimbels and Boston Stores, as well as the Capital Court Shopping Center on 
the city’s northwest side. These retail boycotts, to some extent, reflected a last ditch effort. As 
Howard Fuller warned, “This is the only non-violent thing left…since we have no intention of  
calling for a violent solution, we’ll go to the maximum on non-violent tactics.”208 That meant drifting 
into questions of  race and economics. The coalition wagered that retailers, pressured by angry 
consumers and diminishing profits, would pressure City Hall and the MFPC to take action in 
disciplining the officers who killed Lacy. In addition to the support he drew from labor unions, real 
estate developers, and city contractors, Mayor Maier had close ties to local business magnates, like 
Harold Sampson and Ben Marcus. Their commercial enterprises extended into Milwaukee’s suburbs 
and surrounding states.209 The coalition hoped the boycotts would generate enough of  a backlash 
that Maier would have to honor his corporate allies’ demands for assuaging dissatisfied consumers. 
 Similar to the previous year’s actions, the 1982 boycotts garnered mixed results for the Lacy 
movement. Some businesses indirectly retaliated. For example, several Capitol Court retailers united 
in refusing to comment on sales information to the press. This undercut the CJEL’s goal of  
publicizing the boycott’s effectiveness. More directly, the shopping center barred demonstrators 
from carrying signs or distributing leaflets with political slogans. In response, the CJEL donned T-
shirts with messages asking patrons to join the protest. Downtown, Michael McGee reported that 
the coalition’s boycotting of  Gimbals and Boston Store had slowed business.210 Ultimately, the 
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boycotts failed to produce substantive justice for the Lacy family as intended. Dismayed by the racial 
implications raised by the CJEL, which was now obstructing their relationship to the marketplace, 
business leaders and retail consumers alike balked at offering tangible support. While the coalition 
engaged in a months-long action that, in a narrow sense, disrupted the retail shopping cycle, they 
struggled to persuade the Circuit Court not to dismiss the misconduct charges pending against 
Officers Dekker and Kalt. The coalition decided not to prolong its boycott “with no clear negotiable 
point” for victory or to force residents “to lose good shopping access.”211 
 The practical effects of  the CJEL’s boycott was one question, but what those actions meant 
for the umbrella organization as a grassroots political collective was another. More specifically, they 
touched on important questions about race and class as they relate to police violence and social 
control via law enforcement. The boycott ultimately revealed limitations as to what the wider society 
deemed an acceptable protest politics. A majority white public remained either unwilling or unable 
to connect larger issues of  racial capitalism to Ernest Lacy’s death.212 Milwaukee’s, and by extension 
America’s, white supremacist capitalist system has and continues to prioritize corporate profits and 
consumer access to the marketplace ahead of  accounting for the (presumed) disposability of  Black 
lives. Racism has always been essential to maintaining that system, and organized law enforcement 
has long served as its primary enforcement mechanism, dating back to the 1830s.213 That Lacy was 
Black and poor, i.e. disposable in the eyes of  the above order, matters contextually in terms of  the 
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public discourse, political deliberations, and criminal-legal processes surrounding his death. 
However, the boycott and the coalition’s implicit invoking of  the role that class plays in racialized 
police violence, subtly revealed latent ideological divisions within the CJEL. To be clear, the 
coalition, throughout its existence, remained squarely focused on the goal of  achieving justice for 
the Lacy family. At the same time, however, its members expressed varied opinions about the case 
and its relationship to society writ large that are worth exploring. They help explain the persistence 
of  racialized police violence, as well as the elusive nature of  police accountability for Milwaukee’s 
Black-led movement going forward. 
 Michael McGee and Howard Fuller’s primary focus—beyond securing compensatory justice 
for the Lacy family and the criminal prosecution of  the officers—was building Black political power 
and economic self-sufficiency. Each CJEL leader had formal political aspirations, too, which they 
partially realized based on the images they cultivated while shepherding the Lacy movement and 
other grassroots political campaigns. McGee and Fuller seemed less interested in building cross-
racial working-class solidarity with a set goal of  restructuring the city’s police bureaucracy so that it 
stopped serving exploitative racial capitalist ends. Fuller had drifted from the radical Marxist politics 
that once typified his Black Power organizing, and McGee had always framed his pro-Black 
arguments for community control of  the police in race-conscious terms that fit within the broader 
parameters of  an existing law enforcement paradigm. McGee was not, what scholars people refer to 
today as, an “abolitionist,” at least based on his public commentary. Both Fuller and McGee’s larger 
political objectives dealt with preserving and serving Black life, through more equitable police 
protection and criminal-legal processes and a more racially democratic municipal system overall. 
They saw law enforcement as a legitimate concept in its own right, but rejected the MPD’s racist 
leadership and structure.214 Through community organizing and the budding potential of  Black 
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electoral power, it became more possible for activists like Fuller and McGee to realize procedural 
and substantive justice, to advance community control of  the police and other municipal institutions, 
and to hire more Black police personnel. These were, for the better part of  this history, the key 
reform elements for Black and allied police accountability advocates seeking to transform an unjust 
and racist policing system. 
 And yet, this framework of  accountability, justice, and reform bypassed some inherent truths 
about the U.S. policing mission that merit further analysis—namely that its fundamental purpose was 
upholding white middle-class and corporate elite interests. While the CJEL was unified in its core 
objective, the group’s size and ideological diversity ensured the presence of  divergent understandings 
of  the policing crisis. Some individuals, for instance, made explicit linkages between racialized police 
violence, or “terror,” and the unaccounted for economic injustices that pervaded Milwaukee’s 
terrain. Such injustices—racialized and entrenched as they were—ran contrary to prevailing national 
myths of  meritocratic individualism and the perfectibility of  the U.S. capitalist system. Joan 
McManus, Director of  the Mid-Town Neighborhood Association, offered the most succinct 
example. As she addressed rally goers in July 1982, “Ernie Lacy’s unjustifiable death is a terrible 
symbol of  the blatant refusal of  America’s political and economic system to provide what we all 
grew up believing was ours: ‘Liberty and justice for all.’” She continued: 
What the people who taught us that…are most afraid of  is that sooner or later we 
will see through all those fine words about the American Dream, about the classless 
society where all of  us are equal. And that’s exactly what’s happening now…And the 
truth we’re seeing is that they’ve been running a game on us for better than 200 
years. It’s a game that talks a good line about justice and equality, about a democracy 
where anyone can make it, but somehow only a few ever do…it’s a game that 
encourages the few of  us who do manage to “make it” to think we did because 
somehow we’re different…The whole point of  the game is to keep us divided 
against each other…from acting together, in our collective self-interest…It’s a game 
that tries to keep us in line when we start [protesting] like we’re doing now—by 
telling us to calm down, back off, be reasonable, and give the system a chance to 
 
was not new in Milwaukee, as this dissertation attests. 
 440 
work…And above all it’s a game where the ultimate weapon is the constant threat—
and the periodic use of—police terror.215 
 
 Indeed, for McManus, Milwaukee’s policing system relied on racial and class repression 
operating in tandem. Economic inequality was a fault line that divided metropolitan residents, white, 
Black, and Brown. It was evident during the boycotts and also reflected in deteriorating economic 
conditions for poor and working-class people in the early 1980s. “As the economy gets worse and 
worse, the ‘problem’ will affect more and more of  us every day.” McManus ended her speech by 
affirming the class implications of  Lacy’s death and the victims of  police terror who came before. 
Their deaths symbolized “the injustice and the inhumanity of  [the capitalist] system’s game.” Police 
brutality stemmed from a white-controlled power structure that relegated Milwaukee’s working poor 
to hyper-segregated, under-resourced neighborhoods. The central city not only lacked the jobs and 
investment people needed to survive, but was becoming a breeding ground for Milwaukee’s nascent, 
highly racialized carceral regime. Wisconsin’s developing system of  mass incarceration was lubricated 
by aggressive police contacts with poor and working-class citizens of  color. Sometimes, as was the 
case for Ernest Lacy, these encounters resulted in death.  
 The CJEL was focused on “Lacy’s death, the implicated officers, and showing massive public 
support around that.”216 McManus herself  deemed it “tactically unwise” to expand the coalition’s 
demands or scope of  its moral argument beyond that goal. She believed the time would come for 
addressing the larger socio-political and economic ills that disproportionately affected Black and 
Brown residents, as soon as the courts resolved the “immediate issue of  [the officers’] prosecution.” 
However, one of  McManus’ critiques of  the CJEL was that its leaders, though “strong,” allowed the 
issue of  police brutality to be framed as “a black one” alone.217 “It is to the advantage of  a capitalist 
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system to allow and encourage the misperception that police brutality is an issue of  discrimination 
rather than a class issue,” she wrote. McManus regretted that the coalition had not built multiracial 
working-class solidarity around the issue of  police violence, particularly following the October 1981 
beating of  James Schoemperlen—a white male severely brutalized by police after being arrested for 
an alleged indecent exposure incident and high speed chase on the south side.218 She also noted that 
the coalition could have better leveraged traditional “splits” between the MPA and other “labor 
councils,” or even between the fire and police unions. The relationship between “police repression” 
and the “crisis of  capitalism” undermined “real democratization” and “accountability of  police.” A 
“united,” “common analysis and direction” was sorely needed.219 In keeping “the accountability 
question muddy,” city officials deflected from the truism that “the current role of  the police is 
essential to the existence of  capitalism.” This was “not a local problem,” but “a national one,” 
“directly related to changes in economic conditions.” 
 McManus agreed with other CJEL members that Milwaukee’s policing crisis went beyond 
individual bad actors and a malignant chief  administrator. She articulated three “fundamental 
problems.” The MPD was “particularly brutal to minorities,” it was “not effective in preventing 
crime,” and it functioned in “a totally closed system.”220 However, for too long police accountability 
advocates had framed racialized police violence as “‘simply’ racism, rather than racism for a reason.” 
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They rendered arguments about brutal and inept officers and criticized the police chief  as “too old-
fashioned to use modern or community-based crime prevention methods.” But Breier’s “total 
control” was not at the root of  the problem, she argued. Ousting the chief  and integrating the 
Tactical Enforcement Unit would not resolve an essential flaw embedded in law enforcement’s 
mission: a design to suppress poor people, especially criminalized groups of  color. McManus 
believed that a grassroots approach was necessary that could move people “beyond the ideas that 
integration of  the department, better policy guidelines, a new chief ” would alter “the basic role of  
the police.” This was critical to “our work in the neighborhoods and in unions.”221 She was not alone 
in connecting police violence, racism, poor and working-class suppression, and the urgent need for 
cross-racial solidarity. The Communist Party of  Wisconsin, another coalition member, demanded 
multi-racial working-class unity to bring justice to police brutality victims and to defeat police 
policies “imbedded in racism.”222 “As economic conditions worsen—problems of  police brutality 
and harassment will increase,” Party Chairman Fred Blair wrote to Milwaukee officials. The MPD’s 
“repressive and brutal policies” extended to both white blue-collar workers and white-collar 
professionals, including Sugar Dee Tates—an adult dancer shot and killed by Milwaukee police after 
fleeing a road block in November 1981—and James Schoemperlen.223 “White people in our 
community place their own well-being in jeopardy,” Blair insisted, “when they remain silent in the 
face of  injustice to minorities.”224 Long-standing narratives about race, crime, and policing in 
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Milwaukee directly undermined cross-racial working-class solidarity and helped perpetuate racialized, 
unstable myths about crime and safety in the city.225  
The Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Hearing and Federal Civil Rights Lawsuit 
 About seven hundred people marched down Wisconsin Ave. to rally at Civic Center Plaza 
on July 10, 1982 to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Ernest Lacy’s death. Responding to 
the smaller turnout than previous demonstrations, organizers cited community frustration with the 
drawn out criminal-legal process in the case. By this point, the courts had dropped all criminal 
charges against the arresting officers. Michael McGee also noted the threat of police intimidation.226 
Once again, Chief Breier responded to protesters by making sure his presence and that of his riot-
ready department was felt. The demonstration’s theme was calling for the dismissal of the officers 
who arrested Ernest Lacy and failed to provide him medical attention. The MFPC had finally 
scheduled a hearing on Myrtle Lacy’s police misconduct complaint. “We are still, one year later, 
demanding justice,” Howard Fuller told the crowd.227 “Finally they’re doing something,” Myrtle Lacy 
observed.228 
 The MFPC hearing did not start for another month. MPA attorneys forced a delay through 
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the Circuit Court.229 When it began, the commission notified all five officers—Eliopul, Dekker, Kalt, 
Enters, and Kmichik—that they were being charged with failing to render first aid. The three 
arresting officers faced charges of using excessive force.230 The hearing was held in the police 
administration building—hardly neutral territory. Michael McGee cited an “intimidating” 
atmosphere.231 On the contrary, MPA officials complained about Commissioner William Gore 
barring off-duty officers from carrying their service weapons into the courtroom. Over the course of 
three months, the MFPC heard from attorneys, the accused officers, police co-workers, Lacy friends 
and family, and additional witnesses. As the hearing proceeded, State Representative Spencer Coggs 
(D-Milwaukee) worked to muster support for a bill in the Wisconsin legislature that would make it 
illegal for the police to use excessive force while making an arrest, or to allow other officers to abuse 
a person in custody.232 The measure also rendered it a criminal offense if police failed to administer 
first aid to persons in their custody who required medical attention. Coggs specifically introduced 
the bill in response to the Lacy killing and Schoemperlen beating. While the measure was tabled in 
April 1983 (56-41 vote), the freshman assemblyman successfully attached a compromise version that 
included only the first aid provision in the legislature’s budget bill.233 Democratic Governor Tony 
Earl signed it, making the “Lacy Law” official in July 1983.234 
 On May 20, 1983, the MFPC announced a verdict in its disciplinary hearing, finding only 
Thomas Eliopul guilty of using excessive force. All the commission ruled all five officers, however, 
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guilty of “failure to give aid.”235 Nearly another month went by before the MFPC provided 
disciplinary terms. Not firing the officers, Myrtle Lacy said at a final hearing, “would be the worst 
miscarriage of justice since Reconstruction.”236 If a touch hyperbolic, Lacy’s comment signified the 
depths of her family’s pain and the profound mistrust they felt towards a criminal-legal process that 
once began hopeful and had gradually devolved into a prolonged spectacle of injustice. MPA 
attorney Gerald Boyle countered Mrs. Lacy by arguing his clients did their jobs properly— “If you 
don’t want anarchy, you better have good police officers, and a good police department, which I 
think we have.”237 In the end, only Eliopul was terminated for “using excessive force”—a first for 
the city and MFPC on a complaint of racialized police violence. Myrtle Lacy called the decision “a 
measure of justice.”238 The other four officers received sixty day suspensions.239 The commission 
also removed Dekker and Kalt from the Tactical Enforcement Unit. The MPA, naturally, appealed 
the ruling to the Circuit Court, only to lose their case a year-and-a-half later in a final victory for the 
Lacy family. With the disciplinary process behind her, Myrtle Lacy filed a federal civil rights lawsuit 
against the City of Milwaukee, Chief Breier, and the five officers involved in her son’s death. The 
case was eventually settled for $600,000 in the fall of 1985, on the same day that jury selection in the 
federal trial was set to begin.240 It was the third major settlement City Hall made in resolving an 
alleged civil rights violation in an eighteen-month span, including a $1,600,000 payout to the family 
of Daniel Bell. The City Attorney’s office insisted the Lacy settlement did not indicate an admission 
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by second-guessing decisions made in the field in good faith under hazardous conditions,” the judge stated.” However, 
the public must be protected from those few officers who abuse their authority.” Dave Hendrickson, “Officers in Lacy 
Case Lose Appeal,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 2, 1985, Part 1, 1, 12. 
236 “Officers, Lacy Family Plead Cases,” The Milwaukee Journal, June 14, 1983, Part 2, 17. 
237 Ralph D. Olive, “Panel Ends Lacy Hearing,” The Milwaukee Journal, May 6, 1983, Part 2, 6. 
238 Kenneth R. Lamke, “1 Officer in Lacy Case is Fired; Four Suspended,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, June 17, 1983, Part 1, 
1. 
239 Kenneth R. Lamke, “1 Officer in Lacy Case is Fired; Four Suspended,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, June 17, 1983, Part 1, 
1. 
240 The Lacy family’s attorneys received $150,000 of the settlement. Walter Fee and Mark Ward, “Lacy Suit Settled for 
$600,000,” The Milwaukee Journal, September 30, 1985, Part 1, 1. 
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of guilt. It was merely a less expensive means of ending “an emotional case.”241 
 
The “Breier Bill” and the End of Reactionary Law-and-Order in Milwaukee 
  The Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy’s efforts to garner police accountability occurred at 
the tail end of a roughly ten-year process of recalibrating the administrative terms of police power in 
Milwaukee. Citizens, the courts, federal agencies, state and municipal legislatures all contributed to a 
complex process of shifting law enforcement power from the police chief to the MFPC and elected 
officials. In 1984, this transition manifested in Senate Bill 56 (SB56), or what local newspapers 
dubbed, the “Breier Bill.” SB56 was a revision to the 1911 policing statute that bestowed politically 
independent, lifetime authority on Milwaukee police chiefs.242 Since 1964, at the outset of his tenure, 
Harold Breier relished in having the power to write, revise, and interpret all police rules and 
regulations for the MPD.243 SB56 ensured that those powers and privileges belonged to the MFPC.  
  An overarching purpose of this dissertation has been to explain the wider trajectory of this 
shift in police authority, highlighting the central role that Black citizens, community activists, and 
civil rights organizations have played in bringing it to pass. The CJEL’s campaign for police 
accountability—combined with a reopened Bell case and the legal activism of Black police 
officers—added to a chain of events that ended what had long been the core element of 
Milwaukee’s narrative of policing exceptionalism: the seemingly untouchable state power invested in 
police administrators. This confluence of forces, which sprang from the people, not only compelled 
Chief Breier to retire in 1984 at the age of seventy-two, but established a new playing field for police 
accountability advocates eager to guarantee a more racially just and humane policing system.244 
 
241 “Lacy Suit Settled for $600,000.” 
242 Paul Bargren, “Breier Bill: Control or Chaos,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 22, 1984, Part 2, 1. 
243 He also had state-sanctioned freedom from external political oversight and interventions, which he leveraged 
constantly. 
244 Jo Hansen, “Chief to End 44-Year Career,” The Milwaukee Journal, May 1, 1984, Part 1, 1. 
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  The first noticeable chinks in Harold Breier’s armor appeared in 1977, when, at a public 
hearing, State representative Edward McClain (Wausau-D) requested a copy of the MPD’s “General 
Rules and Regulations.”245 Breier declined to provide the manual. Two circuit court judges 
subsequently ruled it was a “public record” and admissible for review. Legislators then passed a bill 
authorizing the MFPC to annually inspect all police rules and regulations. While Breier remained 
empowered to write and implement rules, the commission could now apply a “civilian review of 
police conduct and efficiency.”246 Around this time, Milwaukee state representatives Warren Braun 
and Marcia Coggs authored separate measures that limited the terms of police and fire chiefs to ten 
years or less, with the Common Council authorized to set tenure limits.247 A compromise version of 
the bills passed and the Milwaukee Common Council decided on seven-year terms for police and 
fire chiefs, with expiration dates in off-election years.248 However, the new law featured an important 
caveat: the current chiefs’ tenures would remain indefinite.249  
  Liberal police bureaucrats and the press sensed a new era of accountability. After the bill 
passed, a headline in The Milwaukee Courier read: “FPC Finally on Side of Citizens.”250 The MFPC’s 
only Black member, William Gore, called the 1977 law “long overdue.” The commission, under 
Gore’s leadership, began flexing its state-sanctioned powers. It formed a Rules and Complaints 
Committee. For the first time ever, the MFPC suspended hundreds of police regulations.251 
 
245 This particular set of rules originated in 1950 and were last updated in 1968. Daniel P. Hanley, Jr., “Legislature, 
Courts Teamed to Make Rules Public,” The Milwaukee Journal, November 6, 1977, Part 2, 1. 
246 “FPC Finally on Side of Citizens,” The Milwaukee Courier, November 4, 1978, 4. 
247 “Chief’s Tenure Bill Advances,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 30, 1977, Part 2, 1. 
248 “New Chiefs on Good Terms,” The Milwaukee Journal, December 31, 1977, Part 1, 8. 
249 Breier remained politically powerful. Reaching a deal on the legislation meant leaving his personal length of tenure 
untouched. Lawmakers expected him to retire soon, regardless. Other state proposals in the late 1970s called for the 
MFPC to review and, as needed, change police rules. Milwaukee Democrats, like Mordecai Lee, hoped this would 
“increase accountability and responsiveness.” Damien Jaques, “Breier, Braun Take Flack,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 
1, 1977, Part 2, 3. 
250 “FPC Finally on Side of Citizens,” The Milwaukee Courier, November 4, 1978, 4. 
251 A surprisingly controversial change made by the MFPC was allowing off-duty police the option to leave their service 
weapons at home when they drank in bars, so as to prevent violent incidents. It was previously required that all off duty 
police carry their service weapons at all times. “Ban on Off-Duty Police Guns While Drinking Sought,” The Milwaukee 
Courier, August 9, 1980, 1; David M. Novick, “Breier’s Iron Fist Opened Slightly,” The Milwaukee Courier, September 30, 
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Chairman Gore specifically looked to address the MPD’s use of deadly force regulations (or lack 
thereof). Police rules, many believed, granted police officers too much discretion. The commission 
wanted to establish a mechanism for conducting external audits of Special Assignment Squad 
dossiers. Doing so, Commissioner Gore added, would “keep people from having their rights 
violated by the police.”252 Civil rights activists then sued the MPD to release secret dossiers on their 
actions.253 Two Black aldermen voiced their opposition to funding “all-white” Tactical and Special 
Assignment Squads and called for a public budget hearing.254 The MFPC also addressed Breier’s 
strict internal regulations. For example, they reinstated a mixed-race police couple he had fired for 
violating a policy on unmarried “cohabitation.” Gore was careful not to make it appear as if the 
MFPC wanted to take over all police operations. Their objective was to “write rules where there is a 
void, where we suspended something and the police chief doesn’t come up with a new rule. That’s 
more limited than writing whatever we want to.”255 Nevertheless, sorting out police power remained 
complicated, as Chief Breier refused to recognize the MFPC’s new rule-making authority. 
  Grassroots efforts to revise police rule-making and oversight converged with related 
campaigns to remove Breier from office. A number of member organizations in the CJEL spent the 
better part of the 1970s trying to implement community control of the police, pushing for state 
legislation that would redefine the terms of police power, and attempting to “oust” Breier from his 
elevated perch. Black and allied accountability advocates began a petition to remove him from office 
in November 1979.256 Their goal was to reach 50,000 signatures by the 1980 primary election.257 
 
1978, 1. 
252 The MPD was charging residents $3.50 to view heavily redacted versions of their Red Squad files. Scott Anderson, 
“FPC Committee May Seek Deadly Force Rule Change,” The Milwaukee Courier, August 23, 1980, 1, 12. 
253 “Brier [sic] Sued for Political Dossiers,” The Milwaukee Courier, January 20, 1979, 1. 
254 The Black city councilors called for a public budget hearing to discuss police funding. David M. Novick, 
“Commission Clips Breier’s Wings,” The Milwaukee Courier, September 30, 1978, 4. 
255 “Commission Likely to Get Rule-making Power,” August 1, 1979, Box 140, Folder 11, “Police Department, October-
December, 1979,” Records of Mayor Henry W. Maier Administration. 
256 “Anti-Breier Petition Seeks New Police Standards,” The Milwaukee Courier, December 15, 1979, 1, 12. 
257 In two weeks, it gathered more than 5,000 signatures. The Coalition to Oust Chief Breier eventually garnered more 
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Activists were prepared to sue if city officials balked at the petition. The ad hoc Committee for 
Democratic Police said it would use the petition to spell-out a revised strategy for hiring a 
replacement chief. The petition called for an end to Detective Bureau and Special Assignment Squad 
spying on activists; compliance with MFPC review protocols; cooperation with the Common 
Council on budget review processes; an immediate end to police targeting of racial minorities; and 
an expanded affirmative action policy for police hiring. The UBCC’s Michael McGee argued that 
Breier engaged in “malfeasance of office” when he refused to cooperate with the DOJ’s 1979 
investigation into police shooting deaths. “It is not only the minority community that is oppressed,” 
he stated, “but a wide cross section of the community is upset.”258  
  The MPD, on the other hand, framed the petition as a direct threat to Breier.259 The chief 
had officers investigate the petition campaign. But the support Breier had long received, almost 
reflexively from city officials, was starting to wane. Mayor Maier wrote to the MFPC that Breier 
might no longer be up to the task of developing a modern police force.260 The chief’s replacement 
would, the mayor said, have to deal effectively with affirmative action mandates, work with 
neighborhood association block clubs on community-oriented policing, and be skilled at navigating 
police labor relations. Momentum was shifting among the people too. A public opinion survey 
found that fifty-four percent of residents were now dissatisfied with Chief Breier’s performance.261  
  Participating members of the renamed Coalition to Oust Breier (COB) comprised the 
backbone of the CJEL in 1981.262 The group was “more than just ‘militants and radicals,’” Michael 
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258 McGee called Breier “an unchecked military dictator” empowered to “declare war on the community.” “Anti-Breier 
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260 In Spring 1980, the mayor wrote Fire and Police Commissioner Arlene Kennedy about the need to “move quickly” in 
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McGee remarked. It included the UBCC, Milwaukee Women’s Coalition, United Worker’s 
Organization, Committee for a Democratic Police, Gay Peoples Union, Project Respect, and 
Progressive Student Forums of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and Marquette University.263 
The COB fought to include a ballot referendum on the chief’s resignation in November.264 Among 
its motivations were Breier’s refusal to allow for community input on policing issues, his tolerance 
for police abuse of African Americans, Latinx residents, and Native Americans, and “his callous 
disregard for the safety of women in the city.”265 Spokesman John Hagedorn called the petition “the 
only option we have” considering the high level of opposition to passing a state law that would 
compel police chiefs to retire at age seventy.266 The COB quickly surpassed 30,000 signatures, with 
organizers collecting names at public events, like the annual Summerfest concerts. Still, they missed 
the 50,000 signature mark. The Common Council voted down the referendum, 11-5.  
  Although Breier remained in power, the COB contributed to “a growing atmosphere” of 
pressure for the state legislature to “change the 1911 law” empowering Milwaukee police chiefs for 
life.267 Senate Bill 56—“relating to the powers of the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission”—
passed the Wisconsin Assembly’s criminal justice committee on February 3, 1984.268 The measure, 
according to the Greater Milwaukee Conference on Religion and Urban Affairs, compelled police 
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administrators to “conform to basic standards of good public administration.”269 Governor Tony 
Earl signed the bill into law in March.270 The measure signaled the end of city officials claiming they 
had no authority to hold police accountable. The statute better explained the intent of the 1977 law 
that revised Ch. 586 by granting the MFPC the “authority to make and revise department rules” and 
review policies that regulated police operations.271 Milwaukee police chiefs reported to the MFPC, 
and the MFPC to the Mayor and Common Council. The police chief was in charge of running their 
department, but with enhanced political oversight. The new law also delineated that the mayor and 
Common Council were in charge of the police budget, which had reached $97 million by 1984. 
  Frustrated by a changing public safety landscape, Harold Breier announced his retirement 
from the MPD on May 1, 1984.272 “The special interest groups and the leftists” won this time, he 
said in a press conference. But he denied that police accountability activists alone had influenced his 
decision: “There wasn’t any one thing that made me retire…This is the time when the department is 
at the top…There’s going to be changes—changes which I will have no part of…In my opinion, 
[politicizing the police department] is a terrible mistake. We’re going back to the days of 1911.”273 
Breier’s retirement spelled the end of unrestrained reactionary law-and-order as a strategic approach. 
Subsequent MPD chiefs came to embrace “community-oriented policing” as a crime prevention 
strategy and utilized more proactive enforcement tactics. But they also continued to apply aggressive 
discretionary practices in low-income Black and Brown “high crime” areas. It took time to supplant 
the generation of officers trained under Breier’s “us-versus-them” mentality. As of 1991, three out 
of four had served under him.274 Harold Breier’s legacy remained powerful. 
 
269 “Legislative Alert!” 
270 Paul Bargren, “Breier Bill: Control or Chaos?” The Milwaukee Journal, March 22, 1984, Part 2, 1. 
271 “Legislative Alert!” 
272 He stayed on the force until June 30, 1984. 
273 Jo Hansen, “Chief to End 44-Year Career,” The Milwaukee Journal, May 1, 1984, Part 1, 1. 





 For decades, police accountability advocates had demanded increased Black representation, 
community input, and civilian oversight within Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy. The revived Daniel 
Bell case, the CJEL’s movement, and a related campaign to oust Chief Breier from office brought 
them closer than ever to those long-standing demands. For the first time in the city’s history, a lethal 
act of police violence committed against a Black citizen led to a guilty inquest jury verdict and the 
firing of the officer responsible. Coupled with the revision of the 1911 statute that authorized public 
safety chiefs with policymaking authority and the settlement of a lawsuit filed by Black officers to 
establish a more equitable hiring, assignment, and promotions process, the mid-1980s marked an 
apparent turning point in Milwaukee’s struggle for police accountability.  
Senate Bill 56 redirected policymaking authority away from the police chief and located it 
with a, theoretically, more accountable, mayor-appointed public safety board. The MFPC was, many 
believed, better equipped to take on the city’s civilian complaint review function. For instance, it 
could now improve police rules for conducting independent internal investigations on public 
complaints against allegedly abusive officers. The law also delivered a blow to the long-standing 
narrative of policing exceptionalism that, for a century, had bolstered the MPD’s outward sense of 
legitimacy. That persuasive story of crime control efficiency, reform innovation, and professionalism 
was rooted in a virtually all-white, politically-independent police force that drew strength from 
exploiting Black peoples’ economic precarity and ongoing criminalization. The revised statute 
suggested a more racial- and gender-inclusive narrative was in the offing.  
  At the same time, policing remained the most viable method for answering urban problems 
rooted in economic racism, Black joblessness and poverty. Shifting police power from one agency to 
another did not address the structural issues that engendered crime on Milwaukee’s north side and, 
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thus, communal demands for preventative law enforcement. The CJEL did not focus on the 
economic underpinnings of racialized police violence. Instead, the group narrowly focused on 
securing justice for Ernest Lacy’s family. That kept the public’s attention on issues of police brutality 
and racism’s harmful impact on Black lives. The coalition’s strategy worked in terms of garnering 
officer discipline, a monetary sum for the family, and a procedural change to how police responded 
to arrestees in need of medical attention.  
  But it avoided a more far-reaching analysis of the economic conditions and racial politics 
that justified “get tough” policing and punishment in America’s Black urban spaces.275 CJEL 
members were sure to find themselves in the streets once again challenging police racism and 
violence as future incidents occurred in Milwaukee’s hyper-segregated streets. Like most police 
accountability coalitions that preceded them, the CJEL did not question the legitimacy of law 
enforcement as a public good. This limited more far-reaching solutions within the collective 
movement. Imagining a world without police was not only unthinkable, it was undesirable; most 
Black citizens longed for equitable police protection for their families, communities, and property.276 
As such, police accountability advocates tended to frame demands for police reform in procedural 
terms that continued to validate the MPD’s crime control and order maintenance functions.277 
 Nevertheless, that Howard Fuller and Michael McGee kept such a large, ideologically diverse 
coalition grounded, so as to achieve a common goal, is commendable. Myrtle Lacy, too, provided 
 
275 On “get tough” politics, see: Julily Kohler-Hausmann, Getting Tough: Welfare and Imprisonment in 1970s America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017). 
276 On Black demands for more and fair policing, see: Michael Javen Fortner, Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug 
Laws and the Politics of Punishment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); James Forman, Locking Up Our Own: 
Crime and Punishment in Black America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017). 
277 Demands included the punishment of abusive officers; the revision of police oversight structures so that all residents 
could access formal complaint reviews; the expansion of minority representation so as to effect more culturally 
responsive policing; and ensuring that citizens of color gained a meaningful voice in law enforcement rule-making. 
Victories were rare, mostly because the city’s white power structure was unwilling to share authority, despite often 
drawing mutual interest from both aggrieved Black citizens and liberal power brokers. Milwaukee’s shifting racial politics 
moved slowly, despite a growing Black and Latinx population. 
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inspirational and consistent leadership as a proud Black woman willing to lay her own vulnerabilities 
on the line after experiencing the heartbreaking loss of a son. This provided a model that Maria 
Hamilton, Sonia Moore, and other Black mothers have followed amid subsequent campaigns for 
justice and procedural reform after losing children to police violence.278 Black women like Lacy, 
indeed, often served as both the organizational backbone, “bridge” and front-facing leadership of 
grassroots campaigns for police accountability, much as they did in ancillary civil rights struggles.279 
 Whether the reforms garnered by the Lacy coalition translated into fairer, more culturally 
responsive and just policing on the north side was mitigated by contextual factors. The movement 
cohered at a historical juncture when the economic bottom was falling out from under Black 
Milwaukee. Rising poverty, drug addiction, youth gang formation, and surging joblessness; a 
shrinking social safety net; and diminishing political support for rehabilitative measures ensured that 
both crime and police brutality would go on unless sweeping structural changes were advanced. 
Combined with the Reagan administration’s budget austerity and retributive federal criminal justice 
policies, a more robust policing presence saturated Black Milwaukee neighborhoods and racially 
transitioning urban communities, leading to fresh conflicts and lethal encounters.
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 From the hiring of the Milwaukee Police Department’s (MPD) first Black patrolman in 1924 
through the passage of a state law that reset the administrative terms of police power in 1984, 
Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability stayed broadly reformist in nature. Altering 
the dominant law enforcement system so that it better served and worked more effectively for 
minoritized citizens was its main objective.1 As such, the goal was not to fundamentally transform 
how the city imagined and advanced public safety and the distribution of resources, free of all racial, 
class, gender, and sex coercion, surveillance, and violence. Instead, the movement’s reformist agenda 
upheld the common assumption that “policing,” as a concept, keeps people safe. Accountability, 
access, and transparency were necessary, but law enforcement also had important crime control and 
order maintenance functions to sustain. Otherwise, society would devolve into chaos and harms 
against law-abiding citizens would proliferate.  
A diverse, mostly middle-class-led police accountability movement coalesced in mid- to late-
20th century Milwaukee. Mobilizations and organizing often followed racialized police killings and 
moments where the MPD had failed to abide by either racial liberal or progressive-left expectations. 
The movement placed its faith in changing a state criminal-legal apparatus and municipal police 
bureaucracy that had always defended white supremacy, property rights, hetero-patriarchy, and the 
traditional civic order at the expense of a growing poor, low-income and working-class minoritized 
population. Most community organizations and political allies collaborating in the city’s struggle for 
police accountability pursued an updated “liberal law-and-order” vision that embraced diversity, 
human relations training, community-oriented policing, and civilian review of police actions.2 While 
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liberal law-and-order incorporated democratic principles, it also grew police power. The approach, 
as historian Max Felker-Kantor has argued, “combined a commitment to police accountability while 
enabling the expansion of [law enforcement’s] crime-fighting role.”3 Liberal law-and-order operated 
according to the postwar “harm principle” that the aggressive policing of crime that threatened lives 
and property was justified. After the 1960s, the theory integrated the more conservative idea that 
offenders, chiefly the Black urban poor, deserved harsh punishments.4 Rehabilitation, anti-poverty 
resources, and second chances only indulged, what came to be known as, “rational” crime actors.5 
That said, some within Milwaukee’s Black-led struggle for police accountability, including the 
city’s first iteration of its short-lived Black Panther Party chapter, recognized the uneven power 
dynamics at play. They made connections between law enforcement and the exploitative racial 
capitalist arrangements that preserved Milwaukee’s color line. While unchecked police repression 
and a complicit criminal-legal system curtailed Black Power’s ideological potency within the city’s 
police accountability movement, articulations of community control of the police and self-
determined visions of public safety at the neighborhood level signified a progressive undercurrent 
that still flows beneath the city’s conventional political waters. Present demands to defund the MPD 
and invest taxpayer resources into BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, People of Color) community health 
and housing initiatives are a legacy of this grassroots, progressive-left thread. Such radical visions 
persist despite PIC (Prison Industrial Complex) abolitionism’s subordinated place within an overall 
accountability struggle more content to co-opt Black radical perspectives than center them outright.6  
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This epilogue interrogates why reformism has predominated in Milwaukee, and by extension 
the U.S. To do so, it touches on intersections of police accountability activism, social scientific crime 
control discourses, and the carceral political turn that exemplified policymaking around public safety 
issues in the “long 1970s.”7 This historical moment matters, in part because BIPOC leaders in 
2020—amid endemic police violence and a volatile COVID-19 pandemic—are reckoning with the 
racist criminal punishment system that came to fruition in this under-studied period. After decades 
of attempting to reform Milwaukee’s police bureaucracy, a transformed movement is demanding 
and experimenting with abolitionist solutions. Defunding the police and removing law enforcement 
from public spaces intended to generate learning, promote health, and build community are steps 
that build towards what Angela Davis has called “abolition democracy.”8 These actions defy the 
limited reformist solutions of the past in Milwaukee, like the 1984 “Breier Bill,” or Senate Bill 56 
(SB56). While that measure shifted police policymaking authority to a more representative, mayor-
appointed civilian review commission, it also maintained the police department’s state-sanctioned 
legitimacy, refashioned the MPD’s impunity, and ensured an expanded police budget that drew 
funding away from urgently needed social and economic programs that would have better fostered 
health, wellness, and employment for African Americans and other minoritized groups.9 
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Squaring Police Accountability and Crime Control in the Long 1970s 
Archival evidence suggests that police accountability advocates in Milwaukee during the long 
1970s tended to conceive of public safety through a moderate political lens that framed law 
enforcement as institutionally vital to addressing urban ills—from crime, to poverty, to joblessness, 
to mental health crises. The most pressing problems for police reform advocates were the MPD’s 
outmoded leadership and racially oppressive function. They were frustrated by Chief Breier’s 
rejection of community-oriented policing concepts, which he viewed as a threat to his autonomy. To 
most reformers, the MPD required liberalization, oversight, and a renewed commitment to working 
with diverse public and private community partners—organizations, non-profits, and commercial 
enterprises. Implementing such changes would lead to a more useful, less racist law enforcement 
system. Movement actors championed integration and promoted a return to the renowned era of 
policing exceptionalism that prevailed in the 1930s and 1940s, before postwar Black migration, white 
racism, and civil rights insurgency re-shaped the MPD as a reactionary law-and-order regime. 
Perfecting law enforcement liberalism via technocratic adjustments, expanded diversity, and 
enhanced oversight would, in theory, result in fewer opportunities for racialized police violence to 
occur. It would also impose tangible consequences when police abused their authority and help 
guarantee a more orderly and productive city. 
This liberal law-and-order framework called for regulating crime in a more culturally 
responsive, competent, and procedurally just way. According to MPD crime reporting, law 
violations disproportionately transpired on Milwaukee’s predominantly Black north side and in 
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Paul Bargren, “Breier Bill: Control or Chaos?” The Milwaukee Journal, March 22, 1984, Part 2, 1; Gregory Stanford, “Bill 




adjacent, racially-transitioning urban neighborhoods. While Black families historically felt 
disrespected and threatened by the mostly white, hostile police force occupying their communities, 
they also shared concerns about the MPD’s longstanding neglect in dealing with interpersonal crime. 
The latter unduly harmed Black people living in the city’s most under-resourced and criminalized 
areas. Flagging economic conditions and the federal government’s retreat from investing in liberal 
social welfare programs and community action agencies throughout the long 1970s compounded 
crime fears, generating broad public support for more efficient policing when, for instance, drug and 
gang-related crime started to increase in the early 1980s.10 State budgets began to deliberately 
prioritize the policing of criminalized urban spaces and building new prisons to warehouse freshly 
convicted arrestees ahead of social welfare improvements and protections of the social wage.  
In this revanchist context, easing public anxieties around crime grew as a concern for many 
liberal police reform advocates. It became a more persuasive issue for middle-class community 
organizations, some of whose members had joined campaigns for police accountability in the late 
1960s and 1970s. Well-meaning liberal social reformers, in addition to conservative voices, filtered 
rising crime fears through a fraught “colorblind” discourse that located Black behavioral failings and 
cultural pathologies as principal causes of disorder. Demands for preventative policing strategies that 
targeted the comportment of poor and low-income residents, especially youth of color, and focused 
on mitigating racialized police violence merged as two sides of the same reform coin. 
Reform legislation in this period took into account interrelated worries about policing and 
crime. Transferring police power in Milwaukee via the 1984 Breier Bill was as much about ensuring 
that the MPD effectively and responsibly addressed illicit behavior as it was about eradicating the 
rampant, racialized police violence at the heart of the city’s police accountability movement. After 
 





nearly two decades of pressuring city officials and filing federal civil rights claims and lawsuits to 
limited avail, police accountability advocates anticipated that garnering a fairer, more reliable public 
safety system was only possible through a state-level reform measure that relocated police policy-
making authority from the MPD to the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission (MFPC). Reform 
groups lobbied the Wisconsin legislature to make this happen.11 Removing power from an autocratic 
police chief in Harold Breier, many believed, would increase the likelihood of enacting the 
procedural changes needed to prevent another tragic “Lacy-type incident.”12 
After the Wisconsin legislature passed SB56, the MFPC had the power to determine who 
was best suited to police and where; how MPD personnel should approach their jobs; and the type 
of disciplinary actions officers should face if found to have engaged in misconduct. At best, 
empowering the commission, accountability advocates hoped, would translate into more anti-
discriminatory policing; enhance institutional oversight and transparency; and facilitate greater access 
and opportunities for Black, Latinx, and women police personnel. On this liberal law-and-order 
basis, communities would also be valued as contributing partners in Milwaukee’s evolving crime 
control and order maintenance program. As Governor Tony Earl commented at the Breier Bill’s 
signing ceremony, this law “simply restores the kind of accountability that any public official ought 
to feel.”13 A Black Milwaukee senator, Gary George, likewise reassured his mostly African American 
constituents that the reform statute guaranteed “citizen input into policy decisions.”14 
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12 James Cameron, “An Open Letter to the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Regarding the Ernest Lacy 
Complaint,” 12. 
13 “Earl Signs Bill to Increase City’s Power over Breier,” The Milwaukee Journal, March 22, 1984, Part 2, 6. 




Liberal police accountability advocates saw value in statutory police reform for good reason: 
no institutional or political mechanisms existed at the municipal level to meaningfully check the 
discriminatory actions of the MPD’s “chief for life” or the discretionary decisions of officers.15 The 
MFPC, established in 1885 as a civil service hiring board with quasi-judicial authority to discipline 
public safety personnel, historically co-signed the police chief’s prerogatives and helped cool dissent 
through a slow-moving bureaucracy. The commission served as a plumb patronage position that 
conferred civic prestige. When it ruled on complaints filed against the MPD, the MFPC normally 
aligned with other units of Milwaukee’s criminal-legal system, questioning the validity of Black 
complaints in particular. The commission had no influence on crafting police rules and regulations 
until 1978.16 As such, the potential for even tactical or procedural modifications was contingent on 
the whims of a racist and reactionary police chief in Harold Breier. This dynamic began to shift after 
Milwaukee’s 1967 “civil disturbance.” As the Wisconsin Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil 
Rights Commission reported in 1972, Chief Breier’s reactionary law-and-order approach eroded the 
MPD’s national “image as a pioneer in progressive police measures.”17 Mayor Henry Maier began 
appointing more diverse, reform-minded candidates to help improve the police image, meet federal 
diversity requirements, and satisfy potential Black voters. The MFPC was still loyal to City Hall’s 
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interests, but more willing to embrace contemporary police reforms that flouted the police chief’s 
approach. Over time, this included measures like SB56. 
And yet, as historian Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor has argued, “statutory changes alone are 
rarely, if ever, enough to undo deeply ingrained cultural, social, economic, and political assumptions 
that shape our society.”18 Writing in reference to federal housing policies, her assertion is no less 
salient when it comes to reforming law enforcement. In fact, part of the problem for police 
accountability advocates in Milwaukee was that the 1911 statute they looked to revise helped mold 
and strengthen conventional interpretations of policing and race in the city. Deep-seated, mutually 
reinforcing concepts of “police legitimacy” and “Black criminality” demarcated public contests 
around police violence, crime control, order maintenance, and institutional reform.19 Naturally, 
accountability advocates found it challenging to disentangle these co-existent ideas. The 1911 law 
outlined the MPD’s legitimacy as it pertained to an overwhelmingly white ethnic populace. Under 
the banner of reform, white social and corporate elites reconstructed municipal police power on 
racial and class terms. In the process, they cloaked the MPD in an outwardly depoliticized and value-
neutral cover. This fed the dominant narrative of policing exceptionalism that developed in the mid-
20th century. It fortified common understandings of police legitimacy and Black criminality. Vaunted 
ideas around the police department’s independence, its openness to innovation, and the efficiency 
with which it nobly controlled crime and prevented disorder—i.e. labor and racial unrest—
supported political decisions in City Hall, influenced outside perceptions of Milwaukee as 
“America’s safest city,” and inflected street-level interactions between police and residents. 
Of course, such police-citizen exchanges tracked differently across lines of race and class, as 
this dissertation has illustrated. Poor and laboring African Americans came to experience a different, 
 
18 Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Race for Profit: How Banks and the Real Estate Industry Undermined Black Homeownership (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2019), 254. 




more heavy-handed and negligent brand of policing than their white counterparts. Extensive post-
World War II Black migration, coupled with forceful white resistance to Black mobility and 
citizenship claims, exacerbated Milwaukee’s disparate law enforcement system, as it did in other 
sectors. Containing Black residents translated into disproportionate surveillance, stops, arrests, and 
killings. The policing of race and class on the city’s near north side, in particular, reciprocally 
informed the MPD’s narrative of policing exceptionalism, which highlighted the department’s ability 
to effect swift citations, arrests, and prosecutions on comparatively minor nuisance offenses, 
including vagrancy, disorderly conduct, and drunkenness.  
Differential police “boundary” and “violence” work in poor and low-income spaces of color 
gave the exceptionalism narrative cogency, while also hardening perceptions of racialized 
criminality.20 Administrative and enforcement innovations embraced by the MPD in the 1930s, 
1940s, and 1950s interpolated racist ideas about poor and working-class Black and Latinx migrants. 
The department’s Youth Aid Bureau, for example, monitored Black youth behavior, as white society 
broadly perceived them as more prone to “delinquent” behavior. Meanwhile, the department’s Vice 
and “Red” squads scrutinized interracial socializing and closely watched activities among left-leaning 
political organizations. Such approaches remained broadly supported and progressed into the Civil 
Rights era 1960s and 1970s. Even in 1984, most residents “admired” the MPD; a slight majority 
supported Chief Breier, despite rising opposition to his unlimited authority and prolonged tenure.21 
 
20 Stuart Schrader, “To Protect and Serve Themselves: Police in US Politics since the 1960s,” Public Culture 31(3) 
(September 2019), 604; Micol Seigel, Violence Work: State Power and the Limits of  Police (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2018). 
21 The authority gained by non-police civilians irked Breier, who saw SB56 as dangerous and irrational political meddling. 
He was right, to a degree, when he argued that many people still supported the MPD. When the law was enacted in 
1984, most residents “admired” the department. A Milwaukee Journal survey found that a wide majority of participants—
77 percent—believed that the MPD was doing an “excellent” or “good” job.” Fifty-six percent even viewed the chief 
positively. Respondents were about evenly split as to whether elected officials should have more control over the MPD, 
with 45 percent in favor and 44 opposed. Surveyed residents favored the MPD’s crime control program (67 percent) but 
were less impressed by its “police-community relations” efforts (43 percent) and “work with minorities” (38 percent). 
However, the survey also reflected nagging racial divides. Black respondents were far more critical of the police. A slight 
majority “backed the department,” “but not Breier,” with 75 percent rating the chief as “fair or poor.” Similarly, 83 




Elected officials still feared the political repercussions of crossing the police chief in the early-1980s. 
This helps explain why SB56 received fairly mixed support from the mayor and Common Council. 
That said, negative opinions of the police chief and reactionary law-and-order tactics grew in 
Milwaukee’s burgeoning neighborhood stabilization movement as the long 1970s progressed. 
Controlling crime under a “community-oriented policing” framework had emerged as a focus of 
community associations nationwide.22 In Milwaukee, these grassroots organizations formed in Black, 
white, Latinx, and racially transitioning sections of  the city. Their development was, in most cases, a 
response to 1960s social and political upheavals, as well as the democratization of  the local housing 
market. Despite being largely comprised by white middle-class homeowners, some community 
groups deliberately supported racial integration.23 However, they also called for more beat patrol 
officers and advocated for community relations units that would partner with residents to resolve 
property and nuisance offenses, like burglaries, auto thefts, sex work, and noise violations.  
By the time the SB56 passed in 1984, neighborhood organizations had assumed greater 
responsibility in keeping their communities safe and their property values secure. In part, that meant 
attracting grant funding for home improvement projects that helped people maintain their 
properties, investing in community-based infrastructure programs, and shoring up private enterprise 
at the local level. But it also meant increasing neighborhood surveillance. Groups like the Sherman 
Park Community Association (SPCA) formed block clubs that connected residents and addressed 
social fragmentation. These block clubs established “neighborhood watches,” which monitored illicit 
behavior at street-level and proactively alerted the police when perceived crimes occurred.24 On 
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Sherman Park’s east side, which was adjacent to the city’s north side, that often meant surveilling the 
activities of poor and low-income Black youth, the poor, and low-income renters.25 The SPCA’s 
residential surveillance program counted seventy-five block clubs as of 1982.26 
Yet, the SPCA and other neighborhood watch groups struggled to generate support from 
the MPD. Supervising officers, following the chief’s lead, continued to resist community-oriented 
policing interventions that called for sharing authority with residents. Police resistance made it 
harder for community associations to preserve order and control crime on their terms. Concurrently, 
index crimes rose, prompting Milwaukee’s neighborhood movement to actively demand reform.27 In 
1983, neighborhood organizations joined under the banner of the Citywide Anti-Crime Coalition 
(CAC). The CAC championed preventative crime fighting initiatives and lobbied for community-
oriented policing in local and state legislatures. The coalition advocated for citizen input on public 
safety matters, a more diverse MPD, and the deployment of proactive crime control strategies.28 
Regarding police oversight, the CAC demanded a more vigorous MFPC complaint review function. 
The CAC also pushed the city to implement a “comprehensive neighborhood foot patrol program” 
in two “high-crime areas,” including Sherman Park, in addition to creating two “crime prevention 
projects” monitored by the coalition’s Neighborhood Advisory Councils.29 
CAC member Joan McManus, a leader in Milwaukee social justice movements, advocated for 
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both responsive crime control and enhanced police accountability structures. She did so through the 
Greater Milwaukee Conference on Religion and Urban Affairs’ (GMCRUA) Criminal Justice Task 
Force (CJTF). Along with the CAC, the task force made its presence felt at MFPC meetings, asking 
tough questions, scrutinizing the police budget, and raising concerns about the Special Assignment 
Squad’s spying on activists.30 The CJTF also provided input on the hiring of  Milwaukee’s next police 
chief.31 Liberal community associations, the League of  Martin, and even some MFPC members 
backed the task force’s efforts to keep police accountability issues at the forefront of  civic discourse. 
Ongoing incidents of  racialized police violence galvanized the CJTF’s advocacy. The 1983 police 
killing of  Percy Joiner, for example, embodied the life or death stakes of  police responding to 
mental health incidents that required sensitive de-escalation.32 
  The Criminal Justice Task Force extended Milwaukee’s police accountability movement into 
the post-Breier era when it co-organized a national conference with the Chicago-based organization 
Citizens Alert.33 Held in Milwaukee in November 1984, the event convened police brutality victims 
and families, social activists, interfaith leaders, and criminal justice professionals.34 Sessions covered 
victim family networking, filing civil rights litigation, strategizing policy, and enacting legislation.35 
Conference attendees completed joint projects, established regional networks, and formed a 
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National Police Accountability Network (NPAN).36 Overall, the conference aimed to “organize and 
mobilize community support for families of  victims and for changes in police policy and practice,” 
to establish national accountability standards, and to “decrease police abuse of  force.”37 
  Milwaukee and Chicago agreed to host demonstration projects that would provide research, 
advocacy, and education outreach. However, securing funding proved challenging in a recessed 
economy.38 McManus worked to develop a “Center for Police Accountability” in Milwaukee—a 
“separate and independent agency” from the GMCRUA that was modeled on Citizens Alert.39 She 
stressed four objectives: Acting as a “watchdog” over police operations and the conduct of  officers; 
providing “public policy analysis on law enforcement related issues”; serving as a “resource center” 
to “neighborhood groups, the Citywide Anti-Crime Coalition, and others”; and establishing a 
regional police accountability network.40 Unfortunately, McManus was only able to secure limited 
funding and her vision for a Milwaukee Center for Police Accountability died before it started.41 
 National Police Accountability Conference participants sought to combat the rising power 
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of  police “unions, lawyers, professional associations and lobbyists,” who defended the rights of  
officers alleged to have engaged in violence and misconduct.42 This was another outcome of  the 
SB56: it charted a path for the Milwaukee Police Association (MPA) to become an even greater 
institutional hurdle for future police accountability advocates to clear.43 During the long 1970s, the 
MPA framed its movement for bargaining rights and political recognition as akin to civil rights-
based struggles. The association expanded its political power, supporting law-and-order candidates 
and lobbying state, county, and city officials on pro-police policies. After eight years of negotiation, 
the legislature passed an officer’s “Bill of  Rights” law in 1980. This measure softened internal police 
policies and better-protected MPD personnel accused of  misconduct by the public. It defined law 
enforcers as a protected class of  citizens.44 The law also granted rank-and-file officers the same 
privileges amid in-house investigations as criminal defendants received in the criminal-legal system.45  
The police “Bill of  Rights” law became a steady barrier to police brutality victims seeking 
compensatory relief  and criminal prosecutions, as it empowered individual officers with legal 
protections. These protections transcended the 1911 statute. For decades, police chiefs had 
safeguarded MPD officers accused of abusing their authority, even to the point of covering up 
murder.46 However, rank-and-file personnel resented the imposition of strict internal rules set by the 
police chief. The Breier Bill’s passage in 1984 changed this dynamic. In turn, the MPA became the 
principal defender of police officers accused of misconduct or civil rights violations. It also 
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obstructed policy changes that allegedly coddled “criminals” at the expense of “law abiding” citizens. 
  Overall, the Breier Bill never translated into the level of accountability Black and allied civil 
rights activists envisioned in the 1960s and 1970s. The statute offered little relief to those over-
exposed to police violence, crime, and poverty. Rather than install mechanisms for input, oversight, 
and representation, SB56 entrusted a part-time, then mostly white MFPC with improving the police 
function in a soon-to-be “majority minority” city.47 While the statute revised the terms of police 
power in ways that better aligned the MPD with federal civil rights provisions, the commission’s 
authority still derived power from the state legislature and City Hall. Control was not in the hands of 
historically “overpoliced and underprotected” people.48  
  In truth, SB56 could never have adequately resolved the totality of a policing crisis that was 
as much economic as it was political. Public and private resources had simply eroded too greatly on 
Milwaukee’s north side, reinforcing poverty and criminalizing perceptions. The law, more than 
anything, repurposed municipal liability for delineating police actions. The legislature did so without 
acknowledging the MPD’s racialized class imperative: to defend the property and commercial 
interests of, first and foremost, white and, since the 1960s, minoritized civic elites. A more liberal 
MFPC gained control over the policymaking and complaint review process. Still, accountability 
barriers remained. Citizens filed fewer complaints than reformers likely anticipated, with only 203 
registered from 1985 to 1990.49 The reasons why were at once structural and cultural. The 
commission took up only grievances that its “Committee on Rules and Complaints” identified as 
necessitating review and conducted hearings only on claims that explicitly violated police policy.50 
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  Fears of  police retaliation dissuaded many African Americans from filing complaints, as they 
did prior to SB56. Ten years after the bill passed, MFPC investigator Joan Dimow observed that 
Black people were still “very uncomfortable about coming to police headquarters.” Those who did 
had to meet “the same burden of proof as in a criminal trial: beyond a reasonable doubt.” As former 
UBCC member Jeanetta Robinson told the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, “people…are literally 
afraid to go down to the fire and police commission and fill out these complaints…they have 
experienced such discrimination that even though it is a new day” with the MFPC, they “do not have 
faith based on past atrocities.”51 Aggrieved parties were not awarded monetary judgments. At most, 
they received “the satisfaction of seeing the officer punished.” Time and again, however, the 
commission failed to apply discipline. The MFPC gained the “authority to impose sanctions and 
change policies in 1984,” just a year after it had fired, for the first time, an officer who killed a Black 
citizen.52 But it refrained from enacting sweeping changes. MFPC trials rarely resulting in dismissals 
or strict rebukes; some officers persisted in abusing their power, insulated by the MPA. 
 
The Punitive Turn and its Local Impact 
While SB56 portended a more democratic police rule-making process and oversight 
structure, the law was not passed in a vacuum. Its enactment reflected national social, economic, and 
political transformations taking place over the course of the long 1970s. Milwaukee’s police 
accountability movement had, alongside related battles over employment, housing, and education, 
confronted and disrupted white supremacy. The national response to BIPOC claims for rights, 
equality, and self-determination in the 1960s and 1970s manifested in what historian Julily Kohler-
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Hausmann has called “tough politics.”53 America’s punitive turn “degraded the citizenship” of the 
very people “making forceful demands on the state and challenging their subordination…” The 
nation’s rightward political drift positioned the urban Black poor, in particular, as pathological and 
wallowing in a “culture of poverty.”54 Conservatives and erstwhile liberal policymakers argued that 
Black behavioral dysfunction sourced an intensifying urban “crime problem.” They rejected that 
systemic racism and class exploitation were any longer to blame. The framers of America’s “get 
tough” politics argued that “subordinated groups forfeited their rights and claims on the state by 
breaking the law or drawing state aid.”55 As the long 1970s progressed, policy analysts increasingly 
favored crime control solutions that placed the needs of victims and “the community” ahead of so-
called street criminals, “welfare dependents,” the homeless, “juvenile delinquents,” and the drug 
addicted. 
Although police accountability activists on the left in Milwaukee, like Joan McManus, saw 
both “the root cause” of  crime and “police abuse of  force” in Black, Brown, and racially-mixed 
spaces as “poverty and racism,” this argument ran counter to the views of national policing experts 
in the 1970s and 1980s.56 Social scientists researching effective means of crime control had moved 
from a liberal emphasis on addressing structural conditions and improving social welfare to a 
conservative emphasis on mediating the “disorderly” behavior of Black welfare state beneficiaries 
and the poor. Neoliberal and neoconservative policy agendas alike demonized poor and low-income 
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residents of color in cities, who conservative pundits and academics referred to as the “under-
class.”57 In the late-20th century, the alleged criminality of dangerous “rational actors” was met by the 
state with huge taxpayer investments in funding police militarization, upgraded surveillance 
capacities, advanced computerization, and data science to analyze, map, and predict crime trends.58 
The nation’s carceral turn, which scholars tend to originate with Nixon, was bipartisan. The 
Johnson administration’s War on Crime from 1965 to 1968 reflected, on the one hand, the need to 
better coordinate police agencies, ameliorate police-community tensions, and instill more democratic 
and competent police administration. On the other, it expanded police power and resources, so as to 
more effectively combat and then prevent lawlessness in America’s rebelling cities under the guise of 
liberal law-and-order. Ensuing Republican administrations focused deliberately on penal responses 
to the “urban crisis,” which Nixon declared over in 1973.59 Yet they did so without the same 
compulsion to also alleviate poverty conditions. More technologically savvy and militarized policing 
blended with racist media imagery and stereotypes about Black urban life to heighten public fears 
about inner city crime. This cycle fed an ever more racialized and punitive backlash politics that 
proved popular with white suburban and exurban constituencies and other conservative voters. 
Even before Milwaukee-native George Kelling and collaborator James Q. Wilson published 
their influential “Broken Windows” treatise in 1982, police agencies were investing millions of 
dollars in controlling low-level misdemeanor offenses in urban neighborhoods. They did so under 
the controversial premise that public fears of “disorder” bred serious crime.60 Broken Windows 
helped buttress popular conceptions of the nation’s crime problem as urban and racial. It further 
justified the financing of law enforcement agencies as catch-all emergency responders, and it helped 
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rationalize the growing network of jails, prisons, and detention centers needed to warehouse criminal 
offenders. Expanded preventative policing capabilities and surveillance encouraged more police-
Black citizen contacts, which meant more hostile interactions, some of them deadly. All of this 
shaped perceptions about how to maintain order and determine who required punitive control.61 
  Broken Windows policing was theorized against the backdrop of the Reagan administration 
ushering in an even more draconian “War on Drugs” in the early 1980s. As historians have noted, 
President Reagan’s drug war enlarged “the scale of the raids, stings, and tactical police units” 
introduced by earlier administrations.62 Congress passed harsh legislative measures that expanded 
“domestic surveillance, the criminal code, and mandatory minimum sentences”—policies that failed 
to pass under liberal congresses in the 1970s. The bipartisan Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984 established more direct relations between law enforcement and military agencies, upgrading 
police weapons capacities.63 The law also created more severe mandatory minimum sentences and 
imposed three strike provisions on violent crimes. A Justice Department clearinghouse administered 
block grants for new state prison construction to facilitate the human caging of convicted drug 
offenders. The law introduced civil asset forfeiture penalties on drug crimes, which proved lucrative 
for local police departments, as well as corrupt officers and civilian whistle blowers on watch.64 
  The national expansion of  police power over the course of  the long 1970s facilitated more 
racially disparate enforcement and higher reported crime rates and arrests in Milwaukee. Racialized 
crime fears fed an evolving set of proactive order maintenance policing initiatives led by citizens. 
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Community associations and non-profits concerned about both rising crime and the ongoing threat 
of police violence, assumed a powerful voice in the city’s public safety discourse. They embraced 
ideas developed by criminologists in public and privately-funded government think tanks, like the 
National Police Foundation. Community-oriented policing concepts shaped their advocacy. 
Proponents eschewed the hierarchical, isolated, reaction-oriented crime control tactics of the 
“reform era.”65 Proactive policing valued liberal law-and-order concepts, like community relations, 
racial diversity, and, to an extent, civilian oversight.66 Proactive, community-oriented policing 
devotees adopted law enforcement strategies written in collaboration with social scientists at the 
neighborhood level. In some cases, academics carried out grant-funded patrol experiments that 
aimed to enhance police service and crime prevention techniques and clarify patrol and surveillance 
capacities. “Respectable” community representatives, whose investment in the status quo ensured a 
positive working relationship with law enforcement, played a central role in advancing crime control 
prerogatives. Crime reduction through community-oriented policing took precedence over ensuring 
accountability to over-exposed poor and low-income BIPOC citizens.  
  That said, community-oriented policing’s democratic intent has remained dubious at best. 
Police often “stoke older residents’ fears about gangs, violence, and crime.”67 This aggravates 
generation gaps within communities and pushes the comparatively affluent to align with law 
enforcement at the expense of  the poor and vulnerable. Citizen-police listening sessions often 
feature homeowners, business people, clergy, and retirees who are eager to maintain a conventional 
order that benefits their social and economic interests. Excluded are the young, unhoused, poor, 
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drug dependent, and formerly incarcerated, whose legitimate stake in the social relations of  their 
community go ignored. Police mobilize the affluent to surveil their blocks and report on 
presumptive safety violations. This community-based reportage sharpens racial and class divisions. 
Rather than strengthening urban neighborhoods, community-oriented policing fractures already 
tenuous social ties. Long-standing community residents, some pushed out by gentrifiers in search of  
more affordable urban living, are ensnared in a surveillance system that too often identifies them as 
inherent criminals rather than comrades. Meanwhile, wealthier newcomers are perceived as lawful. 
Community policing, moreover, negates critical scrutiny of  law enforcement’s racist, violent past. It 
bolsters popular support for the police among “docile and dependent” middle-class residents.68 The 
strategy has largely provided police with enhanced resources, without imparting equitable security. 
 
The Saga Continues 
  Administrative control over police policymaking, indeed, shifted in 1984, but to what end? 
Black human and civil rights remain far from settled in Milwaukee, especially as they relate to a state 
criminal (in)justice system that incarcerates more Black men per capita than anywhere else in the 
U.S.69 Federal consent decrees monitoring interdepartmental racism on the police force, diversity 
hiring, and procedural changes to police-citizen interactions have done little to alter the essential 
“ungovernability” of the MPD.70 Placing Black faces in high places, moreover, has not ended police 
violence and racist enforcement practices in the city’s still segregated, low-income and criminalized 
BIPOC neighborhoods. For example, Arthur Jones, Milwaukee’s first Black police chief and a co-
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founder of the League of Martin, was also the first MPD administrator to fully implement Kelling 
and Wilson’s Broken Windows theory in the late 1990s. Officers disproportionately cited poor 
residents of color on petty offenses—panhandling, jaywalking, vandalism, speeding, excessive noise, 
etc.—throughout his tenure (1996-2003). Broken Windows style policing continues to aggravate the 
region’s inflated incarceration totals, while extracting money and resources via fines and seizures.71 
   Municipal police accountability structures remain anemic. In the 2000s, a good many 
Milwaukeeans continued to view the MFPC as “weak and ineffective.” Police officers, too, have 
positioned the commission as “harsh and unfair.” A 2006 study found that the MFPC was not 
actively investigating complaints from either citizens or police. When the commission did, few 
grievances went to trial or resulted in “sustained findings of officer misconduct.”72 From 2000 to 
2005, only eight of 437 total MFPC complaints saw adjudication. Two cases involving police were 
“sustained,” meaning the commission upheld the MPD’s disciplinary ruling. Conversely, the MFPC 
conducted 44 trials on complaints from 1992 to 1999.73 Aggrieved citizens and police personnel 
both expressed frustration about “long delays in the complaint process.” Different factors explain 
the low rate of sustained cases, “insufficiency of the allegations and difficulties in proving the alleged 
violations” chief among them.74 The MFPC has monitored complaints, but too often stops short of 
instilling lasting justice. This allows for further abuses of power. “Conciliation,” researchers found, 
worked in ten percent (45 cases) of  the 437 cases filed from 2000 to 2005. That meant the dismissal 
of  charges against some police officers.75 No investigations were conducted unless complaints went 
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to trial, an outcome the board avoided.76 When it comes to holding the police accountable for 
institutional and interpersonal racism, the stakes remain high in Milwaukee.  
  State politics has played an important role for residents locally. Since the 1980s, Wisconsin 
has served as a laboratory for revanchist, market-oriented policy experiments in public education, 
social welfare reform, and the expansion of penal authority, with initiatives tested in Milwaukee.77 
The city’s conflicting reputation as both the “worst city for black Americans” and an under the radar 
“tech hub” for mostly white professionals and culture entrepreneurs is attributable to neoliberal 
policy decisions that have engendered racially uneven rates of economic development, public-private 
investments, and asset accumulation.78 The city’s hyper-segregated landscape and class-based 
inequities continue to hit Black and Latinx residents the hardest. Meanwhile, its liberal political 
leadership, backed by many corporate and middle-class elites, has called on the MPD to perform the 
often-harsh boundary and violence work ostensibly required to manage the deleterious mental health 
impacts of deep-seated income inequality and budget austerity. 
  Today, Milwaukee’s police budget comprises more than forty percent of the city’s general 
revenue fund. Police accountability advocates see this allocation of public tax dollars as especially 
detrimental to the health and well-being of poor and low-income BIPOC citizens. This recognition 
on the part of advocates matters, as it marks a departure from the repeated faith Black and allied 
community organizations and activists have placed in police bureaucrats to resolve issues of crime 
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and safety. Groups like Wisconsin Voices’ African American Roundtable, Black Leaders Organizing 
Communities, and Leaders Igniting Transformation have pursued abolitionist objectives to help 
transform society. Organized under the banner of “Liberate MKE,” they are now calling to defund 
the MPD by $75 million and to re-direct taxpayer dollars towards housing, education, and public 
health interventions. Their call is urgent, as the city’s police budget has grown by nearly that same 
amount ($70,000,000) in the five years leading up to 2019.79 Liberate MKE reflects an updated 
demand for community control of law enforcement—one that recognizes policing, punishment, and 
surveillance as inherently racist functions that have historically prompted unequal outcomes and 
aggravated metropolitan inequality structures. The campaign, led by Black women and youth leaders, 
has altered the public safety discourse.80 It has also changed the underlying approach of activists, 
who see reforms that shore up police power as defective in building security and resolving problems 
rooted in racial capitalism. Addressing Milwaukee’s racist policing system through electoral politics, 
statutory change, federal lawsuits, and revised inter-departmental policies has remained a dominant 
approach. But the 2019-2020 Liberate MKE campaign signals an important turn to keep an eye on.  
Racialized police violence, as this project suggests, has never ended in Milwaukee. Recent 
campaigns to curb police brutality have centered on building new systems of community control, 
while also enacting procedural reforms. Accountability groups have focused, as they did in previous 
decades, on making the MPD a more culturally responsive and democratic policing agency that 
applies the law fairly. However, they have also reimagined communal self-determination and the 
capacity of Black north side residents themselves—people with credibility in the community—to 
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intervene in crisis situations before involving the police.81 A series of MPD killings of young Black 
men in Milwaukee during the 2010s renewed demands for racial justice in City Hall and the courts. 
The names of the deceased ring loudly in the city—Derek Williams, Dontre Hamilton, and Sylville 
Smith.82 Each case saw Milwaukee County District Attorney John Chisholm, a noted liberal who is 
widely recognized as a progressive DA, refrain from criminally charging the officers for their deadly 
actions, justifying the use of lethal police force. In the wake of the killings, activists, youth, and 
family-led coalitions dragged the city’s long, Black-led struggle for police accountability into the new 
millennium. Their movement mobilized against the backdrop of larger democratic struggles, such as 
Occupy Wall Street (2011-2012) and the initial phase of the Black Lives Matter Movement (2013-
2016). These national protest battles addressed violent outcomes of global-financial manipulation 
and racialized policing, respectively. The killings of  Williams (2011), Hamilton (2014), and Smith 
(2016) by the MPD evoked Black Milwaukeeans’ long history of  confronting police racism and 
violence, but also their class exploitation. Groups like the survivor-led “Coalition for Justice”—a 
nod to the movement organized by the 1981 Coalition for Justice for Ernest Lacy—drew on similar 
tactics of  political negotiation, coalition-based mobilizing, and street-level protests to push for 
procedural changes, like requiring officers to wear body cameras and receive mental health and crisis 
intervention training, as well as federal civil rights interventions.83  
  Milwaukee’s ACLU, meanwhile, has exposed the limits of liberal law-and-order and the 
racism embedded in proactive, Broken Windows style policing. In 2017, the organization filed a 
federal lawsuit that challenged the MPD’s “high-volume, suspicionless” stop and frisk program.84 
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Analyzing data on more than 350,000 pedestrian and traffic stops from 2010 to 2017, the ACLU 
outlined a “vast and unconstitutional” racial profiling agenda. Former Police Chief Edward Flynn—
a noted advocate of data-driven, “problem-oriented” policing—introduced the policy in 2008.85 The 
City of  Milwaukee, MFPC, and Chief  Flynn’s replacement, Alfonso Morales, settled the case in 2018 
on behalf  of  a class of  Black and Latinx residents.86 The courts found that the program had violated 
plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, which bans unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the 
“prohibition of  racial and ethnic profiling” under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of  the 
1964 Civil Rights Act.87 Milwaukee police bureaucrats denied that the MPD’s tactics were 
discriminatory or illegal. “Saturation patrols” deployed in “economically depressed,” high-crime 
neighborhoods, police held, reflected a sound “crime deterrence” strategy, regardless of  whether 
stopped individuals committed an offense or appeared reasonably suspicious.88 
  The settlement agreement marked a critical juncture in Milwaukee’s police accountability 
movement. Not only did it obligate the MPD to change its order maintenance tactics, data collection 
methods, supervisory practices, and officer training criteria, but it included long sought after 
disciplinary procedures for violators. Police personnel who breached the consent decree faced 
reprimand by superior officers. The settlement agreement also required stop and frisk data to be 
released to the public on a regular basis and the MFPC to expand and improve civilian and internal 
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complaint procedures. A new city-backed organization, the Milwaukee Community Collaborative 
Committee, served as a means for citizens to provide input on police operations and envision 
alternatives. The Common Council authorized the committee to review a U.S. Justice Department 
Collaborative Reform draft report in 2017 and solicit feedback from the public. 
  Indeed, not all police accountability advocates today agree with abolitionist proposals, like 
defunding the MPD. Reformist voices support investing in “good” policing. As such, they continue 
to influence policy debates. Elected officials are more receptive to liberal coalitions that advocate for 
procedural changes that maintain police power, while seeking to modify or “improve” police 
capabilities. The Community Collaborative Commission, for instance, has called on the city to shore 
up the MPD’s approach to “community policing,” as outlined by the Obama administration’s 
“President’s Taskforce on 21st Century Policing” (2015) report and the “New Era on Public Safety” 
(2019) study. Yet, these liberal proposals replicate many of  the same reform fixes that have failed to 
hold police departments accountable since at least the 1960s. They incorporate policies enumerated 
by accountability groups in Milwaukee during the long 1970s, like garnering community input on 
police operations with the goal of  “improving trust;” conducting annual surveys on “police-
community relations;” evaluating “progressive policing strategies in other cities;” and regularly 
communicating public concerns over “police policies, procedures, and practices” to City Hall.89 
 Events in the summer of  2020 pushed this already polarizing conversation around public 
safety in all directions. Since May 29, 2020, four days after a Black man named George Floyd was 
asphyxiated by a white Minneapolis police officer, thousands have protested in Milwaukee against 
police violence and systemic racism.90 New organizations formed amid the demonstrations, like the 
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People’s Revolution and Milwaukee Alliance against Racist and Political Oppression. Latinx 
coalitions joined in solidarity, demanding justice in the streets, criminal-legal system, and MFPC for 
Joel Acevedo, a Latinx man killed by a white off-duty MPD officer in April. New protest strategies, 
like car caravans, which block entry points and have kept social distancers safe amid the COVID-19 
pandemic, have facilitated larger and longer demonstrations. Clashes between protest leaders on 
freeway bridges and militarized police riot suppression tactics, including the use of chemical irritants, 
further galvanized crowds demanding justice. The MPD’s show of force during peaceful protests 
exacerbated unrest. It also led to legal challenges and served to expedite the MFPC’s subsequent 
demotion of embattled Police Chief Alfonso Morales, who soon retired.91 
Milwaukee’s movement has extended beyond the city’s borders. Community leader Frank 
‘Nitty’ Sensabaugh led a 750-mile march to Washington, D.C. in August. He and a contingent of 
Wisconsin protesters rallied with allied organizations and national voices.92 While they did not intend 
to initially, demonstrators in Milwaukee expect to surpass the 200 straight nights of protests that 
NAACP Youth Council (YC) activists led in support of an open housing ordinance in 1967-1968. 
Like the YC, contemporary activists understand that marching into the city’s majority white suburbs 
carries symbolic power. They have challenged police impunity in the adjacent city of Wauwatosa, 
where a now-suspended Black patrolman shot and killed three Black males in five years.93 Activists 
also marched in Kenosha, Wisconsin in solidarity with demonstrators there after a white police 
officer shot a Black father, Jacob Blake, seven times in the back. As of this writing, Milwaukee’s 
2020 movement against police violence and systemic racism has not ceased. As community leader 
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Khalil Coleman observed, “The whole purpose is civil disobedience. The whole purpose is to be a 
disruption. Because injustice has been a disruption in the lives of many Black and brown people.”94 
  Ultimately, the query posed by James Cameron at the outset of  this project—“How can a 
people be brought to respect a government that constantly oppresses and exploits them?”—lingers 
as an abiding one.95 And not just in Milwaukee. Endemic police violence continues to harm Black 
people nationwide, even as 2020’s COVID-19 emergency offers its own racially disparate and deadly 
outcomes. The police murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and other BIPOC citizens have 
again exposed the racist underpinnings of U.S. law enforcement, as well as the inability of America’s 
criminal-legal system to administer justice. These killings have driven an international reinvigoration 
of the Movement for Black Lives—now the largest social movement in U.S. history.96 Millions are 
demanding discipline for offending officers and calling to defund the police. White people, no 
longer comfortable with standing on the sidelines of political struggle, have joined Black, Latinx, and 
Indigenous folk in pressuring elected officials to move beyond symbolic gestures and expensive 
reforms that only expand police power with little pay-off for poor and working people. Studying 
over a century of policing history in Milwaukee tells us that both liberal and reactionary law-and-
order will not solve far-reaching problems we know to be embedded in capitalism and racism. 
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Select Milwaukee Police Department Killings/In-custody Deaths
Date Name  Age Race Cause of Death 
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1958 Daniel Bell 22 Black Shooting 
1959 Roscoe Simpson 29 Black Shooting 
1967 Clifford McKissick 18 Black Shooting 
1967 Lee Wilson 44 Black Shooting 
1970 Randolph Anderson 26 White Shooting 
1972 Jacqueline Ford 19 Black Shooting 
1973 Andrew Friend 22 Black Shooting 
1974 Johnnie Starks 54 Black Shooting 
1974 Mary Pendleton 42 Black Asphyxiation 
1974 Jerry Brookshire 16 Black Shooting 
1975 Steve Gaston 21 Black Shooting 
1975 Charles Dailey 20 Black Shooting 
1977 Roger Lyons 32 White Head injuries 
1981 Ernest Lacy 22 Black Asphyxiation 
1991 George Brown 15 Black Shooting 
2002 Larry Jenkins 31 Black Shooting 
2002 Samuel Rodriguez 24 Latinx Shooting 
2002 Edward Pundsack 28 White Shooting 
2003 Justin Fields 21 Black Shooting 
2005 Wilbert Prado 25 Latinx Shooting 
2010 Tony Bean 43 Black Lost consciousness 
2011 Derek Williams 22 Black Asphyxiation 
2014 Dontre Hamilton 31 Black Shooting 
2016 Sylville Smith 23 Black Shooting 
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2011 “Community Documentation Initiative,” Smithsonian Institution, Anacostia 
Community Museum, Co-Web Designer,  
https://web.archive.org/web/20150221223711/http://cdi.anacostia.si.edu/  
2010 “American Enterprise,” Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of American 
History, Pre-Exhibition Website, Co-Web Designer, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20121023002210/http://americanenterprise.si.edu/  
 
PUBLIC HISTORY INTERNSHIPS 
 
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC 
Anacostia Community Museum, Web Developer, Paid Internship, May 2011–October 2011 
National Museum of American History, Web Developer, Paid Internship, August 2010–May 2011 
 
Milwaukee County Historical Society, Milwaukee, WI 
Processing Assistant, Brewery Collection, June 2010–August 2010 
 
Arlington House, The Robert E. Lee Memorial, Arlington, VA 
National Park Service, Furnishing Plan Developer, January 2010–May 2010 
 
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal, Great Falls, MD 
National Park Service, Historical Interpreter, September 2009–December 2009 
 
Museum of African American History, Boston, MA 




UW-Milwaukee Libraries Digital Humanities Lab Advisory Board, 2015-2016 
Associate Developer/Consultant, UW-Milwaukee Libraries Digital Humanities Lab, 2013-2015 
Graduate Student Liaison, UW-Milwaukee History Graduate Affairs Committee, 2012-2013 








Proficiencies: HTML, CSS, WordPress, Omeka, CommonSpot CMS 
 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS OR AFFILIATIONS 
 
Organization of American Historians 
Urban History Association 
Association for the Study of African American Life and History 
Labor and Working-Class History Association 
National Council on Public History 
